








POLITICS AND PARADOX IN TACITUS’ ANNALES 1-3: 
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF PEACETIME CONFLICT IN TIBERIAN ROME 
 
 

















A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 






DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP 
  
 
I confirm that this is my own work and that the use of all material from other sources 












Analyses of conflict in Tacitus have often been focussed on the constitution of the 
Principate, specifically the loss of libertas which followed from the system of rule by 
one. This thesis offers a theoretical analysis of conflict in Tacitus, arguing that conflict 
stems from the wider social and systemic structures ordinarily designed to ensure 
peace, such as the law, the imperial hierarchy and the mos maiorum. The notion that 
peacetime policies and procedures became in themselves a source of conflict is here 
described as the paradox of imperial politics.  
Chapters 1 and 2 offer a close reading of the Augustan prologue and the 
accession of Tiberius, while also introducing the work of Giorgio Agamben on the 
sovereign exception and Michel Foucault on biopolitics. The first chapter argues that a 
source of epistemological conflict is cultural memory, specifically the knowledge of the 
violent past of civil war. The second chapter argues that political conflict results from 
Tiberius’ inability to replicate Augustan imperium, which in Tacitus is the power to 
speak in the name of the law and decide truth. In Chapter 3, and with reference to 
Jacques Rancière’s conception of democratic violence, hierarchy is revealed as the 
source of conflict since although it serves to maintain order in the imperial state it 
equally (and paradoxically) fosters the potential for revolution. In Chapter 4, building 
on Hannah Arendt’s notion of mores and lex, it is argued that systemic conflict 
(corruption and moral decline) stems not from the lack of law or the erosion of prisca 
virtus but rather, and again paradoxically, from the system of law itself as well as the 
moderating values encoded in traditional Roman morality.  
By reading Tacitean conflict as something which is extraneous to the more 
obvious sources of political conflict (rising tyranny/maiestas/republican sympathies), 
but as something which is engrained within the ordering structures of society, this 
thesis offers new insight into the frailty of imperial politics as well as a wider 
understanding of Roman political and social conflict in times of peace. The thesis also 
shows that the contradictory nature of Tacitus’ narrative is not merely a reflection of 
the ambiguous nature of men and government; but it may be read from a wider 
theoretical perspective, as an attempt to foreground the generative power of paradox, 
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We are always writing the history of the same war, even 
when we are writing the history of peace and its 
institutions.1 
 
This thesis presents an examination of the political and legal thought of Tacitus. 
Through a commentary on the first three books of the Annales, focussing in particular 
on Tacitus’ writing of conflict, I examine the ways in which Tacitus’ analysis of 
imperial politics under Augustus and Tiberius exposes the multiplicities of power at 
work under the early years of the Roman Principate. In exposing such powers, I argue 
that Tacitus’ narrative is less a liberal critique of the system of rule by one but instead a 
genealogical analysis of problematic social structures, structures which on one hand 
ensure peace, but on the other embed conflict throughout the social body. 
For many years, Tacitus has been read as an analyst of tyranny.2 The Annales in 
particular, given the focus on the beginning of monarchic politics, have provided a 
model for political thought in relation to tyrannical regimes.3  It follows that the nature 
of power (and conflict) has been read alongside the establishment of the Principate, in 
particular the dominatio of the princeps. In this perspective, power takes on a particular 
meaning: power is a possession which belongs solely to the emperor and in exercising 
this power over citizens they are reduced to servitude.4 
                                                           
1 Foucault (2004:16). 
2 See for example, Walker (1952), Griffin (1995), Haynes (2003) and Mellor (2011). 
3 See further Boesche’s chapter on Tacitus and de Tocqueville in his monograph on tyranny (1996: 
85ff/201ff.). On ‘Tacitism’ (in Lipsius and Grotius) see Waszink (2012). On the relationship between 
Tacitism and Machiavelli’s writings see Burke (1991) and Smuts (1994). See also Kapust (2012:504ff.) 
on Tacitus’ political thought and its reception.  
4 See for example Walker’s interpretation of Tacitus’ Augustus (1952). For Walker, ‘Tacitus’ whole 
theory of Tyranny is expressed in Book 1 in reference to Augustus. His autocracy is established because 
there is widespread exhaustion…and he knows how to take advantage of his opportunities. The long and 
impressive sentence which opens [1.2] implies that the concentration of power in Augustus’ hands and 
the reduction of the Senate to servility was the result of his deliberate intention.’ (1952:212). While this 
study does not of course refute the notion of power as a repressive and centralised form of authority 
(rather such a notion will be examined in close detail in Chapters 1 and 2), it seeks to build on the themes 
explored by Tacitean scholars by showing that, for example, liberty, rhetoric, writing, language and 
knowing were not only problematised due to the emperor’s supreme power but also due to deeper social 
forces and power structures. For an exploration of the multiplicities of power in imperial society see 





This thesis pursues a different analysis of power. The dominatio of the emperor 
is undoubtedly pronounced in Tacitus, due partly to a crucial question the narrative 
addresses: what is totalitarian power? However, though the Principate was a system of 
government which we may describe as totalitarian in nature (due to the central role 
played by the all-powerful princeps), this thesis argues that Tacitus locates other 
sources of power and conflict within the imperial system, sources which are extrinsic to 
the emperor and his monarchy. The question my thesis seeks to answer is thus: what is 
the source of conflict in Tiberian Rome if not the emperor himself and his system of 
rule by one?  
By reading the narrative from this perspective, that is, analysing power beyond 
the more local or (quasi-)constitutional powers of the emperor and instead as something 
which spreads through cultural values (for example, the mos maiorum), it emerges that 
power in Tacitus eludes the classical model of sovereignty (a model in which the 
sovereign or king is conceptualised as the sole possessor of power).5 Rather, and 
presaging Foucault, Tacitus shows that relations of power are perpetuated through 
traditional (disciplinary) norms, norms ordinarily designed to organise right and wrong 
and in so doing ensure normality, order and peace. The source of conflict is similarly 
displaced, since, not only does conflict stem from the sovereign’s oppressive gaze but it 
may also be located to a broader set of social systems, in particular those systems 
central to the organisation and order of Roman society (hierarchy and law).  
That sources of conflict are embedded within the wider structure of the imperial 
order and that conflict may exist alongside peace (pax, quies, concordia) as well as 
produced from the more “positive” effects of imperial rule (otium, annonae, dona) is 
what I explore in this thesis as the politics and paradox of Tiberian Rome. 
 
Politics and Paradox 
What led me to question the nature of power in Tacitus is a set of paradoxes which 
Tacitus presents at the beginning of the Annales, paradoxes which assert the existence 
                                                           
5 See Foucault (1980b:109-133) and (2004:242ff.). In Foucault’s view, ‘we need to cut off the King’s 
head’ (1980b:121) in order to liberate theories of power from those based on sovereignty and the law; the 





of power beyond the sovereign authority and in so doing problematise established 
modes of understanding certain Roman concepts, namely libertas (freedom) and 
servitium (servitude) as well as pax (peace) and mores (customs, habits or norms). 
The first paradox is to do with the nature of Tiberius’ sovereignty, in particular 
Tacitus’ depiction of Tiberius’ relation to his own position in the state. Ancient 
literature allows us to see that traits such as arrogance (adrogantia), cruelty 
(crudelitas), impiety (impietas), greed (avaritia) and lust (libido) were typical features 
of corrupt leaders and individuals.6 Many of these characteristics, some more than 
others, aptly describe Tacitus’ Tiberius. Yet, the primary feature of the tyrant (apart 
from being the exact antithesis of the good man or the ideal ruler) is something which 
Tacitus’ Tiberius does not wholly possess: a desire for domination (cupiditas 
dominandi).7 Rather, Tiberius remains ambiguous about ruling (ambiguus imperandi), 
something which eventually culminates in his self-exile to Capri. This immediately 
problematises any reading which places too much emphasis on the dominatio of 
Tiberius as the prominent subject of Tacitus’ critique. Tiberius possessed imperium but 
this must be read alongside the particular way in which he used imperium, which was 
not excessively imperiosus, but ambiguous and obscure. The non-sovereignty of 
Tiberius calls into question the means through which the elite were enslaved, as well as 
raising the question of how far Tacitus’ Tiberius, as commonly read and as Tacitus 
himself occasionally implies, was indeed tyrannical or ‘superbus’.8 
The second paradox, connected with the first, is to do with the nature of 
individual servitude. The relationship between the Principate and freedom is 
traditionally seen as antithetical. Yet, this is not consistent throughout Tacitus’ 
narratives. On the one hand, there remains a historical tension between the Principate 
                                                           
6 In the theories of Plato, for example, the tyrant is unequivocally bad and enslaves everyone around him 
(see for example Rep. 9.576E). In Roman declamation, the tyrant typically seizes power by force, strips 
the res publica of its libertas and enslaves it. He acts in contravention of the law, he is feared by his 
subjects, and is generally presented as cruel, greedy, and impious (see further Lobur (2008:164-8)). As 
Martin and Woodman put it, the tyrant is ‘the exact antithesis of the good man or the ideal ruler’ 
(1989:29-30). (Cf. OLD s.v. tyrannus: ‘Any ruler, etc., who exercises authority in a cruel or oppressive 
way’).  
7 Cic.Rep.1.50. 
8 For Tiberius’ superbia, see for example Ann.1.4.3 and 1.72.4. The term tyrannus appears only once in 
the Tacitean corpus (GG s.v. p.1689). Notably this is in a rather abstract context, and more a 





and libertas (res olim dissociabiles; Ag.3.1), a tension which has been analysed as a 
key theme throughout Tacitus’ narratives.9 On the other, and since it was possible 
(supposedly) for libertas to exist under certain principes, ‘where one could feel what 
they want and say what they feel’ (Hist.1.4), Tacitus implies that the Principate as a 
political system of government was not in itself that which interfered with individuals’ 
freedom.  
 In the Annales, Tacitus further problematises the relationship between 
Principate and freedom through peculiar references to servitium. On describing the 
accession of Tiberius, Tacitus claims that senators, equestrians and consuls ‘rushed into 
servitude’ (ruere in servitium) and following their Augustan ancestors, all of whom 
waited for the commands of the princeps, it is asserted right from the beginning of 
Tiberius’ reign that the elite welcomed one head for the state.10 Given this apparent 
desire for someone to take charge, as well as the active rushing into servitium, it 
becomes very difficult (almost implausible) to claim that Tacitus is describing a system 
whereby power is exerted solely from the emperor onto his subjects, who by force 
(without citizen consent), are made subject to it. The Tacitean narrative thus resists the 
typical understanding of how a monarchic regime affects individuals’ freedom since a 
system which manages to gain acceptance of its own centralised authority is very 
different to one which requires brute force in order to maintain the subservience of its 
citizens. We may assume that tyrannical regimes develop mechanisms to secure either 
the consent or the tacit acquiescence of its people, but Tacitus presents us with a rather 
different situation in which the loss of political freedom becomes the demand of the 
political class and that class exercises its (possibly limited) discretion to force the 
regime towards an authoritarian position. Since it is not by sovereign will alone that 
individuals are becoming servile, we are immediately presented with evidence of wider 
forms of power, forms which constitute the individual subject in such a way so that he 
not only becomes servile but furthermore ‘eager for servitude’ (servitio promptior).11 
                                                           
9 See Oakley’s recent discussion (2009:184-194).  
10 Cf. Q. Haterius’ question at Ann.1.13.4: “quo usque patieris, Caesar, non adesse caput rei publicae?”  
11 Cf. Alston (2008:151): ‘Tacitus provides us with a model of gradual but fundamental change that, as in 
Annales 3.65, is connected to a decline in individual character: nobles “are eager” for slavery, a servitude 





A third paradox is to do with the notion that with the establishment of the 
Principate there was also the beginning of peace. As Tacitus claims in the Histories, 
after Actium it was necessary for peace for power to be concentrated in the hands of 
one man (postquam bellatum apud Actium atque omnem potentiam ad unum conferri 
pacis interfuit; 1.2). This theme is continued in the Annales, when, for example, 
Tiberius’ confidant implies that order in the state depends on decisions being made by 
one man.12 With power concentrated in the hands of one man (now ensuring peace), we 
would be led to believe that the Principate saw the end of conflict, which is supported 
by a digression in the Annales when Tacitus claims that the time of Tiberius was one 
under which peace remained undisturbed or was only modestly challenged (immota 
quippe aut modice lacessita pax; 4.32). However, at the same time, the Tacitean 
Tiberian narrative is not one which wholly supports the Velleian view, that Tiberius 
ensured ‘salus, quies, pax, tranquilitas’ (Vell.2.103.5). Rather, the reign of Tiberius is 
fuelled with strife, in the form of suspicious murder, military sedition and charges of 
maiestas as well as a growing sense of fear, confusion and malaise. There is thus an 
obvious contradiction in Tacitus’ narrative (and also within my own thesis) which is 
that even though the narrative asserts peace, peace remains coterminous with persistent 
conflict. We may then read the early years of the Principate as a time of peacetime 
conflict, a period which did establish peace, but a peace which was questionable right 
from the start, as suggested by certain oxymoronic references to pax13 as well as by 
Tacitus’ description of the establishment of peace upon the foundation of the Principate 
through the seduction of all by the sweetness of leisure (cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit; 
Ann.1.2). 
The opening of the Annales thus foregrounds a number of paradoxes which 
immediately problematise the base meanings of certain Tacitean concepts. It is 
puzzling, given the revered value of libertas in Roman political thought (as something 
                                                           
12 Ann.1.6.6: eam condicionem esse imperandi, ut non aliter ratio constet quam si uni reddatur. 
13 For example, a mutinous soldier speaks of sterilis pax (Ann.1.17.4). On after the settlement of 28, 
Tacitus claims that there was peace but it was bloody: pacem sine dubio…verum cruentam (Ann.1.10.4). 
For a summary of historiography on the subject of peace in Tacitus see Benario (1991:3347ff.). For other 
terms Tacitus uses to denote social peace (oppon. seditio, bellum) GG s.v. quies (p.1324). On ancient 
Roman notions of peace see Barton (2007:245-278) and Rosenstein (2007:226-244). Cf. also TLL s.v. 





which was deeply incompatible with monarchical government) that what we are 
presented with in Tacitus is an analysis of a system which represents the beginning of 
monarchical authority and peace. It is further puzzling, given the way in which libertas 
is conceptualised under the imperial regime (as something that is taken away from 
citizens through loss of the democratic process), that Tacitus’ elite are not in fact 
‘reduced’ to servitude but rather have an ‘eagerness’ for servitude.  A further 
peculiarity of the Tacitean critique is the coexistence of conflict and peace. Why is it 
that Tacitus presents the Principate through the phraseology of peace (pax, quies, 
concordia, otium) and conflict (seditio, maiestas, terror)? Yet, by framing my thesis 
around this particular set of phenomena, and by reading such paradoxes as critical to 
imperial politics (rather than a Tacitean exercise in wit) we are provided with a unique 
paradigm for political enquiry, one with which we may trace the conditions and means 
by which peace and conflict coexist, as well as re-question the many forms which 
conflict and peace may take. Such a paradoxical combination of order and violence, 
sovereignty and the emergency exception, concord and repression, bare life and the 
biopolitical system are familiar from radical contemporary accounts of modern political 
formations. 
The four chapters of this thesis, then, propose to locate a different form of 
conflict, conflict which is not only represented in manifest or physical form, but 
conflict which is epistemological or latent in form, conflict even in its opposite form: 
conflict as peace or as something which is embedded in the institutions of peace. In this 
perspective, Tacitus’ analysis of early imperial Rome may be read as a history of war, 
even though he writes of peace and its institutions.14 
 
Chapter Outline 
The chapters of this thesis are divided into two sections, with the first two chapters 
looking at Tacitus’ analysis of absolute sovereignty (the nature of the emperor’s power) 
and the second two chapters looking at Tacitus’ analysis of imperial institutions (the 
                                                           





nature of governance).15 While the thesis presents a theoretical engagement with the 
Tacitean narrative, it remains chronological in structure. The reason I chose to analyse 
the narrative in the form of a political-philosophical commentary rather than a sporadic 
analysis of specific passages across the Annales or the wider Tacitean corpus is 
twofold. Firstly, I wanted my analysis to follow Tacitus’ own, so to be constrained by 
Tacitus’ own constraints and to be able to trace the development of conflict over the 
course of time. In so doing, I am able to follow Tacitus’ own genealogical analysis 
more acutely, allowing a deeper insight into why something came to have a particular 
meaning at a particular point in history. Furthermore, this approach honours Tacitus’ 
own methodology: he was first and foremost a historian, writing within the conventions 
and disciplines of an established genre. Those severe disciplines of Tacitean 
historiography allowed the emergence of ideas and understandings in a complex fusion 
and juxtaposition of event and ideological comment (speeches, narrations). Only by a 
detailed engagement with that methodology can we trace the complexity and nuances 
of Tacitus’ thought. 
Thus, I want to be able to take into account as much as possible the paradoxes 
and contradictions Tacitus presents alongside his own quasi-annalistic structure, 
especially since it is a central aim of this thesis to use such paradoxes to reflect on the 
wider nature of imperial politics. Tacitus is known for being paradoxical, often 
presenting conflicting ideas in the space of a few chapters. Yet, by taking such 
contradictions into account, I am able to develop the dimensions of the various 
paradoxes I see as central to Tacitus’ Rome to their distinct potential, considering their 
implications in relation to the nature of conflict under the early empire, and ultimately 
making them intelligible rather than anomalous aspects of the Tacitean critique. 
The four chapters follow the first three books of the Tiberian hexad in the 
following structure: the first chapter focuses on the Augustan prologue, 1.1-1.5; the 
second on the accession of Tiberius, 1.6-1.15; the third on the mutinies, 1.16-1.53; and 
the final chapter covering the remainder of the narrative up until 3.76. Though the 
                                                           
15 By governance I do not mean ‘the government’, but rather the means through which people are 
controlled and ordered, taking into account the epistemological as well as legislative foundations of 
social organisation. Cf. Foucault on Gouvernance (1983): ‘To govern, in this sense, is to structure the 





commentary ends at the beginning of Book 4, the final chapter makes much use of 
certain later passages so to offer some thoughts on forthcoming narrative/events. 
In Chapter 1, I focus on Tacitus’ brief survey of Augustus and his establishment 
of the Principate. I start by tracing the double use of memory in the aftermath of 
Actium in order to provide a historical-contextual background to the beginning of the 
Annales, as well as an insight into how our sources worked to confirm a particular 
narrative of identity upon the foundation of the monarchy (one of peace and 
restoration). On the one hand, the historical record reveals the Augustan regime as one 
which sought to restore peace and order by re-dedicating the state to the ideals and 
ideas of the republican body-politic.16 According to Velleius’ history, for example, 
which follows Augustus’ own account of his deeds closely, the settlement of 28/27 BC 
was less a revolution or transformation – but rather a ‘restoration’ of the old forms of 
the republic which by extension saw the restoration of peace after years of civil war.17 
Yet on the other hand, it is possible to trace a particular ethics of memory underneath 
the Augustan peace, which I describe as a politics of wilful forgetting – a politics which 
willed to forget triumviral memories in order to consolidate the new era of peace and 
conflicts resolved.18 We may therefore read the making of national identity at the 
beginning of Roman imperial time as something which was premised on a culture of 
discontinuous remembrance – a culture which depended on both a politics of 
remembering (the republican past) and a politics of forgetting (the civil war past).  
With this established as a historical backdrop, the differences in the Tacitean 
interpretation as to how Augustus re-established order in the aftermath of the civil wars 
become clear. Whilst the Tacitean view maintains that the establishment of the 
Principate was coterminous with the establishment of peace, this peace was not brought 
to the empire through any engagement with the normative knowledge of the 
Republican past (nor was it established through any disengagement with the civil war 
past). Rather, Tacitus’ brief account of the Augustan years presents a society devoid of 
traditional virtue, and in a way, almost devoid of the very process of practicing an 
                                                           
16 Galinsky (1996:80ff.). 
17 Vell.2.89.3-4: ‘…antiqua rei publicae forma revocata’. Cf. RG 8.5. 






ethics of remembrance. Yet, peace and order are nevertheless maintained, but through 
Augustus’ particular imperium. 
Tacitus’ Augustan prologue brings into sharper focus the paradox at the heart of 
the imperial order – a republican moral and social order compressed within a newly 
monarchic polity – as well as a new monarchic paradigm from which to explore Roman 
imperial sovereignty. Romans looked to the ideas and traditions of the Republican past 
in order to formulate an appropriate narrative of identity. Yet, at the same time Tacitus 
draws attention to the problem of the past as well as the very remembrance of that past. 
He asks, ‘quotus quisque reliquus qui rem publicam vidisset?’ (Ann.1.3.7) and in so 
doing, he calls into question from the very beginning of the narrative the problematic 
nature of Roman epistemology (the means through which Romans defined right and 
wrong, true and false). With no experience of the ideals of the traditional republican 
past, we may suppose that a new time has begun, one in which knowledge is being 
organised around a different epistemological foundation. 
The different foundation is inextricably linked with Augustus and the particular 
nature of his imperium, which was not tyrannical but exceptional and seductive. The 
prologue states that Augustus ‘accepted’ power; he did not ‘seize’ power which 
contradicts ‘the essentials of the Tyrant-portrait’ Tacitus supposedly presents.19 
Secondly, in order to maintain peace (or maintain his own powers) Augustus seduced 
all with the sweetness of leisure (cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit; 1.2.1). He did not 
depend outwardly on the threat of death, which again problematises the typical features 
of tyrannical rule, as both understood in ancient and contemporary political thought. 
Thirdly, Augustus did not only accept imperium, becoming the executive power, but he 
furthermore absorbed the functions of the senate, the magistrates and the laws (munia 
senatus magistratuum legum in se trahere; 1.2.1), becoming the judiciary power. 
Furthermore, Augustus faced no opposition (nullo adversante), rather, all looked to the 
orders of the princeps (omnes…iussa principis aspectare; 1.4.1), which I read as 
affirming a form of patricentric element to the Tacitean interpretation of Augustus’ 
system of rule.20 
                                                           
19 Walker (1952:212ff.).  





It emerges, then, that Tacitus’ Augustus is an ‘exceptional’ sovereign, one 
whose earlier questionable status in relation to the law continued through to his 
Principate (Augustus in Tacitus exists as the law, even after his death).21 It also 
emerges that the nature of Augustus’ sovereignty in Tacitus is not only distinguishable 
from tyrannical forms but it may also be read as distinguishable from monarchical 
forms. This is because in asserting his power (while also achieving peace) through 
otium, annonae and dona it is implied in turn that Augustus tied himself to the 
populace in the form of a relational network of exchange.22 In this view, Augustus’ 
sovereignty may be described as circular (rather than top-down) since his power was 
constituted and preserved through systems of mutual gain (rather than through a 
monopoly of the means of social and political life). Moreover, since Tacitus’ Augustus 
did not seek to reduce life through the threat of death, nor indeed discipline it through 
mores, we may describe his sovereignty as peculiarly ‘biopolitical’, as a form of power 
which seeks to ‘improve life’ or ‘make life’, in Tacitus, through leisure, gifs and 
grain.23 We have thus by the end of the prologue a unique political framework for the 
successful construction of peace, a framework which in contradiction of Augustus’ Res 
Gestae, has little to do with the restoration of moral and legal precedents (RG 8.5). The 
question turns to whether Tiberius will be able to maintain order through an adequate 
replication of the particular precedents laid down by Augustus.24 
                                                           
21 By ‘exceptional sovereign’ I refer to Schmitt’s phrase in the opening of his Political Theology: 
‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ (1985:1). This conception of sovereignty was later 
developed by Giorgio Agamben in relation to the Augustan Principate: ‘The constitutional novelty of the 
Principate can thus be seen as an incorporation of the state of exception and anomie directly into the 
person of the sovereign, who begins to free himself from all subordination to the law and asserts himself 
as legibus solutus [unbound by the laws].’ Agamben (2005:69). Cf. O’Gorman (1995:97-98) on the 
‘incorporative’ nature of Tacitus’ Augustus (discussed further below).  
22 Cf. Flaig (2011:78ff.) on imperial gift exchange. Galinsky (1996:64) also notes that under Augustus 
there existed ‘a reciprocal process and dynamics of negotiation and renegotiation between ruler and 
subjects’ but while Galinsky reads this dynamics as that which allowed for the ‘renewal of the republic’ 
(and rightly so), Tacitus asserts this dynamics as fundamental to the empowerment of Augustus’ own 
supreme position in the state, which of course problematises any such republican restoration.  
23 In Foucault, biopower (biopouvoir) is described as a type of power which seeks to ‘make live’ rather 
than ‘take life’ and as something which is purposed to improve or increase life on the level of the 
population (2004:240-254). In Critical Theory, the term is used varyingly but it mainly represents a type 
of power which is focussed on biological life (Cf. DCT, p.59: ‘[Biopower is] a form of political power 
that revolves around populations (humans as a species or as a productive capacity) rather than 
individuals (humans as subjects or citizens).’  
24 As O’Gorman notes, the burden which Tiberius faces is not only the burden of the state but ‘the 





In Chapter 2, I focus on Tacitus’ narrative of the accession of Tiberius, 
focussing in particular on Tiberius’ questionable stance towards formalising his new 
position in the state. The Tiberian narrative centres on the memory of Augustus by 
repeatedly calling into question the nature of Augustan sovereignty and more 
importantly, whether Tiberius can restore that sovereignty in order to maintain the 
integral link between peace and the Principate. In this view, the narrative on after 
Augustus’ death does not focus on the question of ‘res publica restituta’ (that is, 
whether Tiberius can restore the political and moral forms of the old Republic as did 
Augustus, at least according to his Res Gestae). Rather, from AD 14 the exemplary past 
is written around Augustus and the narrative centres on another question, which is, 
whether Tiberius can restore ‘Augustus’ Republic’ and in so doing keep suspended the 
unwanted memories of the past while also supplementing the erosion of prisca virtus 
by becoming the new exemplum in the state.  
However, a narrative of doubt quickly emerges on Tiberius’ accession, since 
Tacitus is quick to undermine the powers of the new princeps (despite the fact that he is 
already the emperor). This may be connected to the notion that Tiberius is confronted 
with the task of restoring a political system which is notably (and especially in the 
Tacitean account) embodied in Augustus (solam divi Augusti mentem tantae molis 
capacem; 1.11.1). It can then be traced through the continued emphasis on Tiberius’ 
hestitatio – a reluctance to accept full responsibility for the empire and the aim, instead, 
to exist on parity with the rest (to give power back to the senate).25 We may also read it 
through the suspicious elite, whose lack of belief in what the new sovereign says 
undermines Tiberius’ ability to both speak the truth and thus represent authority: 
‘[Tiberius’] speech was more impressive than credible’ (plus in oratione tali dignitatis 
quam fidei erat; 1.11.2). From this perspective, I argue that the Tiberian narrative 
begins with a certain ‘non-sovereignty’ – that is, a precise inability to ensure social and 
political order by following the precedents (laws, truths, powers) laid down by 
Augustus.  
                                                           





 By focussing on the non-sovereignty of Tiberius I am able to offer a different 
reading of Tacitus’ Tiberius and more widely, why conflict pervades the politics of his 
Principate. Tiberius is normally analysed as one of Tacitus’ prime targets – a despot 
under whom the reality of imperial rule became clear.26 This model is often supported 
with references to Tiberius’ ‘hypocrisy’ (that, Tiberius was pretending he did not want 
the powers when he did).27 Such a view can be supported by Tacitus’ language, for 
example, when Tacitus implies a certain insincerity behind Tiberius’ manner of ruling, 
that he acted ‘as though’ the old Republic still existed or ‘as though’ ambiguous about 
ruling (nam Tiberius cuncta per consules incipiebat, tamquam vetere re publica et 
ambiguus imperandi; 1.7.1).  
Nevertheless, there is another way to read Tiberius’ supposed insincerity. 
Firstly, Tiberius in the Tacitean account is clearly a sovereign with republican 
inclinations, on several occasions he is written as an emperor who, unlike Augustus, is 
reluctant to speak in the name of the law.28 Rather, Tiberius is shown to constantly aid 
democracy, giving powers of decision back to the senate (though his oppressive gaze 
naturally remains). Secondly, one notes that it is not necessarily the case that Tiberius 
is being deceitful (though he does dissemble) but that his words lack the power of 
being received as credible.29 In drawing attention to the incredibility of Tiberius’ 
words, Tacitus points to another fundamental feature of sovereign power, that it must 
maintain a relationship to truth, not in terms of ‘telling’ the truth but in terms of 
‘deciding’ it.  We may therefore understand Tiberius’ key features (silence, hesitation, 
dissimulation) not as defects of a tyrant or signs of hypocrisy but rather as examples of 
his inability to speak in the name of the father and establish the truth. This then enables 
a wider conception of what imperial sovereignty encompassed or should encompass, at 
least from Tacitus’ view. Rather than offering us a sovereignty which is embedded in 
the narrow zone of power that is a legal system, Tacitus implies that sovereignty must 
maintain a relationship to the production of knowledge and truth. Yet, this remains a 
key failing of Tiberius. I argue, then, that the severance of the relationship between 
                                                           
26 See for example Eder (1993:73) and Griffin (1995). 
27 Griffin (1995:37). 
28 For Tiberius, the laws are to be enforced (exercendas leges esse; Ann.1.72). 





sovereignty and truth is a fundamental source of political conflict in the new reign, a 
key example being the mysterious death of Agrippa Postumus, the outcome (or truth) 
of which Tiberius could not decide. 
 In the third chapter I focus on the mutinies on the frontiers, focussing in 
particular on the relationship between seditio and democracy. Tony Woodman has 
recently read the violence of the mutinies from the perspective of frenzy (furor), 
arguing that Tacitus describes the soldiers in such a way so as to imply their suffering 
from some form of ‘mental illness’ or ‘collective madness’.30 In order to allow for a 
different perspective, I read the violence of the mutinies as ‘democratic’. Democratic 
violence refers to a form of violence which seeks to interrupt established roles and 
places and in so doing make visible certain wrongs imposed onto subordinates (in this 
case, the soldiers’ low pay, terrible living conditions and physical abuse).31  
 By shifting focus to the problematic nature of army discipline (disciplina 
militaris), reading the narrative as a critical commentary on the effects of the 
persistence of discipline rather than a literary exercise in furor discourse, I am able to 
trace a particular paradox within the orders of imperial society: Roman society was 
extremely hierarchical, necessarily so since hierarchy (assigned roles and places) was 
critical to maintaining order in the state. But the narrative of the mutinies suggests that 
hierarchy was also a source of everyday conflict due to the severe degree to which 
disciplina and labor were imposed onto the soldiers. The establishing of hierarchy is 
then a fundamental institution of peace (a mode of maintaining order), but it is equally a 
mechanism within which is compressed the potential for the dangerous and threatening 
emergence of democratic violence. However, in the resolution of democratic violence, 
and the renewal of hierarchy which resolution sees, democratic potential is not 
                                                           
30 Woodman (2006:329). 
31 This definition of democracy follows Jacques Rancière (1994 and 1999). In Rancière, democratic 
politics refers to a type of political activity, namely a conflict or ‘clash’ between two social orders, which 
challenges the naturalness of a place. The democratic moment is an ‘interruptive’ moment during which 
the structural positions supposed to be occupied within a given hierarchy are transgressed. In this 
transgression, that which was previously made invisible (a wrong/the natural equality of all beings) is 
made visible. Rancière’s notion of democracy does not therefore refer to the organisation of government 
and notably Rome was not a democracy under the Republic, nor under the Principate (though it retained 






terminated but merely suspended.  Hierarchy is therefore analysed as an essential space 
of conflict, because even though hierarchy (a fundamental peace-ensuring social 
structure, one which in the military context ensures the soldiers’ habit of submission, 
‘morem obsequii’) is designed to prevent democratic operation, it paradoxically embeds 
the potential for the emergence of democratic revolution. 
 Reading the narrative beyond tropes associated with madness and frenzy, also 
enables a different understanding of Tacitus’ mode of history writing. Not only is the 
soldiers’ violence democratic, but so too is Tacitus’ own historiographic practice, 
which, rather than the typical elite account which fails to speak for other voices or 
trivialises seditious voices by either implying a ‘collective madness’ or inadequately 
explaining their motives for revolution, Tacitus gives a space for such voices, allowing 
an insight into the lives of those persons not normally allowed to speak. Though this 
remains a representation (the soldiers can only be voiced through Tacitus’ own elite 
consciousness), at the same time, I show that the narrative differs from other elite 
representations (Velleius, Suetonius, Dio), since Tacitus gives reason to the soldiers’ 
grievances rather than ridiculing them through discourses of disease and ‘madness’.32 
 The fourth and final chapter presents an analysis of corruption, paying 
particular attention to a forthcoming digression in Book 4, where Tacitus states that 
under Tiberius few had the knowledge (prudentia) to discern the honourable from the 
worse (honesta ab detorioribus…discernunt) and the useful from the harmful (utilia ab 
noxiis discernunt; Ann.4.33.2). In order to explore why corruption (either in the form of 
corrupta iudicia or due to the erosion of mores) continued to plague Rome in the early 
years of the Tiberian Principate (and why it is perhaps the prominent thematic similarity 
between much ancient historiography) I seek to disclose a necessary connection 
between corruption and politics, and more widely corruption and morality.  
 Corruption is traditionally defined as an activity which represents illegal or 
immoral behaviour, behaviour which is contra morem maiorum (against the way of the 
ancestors). Tacitus is not an exception to this general rule, since he does juxtapose 
                                                           
32 Cf. Auerbach (2003:30ff.) who criticised Tacitus’ description of the Pannonian mutiny on the grounds 
that it is not a realistic representation of reality. Auerbach’s point is that ancient rhetoric was such that it 
could only voice the everyday person (in this case the rebellious soldier) through a limited number of 





corrupt behaviour with the discipline and principles of the maiores.33 However, what 
Tacitus also reveals is a peculiar connection between corruption and morality: in order 
to gain at least the appearance of virtus, either through political ascendancy, wealth or 
the emperor’s favour, the individual must partake in corrupt activity. This argument is 
focussed in part to an analysis of Roman moderatio and luxuria. While luxuria in 
Roman historiography is often connected with vice (Sallust, Livy, Velleius) Tacitus 
reveals that luxuria, though a vice, nonetheless enabled moral propriety (decus) and 
glory (gloria). I therefore analyse corruption in Tacitus not as antithetical to morality 
but as something which is consistent with the aims of morality, as something which 
played a critical role in society since it allowed the individual to fashion an honourable 
identity. 
 I also read corruption as something which was an inescapable by-product of the 
politics of the Principate through a discussion of the revival of the lex maiestatis and 
the corrosive force of delatores. Law is a fundamental means of maintaining order. In 
addition to this, it is of course designed specifically to prevent corruption in the form of 
the sustained protection of citizen rights. Yet, the lex maiestatis and the connected 
(legalised) process of delation is a significant example of the problematic nature of 
certain leges. Augustus made official an old means of censorship where verbal 
defamation of the state (under the Principate the state meant foremostly the emperor 
and his house) was to be made punishable by law, under the lex maiestatis. Tiberius, 
constrained by the Augustan past, revived this law since it would not be right (fas) to 
interfere with any responsum of the divine Augustus (1.77). Yet the revival of this 
particular means of maintaining order also enthused the legal-protective (surveillant) 
process of delation which as Tacitus describes rendered privacy and property violable, 
fear automatic and displaced the honour of innocent citizens onto those less honourable 
(the needy delatores). In this view, corruption in Tacitus is not necessarily due to a lack 
of law, nor inadequate law reform. Rather, it is due to a contamination within the very 
system of law itself (the delatores), a contamination which under the Principate 
                                                           





endangers fundamental civil rights (to freedom, to property, to privacy, to speech, to a 
fair trial) and to being Roman (to maintaining one’s own honor).  
This means that a similar paradox to that located in hierarchy (that is, 
mechanisms of order as mechanisms which cause disorder) can also be located in law 
(the lex maiestatis) and morality (moderatio) which then problematises what precisely 
connotes ‘use’ and ‘harm’ in Tacitus, as well as how one could rightly discern the 
honourable from the worse. 
By the end of the thesis I hope to have revealed a number of answers to my 
central research question, which was to test the possibility of conflict as something 
which is engrained within the Roman social and epistemic order, and, structures of 
enslavement as existing beyond the person of the emperor, embedded instead within 
social and political systems. In support of this initial hypothesis, the four chapters show 
that conflict in Tacitus results from 1) cultural memory (the memory of the republican 
and Augustan pasts), 2) Tiberius’ non-sovereignty (his hesitatio, dissimulatio or 
inability to decide the truth), 3) hierarchy (assigned places and roles) and 4) morality 
and law itself (mores such as moderatio and leges such as the lex maiestatis).  
Given that these four sources of conflict are at the same time the very measures 
through which one would expect peace to be maintained, I argue that the Tacitean 
narrative not only contradicts the conventional understanding of what makes a good 
state, for example, knowledge of the ways of the past, a democratic or mixed 
government, a defined ranking system, a strong legal and moral code, but he also, 
through this contradiction, provides a unique explanation for the persistence of conflict. 
Conflict persists because its source resides in the institutions of peace. But the tragedy 
is that such a paradox remains critical to politics since without such institutions, the 
alternative would be anarchy or a return to civil war. In a place where there are no 
better alternatives, this may explain why Tacitus is not someone who valorises 
revolution and why, instead, he favours acceptance. 
 
Method: Using Contemporary Political Theory with Tacitus 
While this thesis naturally reads Tacitus in the context of early imperial history, it also 





Such an approach is necessary in order to meet a wider research purpose, which is to 
trace what Tacitus can tell us about the nature of political life under the Principate and, 
more widely, how Tacitean thought can advance an understanding of politics as 
conflict, and politics as a non-context specific process (politics as a concept).  
One of the many advantages of employing a theoretical approach in an analysis 
of Tacitus is that it enables precisely this, a conceptual investigation. Arguably, a 
conceptual investigation implies a more generalised analytical approach than a 
historical or literary investigation. For example, a conceptual analysis of Tacitean 
libertas would consider the ‘idea’ of freedom, as well as take into account a set of other 
ideas in relation to what freedom means or what makes it possible; whereas, a strictly 
historical investigation of Tacitean libertas would seek to provide a more contextual 
(Roman) and determinate (distinct) explanation of the term. Yet, in my view, Tacitus’ 
narrative is itself conceptual (as well as historical), given that the texture of his writing 
is such that we are often presented with an exploration of diverse ideas (as well as a 
description of specific events). 
The benefit of a conceptual investigation, then, is that it is in tune with Tacitus’ 
own method of writing the past, which allows and accounts for historical, literary and 
political reflections rather than one which seeks to define the boundaries between the 
historical, the literary and the political, boundaries which are not presented in Tacitus 
(nor natural to ancient historiography) and thus should not be posited from the reader’s 
point of view.34 Certainly, Tacitus is a historian and the Annales is a historical narrative 
dealing with particular historical events, yet, employing a historical perspective alone 
(in the scientific sense), one which would seek to assess the facticity of Tacitus’ 
depiction of a particular event (for example, the accession of Tiberius) by measuring 
Tacitus against other sources in order to reach a more accurate picture of what 
happened in the past, is an exercise of limited value. This is for two main reasons. 
Firstly, given that a historical investigation is directed towards the discovery of facts, 
such an aim for a reader of Tacitus would remain contentious and not only because 
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Tacitus’ narrative is subject to Tacitus’ own opinions and a possibly unreliable research 
method (taking into account senatorial acta, cultural memory, previous historiography, 
all of which are hardly objective sources of information) but also because methods and 
techniques of ancient history writing are not the same as those of contemporary 
(western) historiography (or at least its idealised forms): the latter for example does not 
allow for literary set pieces (such as speeches) or references to popular opinion and 
rumour.  
A strictly historical (or strictly literary) approach would also, in my view, be 
somewhat reductive, given that there is more in the narrative than a mere compilation 
of facts (or display of intertexts). In his analysis of the mutinies, for example, Tacitus 
creates an opportunity to make sense of a larger phenomenon (the phenomenon of 
revolution, the paradox of hierarchy) as well as what caused the Pannonian soldiers to 
revolt on that particular occasion, how and why they did so. A conceptual analysis is 
therefore beneficial because it increases possibilities, enabling a wider, experimental 
and hypothetical but nonetheless possible explanation of a certain problem or set of 
phenomena.  
In order, then, to follow the broader line of enquiry I have chosen for this thesis, 
which is to engage specifically with Tacitus’ political and legal thought, that is, what 
Tacitus tells us about political concepts (such as, for example, democracy, authority, 
ideology) and legal concepts (for example, legitimacy, justice, rights) I analyse the 
Tacitean narrative alongside the political and legal theories of Michel Foucault, Giorgio 
Agamben, Jacques Rancière and Hannah Arendt, all of whom engage either directly 
with Tacitus’ Annales (Rancière), the politics of the early Roman Principate 
(Agamben), ancient Roman concepts such as mores and lex (Arendt) or antiquity in a 
more general fashion (Foucault). Further to such direct connections between the subject 
of their analyses and Tacitus’ own, the theorists I have chosen also engage with an 
investigation of politics after war and after liberty, and often from the position of 
totalitarian political societies. This means that the shared context of their thought 
together creates more common ground with that of Tacitus’ own thought, than, say, 





 A further advantage of using contemporary theory to analyse the nature of 
politics in Tacitus is that it enables a way to question certain beliefs held by moderns in 
relation to classical sovereignty, classical politics or ‘the antique’. Part of what led me 
initially to an analysis of conflict in Tacitus is a set of presumptions at the heart of 
certain modern analyses of power, namely those of Michel Foucault, which present 
especially defined temporal boundaries between classical (juridical/kingly) forms of 
power and their modern counterparts (disciplinary power/biopolitical power). Yet, the 
Tacitean narrative contradicts Foucault’s trajectory of power, which argues for a 
historical progression from juridical power, to disciplinary power and finally to 
biopolitical power. There is much in the Tacitean narrative which supports the 
existence of other forms of power, forms which are ‘biopolitical’ and which co-exist 
with juridical forms, thus problematising Foucault’s temporal trajectory, which locates 
the emergence of biopolitical forms at the turn of the nineteenth century. Tacitus allows 
us to see that it is not the case that one form of power turns into another but how 
juridical, sovereign, disciplinary and biopolitical powers intersect and to what effect.  
The category of the antique is often invoked in this way, to assert some form of 
shift in the history of Western politics. Yet, Tacitus draws attention to the possibility of 
there being something ‘modern’ about the antique (or something ‘antique’ about the 
modern), rendering the comparison of modern theory and ancient texts a useful rather 
than questionable hermeneutic exercise.35 There are thus two advantages to the 
theoretical approach: not only am I able to explore the narrative from a wider 
perspective, but I am also able to challenge views of Tacitus and by extension views of 
the classical as held by moderns.  
A further advantage to the specific theorists explored in this thesis is to do with 
method. Not only do the theorists chosen analyse similar contexts and concepts but 
they also share a similar method of analysing history and politics. Tacitus is not known 
as a ‘theorist’, rightly, since unlike Cicero or Seneca for example, he does not directly 
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read ancient literature in terms of ancient criticism is itself a modern prejudice.’ (443). See further the 





posit what something should mean or should be, at least not often. In Tacitus, we are 
presented with an analysis of what something is or what something has come to be over 
the course of history.36 His method of writing history is therefore not only aetiological 
but it may also be described as genealogical, that is, a method which seeks to trace the 
constitution and development of something (for example, a moral norm) over the 
course of time in order to allow an insight into how it has come to be what it is in the 
present. The significance of this is that Tacitus challenges the view that there exist 
natural or immutable referents for certain notions, beliefs or ideas. Such a suspicious 
questioning of natural, universal or ontological categories is something which Tacitus 
discloses in reference to mores, which, though often referred to as fixed in Roman 
thought (as the criteria for good, right and true) are implied by Tacitus as something 
different: on one hand, mores are a guide to correct behaviour but at the same time this 
does not mean that they remain the same, stable categories of definition over time. 
Instead, Tacitus sees the mutability of all things, mores included.37  
It is thus suggested that mores, unlike the conservative-conventional view, are 
“produced” and furthermore open to transformation, resistance or even rejection. While 
I would not extend this to argue that Tacitus speaks from a position of moral relativism, 
there is a genealogical logic to his writing which then pushes the reader to think about 
what (power relations) created the conditions for the possibility of the constitution of 
certain structures, norms or ‘truths’, rather than assuming that these norms are natural 
and questioning whether such norms were followed or held by Tacitus or those in his 
narrative.38  
The contemporary theory I have used in this thesis is therefore specifically 
designed to strengthen my engagement with what I see as unique in the Tacitean 
narrative. All thinkers share similarities in terms of context, concepts and method, 
providing a solid basis from which to analyse Tacitus’ narrative on politics under the 
Principate as well as politics more widely. By sustaining a critical dialogue between 
                                                           
36 Cf. Tacitus’ history of Roman law and morality at Ann.3.26-28. 
37 Ann.3.55.5: nisi forte rebus cunctis inest quidam velut orbis, ut quem ad modum temporum vices ita 
morum vertantur. 






modern theory and Tacitus’ narrative, it is also hoped that this thesis makes obvious the 
timeless value of Tacitean thought, something which has not often been supposed in 
reference to his particular contribution to politics and historiography.  
 
Tacitus, Foucault and Agamben 
Although Foucault’s genealogy of power is contradicted by Tacitus, as explained 
above, this contradiction allows an in depth discussion of Tacitus and Foucault which is 
maintained throughout the thesis. The primary value of Foucault is his conception of 
power, in particular the relationship between power and truth:  
 
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of 
power in negative terms: it “excludes”, it “represses”, it 
“censors”, it “abstracts”, it “masks”, it “conceals”. In fact, 
power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains 
of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the 
knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this 
production.39  
 
Once power is conceptualised beyond the power of the emperor, the government or the 
state, it changes perspectives. Firstly, while any reading of Tacitus cannot ignore the 
model of power which is based on the power of the emperor given the central role he 
plays in the politics of the Principate, at the same time, one can find many similarities 
between Foucault’s particular conception of power as something which produces 
‘rituals of truth’ and the Roman notion of the mos maiorum – as a source of knowledge 
(an epistemological system), a set of discourses which organise right and wrong, true 
and false. Once we see power in this way, not only as something which limits but also 
as something which ‘produces’, through disciplinary techniques such as customs 
(mores) or references to authoritative figures (exempla, the maiores, Augustus) as well 
as other mechanisms which seek to define what is normal or acceptable (law, hierarchy, 
cultural memory) this alters in turn what we see as enslaving. The source of servitium 
(and conflict) is not solely the emperor but possibly, ordering structures themselves 
(customs, laws, hierarchy). Freedom, too, will emerge differently; an act of libertas is 
                                                           





not necessarily an active speaking out against the emperor, nor even the space to feel 
what you want and say what you feel, but possibly, the freedom to choose to be 
constituted as a subject. When sources of oppression are dispersed throughout the 
social body to such penetrative an effect, we may want to consider the possibility that 
Tacitus’ narrative questions the very notion of freedom as an ontological condition of 
being, in which case we are confronted with a deeply tragic affirmation, that freedom 
may only refer to the freedom to accept servitude (to be obsequens) which may explain 
why Tacitus imbues (and perhaps has no choice but to imbue) obsequium with a newly 
moral value.40  
Thus, for Foucault it is essential to ‘break free’ of the model of power which 
takes law and sovereignty as its code and by applying this view to Tacitus, we can 
develop our understanding of what freedom (and servitude) may mean from a Tacitean 
perspective. Equally, we may conceive of power as something which not only ‘censors’ 
(individuals) but also as something which ‘produces’ (truths). Yet, in a Roman imperial 
context, especially in a Tacitean historiographical context, this perspective must be 
balanced with an understanding of power which does take law and (the emperor’s) 
sovereignty as its code, a code which may be constituted through either the emperor’s 
power (imperium), influence (auctoritas), or words (dicta).  In order to achieve the 
balance between disciplinary and sovereign forms of power, the Foucauldian strand of 
my thesis is nuanced with the work of Giorgio Agamben, whose political thought 
remains connected with the model of power which takes sovereignty and law as its 
code. 
                                                           
40 Such a position continues to assert a sharp distinction between the time of the republic (a time of 
freedom) and that of the Principate (a time of servitude); but given the Germanorum libertas 
(Germ.37.3), it isolates specifically the Roman imperial condition as one of inherent servitude. This 
condition of inherent or ontological servitude is further implied by Tiberius’ reported comment upon 
leaving the senate house which was not that the elite were like slaves, but that they were men purposed 
for or prepared for servitude (‘…ad servitutem paratos'), which implies that it is not the moment of 
coming into the political arena (coming into contact with the emperor in the senate house, for example) 
which represents the moment when servility begins, but that servility, as an elite condition, preceded the 
context/space of Tiberian politics (Ann.3.65). On obsequium (compliance/deference) in Tacitus see 
Ag.8.1, 30.3, 42.4. Cf. Ann.4.20.3 (on deforme obsequium). Cf. also TLL s.v. obsequium 182.33ff. (in 
vita publica). On the disjunction between freedom and biopolitical regimes see especially Alston and 





The usefulness of Giorgio Agamben for the reader of Tacitus is his theory of the 
state of exception, derived in part from Carl Schmitt’s definition of sovereign as ‘he 
who decides on the exception’ (Souverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand 
entscheidet).41 While Schmitt analyses emergency powers in the context of Roman 
republican dictatorship, where the dictator in contravention of the constitution was 
temporarily granted unlimited powers in order to bring order back to the state (such as 
those granted to Octavian), Agamben analyses emergency powers with reference to the 
Roman iustitium, which he reads as a miniature model for the state of exception.42 The 
Roman iustitium refers to a formal suspension of power or standstill (or a period of 
mourning, such as that declared upon the death of Augustus), wherein all bodies, for 
Agamben, ‘seem to be invested with a floating and anomalous imperium (un imperium 
fluttuante e anomalo) that resists definition within the terms of the legal order’ (hence 
perhaps, the mutinies occur).43  
From this basis, Agamben develops his theory of the State of Exception, which 
is premised on a certain ‘paradox of sovereignty’. The paradox of sovereignty refers to 
the notion that during the state of exception, which makes obvious who the sovereign is 
(because only he can declare it) the sovereign is both inside and outside the law 
(because he is able to suspend the law legally). Once the paradoxical suspension of the 
law is declared, creating the state of exception, Agamben claims that all are susceptible 
to being reduced to a status of ‘bare life’ (nuda vita), which is a de-politicised form of 
biological life wherein the individual loses his political identity by being stripped of the 
right to legal protection.44 
While Foucault sees the sovereignty model as a limited one from which to 
analyse power, in particular the biopolitical effects of power (how power affects 
                                                           
41 Schmitt (1985:1).  
42 In addition to the Roman iustitium (which refers to the ‘cessation of judicial and all other public 
business, in the event of national calamities, riots…the death of an emperor or one of his family’, OLD 
s.v. iustitium), the state of exception is also analysed by Agamben alongside civil war (2005:1-2, 19ff.), a 
period during which lawlessness is legalised for the purposes of preserving law and order 
(paradoxically). The crucial example is the concentration camp which is posited by Agamben as the 
fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West (1998:181). 
43 Agamben (2005:43).  
44 Notably, bare life is (deliberately) an ambiguous term in Agamben, since as well as denoting a 
depoliticised form of life (1998:97) that life remains political because the subject even if denied legal 





biological life), Agamben sees a precise connection between sovereignty and the 
biopolitical. This is because the production of ‘bare life’ is the essential sign of the 
sovereign, since the conditions of bare life only become possible in the state of 
exception, which can only be declared by the sovereign.45 This biopolitical logic of 
sovereignty, and again in distinction to Foucault, is not for Agamben a modern 
emergence, but rather an ancient one.46 Agamben focuses his discussion of the 
production of bare life to the Roman figure of homo sacer (the sacred man, the exile or 
interdictus), who not only loses his citizen rights once declared an interdictus but can 
also be killed by anyone with impunity.47 The sacred man is thus marked by a similar 
inside/outside status to that of the sovereign, at once included in and excluded from the 
juridico-political order. Agamben makes from this a new type of connection between 
the sovereign and life, not one in which the sovereign asserts power through outright 
domination over life but one where the sovereign withdraws from his duty, abandoning 
life to a realm of violence, lawlessness and inhumanity. From this basis, Agamben 
further subverts the traditional liberal conception, that sovereignty functions in 
opposition to liberties and rights. Rather, for Agamben it is only under sovereignty that 
liberties and rights are possible.  
However, a further paradox is that ‘the spaces, the liberties, and the rights won 
by individuals in their conflicts with central powers’ does not assert freedom from 
sovereignty, but, ‘always simultaneously [prepares] a tacit but increasing inscription of 
individuals’ lives within the state order, thus offering a new and more dreadful 
foundation for the very sovereign power from which they wanted to liberate 
                                                           
45 Cf. Agamben (1998:6): ‘The inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original – if 
concealed – nucleus of sovereign power. It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is 
the original activity of sovereign power. In this sense, biopolitics is at least as old as the exception’. For 
Agamben’s correction of Foucauldian biopolitics see Agamben (1998:9-11). 
46 It is implied to be pre-ancient because it is conceptualised by Agamben as the ontological basis of 
politics. For a useful survey of the differences between Agambenian and Foucauldian conceptions of 
power (sovereign, disciplinary and biopolitical) see Frost (2010: 545-577). See especially Brockling and 
Krasmann (2011:165-184). 
47 The term homo sacer (sacred man) is first recorded in the Lexicon of Festus (de verborum significatu) 
some time during the early imperial period (possibly late second century). Festus defines this man as 
follows: At homo sacer is est, quem populus iudicavit ob maleficium; neque fas est eum immolari, sed, 
qui occidit, parricidi non damnatur (424L). As a critical concept, the figure of homo sacer is used ‘to 
emblematise the sovereign’s power over life and death, the power to designate a life that is worth neither 





themselves’.48 Agamben posits thus the ‘double-sided’ nature of decisive political 
events, not liberating nor enslaving, useful or harmful, but somewhere in between, in a 
zone of indistinction. 
Agamben’s notion of the ‘double-sided’ nature of the political order, as 
explored through the paradox of sovereignty, his concept of ‘bare life’ and the 
sovereign ban, which culminates in his theory of the state of exception, provides a 
useful analytical framework for the reader of Tacitus, especially in terms of how it can 
aid an understanding of Tacitus’ own paradoxical or ‘double-sided’ interpretation of 
the nature of imperial politics. From a historical-theoretical point of view, the 
foundation of the Principate is grounded in the sovereignty paradox, given that prior to 
the settlement of 28/27 Octavian was granted exceptional powers in order to quell civil 
war. From a Tacitean-theoretical point of view, this can be further developed since the 
notion that Augustus exercised an exceptional form of power (one which maintained a 
relationship with the law only through being external to it) is foregrounded in Tacitus’ 
prologue which states that Augustus received all things in the name of prince, 
absorbing the functions of the senate, the magistrates and the law. This is peculiar 
given that the Principate was established after the emergency situation of civil war, in 
which context, the Principate in Tacitus represents a time of persistent exceptionality 
(the time after 28 was not one of emergency, nevertheless the sovereign retained an 
exceptional status). Furthermore, sovereign power and its exceptionality were 
necessary for the creation and maintaining of the biopolitical regime, the very systems 
of powers diffused through the social body which allowed the functioning of society in 
peace, leisure, gifts and abundance. In Tacitus, sovereignty allows society to come into 
being and the society provides the structural props of sovereignty: the eagerness of the 
senators for slavery was thus both a response to the sovereignty that allowed them to be 
and a restitution of (Augustan) sovereignty.  
The continuation of a questionable legal structure, (as well as the attached 
production of bare life), is narrated throughout the Tiberian books. During the 
                                                           
48 Agamben (1998:121). As will be discussed below, this notion of servitude through freedom is 
peculiarly Tacitean; it is the logic of the principate that the more one chooses to rebel the more he 





accession debate, it is implied that Tiberius was invested with ‘an anomalous 
imperium’ that resisted definition within the terms of the legal order. At the same time, 
Tacitus shifts focus to another problem of definition, that Tiberius’ power could not 
define truth, in which case we can rethink sovereignty in a Roman Tacitean context not 
as ‘he who decides on the exception’ but ‘he who decides truth’. In this, the sovereign 
becomes the enforcer of the power-knowledge diarchy of Foucauldian thought. 
More widely, Tacitus develops a similar understanding of imperial politics in 
terms of the way in which it defies traditional opposites (sovereign and subject, 
freedom and servitude, humanity and inhumanity) so that, as in Agamben, one opposite 
comes to be constitutive of the other. This can be seen in his analysis of civic virtue, 
which no longer works to affirm individual virtus, nor the ‘health’ (salus) of the res 
publica. Rather, an engagement with civic virtue is shown to further preserve conflict 
within the state, as explored through Tacitus’ reflections on moderatio. 
Yet, Tacitus allows for a different understanding of such conflations. In Tacitus, 
legalised lawlessness or ‘virtuous corruption’ is not, as in Agamben, necessarily 
stemming from the authority of the sovereign body. As mentioned above, for 
Agamben, conflict in the form of inhumanity (as that displayed towards the camp 
prisoner when stripped of his civil and human rights) is the product of the workings of 
sovereignty in the state of exception. Tacitus offers an alternative explanation. The 
production of bare life is not only the product of sovereignty, but it can instead be 
pinpointed to the wider notion of Roman humanitas. This is because although 
humanitas is that which guides and holds together the ethics, law and moral discourses 
of Roman society, at the same time Tacitus’ narrative shows that the display of 
humanitas cannot be achieved without the perversion of justice and equality (the 
production of bare life). The interdictus was not punished by the sovereign’s taking of 
life (execution) but by stripping him of his rights (exile). The reason for punishment by 
exile rather than execution was to display not brute power but virtue (or a form of 
virtuous power/virtue through power). Homo sacer was the one who was rescued from 
death through the virtuous act of sovereign clementia. But the virtuous act of clementia 





of equality, since as an exile he was stripped of his citizen rights.49 Virtue is embedded 
in sovereignty and in the potential of the sovereign to reduce the man to virtual 
enslavement (robbing him of his virtue), but in reverse fashion virtue is constructive of 
sovereignty through humanitas. 
In asserting a fundamental dialectic between sovereignty and virtue (instead 
of/as well as sovereignty and power) Tacitus allows us to read conflict as ever-present. 
Paradoxically, the Roman commitment to politics as a civic moral enterprise was one 
which could not be disentangled from corruption and conflict. From this perspective, 
we may rethink the very nature of politics in Tacitus. Politics is often defined as a 
system or process of organisation which seeks, as an ultimate aim, to maintain social 
order. Yet in Tacitus, the process of politics is written as synonymous with conflict 
itself as well as the very means through which conflict is preserved.  But that conflict 
appears to be necessary, an inevitable feature of imperial society certainly, but also of 
what came before, and perhaps of humanitas itself, humanitas defined as a social way 
of life. In that sense, we may re-read Tacitus’ puzzling description of Romanization in 
the Agricola as a process that the undiscerning understood as humanitas when it was 
really slavery not as oppositional but integral and dialectical.  
 
Preliminary Conclusions: The Persistence of Paradox 
The paradoxical nature of Tacitus’ narrative has been noted for a long time. According 
to Syme, for example, ‘Tacitus’ views on men and government are ambiguous, 
                                                           
49 Notably clementia was not always associated with virtue and humanitas, especially in the context of 
Julius Caesar’s acts of mercy in the aftermath of the civil war. As the act of one in a superior position it 
has been argued that clementia in the context of pre-imperial history was not conceived as a virtue. 
According to Syme, clementia had a dubious and variegated history because it had been seized and 
exploited by leaders or parties in the Civil Wars.  For Syme, given this history, clemency was ‘the will of 
a master’ rather than ‘an aristocrat’s virtue’ and ‘to acquiesce in the clementia Caesaris implied 
recognition of despotism’ (Syme:1958:414). Cf. Cic.Att.8.16.2 where he speaks of Caesar’s insidiosa 
clementia (‘treacherous clemency’). Following Syme, Levick has argued similarly on the clementia of 
Tiberius: as ‘the virtue of an autocrat, of a Caesar’ she wonders why clementia was taken up by a 
princeps of Republican inclinations (1975:126). Against such views Konstan has argued more recently 
that clementia was regarded as a ‘wholly positive quality’ and even under Caesar it had no such 
connotations of despotism or tyranny (2005:340). For Konstan, clementia ‘was a virtue, and the senate 
was acting in perfect accord with the traditional meaning of the term when it included it in the clupeus 








necessarily so, for they reflect the historical situation.’50 Haynes has presented a similar 
view, claiming, ‘where [Tacitus] is paradoxical or confusing, he reproduces paradoxes 
and confusion within the ideology of the period.’51 The paradoxical nature of Tacitus’ 
narrative may certainly be read as a reflection of the historical situation or a 
reproduction of the ideology of the period, as both Syme and Haynes suggest. Yet, in 
order to build on these views, this thesis seeks to show that there is a particular role that 
paradox plays in Tacitus’ political and historical thought. Beyond merely ‘reflecting’ 
history and ideology, paradox in Tacitus is imbued with a fundamentally generative 
power. 
 A paradox is a sign of conflict, a conflict between two antithetical institutions, 
values, statements or meanings. Yet, as well as being something which represents 
conflict (whether historical or ideological), in the Annales Tacitus shows that paradox 
also represents or enables peace; in other words paradox is not merely a static sign or 
manifestation of past or present conflicts but it is also a fluid, driving force, which 
generates peace. The generative power of paradox is a crucial aspect of early imperial 
history, given that, that which generated the pax Augusta was the paradoxical 
conflation of Republic and Principate. In Tacitus, the generative power of paradox is 
developed further, since, that which enabled pax et princeps (or otium et princeps) was 
not the paradox of republic and Principate but rather the sovereign paradox of Augustus 
as law. Furthermore, that which continued to generate social stability was the 
individuals’ own wilful self-subjection to the regime, which, as a paradoxical act of 
“free will” only empowers the sovereign and his regime. A similar generative power is 
written into Tacitus’ paradoxical writing of law, morality and hierarchy: these 
structures, as the chapters will show, are innately paradoxical since they embed conflict 
and preserve relations of domination within the social sphere, but at the same time, it is 
through the paradox of hierarchy, for example, which is that it sources revolution, that 
it generates (momentarily) power and democracy. Equally, it is due to the paradox of 
the lex maiestatis (it is paradoxical because in seeking to defend from defamation and 
                                                           
50 Syme (1970:139). See also Mellor (1993:90). 





conspiracy, it further perverts the system of law through the legal yet intrusive activity 
of delatores) that the power of the sovereign and his house is affirmed.  
One can see, then, that paradox plays a crucial role in Tacitus’ picture of 
politics and more widely, his understanding of what generates stability. By looking at 
paradox from this perspective, as something which serves a purpose or plays a 
meaningful role in Tacitus’ historical and political thought, we may resist the 
temptation to reconcile the contradictory nature of Tacitus’ narrative (as well as his 
own opinions) according to a particular logic of interpretation and instead accept the 
paradoxical as the essence of his political ontology. The value of Tacitus as a political 
and historical analyst is thus that not only does his narrative ‘reflect’ or ‘reproduce’ the 
historical and ideological conflicts of the past (which perhaps is to be expected), but 
that it reveals in its own right a wider theoretical framework which allows us to 
understand the role played by paradox (the purpose of paradox) in history and politics. 
However, this theory contains a clue to its own meaning, which is that if it is paradox 
(conflict) that generates peace and if it is paradox that lies beneath the power and 
dictates of the sovereign, then what Tacitus is exposing is not a pure or stable peace but 




WILL TO FORGET?  
ON DISCONTINUOUS MEMORY & REMEMBRANCE IN TACITUS’ AUGUSTAN ROME 
 
 
Social amnesia is terrible because it destroys the base of 
culture, in other words, the viability of culture...At the 
same time, sometimes it is amnesia, artificially created 
forgetfulness, that is the stimulus of society’s progress.1 
 
Bakieva’s notion of social amnesia invites two comparisons from Roman imperial 
history: In his sixth consulship (28 BC), three years after Anthony‘s defeat at Actium, 
Octavian had eighty silver statues of himself melted in order to use the proceeds to 
dedicate tripods in the temple of Apollo. Memorialised in the Res Gestae (RG 24) in 
terms of pietas – and it was a spectacular exemplification of personal modesty – it was 
equally an opportunity for Octavian to eradicate sites which preserved dangerous 
memories from his triumviral past.2 As W. Eder notes ‘it is telling...that after the victory 
over Anthony, when Octavian literally was mon-archos, sole ruler, and not constrained 
by tactical reasons to play the role of staunch Roman and Republican, he did 
everything he could to emphasize exactly this role in order to make people forget the 
time before Actium.’3 It is telling, reflecting well Octavian’s awareness of the 
potentially destructive knowledge communicated in memory’s persistence with 
posterity. Yet, it is furthermore revealing because it affirms the personal and political 
value of forgetting. For Octavian, the process of fostering social forgetting was not 
counter to subject nor state formation. Rather, forgetting and disconnection from the 
civil war past were constitutive to what we might describe as the republican narrative 
of identity necessary for the social and moral progress post-Actium. The melting can 
thus be read in terms of Bakieva’s formulation above – as an attempt to stimulate 
                                                           
1 Bakieva (2007: 94). 
2 See Zanker who argues that the statues, which displayed Octavian ‘spouting self-assured gestures of 
himself’, did not ‘fit in with his gradually evolving new style’ (1990: 86). 





society’s non-civil war progress and of course, Octavian’s appropriated non-triumviral 
identity within it.4  
This need for social amnesia or ‘artificially created forgetfulness’ at given 
moments in history – a need which problematises the familiar notion that ‘forgetting’ is 
synonymous with the loss of identity5 – is also related to us by Tacitus. As he reminds 
us near the beginning of the Agricola, those who survived the Domitianic past did not 
only survive their contemporaries but they also survived a part of their own selves 
(pauci et, ut ita dixerim, non modo aliorum sed etiam nostri superstites sumus; Ag.3.2). 
The survival of a part of one’s own self implies a certain level of forgetting, that is, 
banishing to oblivion traumatic years and memories in order to progress through to a 
new and happier age. If, then, it was through the removal of years from the middle of 
lives (…exemptis e media vita tot annis; Ag.3.2) that progress through the traumas of 
the Domitianic past was enabled, for Tacitus, the will to forget the memory of his own 
servitude under Domitian constituted an important and essential component of his own 
psychological and physical survival.6  
In these two instances therefore, a distinctive parallel emerges: survival and 
political continuity depended on some oblivion – predicated on either a strategic 
politics of ‘forgetting’ or a wilful ‘loss’ of years for the purpose of stimulating social 
(and individual) progress. Considering oblivion in this way encourages another 
perspective: rather than perceiving oblivion simply as a loss of remembrance, for 
Tacitus, Augustus and Augustus’ Rome, it becomes a crucial component of, and agent 
in the construction of a stable and stabilising social memory in the present.7 Given this, 
forgetting becomes a necessity almost – and both on the level of the individual and the 
                                                           
4 For further on ‘Octavianic oblivion’ see Bringmann (2007:310ff.). See also Suet.Aug.36 on Augustus’ 
destruction of acta and Ann.3.28.3 on Octavian’s declaration of all unconstitutional acts from the 30s 
invalid.  
5 According to Gowing, for example, ‘for Romans the past wholly defined the present, and to forget – to 
disconnect with – the past, at either the level of the individual or of the state, risked the loss of identity 
and even extinction.’ (2005:8). However, as Octavian’s melting indicates, it depends on which aspects of 
the past one is forgetting or disconnecting with and when this forgetting or disconnection takes place.  
6 On Ag.3 and survival see further Hedrick (2000:164ff.).  
7 On the value of oblivion see Augé (2004) and Nietzsche (2007). For Nietzsche, the value of forgetting 
is that it enables the individual to feel and experience life ‘unhistorically’, that is, to be saved from the 
burden of the past which can be harmful and fatal. For Augé, oblivion helps to construct the identity one 
desires but it is that which one seeks to forget that nevertheless reflects who they really are (‘Je risque 





state – in order to ‘survive’ either the traumas of civil war or the terrors of tyranny.  In 
other words, the technique of creating and regulating a particular culture of 
remembrance, in order to resituate society and the self in a more comforting mnemonic 
episteme, depended on a sub-culture of forgetting first.  
 Such an engagement with oblivion renders problematic any notion of a 
continuous Roman memory. Spaces of oblivion, or periods of social amnesia signify, it 
seems to me, a series of ruptures embedded within the texture of Roman time and as I 
shall argue, such ruptures reveal an ontological paradox embedded within the 
‘continuum’ of Roman cultural memory: the only way Roman memory could provide a 
‘whole’, ordered and civilised sense of relation to the past and genealogical knowledge 
in the present, was by being essentially discontinuous. And in Tacitus’ Annales this 
theme is pronounced: the discrepancies from the past re-emerge as the darker, non-
glorious aspects of history are now remembered – aspects which are expressed, in 
Syme’s words, through ‘damaging parallels, forgotten facts and any uncomfortable 
truth.’8 In the Tacitean narrative, there remains the underlying will to lose or deny the 
past, but in the context of monarchy and growing Empire, it is not only the trauma of 
civil war that needs to be forgotten, but also the burden of ‘republicanism’. 
 The aim of this chapter is to trace the discontinuous nature of Roman memory 
and remembrance as presented in Tacitus’ prologue (1.1.1-1.5.4) in order to explore the 
implications of this discontinuity for the beginning of the Tacitean narrative and 
through this, the foundation of the Roman Principate. The focus will be on two key 
binaries: republicanism and civil war and republic and monarchy, as I think they 
represent well, in their conjunction, the complexity of Roman memory in terms of its 
dependence on both remembering and forgetting for the purpose of formulating a 
suitable sense of genealogy and through this, an appropriate narrative of identity. A 
secondary aim, which will be pursued alongside the first, will be to trace precisely how 
Augustus in the Tacitean interpretation managed to establish peace upon the foundation 
of the Principate if not, as generally conceived, through the careful cultural 
preservation of traditional customs.  
                                                           





 In the first section, I shall examine Tacitus’ depiction of Augustus and Augustan 
Rome. The Republican past was used as an epistemic system by which individuals 
grounded their identity in the past. This became an episteme: a complex and 
constitutive narrative of the present of Augustus’ Rome.9 Indeed, the Augustan regime 
instigated a paradigm shift – an epistemic departure from the old; but at the same time, 
the paradigm was very much based on, and substantiated through, the careful cultural 
preservation of old-time republican tradition.10 However, in Tacitus’ Augustan Rome, 
the republican moral and ethical bases of Augustus’ episteme are rendered out of place 
and as I shall argue, the narrative begins in flow against the conventional understanding 
of Roman foundational knowledge (and traditional Roman historiographic practice). 
In Tacitus’ Augustan Rome, the Republic has not been restored. Republican 
morality is also disparate; indeed mores are more often disclosed through those who are 
no longer living.11 Similarly, Tacitus’ portrait of Augustus himself is contradictory to 
that of either staunch Roman and Republican, or even republican princeps. Rather, 
Tacitus’ Augustus is an ‘exceptional’ monarch, that is, a monarch who exists as the law, 
rather than he who restores or abides by it.12 Yet, it is through Augustus’ own 
‘exceptional’ being, that the paradoxical nature of his own existence is maintained. In 
other words, Tacitus’ Augustus is not only the exception to the rule but furthermore, he 
is the exception to the rule because he is the rule – and a rule which self-maintains 
through his own extra-legal, exceptional status. This is a significant aspect of the 
prologue and it sets up one of the dominant themes throughout the Tiberian books, the 
progressive corruption of legality and the emergence of conflict. However, in the 
prologue the transcendence of law is not made analogous with a tyrannical or 
                                                           
9 On the episteme as a kind of historical a priori or a ‘certain structure of thought that the men of a 
particular period cannot escape’ see further Foucault’s definition in The Archaeology of Knowledge 
(2002a:211-212). For Foucault, the épistémè means the ‘total set of relations’ which unites and 
consolidates discursive practices in the present period, practices which order knowledge or render 
something as knowable (rather than knowledge itself).  
10 On Augustus’ regime as representative of a ‘paradigm shift’ see Wallace-Hadrill (1997 and 2005:55-
82).  
11 Many argue for Germanicus as the moral exemplum in Annales 1, the foil to Tiberius (see below, p. 
141, n.96). However, in my view, and as will be discussed in Chapter 3, this is a problematic reading 
given that Germanicus’ portrait up until his death remains inconsistent. Praising only those who are no 
longer alive (in the narrative context) may be a Tacitean technique of presenting moral exempla, the key 
example being Julius Agricola.  





‘thanatopolitical’ regime (one based on the use and threat of death for the mobilization 
of political life). Rather, Augustus mobilised life through the seduction of all with the 
sweetness of leisure (cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit; Ann.1.2). The use of leisure, as 
well as gifts and grain, to pacify (or to control) the population in the aftermath of civil 
war asserts the fundamentally ‘biopolitical’ nature of Augustan power and politics, that 
is, the use of political power to manage, regulate and ‘improve’ life rather than threaten 
or reduce it to servitude.13 And as I shall argue, it is due to Augustus’ techniques of 
improving life through pleasure, as well as his own ability to be immune to the law 
(through absorbing it) that pax is maintained. In the context of new pleasures and 
benefits, traditional republicanism in Tacitus’ Augustan Rome is therefore not only no 
longer relevant, but furthermore, it is seemingly no longer desirable.14 
In the second section, I shall focus on one of the key questions raised in the 
prologue: quotus quisque reliquus, qui rem publicam vidisset? (Ann.1.3.7). By raising 
this question at the opening of his narrative, Tacitus makes an important point. In the 
early years of the Principate, stability and legitimacy rested on notions of continuity 
between the present and the republican past. But if, as Tacitus implies, few in the 
Augustan period had seen the Republic, experience as a criterion of knowledge is 
removed from the historical episteme. Memory of that past is now immediately 
inauthentic and this alludes to the hollow centre at the “whole” of Roman genealogy of 
knowledge.  Given this, the Augustan episteme, an episteme based on restorative and 
restoring narratives is now named as a discursive construction of reality, as an 
                                                           
13 Michel Foucault defined biopolitics in the final section of The History of Sexuality Volume 1: The Will 
to Knowledge (1998). The term was later used by Foucault in a series of lectures given at the College de 
France from 1975-6, now published as Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College De France, 
1975-6, Penguin (2004). A subsequent series of lectures given between 1978-9 further explored the 
concept (these lectures have now been published in a series entitled Security, Territory, Population 
(Palgrave, 2007) and The Birth of Biopolitics (Palgrave, 2008). I use the term biopolitical here because 
biopolitical power (or biopower) is distinct from traditional forms of power based on the threat of death 
(which Augustan power was not, in its totality). Rather biopower is power which is utilised through an 
emphasis on the protection of life. As such, Foucault defines it as positive and productive, rather than 
negative and ‘subtractive’ and as something which works through ‘an explosion of numerous and diverse 
techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations’ (1998:140). For 
Foucault’s key definitions of biopolitics see (1998:139-143, esp. 143), (2004: 254) and (2007:1).  
14 Cf. Ann. 3.55.5, where Tacitus suggests that the institutions and customs of the past were not always 
better. As Ginsburg notes, ‘of particular interest to the historian seems to have been the question of 
whether the institutions and decisions handed down by the maiores possess a timeless value or whether 





invention.15 But the problem of memory in Tacitus’ prologue is further complicated 
given the backdrop of Tacitus’ exceptional monarchic Augustan state – a state which 
automatically and immediately exists contra morem maiorum (that is, against the way 
of the ancestors).16 In the presence of growing monarchic sovereignty, the familiar and 
traditional values associated with the republican past (libertas, aequalitas, moderatio) 
are in a progressive state of erosion and Tacitus’ depictions of elite activity are 
notoriously linked with a growing descent into servitude. The Annales’ prologue 
description of the Augustan senate presents no exception: the senators are servile 
(1.2.1), the magistrates have become corrupted by greed and the law by violence, 
vanity and money (1.2.2). According to Tacitus, nowhere did mores remain untouched 
and aequalitas had been cast aside (1.4.1) – but despite this, there is peace.  
There is a peculiar ambivalence written into Tacitus’ portrait of Augustan Rome. 
Despite elite ignorance of traditional codes for behaviour and the failure to emulate the 
virtuous habits of the ancestors, peace is nevertheless sustained.17 This is the 
unfortunate and paradoxical aspect of Tacitean elite critiques written throughout his 
histories: the integral link is not between libertas et pax but between servitium et pax.18 
However, since servility can only manifest peace if it is to Augustus, the integral link, 
rather, is between pax et princeps.19  
                                                           
15 Cf. Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) on the invention of tradition: ‘Invented tradition is taken to mean a 
set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, 
which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies 
continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a 
suitable historic past.’ (1983:1). See also Lobur (2008:5ff.) and Habinek (1998:34-68, esp. pp.53-54). 
16 Cf. Cic.Rep.3.43: ergo ubi tyrannus est…dicendum est plane nullam esse rem publicam. 
17Although at Ann.1.4.1 Tacitus states that nothing remained of ancient, uncorrupted mores, it should be 
noted that ignorance of tradition and traditional codes for behavior is not maintained throughout the 
narrative (as will be discussed in Chapter 4). 
18 I am aware of the arguments against positing a binary between libertas and servitium, on which see 
Miller (2005:7ff.). However, in the Tacitean prologue, the terms are used in relation to the elite and in 
the context of aristocratic behaviour. In such a context the juxtaposition of the terms implies their basic 
meaning – which in my view is essentially the opposition between freedom and slavery, on which see 
Roller (2001:213ff.).  
19 The relationship between peace and the Principate is a key feature of Tacitean historiography, (cf. 
Ann.1.2, 1.9-10, 3.28; Hist.1.1; Ag.1.3). However, it seems that pax is linked, specifically, with the 
foundation of the Principate. Subsequently, whilst it was in the interests of peace for all power to be 






The focus therefore, is on the present – “remembering the present” rather than 
remembering the past and disconnection from the ideological construction of the 
traditions of the republican past, according to the Tacitean account, does not result in 
the collapse or loss of the epistemic grounding of contemporary society. Rather, the 
memory of the past is supplemented with the alternative memory of Augustan power in 
the present. In Tacitus’ prologue, a crucial break is inserted between republican 
memory and Augustan culture. The Annales therefore opens by exploring and 
establishing a paradox at the heart of social memory (and thus within the Roman 
historic episteme) through an engagement with the paradox at the heart of the imperial 
order (republican princeps/Principate and Libertas).20 I argue that this paradox was 
maintained throughout the Augustan period (at least in the Tacitean narrative) through 
the exceptionality of Augustus, an exceptionality grounded in an all-absorbing 
imperium.  
In the concluding section, I offer some suggestions for why Tacitus’ narrative 
appears to work against the re-articulation of the moral value of the republican past. 
Whilst Tacitus’ writing of Augustan Rome struggles against the memory of the 
republican past, it reflects in this struggle Tacitus’ own discontinuity from and ‘strategy 
of resistance’ to the traditional meta-narrative of republican history and memory, a 
narrative which he resists due to his contemporary political difference, but in which he 
nonetheless remains implicated.21 This modality of resistance yet implication produces 
a conflict which reflects the wider theoretical tension between the processes of 
forgetting and remembering. Whilst ‘forgetting’ in the domain of the cultural – the 
process through which identity oscillates and is enabled to re-appropriate according to 
socio-political flux (years removed, and statues melted) – is both necessary for and 
integral to social and moral progress, the problem is that in the realm of the 
psychological, forgetting, cognitively speaking, can never happen. As a result of this, 
                                                           
20 Similarly, the political paradox presented by Republic and Principate is weighed down by the moral 
paradox at the heart of Roman genealogy – civil war and republicanism; “who had seen the republic?” 
becomes in the Tacitean narrative “who had not seen a civil war?”.  
21 ‘Strategy of resistance’ is a Foucauldian term to which, in his opinion, every type of power gives rise: 
‘As soon as there is a power relation, there is a possibility of resistance. We can never be ensnared by 
power; we can always modify its grip in determinate conditions and according to a precise strategy’ 





any act of forgetting must encompass an act of remembering.22 The desire to commit an 
act to oblivion requires that the act is remembered. This is the fundamental paradox at 
the heart of Roman (individual) memory, crucial to the interpretability of the rest of the 
hexad and Tacitean historiography. The narrative representation of rupture and 
discontinuity may be read as a manifestation of Tacitus’ own guilt and anxiety. In his 
own words; ‘we should have lost memory as well as voice, if it had been as easy to 
forget as to keep silent.’23 But though voice can be silent, memory can never truly be 
lost; rather memory, always there and always diverse, persists as source of conflict. 
And this creates ‘the will to forget’ – a will which is always there but which remains 
ultimately unsuccessful: I argue that this is Tacitus’ ‘uncomfortable truth’ and a 
dominant force in his narrative (and inevitably narrativised) representations of history.  
                                   
1.1 Tacitus on Augustus and Augustus’ Republic  
 
Tacitus is economical with the preliminaries – from the 
dead ruler he wished to break free, quickly.24 
 
 
Beginning at the Beginning?  
The start date of Tacitus’ Annales has inspired some considerable debate. The issue 
may be phrased as why begin with the death of Augustus and the accession of Tiberius 
in AD 14 and not, for example, the ‘accession’ of Augustus in 27 BC – ‘the start of civil 
peace and the new order.’25 At Ann.3.24 Tacitus tells us that he will save the task of 
writing about Augustus to a later date; nonetheless, the Annales offers much on the 
dead ruler and for this, we must turn to the chapters preceding the Tiberian narrative, 
                                                           
22 See Ricoeur (2004: 414ff.). For further parallels on the paradox of forgetting see Hedrick (2000:10ff., 
113ff.) on the damnatio memoriae: ‘The name of the enemy survives, and wherever it is erased the 
erasure itself is displayed as a sign, a reminder of what lies beneath it’ (113).  
23 Ag.2: memoriam quoque ipsam cum voce perdidissemus, si tam in nostra potestate esset oblivisci 
quam tacere. 
24 Syme (1958:304-5). 





1.1-1.5, which in my view constitute a unit and form the programmatic prologue to the 
Annales.
26  
 According to Leeman, for the Roman reader the prologue was of secondary 
importance, but for the modern reader, looking for motives and backgrounds from a 
2000-year distance, the prologue is paramount to understanding the text in question.27 
In the case of the Annales, the prologue is of particular importance; but it is 
compressed, since as well as offering the customary explanation of authorial intent;28 it 
also dictates a history of Roman power from the Kings to Augustus (a span of roughly 
500 years in just over 50 words);29 and finally, a brief overview of Augustus and his 
Principate.30 Yet despite this brevity, often read as characteristic of the ‘jaundiced’ 
Tacitean view, there is a case to be made for the importance of Tacitus’ prologue; and 
there is much to gain from the insight it provides into the nature of the dead ruler, the 
success of his Principate, and the implications of his death on the Tiberian Principate – 
all of which ultimately elucidate and explain Tacitus’ structural choice. 
 In my view, choosing to begin with the death of the divine Augustus is fitting, 
especially if rather than reading the Annales from the perspective of the transition from 
Republic to Empire, we approach the narrative in terms of the transition from Augustus 
to Tiberius. In AD 14 the political shift from Republic to Empire has already taken 
place. Thus, the transition in Tacitus’ first hexad is not about the political 
transformation from Republic to Principate as much as it is about the sovereign 
succession from Augustus to Tiberius, within which is compressed the co-existence of 
                                                           
26 Views on the prologue differ. For Syme, it falls into two parts: first, the vicissitudes of governmental 
power at Rome from the Kings to Augustus (1.1.1-1.1.2); and second, the character of history-writing 
and the authors design (1.1.3). Then follows the “Introduction”, as Syme termed it, starting with 
Augustus’ rise to power (1.2), the death of Augustus (1.5.4), the murder of A. Postumus (1.6.1), and 
finally the debates in the senate on the accession of Tiberius (1.7-15). Then the scene changes to 
Pannonia and the Rhine (1.16ff.) after which the narration is firmly underway (1958:304). Woodman 
(1998:23) on the other hand reads the prologue from 1.1-1.5 (similar to the present study) and divides the 
first five chapters into two parts: (1) “pauca de Augusto”: 1.2.1-1.4.1 and (2) “extrema (de. Augusto)”: 
1.4.2 to 1.5.4. For further on Tacitean prologues specifically see Leeman (1973:169-208). For an 
extended study of Latin prose prefaces see Janson (1964).  
27 Leeman (1973:169). 
28 1.1.3: inde consilium mihi pauca de Augusto et extrema tradere, mox Tiberii principatum et cetera 
(‘hence my plan is the transmission of a few things about Augustus and his final period, then of Tiberius’ 
Principate, and the rest.’ 






republican and imperial epistemologies. From such a perspective, the choice of AD 14 
as a start date is suitable. At AD 14 the shift from a republican method of government 
to a hereditary monarchical form of government is confirmed; and now the analysis is 
centred on the examination of how personal power transfers from one monarch to 
another, and how traditional narratives (of republican morality, ideas and ideals) 
perform their social role despite his sovereign presence.31  
In what follows, I shall examine in more detail Tacitus’ ‘economical’ 
preliminary narrative, in order to outline the framework it provides for understanding 
Tacitus’ writing of peace and sovereignty in the rest of the hexad. Tacitus’ Augustus and 
Augustan Rome provide a model against which the Tiberian Principate can be better 
understood.32 The depiction of a monarchic regime, which absorbs the functions of the 
legal order and seduces all with pleasure and profit, and in so doing, suspends post-civil 
war ideological conflict and maintains peace (despite increasing servitium) is the 
specificity and success of Augustus and his Principate. Subsequently, AD 14 – the 
death of Augustus and the beginning of the rest of the Roman Principate – represents 
the moment when the sustenance and strength of the aforementioned techniques of 
Augustan rule (which I will term ‘Augustan Exceptionality’) will be tested.  
 
Res publica restituta: Re-creating the Continuity of Time  
 
As with modern persons, so it is with nations...awareness 
of being imbedded in secular, serial time, with all its 
implications of continuity, yet of ‘forgetting’ the 
experience of this continuity engenders the need for a 
narrative of “identity”.33  
 
                                                           
31 See Alston (2008:151ff.).: ‘With the transition from imperial authority AD 14 becomes an ideal date 
from which to start the analysis, not because the Augustan period was not monarchic but because the 
debate about the Augustan period and the relationship between the present and the republic became a 
significant issue.’ (151). 
32 Equally, Tacitus’ Tiberius and Tiberian Rome, by retrospect, help the intelligibility of Tacitus’ 
Augustus and Augustan Rome (as will be discussed in the next chapter).  





Anderson points to two defining features of “Augustan Culture”34 – the regulation of 
which was integral to the success of his regime post-Actium: these are ‘the experience 
of continuity’ and ‘the need for a narrative of identity’ and both have various 
implications on the experience of Roman temporality, the ethics of Roman memory and 
Tacitus’ writing of both in his prologue. 
 In the aftermath of the civil wars, after the sea of Actium had been stained with 
Roman blood (post mare Actiacum Romano cruore infectum; Sen.Clem.1.11.1), 
forgetting the experience of continuity was imperative for the construction of a new 
‘narrative of identity’.35 Being embedded in serial time, with continuous memory, 
meant experiencing and remembering the previous years of civil strife and the 
foundational acts of violence upon which the new regime rested. Whilst we know that 
Actium was re-presented as a victory, celebrated on Augustus’ return to Rome in 29 BC 
and memorialised through the so-called “Actium Arch”, it was equally an event which 
problematised Augustus’ own identity and the ideology of the age. As well as being the 
“non-civil war” that (paradoxically) brought an end to the civil war, it also concretised 
the brutal means through which the new age came into being.36 Subsequently, anxiety 
                                                           
34 On Augustan Culture see Galinsky (1996). On time and Augustan Culture see Feeney (2008:108-137) 
and Wallace-Hadrill (1997:16ff., 2005:58ff.). 
35 There are various arguments regarding Actium and/as civil war: Most scholars agree that it was 
reconstructed by Augustus as a foreign war against Cleopatra and the un-Roman behaviour of Anthony. 
For Syme, ‘it was part of the Augustan cultural achievement to valorise the civil war past by making the 
victory at Actium the legitimizing foundation myth of the new order’ (1939:335). For various arguments 
from this perspective see further Eder (1993:100), Galinsky (1996:82), Kleiner (2005:205/222) and 
Osgood (2006:351/375). But, the fact that RG 34.1 claims ‘in consulatu sexto et septimo, postquam bella 
civilia extinxeram’ and not for e.g., ‘postquam bella externa extinxeram’ does pose a problem here. See 
also Liv.Per.133, Vell.2.87.1, Sen.Clem.1.11.1 and Suet.Aug.9 where it is attested that Actium was civil 
not foreign. Gurval (1998) has extensively studied how the relationship between Actium and Augustus 
was publicly celebrated and commemorated in Augustan art, coinage and poetry but his argument 
undermines the view that Augustus sought to make propagandistic use of Actium. In Gurval’s view, the 
image of Actium ‘was never fixed or constant but must be seen in a process of political development’ 
(1998:3 n.6); the so-called Actian arch is in Gurval’s view a generalized monument to the emperor's 
military achievements rather than a reminder of Antony's defeat. Lange’s discussion (2009) offers some 
reassessments, arguing ultimately that Augustus’ contemporaries could no longer distinguish between 
foreign and civil. In any case, the narrative of triumph only results from the recognition of the painful 
reality of civil war and the foundational problem it posed, hence, the subsequent rebranding of the battle 
into a narrative of triumph and closure. 
36 Cf. Osgood (2006:403ff.): ‘to state the truth about Octavian’s rise to power threatened to undermine 
everything he had achieved’ and this perhaps explains Augustus’ decision in 28 BC to take the 
customary oath that he had done nothing contrary to the laws, and his annulment by edict in the same 
year of everything he had enacted illegally up until 29. To prevent Actium from becoming the threat or 





over that past and the resulting will to forget the experience of that continuity 
stimulated a struggle to appropriate it in line with a better past – a past which was 
glorious and glorifying, moral and also moralising. In other words, the unavoidable 
experience of continuity with the civil war past engendered the need for a new (yet old 
or older) narrative of identity:  as Ellen O’Gorman writes, making the important point, 
‘the totalising claims of Augustus’ Principate’ were ‘claims to order, stability, and 
continuity with a pre-civil war (republican) past.’37 Similarly, as Lobur writes, ‘the 
Romans of the Augustan age, if they were not living in the same community their 
forefathers did, still lived in a very “ancestral” atmosphere’.38 Hence for Romans, it 
was important to feel a sense of the presence of the past in the present. But, in all cases, 
the ‘past’ and the ‘community’ to which they (and we) refer when discussing Augustan 
Culture as a culture of remembrance, is specifically the pre-Actium/pre-Octavian 
republican past. Thus, Augustus’ narrative of identity – the discursive construction of a 
restored republican ‘reality’ was crucial; yet, being based on specifically the pre-civil 
war past it was crucially discontinuous.  
Before analysing Tacitus’ re-creation of this (already re-created) sense of 
continuity, a few examples of Augustus’ restoration programme (or narrative of 
identity) are noteworthy.39 The essential aim of the program is stressed best in the Res 
Gestae:  
                                                                                                                                                                         
surprise that in the latter half of the first century there emerges a notable tension between remembering 
Augustus as the peaceful emperor he became and remembering his role in the civil wars). On the 
problematic nature of the civil war past see Sen.Clem. 1.9.1-11.1 on the two sides to Augustus’ career 
and, speaking in the context of the civil war between Caesar and Pompey, Sen.Con.10.3.5: ‘optima 
civilis belli defensio oblivio est’. See also Suet.Gai.23 where it is suggested that Caligula forbade the 
celebration of Actium and of Sicily). See also Dio’s accounts of Octavian’s reception after Actium at 
Brundisium in 31/30 and Rome in 29 (51.21.34-5) – Dio tells that Octavian refused the gold crowns 
which had been voted to him and provided by the cities of Italy, paid off his own debts and forgave those 
owed to him. Again, this was perhaps another attempt to make people forget the fact that these triumphs 
were celebrating the victory over fellow citizens.  
37 O’Gorman (2000:23), my emphasis.  
38 Lobur (2008:173). 
39 The nature of Augustus’ restoration is of course debated, as is the phrase “Res Publica Restituta”. On 
this see Judge (1974:279-311) in whose view the phrase belongs to Mommsen and modern conjecture 
rather than ancient sources and epigraphical evidence. For an opposing view, see Wirszubski (1950:107-
123). See also Toher (1993:151ff.) and more generally Galinsky (1996/2005) and Edmonson (2009:195-
202).  It seems that much of the debate stems from a tendency to distinguish between whether the 
restoration was political/governmental or cultural/moral – i.e. “Res Publica Restituta” (with capital 
letters) or “res publica restituta” (denoting the moral/cultural kind) on which see Galinsky (1996). 






Legibus novis me auctore latis multa exempla maiorum 
exolescentia iam ex nostro saeculo reduxi et ipse 
multarum rerum exempla imitanda posteris tradidi.  
(RG 8.5) 
 
By new laws passed with my sponsorship, I restored 
many traditions of the ancestors, which were falling into 
disuse in our age, and myself I handed on precedents of 
many things to be imitated in later generations.40 
 
 
Augustus is referring, in particular, to the legislation of 18/17 BC (perhaps, a further 
attempt to enforce acts of ‘forgetting’ the dangerous memories from the past). 
However, as Galinsky notes in his interpretation, ‘Augustus was not content with 
merely restabilising the mechanics of government…it was a time for rededicating the 
state to values, virtues, ideals and ideas.’41 This is the crucial aspect: the legislation, 
though new (leges novae), was morally and mnemonically inclined, designed to 
rearticulate the values and principles of the republican past in order to reintegrate into 
the domain of the cultural an ideology which could inspire, moralise and civilise.42 
Furthermore, and as the passage suggests, mores and leges are not only reinstalled, but 
also in unification. In the years leading up to 31 BC, the years of emergency which 
permitted Octavian’s own lawlessness, the relation between leges and mores was 
problematized (pace Horace, ‘what use are laws, empty as they are without morals?).43 
However, through the programme of moral legislation, the previous years of violence 
and exception are remedied: leges and mores are flourishing again. Though, now, 
neither can flourish unless implemented by the ruler, or to use the appropriated title; 
‘curator legum et morum’.44 
                                                                                                                                                                         
different formulations which denote the restoration – on this see Lange’s discussion of Livy (2009:183). 
Since narratives of identity are not to be analysed through the binary of truth and falsehood, I do not 
intend to question the authenticity of these accounts nor ascertain whether the republic/Republic really 
was restored under Augustus. Contexts and uses will vary naturally. By res publica restituta, I mean a 
restored sense of the epistemic structures of the republican past in the present. 
40 Translations of Augustus’ Res Gestae are those of Galinsky (1996). 
41 Galinsky (1996:19-20). 
42 Cornell (1986:82). Cf. Zanker who further adds an element of ‘healing’ to Augustus’ politics 
(1990:101). 
43 Hor.Carm.3.24.35-6: quid leges sine moribus vanae proficiunt? 





Another example can be found in the History of Augustus’ contemporary 
Velleius Paterculus:  
 
Finita vicesimo anno bella civilia, sepulta externa, 
revocata pax, sopitus ubique armorum furor, restituta vis 
legibus, iudiciis auctoritas, senatui maiestas, imperium 
magistratuum ad pristinum redactum modum, 
tantummodo octo praetoribus adlecti duo. Prisca illa et 
antiqua rei publicae forma revocata.  (Vell.2.89.3-4) 
 
After twenty years the civil wars were ended, foreign 
wars suppressed, peace restored, the frenzy of arms 
everywhere lulled to rest; validity was restored to the 
laws, authority to the courts, and dignity to the Senate; the 
power of the magistrates was reduced to its former limits, 
with the sole exception that two were added to the eight 
existing praetors. That old traditional form of the republic 
was brought back. 
 
For Velleius, the restitutio rei publicae (restoration of the state) is evidently a key 
aspect and the passage above provides an important example of Augustus’ regulating 
and regulated cultural realm. The language of republican history has been brought back 
into prominence and the re-establishment of old political form (restituta vis legibus, 
iudiciis auctoritas, senatui maiestas) has now cured the previous years of civil strife 
and frenzy (furor).45 The theme of return to a pre-civil war past is manifest and through 
this narrative Velleius both attests and perpetuates the cultural activity centred on 
emphasising the presence of republican restoration and continuity.46 Put in another way, 
Velleius’ claims propagate the narrative of the symbolic order since they reproduce its 
ordered and ordering structure. 
 Similar narratives can be traced in the accounts of other contemporaries. Livy, 
for example, describes the settlement of 27 BC simply as ‘rebus compositis’ (when 
things had been put back together; Epit.134). Virgil’s Aeneid is of course another 
                                                           
45 For further on Velleius on Augustus see Gowing (2007). On Velleius and his ‘cultural activity’ see 
Lobur (2008:94ff.).  
46 Horace expresses similar sentiments, for example: tua, Caesar, aetas | fruges et agris rettulit uberes| et 
signa nostro restituit Iovi| derepta Parthorum superbis| postibus et vacuum duellis (Your age, Caesar, 
returns fruits to the fields in abundance and restored to Jupiter our standards snatched from proud 





important example: the epic is foundational, stressing the ending of war and re-
establishment of order under Augustus’ Saturna regna (6.791-5).47 For other 
contemporaries, the line between restoration and revolution has often been read as 
pronounced in their works. If aetiology attempts to bridge the rupture between past and 
present, aetiological narratives written after Actium may face a problem. Ovid’s Fasti 
are, in some ways, exemplary of this conflict. As Newlands argues, ‘the poem offers 
important insights into the mentality of Roman society’ and explores ‘the authority of 
the sources by which national myths are constructed and time and speech controlled.’48 
In other words, whilst Velleius’ and Virgil’s text may be read as texts which cultivate 
Augustus’ regulation of time through the restoration rhetoric, Ovid on the other hand 
reflects on the ideological management of ‘truth’ by ‘uncovering the disorderliness of 
the past and the often arbitrary nature of links between the past and present.’49 
However, the essence of Ovid is his ambiguity and despite his musings on the nature of 
monarchic Rome, Ovid also gives support to Augustan uses of time and memory. As 
Wallace-Hadrill argues on the Fasti, the incorporation of Augustus into the republican 
year replicated the emperor’s own efforts to insert himself into the “heart of Roman 
time”.50 Ultimately, and as Miller neatly explains, ‘every pun reveals not a hidden truth 
but another series of double meanings that reflects back on itself to create a depthless 
mise-en-abyme.’51 In other words, whilst the insertion of Augustus into Roman time 
preserves Augustus’ importance in time, the pun equally ‘reflects back on itself’ 
suggesting simultaneously Augustus’ influence on time. In so doing, Ovid does 
promote Augustus’ traditionalist narrative and the idea of Augustus as part of the moral 
fabric of Roman life, but only through simultaneously drawing attention to the 
artificiality and constructed-ness of time itself, mirroring perhaps, Augustus’ own 
paradoxical and peculiar/exceptional technique of preservation (through violation). 
                                                           
47 Cf. Hardie (1998:78) ‘[Virgil’s] literary endings and closings enter the world of history, via the 
particular institution (self-consciously revived by Augustus) of the opening and closing of the gates of 
the temple of Janus to mark the start and conclusion of war…the restoration of order’.  
48 Newlands (2002:200). 
49 
Ibid (204). 
50 Wallace-Hadrill (1987:223-4). 





Thus, to slip back into the re-discovered continuity of time required the creation 
of various corrections, balances and erasures: on one hand, in the Augustan 
construction of a republican past the civil dissensions represented a discontinuity or 
rupture which was best forgotten in the republican restoration; on the other, and at the 
same time, the increasing presence of Augustus’ own sovereign being in the present of 
a “restored” republic represented a paradox which required some forgetting if it was not 
to erode the strength of the restoration discourse. Ultimately, the task of recreating the 
continuity of time and the appropriate narrative of identity alongside it depended on 
some oblivion. Subsequently, notions of temporality in the context of the early 
Principate are complicated due to the co-existence of these various layerings of 
contradictory realities. As Feeney puts it, simply: ‘the fantasy of turning back time will 
call into question the basic structure of Roman time’52 and whilst in Augustan Rome, 
the regulation of temporal and mnemonic fantasy was, possibly, maintained; in Tacitus’ 
prologue, narratives of identity and the interrelated experiences of continuity are called 
into question, and exposed as unstable. Whilst at least some Augustan contemporary 
conceptions of historical continuity are proud and congratulatory, though also 
ambiguous and coded, with the advantage of hindsight Tacitus’ brief history of 
Augustus now acts to unfold the values and political rituals associated with the 
republican past. Rather than a republican princeps, Tacitus’ Augustus is the princeps, 
the ‘sole ruler’.53 In his retrospective account therefore, the idea of an ‘ideologically 
managed truth’ and the discursive practices through which it was maintained are 
analysed as such. Consequently, the credibility of the temporal narrative of the 
Augustan episteme is eroded, and a different, sequential and causal, but also potentially 
fragmentary chronological sequence from the kings, through the Republic, to civil war 





                                                           
52 Feeney (2008:109). 





Res non gestae: Being Remembered for Becoming the Rule  
The first book of the Annales has been described as a text which takes as its main 
theme the growth of tyranny.54 When considering Tacitus’ Augustus, in reference to 
whom Walker claims ‘Tacitus’ whole theory of tyranny is expressed’55 (and particularly 
Tacitus’ Tiberius as will be discussed in the following chapters), this categorisation 
needs some re-assessment. Besides the fact that the term tyrannus is mentioned only 
once in the Annales,56 a tyrannical regime cannot, in my view, be made synonymous 
with one which sustains peace.57 Any theory of tyranny expressed in Tacitus is more 
complex, as insinuated in the opening paragraph of the Annales: 
   
Urbem Romam a principio reges habuere; libertatem et 
consulatum L. Brutus instituit. dictaturae ad tempus 
sumebantur; neque decemviralis potestas ultra biennium, 
neque tribunorum militum consulare ius diu valuit. non 
Cinnae, non Sullae longa dominatio; et Pompei 
Crassique potentia cito in Caesarem, Lepidi atque 
Antonii arma in Augustum cessere, qui cuncta discordiis 
civilibus fessa nomine principis sub imperium accepit. 
(1.1.1-2) 
 
From the beginning the city of Rome was held by kings. 
Lucius Brutus established freedom and the consulship. 
Dictatorships were taken up when time required so; nor 
was the power of the decimvirs valid beyond two years, 
nor did the consular authority of military tribunes prevail 
for long. Neither the domination of Cinna nor Sulla was 
lengthy; and the power of Pompeius and Crassus passed 
quickly to Caesar, as did the armies of Lepidus and 
Antonius to Augustus, who, accepted everything, 
                                                           
54 Walker (1952:212). See also Boesche (1996: 85ff.) and Henderson who argues: ‘Tacitus tells how the 
cumulative procession of reigns through the first dynasty produced derealisation, measuring the 
alienation of Roman discourse from its former meanings in an exponential series of degradations from 
one tyrant to the next…mockery of a monster.’ (1998:259).  
55 Walker (1952:212).  
56At Ann.6.6.7. I note that tyranny/tyrants and despotism/despots are closely related – and that Tacitus 
does not necessarily have to use the word ‘tyrannus’ to denote some form of tyrannical power; however 
he did have the word at his disposal yet chose to use others, almost all of the time.  
57 Cf. Cic.Rep.3.43, (see above p.35, n.16). Also notable is Tacitus’ comment at Ann.1.1 – tyrants are 
normally conceptualised as rulers who seize or ‘take’ power (cf. Woodman [2004a:1]), but Tacitus 





exhausted as it now was by civil discord, under his 
imperium in the name of prince. 
 
Tacitus here describes the history of Roman political power from the kings to Augustus 
(753-27 BC). Whilst the passage is undeniably brief, clear distinctions between forms 
of power are made (potestas, ius, dominatio, potentia) and as will be discussed, the 
categories thus defined are not ones which can easily accommodate Tacitus’ Augustus, 
his ‘revolution’ nor the specificity of his personal and political (moralising and self-
legitimising) power. For example, distinctions are made between the regal period of the 
first seven kings, the brief domination of Cinna and Sulla, the powerfulness of Pompey 
and Crassus and then finally the Principate of Augustus, which clearly marks an end-
point and sense of closure to the long-spanning history of Roman political dissension.58 
Thus, already Tacitus’ cataloguing of constitutional states, though complex, seems 
particularly distinguishable from Tacitus’ diagnosis of Augustus and his particular form 
of government. In short, one needs to note that Tacitus presents a distinction between 
the regnum of kings, the dominationes of dictators, the potentia of triumvirs and the all-
encompassing imperium that Augustus exercised nomine principis, which, incidentally, 
is not analogous to the models of monarchia later ancient (and modern authors) 
attribute to his regime.59 This deserves further explanation and comparison – Tacitus’ 
infamously brief history of Augustus is as follows: 
 
ubi militem donis, populum annona, cunctos dulcedine 
otii pellexit, insurgere paulatim, munia senatus 
magistratuum legum in se trahere, nullo adversante, cum 
ferocissimi per acies aut proscriptione cecidissent, ceteri 
nobilium, quanto quis servitio promptior, opibus et 
honoribus extollerentur ac novis ex rebus aucti tuta et 
praesentia quam vetera et periculosa mallent. (1.2.2) 
                                                           
58 For an opposite view, see Levene (2010:298-9). For Levene, one effect of Tacitus’ opening is ‘to 
flatten all non-republican varieties of political rule into the single issue of domination: there is implicitly 
little substantial difference between Romulus and (e.g.) Cincinnatus or Sulla except the shorter time that 
the latter held control; there is implicitly no substantial difference between Romulus and Augustus.’ Cf. 
O’Gorman: ‘the extreme variety of words for power…suggests at first that this constitutes a precise 
description of different aspects of rule…but the absence of explicit links, evokes the idea of a hidden 
reality, a true relationship between these different aspects of power.’(2000:8). 
59 See Rich (1989:86-110.) on Dio’s Augustus’ monarchy. Suetonius and Plutarch consider Augustus as 






When he had seduced the army with gifts, the people with 
cheap grain and all with the sweetness of leisure, he, 
gradually rising up, absorbed the functions of the senate, 
the magistrates and the laws – with no opposition, as the 
boldest would have been taken in battle or proscription. 
The rest, according to how eager they were for slavery, 
were elevated by wealth and honours, and besides, they 
had profited from the revolution so now they preferred 
security and the present, rather than the old and the 
dangerous.  
 
Though brief, this passage is telling. Immediately, we can trace a specific discrepancy 
between Tacitus’ Augustan Rome and the narratives found in Velleius’ History and 
Augustus’ Res Gestae. Whilst restoration is a key feature of the latter two, Tacitus’ 
Augustan Rome is a state charged with an absence of any restorative faculty. Whilst 
Velleius claims that dignity was restored to the senate, authority to the courts, and the 
old traditional form of the republic restored (antiqua rei publicae forma revocata) – 
everybody in Tacitus’ Augustan Rome has been ‘seduced’ by the sweetness of leisure 
(cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit). There is no sense of return to a pre-civil war past, and 
no sense of res publica restituta (though one senses the feeling of Livy’s reference to 
‘rebus compositis’).60 The men from the past, the boldest or most courageous 
(ferocissimi) had been disposed of.  
 In L’Hoir’s analysis of Ann.1.2, a comparison is offered with Cicero’s account 
of Caesar’s settlement after Pharsalus (Phil.2.116). Her analysis centres on magic: ‘the 
results of this dominion are the same, as far as the people are concerned: as Caesar’s 
gifts accustom them to slavery, so Augustus’ beguiling largesse acclimatizes them to a 
similar servitude…similarly in se trahere insinuates a paranormal magnetism. Tacitus 
implies that like a conjurer, Augustus has performed his seductive magic on the people 
and senate.’61 Whilst the category of ‘magician’ at least offers a different perspective to 
that of ‘tyrant’, L’Hoir’s analysis is somewhat limiting. Firstly, as she notes herself, the 
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vocabulary of the two pieces is different: (‘Tacitus substitutes pellexit for Cicero’s 
devinxerat’).62 Moreover, the paradigm of seducer-magician, similar to tyrant, cannot 
explain the reciprocal relationship Tacitus posits between Augustus and the elite – the 
elite were not forced or reduced into slavery but they were ready for slavery (servitio 
promptior). Furthermore, imagery and language related to ‘magic’ is too close to 
imagery of super-naturality and/or divination. Yet, Tacitus’ Augustus is not portrayed as 
divine nor supernatural here. The feeling is that there is no model against which we can 
elucidate Tacitus’ Augustus. All that can be ascertained, at this stage in the narrative, is 
that there was no restoration under his regime, nor renewal. Rather, Tacitus takes as his 
point of departure the notion that Augustus instigated a ‘revolution’, a revolution that 
becomes progressively characteristic of a specifically biopolitical form of sovereignty.  
 If we return to the Res Gestae, further and specific ‘corrections’ or 
discrepancies can be traced. The following passage, Augustus on his becoming of 
Augustus in 27 BC, can be compared: 
 
In consulatu sexto et septimo, postquam bella civilia 
exstinxeram, per consensum universorum potitus rerum 
omnium, rem publicam ex mea potestate in senatus 
populique Romani arbitrium transtuli. Quo pro merito 
meo senatus consulto Augustus appellatus sum et laureis 
postes aedium mearum vestiti publice coronaque civica 
super ianuam meam fixa est et clupeus aureus in curia 
Iulia positus, quem mihi senatum populumque Romanum 
dare virtutis clementiaeque et iustitiae et pietatis caussa 
testatum est per eius clupei inscriptionem. Post id tempus 
auctoritate omnibus praestiti, potestatis autem nihilo 
amplius habui quam ceteri qui mihi quoque in magistratu 
conlegae fuerunt. (RG 34) 
 
In my sixth and seventh consulships, after I had 
extinguished civil wars, and at a time when with universal 
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terms do connote a subtle form of control, in Tacitus the contexts in which the terms are used more often 
imply a sexual rather than ‘magical’ meaning. One difference is that pellicere is used more often in the 
context of emperors’ actions (GG s.v. pellicio, p.1084) and it is an act which seduces or entices groups 






consent I was in control of all affairs, I transferred the 
commonwealth from my power to the judgement of the 
senate and people of Rome. For this service of mine I was 
named Augustus by decree of the senate, and the 
doorposts of my house were publicly wreathed with laurel 
leaves and a civic crown was fixed over my door and a 
golden shield was set up in the Curia Julia, which, as 
attested by the inscription thereon, was given me by the 
senate and people of Rome on account of my courage, 
clemency, justice and devotion. After this time, I 
exceeded all in auctoritas, although I possessed no more 
official power than others who were my colleagues in the 
several magistracies. 
 
Tacitus rarely provides any information regarding his archival practice.63 The Res 
Gestae is not mentioned as a source for his Annales. However, a comparison of Ann.1.2 
and RG 34 reveals an acute familiarity, since in the Tacitean account the deeds of RG 
34 are re-memorialised.  
As Syme notes, Tacitus’ neglect of Augustus’ Res Gestae ‘was not ignorance 
but art – he can echo or convert its affirmations, he can parody themes and 
phraseology’64 – he can, as he very much does, offer an alternative memory to that 
which it concretised. A few examples are noteworthy. Whilst Augustus claims he had 
extinguished civil wars, in Tacitus’ narrative, finding the state exhausted by civil 
dissensions, Augustus received all things – “everything” – under his command in the 
name of prince (qui cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa nomine principis sub imperium 
accepit; 1.2). This was then followed by a process of gradual absorption of the senate, 
the officials and the laws, again directly oppositional to Velleius and RG 8.5 regarding 
the restoration of past legislation and magisterial positions. The idea of ‘absorption’ (in 
se trahere) is of particular importance, contradicting the crucially important transfer of 
power back to the senate and people (transferre in senatum), which is omitted from the 
Tacitean account altogether.65 Furthermore, the relational value between mores and 
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For more on Tacitus’ sources see Martin (1981:199ff.). 
64 Syme (1958: 272). 
65 Cf. O’Gorman on the absorbing and incorporative nature of Augustus’ power in Tacitus’ opening 
narrative and how this contradicts Augustus’ Res Gestae: ‘[Tacitus’] cuncta... accepit jars with Augustus' 





leges in which the former sediments the latter, is no longer, since everything has 
become sediment in the being of the sovereign himself.  
However, the most significant omission is Augustus’ essential quality, 
auctoritas, which is not mentioned in Tacitus’ prologue.66 Rather, Tacitus’ Augustus 
necessarily did possess more power than his contemporaries – and to this there was no 
opposition (nullo adversante). Any notion of influence-based policy is thus consigned 
to oblivion.67  
In Lobur’s view, (speaking of the historical Augustus), ‘cultural attitudes would 
not tolerate a system that lacked continuity between the past and present’ and Augustus’ 
regime ‘could garner more auctoritas by committing itself to preserving that 
continuity.’68 In my view, it remains altogether unclear whether it was the narrative of 
restoration and notions of continuity with the republican past that enabled Augustus to 
garner more auctoritas, or whether it was Augustus’ auctoritas that maintained 
(implications of) continuity between the republican past and present, and through this 
the regulation of cultural attitudes. There is in this a crucial difference in which 
Augustan power and the very personalised quality of that power, enabled the 
construction of a continuity with pre-civil war traditions. This is precisely the point 
made in the Tacitean narrative: auctoritas is replaced with an all-absorbing imperium, 
to which ‘all things’, cultural attitudes included, become subordinate. 
 The opening of the Annales is not therefore just evidence of the typically 
jaundiced Tacitean view69 but a specific engagement with the memory and 
memorialisation of Augustus in which the crucial aspects of his regime – his personal 
narrative of auctoritas and the cultural narrative of restoration – are re-written or erased 
altogether. As such, though it is undeniably brief, the ‘distortion’ is specifically 
continuous with the narrative of Augustan history, and the model Tacitus uses is 
seemingly the Res Gestae, but now only in a reversed form: restoration becomes 
revolution, influence becomes power. The Tacitean critique thus appears to engage with 
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(1912:197-8); see also Woodman (1998:98), and Galinsky (1996: 77ff.).  
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an unfolding of memory in order to disclose the ‘damaging parallel’ of the monarch in 
the present, which Syme possibly was referring to. While in Augustan Rome this was a 
parallel from which attention was to be repelled in order to maintain the implications of 
continuity with a republican past for the purpose of maintaining a suitable, identity-
supporting episteme, in Tacitus, it is Augustus’ supremacy that constitutes the central 
force in society. Put in another way, whilst the poets struggled to express the 
paradoxical, negotiating Augustus’ supreme position within the phraseology of the new 
restored monarchic democracy (the greatest of the princes: maxime principum; 
Hor.Odes.4.14.6) or a humane transcendental divinity, Tacitus can recall with less 
ambiguity the Ovidian perception: “res est publica Caesar”70 to argue that Caesar had 
come to embody the Res Publica.71 
 In this view, it is not that Tacitus un-does Augustus’ deeds, but that he provides 
a different explanation or framework through which to understand how they were 
achieved: Augustus had “restored” leges – but only by becoming them. Yet in this 
embodiment, which sees the compression of two paradoxical political regimes (an 
oligarchic republican form of government and an autocratic monarchic form of 
government) the essence of republican form is dissolved due to Augustus’ all-
encompassing powers.72 
However, one needs to note that despite Augustus’ exceptionality (indeed, rather 
because of it) – benefit, profit, enjoyment, leisure and peace are delivered to the 
populace. Subsequently, in Tacitus’ Augustan Rome, the regime is not thanatopolitical 
(based on the threat of death) nor is it necessarily tyrannical since that would 
presuppose (by Platonic standards at least) a regime based on the sovereign’s personal 
interests. Rather, it is a power utilised to a positive effect, based on and for the fullness 
or improvement of life.73 However, since public well-being could now only be created 
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Trist.4.4.15: ‘Caesar Augustus is the State’. For alternative translations see Miller (2004:217). See also 
Propertius (3.4; 3.5). On Augustus as Jupiter see Ov.Fast.2.131, Trist.2.37-40.  
71 Cf. O’Gorman (1995:107-108). 
72 The paradoxical nature of the Principate is discussed further in Chapter 2 (see below p.69, n.20 and 
p.91, n.70).  
73 Given this, it is not implausible to argue that Tacitus expands on the Augustan contemporary idea of a 





through Augustus’ transcendence of the law; the fullness of life and the maintenance of 
peace depend on extra-legal sovereign exceptionality. 
 
1.2 Tacitus’ Configuration of the Memory of the Republic  
 
What is interesting is that which remains. And what 
remains...is the product of an erosion caused by oblivion. 
Memories are crafted by oblivion as the outlines of the 
shore are created by the sea.74 
 
 
Tacitus’ prologue reveals two problems related to the memory of the republican past: 
on one hand, it is inauthentic (a problem of substance); on the other, it preserves 
knowledge which is in paradoxical relation to the monarchic present of Augustan Rome 
(a problem of function).  
 As discussed at the beginning of the previous section, the narrative of identity 
central to Augustus’ Rome was one based on continuity with the laws and morals as 
well as the ‘ideas and ideals’ of the republican past. Augustan Rome may therefore be 
described as a culture of (discontinuous) remembrance. In Tacitus’ narrative, continuity 
with that republican past remains, but the crucial difference is that his historical 
account of the memory of that past is now communicated as a narrative, by which I 
mean it is exposed as a construct. But the persistence of republican memory, regardless 
of its limited authenticity, is further problematised given Tacitus’ memorialisation of 
Augustus as the rule (as the monarch). If Tacitus’ Augustan Rome is presented as a 
sovereign regime, in such a place a ‘truth’ based on traditional republican democracy is 
immediately contradictory.  
In what follows, I aim to examine in more detail Tacitus’ configuration of the 
memory of the republican past in the context of the Augustan present. In Augustan 
Rome remembering that past was key to maintaining supportive narratives of identity, 
but in the Tacitean narrative Augustus’ strong discourse of republicanism is eroded; and 
                                                           





it is seemingly through forgetting, or denying, the traditional values of the republican 
past that order is maintained. 
 It will be useful at first to briefly outline how the value of Roman memory has 
been understood in contemporary scholarship. As Gowing argues (on the memory of 
the Republic in the context of Empire), ‘for Romans the past wholly defined the 
present, and to forget – to disconnect with – the past, at either the level of the individual 
or of the state, risked the loss of identity and even extinction.’75 In Lobur’s view, (on 
discussing the making of imperial ideology in Augustan Rome) ‘the language of 
republican history…contained the unimpeachable social and cultural truths whereby 
Romans learned to become Romans, experienced their social and political world, and 
understood themselves and their roles.’76 Similarly, as Mellor notes, ‘for Tacitus, as for 
many other Romans, the bedrock of the Roman moral system was the noble deeds of 
Romans of the past…For the young Roman, duty was defined historically by the 
important term aemulatio; he was to emulate the personal, civic, and martial virtues of 
his ancestors…Tacitus saw in the achievements and values of the past the only reliable 
guide to public or private conduct.’77 Since in Tacitus’ prologue we are denied 
(manifest) insight into his own views regarding the values of the past, for the moment I 
can only discuss how the aforementioned opinions are expressed through his historical 
account of his ancestry, in this case the Augustan elite: 
 
bellum ea tempestate nullum nisi adversus Germanos 
supererat, abolendae magis infamiae ob amissum cum 
Quintilio Varo exercitum quam cupidine proferendi 
imperii aut dignum ob praemium. domi res tranquillae, 
eadem magistratuum vocabula; iuniores post Actiacam 
victoriam, etiam senes plerique inter bella civium nati: 
quotus quisque reliquus qui rem publicam vidisset? Igitur 
verso civitatis statu nihil usquam prisci et integri moris: 
omnes exuta aequalitate iussa principis aspectare, nulla 
in praesens formidine, dum Augustus aetate validus seque 
et domum in pacem sustentavit. (1.3.6-1.4.1)   
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There was no war remaining at that time except against 
the Germans, more to erase the infamy of the army lost 
with Quintilius Varus, than through any desire to extend 
the empire, or for some worthy prize. At home, things 
were calm, magistrates had the same designations. But the 
younger men had been born after the Actian victory, and 
most of the elderly in the course of the civil wars: how 
many were remaining who had seen the Republic? So, 
with the condition of the state transformed, nothing 
remained of the old, unblemished mores. With equality 
cast off, all looked to the commands of the princeps. 
Nobody had any immediate worries as long as Augustus 
had the strength and years to sustain his house and peace.  
 
Tacitus’ passage above poses a problem: if no one in Augustan Rome had seen the 
Republic, Tacitus complicates in turn their ability to emulate, or more generally, ‘to 
know’ that past accurately. By conceptualising the memory of the Republic in Augustan 
Rome as non-experienced, Tacitus takes us immediately into the realm of narrativised 
history or cultural (as opposed to cognitive) memory – memory as mediated and 
regulated in the domain of the social, through history, becoming a part of individual 
experience.78  
 According to Jan Assmann, cultural memory is ‘intrinsically related to power 
and tradition.’79 The following, in his view, are two of its key functions:  
 
The binding character of the knowledge preserved in 
cultural memory, (a knowledge used by a group to base its 
consciousness of unity allowing it to reproduce its 
identity) has two aspects: the formative one in its 
educative, civilizing and humanizing functions and the 
normative one in its function of providing rules of 
conduct.80  
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Assmann essentially conceptualises the knowledge preserved in cultural memory as a 
Foucauldian technique of power, used for the purposes of epistemic fashioning and 
control: whilst ‘formative’ knowledge educates, civilises and humanises, ‘normative’ 
knowledge provides codes of behaviour. In a Roman context, Assmann’s categories can 
be compared to the ‘binding character’ or function of the mos maiorum, which as 
discussed above constituted a crucial, if not the crucial, component of Augustus’ 
restoration discourse. As Habinek argues; ‘the mos maiorum is something you know, 
but also something you do.’81 However, the difference in Tacitus’ passage above and 
indeed throughout his portrait of Augustus’ Rome is that neither the ‘formative’ nor 
‘normative’ functions of (republican) cultural memory are at work. If political equality 
was a thing of the past, how far did the memory of the Republic provide through its 
‘normative’ function traditional ‘rules of conduct’? Equally, if in the country’s 
transformation, nothing remained of the fine old Roman mores (nihil…prisci et integri 
moris) how far was the formative knowledge preserved in the memory of the Republic 
‘civilizing’ and ‘humanizing’? Assmann’s formulation of cultural memory is in conflict 
with Tacitus’ Augustan Rome, as are the ‘ways of the ancestors’. Identity is not being 
reproduced in conjunction to a republican consciousness, and mores are not only 
‘forgotten’ but seemingly ignored – (that is, they are remembered to be forgotten). 
Tacitus therefore creates a break-point here by placing a temporal limit on the 
continuum of cultural memory. In other words, by writing a society unbound by 
traditional codes for behaviour, the memory of the Republic in terms of its capacity to 
‘form’ and ‘norm’ has not continued into Augustan Rome. The content of republican 
memory, which is the knowledge it preserves through which a group can reproduce its 
identity, is thus rendered discontinuous with the political landscape of Tacitus’ 
Augustan Rome. Any substitute ‘narrative of identity’ is, for the moment, pending. 
 According to Lobur, ‘even in the formative years of the Principate, few had 
experienced the republic…this vacuum of experience allowed for the “invention” of 
republican tradition, providing a crucial sense of continuity between the republican past 
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and the “restoration” of the present.’82 Lobur’s claim, reminiscent of Tacitus’ question 
above (quotus quisque reliquus qui rem publicam vidisset?) is important and especially 
in the context of Tacitus’ writing of Augustan history. As I discussed at the beginning of 
this chapter, in the aftermath of Actium, Augustus acted to reform society, aligning it 
with the ideas and ideals of the mos maiorum. His remedy rested on a specific use of 
time which depended on folds, whereby certain times appeared to be in historical 
continuity, whilst others – namely the Triumviral decades – were pressed beneath the 
mnemonic consensus based on the time of the republic. In other words, in order to 
compensate for the loss of republican forms, Augustus instigated a cultural program 
which sought to exaggerate the feeling of their presence in the time of his present. 
Given this, Augustus’ restorative narrative depended on circularity, in that the present 
needed to return back to the republican past for the purposes of stability. But in Tacitus’ 
Augustan Rome, this discursive construction of reality, as a cultural hegemony which 
rested upon an “invented” sense of (elite) tradition is named. In Tacitus’ passage above, 
the particularity of Augustus’ temporal discourse is stretched-out since the question 
‘how many were remaining who had seen the republic?’ (or if we read it to its extreme, 
as simply ‘who had seen the Republic?’), immediately emphasises the linearity of time 
and the inevitability of individual alienation from the republican past. In other words, 
the collective nature of ‘collective memory’ is not necessarily written in terms of being 
shared by a society or group, ‘through which they can reproduce their identity’ as 
Assmann describes above. Rather, if as Tacitus tells us, political equality was a thing of 
the past and nothing remained of old-time republican tradition, his narrative acts to 
interrupt Augustan discourse, disclosing it as a means of power which had only 
collected individuals into an imagined sense of community.83 
However, besides Tacitean unfoldings, the crucial difference notable in his 
passage cited above is that despite the ‘vacuum of experience’, republican tradition is 
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not being invented. Despite the erosion of tradition and memory, historical 
consciousness is not being exaggerated in order to compensate for the loss of it. Whilst 
we know that there is no reason to think that the mos maiorum had a real, historical 
force independent of that ascribed to it by its contemporary promoters,84 the important 
point made in Tacitus’ prologue is that there are no contemporary promoters ascribing a 
‘realness’ to this force (in the presence of its absence).  
Subsequently, Tacitus’ history begins not only through an erosion of the value 
of the past, but also an erosion of the will to remember that past, and furthermore the 
will to ‘invent’ it. Thus, whilst arguments regarding the invention of tradition claim it 
remains binding despite its invention and reinvention over time (and of course it does 
as argued at the beginning of this chapter in light of the Augustan restoration 
narratives) in Tacitus’ Augustan Rome this process of inventing (or “remembering”) 
has ceased. As such, the mnemonic paradox built into the Roman historic episteme – 
that achieving continuity and identity depended on discontinuity and invention – is not 
articulated nor perpetuated through the Tacitean narrative.  This raises a key question: 
if society is not being controlled within the realm of republican memory nor 
administered by the past-based ideological knowledges it preserves, how is it that peace 
is sustained? What constitutes the supplement to this evident erosion in Roman 
epistemic structure? The answer in Tacitus is apparent: ‘All looked to the princeps, 
nobody had any immediate worries as long as Augustus retained his strength…’ 
(Ann.1.4.1). 
According to Mellor, Tacitus, being less concerned with principles than 
personalities, ‘analyses the use and abuse of power’.85 I would also argue, given his 
ways of remembering republican and Augustan memory and memorialisation at the 
opening of the Annales, that he equally analyses the use and abuse of memory. As 
memory is related to the ontological security of the individual, the narratives of 
memory are not only powerful in their constitution of identity, but also potential points 
of vulnerability to an ideological and ontological system if they are seen to be in some 
way insecure. Identity, then, oscillates within a society as memory is disputed and the 
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narratives of memory are constructed and deconstructed. That process of construction 
and deconstruction must always happen in the present, and in reflection of the cultural 
and political landscape.86  And since in Tacitus the cultural landscape is analysed, as 
Mellor rightly notes, around the use and abuse of power, memory and remembrance are 
constructed, it seems, in reflection of the princeps.  
As discussed throughout this chapter, Tacitus’ preliminary narrative does not 
contribute to the narrative of identity centred on the moral values of the republican 
past. Yet, despite the departure from the fine old Roman character, and the opening up 
of a newly monarchic present which is inassimilable to a republican narrative of 
identity, Tacitus does not make this synonymous with the loss of peace; indeed, rather 
the opposite. Peace and political stability seem guaranteed by the loss of experience of 
the Republic. This is the crucial ambivalence through which the Annales begins: whilst 
the value of the past is progressively eroded, the value of the present is progressively 
pronounced. In the prologue, Tacitus remains firm on the establishment of domestic 
peace and security under the Principate. The synonymy therefore, is now between 
peace and the princeps and throughout the Annales peace and Augustus are not 
described in oppositional terms, rather they are directly linked: Velleius’ idea of 
‘revocata pax’ (Vell.2.89.3) is transferred directly into the being of the sovereign 
himself and thus symbolic integration is achieved but not through remembering the 
past, but through remembering the present – the monarchic and totalising person of the 
princeps. Given this, and to return to Assmann’s claim, power and tradition are no 
longer intrinsically linked; and cultural memory, in Tacitus’ account, is not the 
‘norming’ and ‘forming’ harmonizing power technique in society. Rather it is the power 
stemming from the sovereign presence in the present which is forming and norming, 
controlling and guiding. Tacitus’ Augustus, though not the auctor of republican 
government remains the auctor of a sovereign peace and calamity. 
Thus, in Tacitus’ Augustan prologue, processes of remembrance are removed 
from their temporal framework and through this, Tacitus makes an important point. It is 
not inevitable that the memory of the past – the memory of the Republic – is that which 
                                                           






controls and inspires, and against which identity is stabilised and reproduced. Rather, 
the process of “remembering the present” is both possible and pertinent and it alludes 
to a further fundamental concept: consent – that is, choice.87 And this is both a problem 
for Tacitus as a memory from the past and furthermore as an experience in his own 
past.  Indeed it is not that Tacitus is keen to discuss the senate’s servility, but rather that 
he is discussing the senate’s keen servility (servitio promptior). As such, Tacitus alludes 
to the essential role that ‘will’ plays in the realm of social memory. Whilst the 
suppression of dangerous memory is a significant component of political authority (and 
the foundation of political regimes), in Tacitus’ Augustan Rome, there is a crucial 
ambivalence between the use of oblivion as a top-down power structure and as a 
cultural hegemony within the grasp of social control.88 There is a strong sense that the 
elite allow themselves to be suppressed (‘they know very well what they are doing, but 
still, they are doing it’).89 Through this, there is equally the sense that they will 
themselves to ‘forget’ the moral codes of the republican past, to become amnesiacs, in 
order to progress through the past and enjoy the benefits of the present (‘they had 
profited from the revolution so now they preferred security and the present, rather than 
the old and the dangerous’; Ann.1.2.2). Subsequently, in Tacitus’ Augustan Rome, it is 
through a false consciousness of history – a discontinuous memory – that stability and 
progress is enabled.  
This is the uncomfortable truth upon which the Annales begins. One’s historical 
sense is always there, but the use-value of the past as ‘formative’ and ‘normative’, or as 
the locus of nostalgic longing or as a base for ontological totality, is determined, it 
                                                           
87 See Lobur on consensus and concordia in the formation of ‘Roman Imperial Ideology’ (2008).  
88 On forgetting and its relationship with the foundation of political regimes see especially Bhabha 
(1990) who argues more generally that since ‘historical enquiry brings to light deeds of violence which 
took place at the origin of almost all political formations, even of those whose consequences have been 
altogether beneficial...unity is always effected by means of brutality’ (11). Subsequently, forgetting is a 
crucial factor in the creation of a nation. See also Bradford’s recent analysis of Public Forgetting and the 
rhetoric of ‘beginning again’ (2010:133ff.). A useful comparison can be traced in her analysis of 
Lincoln’s Gettysburg address and second inaugural: ‘Leaders may employ idioms of forgetting as moral 
and political resources in order to profoundly rejuvenate the content of formal public history, informal 
ideas of cultural identity, and the quality of socio-political relations they celebrate – to begin again, that 
is, in moments of civic tragedy or instability’ (2010:133ff.).  
89 As opposed to Marx’s basic definition of ideology from Das Kapital: ‘Sie wissen das nicht, aber sie 





seems, by the adequacy of the present. In Tacitus’ Augustan Rome – the present is 
adequate and the cultural and political landscape is for that moment secure. 
 
Conclusion: The Emperor as Exemplum 
The prologue to the Annales presents a complex pattern of engagement with the 
Augustan past.  Whilst an integral component of Tacitean historiography is the tragic 
voice of discontentment due to the loss of traditional standards, in the Augustan 
prologue, discontent lies in and with that past. Through this subversion, Tacitus shifts 
the familiar categories of Roman self-definition: the Republic is no longer the 
epistemic basis of societal ontology; it is neither the locus of nostalgia, nor even the 
locus of utopia; similarly the link between exempla, mores and the past is eroded; and 
power is not analysed through the binary of sovereign tyranny/sovereign democracy 
(monarchy/republic). Rather, the stability of individual ontology is made possible by 
the present, and the present is made possible by the sovereign exceptionality of the 
monarch. In this way, the very exceptionality of the monarch calls into being the 
present (all eyes look to Augustus) and it really is the Augustan age. 
In many ways, Tacitus’ Augustan prologue can be read as a self-contained 
commentary on Augustus’ RG 8.5, a passage which is Augustus’ concretisation of his 
own person as a moral exemplum. In this passage, Augustus becomes the example in 
reference to which future generations are to practice their aemulatio, and in this way 
his systemisation and recreation of the mos maiorum makes Augustus himself the 
source and necessary curator of ancestral custom, the original ancestor and the 
presiding moral presence.90 In this creation a paradox emerges which in my view 
constitutes the crux of Tacitus’ first hexad. As Tacitus tells us in his opening paragraph, 
after power had passed from the hands of kings, to dictators, to triumvirs and then into 
the hands of Augustus (along with everything else) the civil dissensions which 
characterised the first century BC came to a close. From this point onwards, 
(presumably 27 BC) Augustus was in charge – absorbing the functions of the law, the 
                                                           
90 Cf. Cooley (2009:143-4) who reads ipse multarum rerum exempla imitanda posteris tradidi as a key 
phrase for understanding Augustus’ conception of his place in society (144). For Cooley, RG 8.5 echoes 
the Ciceronian notion of the ideal monarch, as voiced by Scipio Africanus, who does not only impose 





senate and the magistrates – yet it was through this absorption that peace and security 
were integrated into the present.  
The emergence of the exception thus marks the resolution of civil conflict but 
also the sheer power of the sovereign authority (since he becomes the new law, and in 
so doing affirms his power). In this perspective, Tacitus’ writing of the paradox of 
Augustan exceptionality makes obvious the generative power of paradox: on the one 
hand paradox functions as a means to protect and secure social order, on the other and 
in so doing, it generates the power of the sovereign. However, one notes that the 
essential meaning of the ‘state of exception’, which is that it refers to an exceptional, 
“emergency” situation like civil war, is in this case problematised because as Tacitus 
tells, it was after Augustus had put aside the name of triumvir that he absorbed the 
functions of the juridical order (postquam…posito triumviri nomine…munia senatus 
magistratuum legum in se trahere; 1.2.1). That Augustus became the law (which 
means, as Agamben states, that he was released from the law [legibus solutus]) post-
Actium or post-emergency means that the foundation of the principate saw the 
normalisation of the state of exception. In other words, the exhausted Roman people 






AB EXCESSU DIVI AUGUSTI: AN ALTERNATIVE CRISIS AT AD 14 
 
 
Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ 
of truth: that is, the types of discourse it accepts and 
makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances 
which enable one to distinguish true and false 
statements…the status of those who are charged with 
saying what counts as true.1 
 
In a Roman context, such a ‘regime of truth’ as Foucault describes above was largely 
concerned and connected with time. The types of discourses which ‘functioned as true’ 
may be read in line with the customs of the ancestors – a ‘notional-stock of time-
honoured principles’2 such as freedom (libertas), moderation (moderatio), 
trustworthiness (fides) and civil duty (pietas) – which enabled the individual to 
distinguish between ‘acceptable’ and non-acceptable behaviour. Another example of 
the ‘general politics’ of truth is encapsulated in the Roman process of damnatio 
memoriae – an official ‘mechanism’ which regulated ideas of legal and/or moral 
conduct by publicly consigning those individuals who had acted in contravention of the 
law and the mos maiorum to oblivion.3 In this way, the regime of truth was enforced by 
a political forgetting of those who had abused the social order and in that forgetting 
they could no longer act as exemplars of Roman behaviour. But if a regime of truth 
depends on a political process of deciding what is true or what should ‘count as true’, 
then there must be a process by which individuals or groups are empowered to speak 
truth, and by implication other individuals and groups do not have or are not given such 
powers.  
 Since the Roman regime of truth was largely ordered around past time, the 
modes of the regulation of behaviour and establishing social regularities were 
engrained in a notion of the past.  In that past, conceptions of the mos maiorum, 
problematic and disputed though they may have been, effectively operated as a 
                                                           
1 Foucault (1980b:131). Cf. Foucault (2002a:75-76). 
2 Hölkeskamp (2010: 17-18). 





regulatory technology which determined notions of acceptability within the socio-
political sphere.4 The mos maiorum in itself was established through a system of 
exempla – the collection and transmission of anecdotes that provided templates for 
behaviours and behavioural norms.5 Such templates rooted the ideals of virtus 
circulated. Yet, the mos maiorum in itself was bound into an evaluation of the past both 
as a differentiated space of moral excellence and an influential space within the history 
of the Roman present. That Roman past was conservative and hierarchical and it 
embedded the virtues of the past political system (however vague and unreal the 
historical interpretations of that past) within the history of the present. Those who 
spoke truth, then, were those who controlled the discourses of the mos maiorum, the 
orators and the historians, the collectivity of the political and literary elite that 
dominated the history-writing and the social memory of republican Rome.    
The beginning of absolute sovereignty confused the established regime of truth 
which for many years had created the model through which Romans could determine 
virtuous behaviour and in so doing ‘learn to become Romans.’6 The reason for this is 
that the emperor’s sovereign power (that is, supreme power concentrated in the hands 
of one individual) did not fit easily with the political traditions of the ‘free republic’ nor 
the Roman ideal of ‘res publica restituta’.7 Furthermore, under the monarchy the 
system of exemplarity which was to maintain the general politics of truth (as 
orchestrated through the dead and living collectivity of the literary and political elite) 
was threatened by a new body of social regulation, namely the emperor himself, who as 
                                                           
4 Cf. Suet.Rhet.1 (quoting an edict of the censors of 92 BC): haec nova, quae praeter consuetudinem ac 
morem maiorum fiunt, neque placent neque recta videntur (‘these new things which are being done 
contrary to the tradition and customs of the ancestors seem neither acceptable nor right’).  
5 On the purpose of historical exempla see especially Quint.Inst.12.4.1-2. For the uses of exempla in 
ancient literature see Lobur (2008:177ff.) and Bloomer (1992) on Valerius Maximus; Gowing 
(2009:333ff.) on Camillus; Blom (2010:61ff) on Cicero. For exempla in Tacitus see Alston on C. Cordus 
Ann.4.30 (2008:147-159) and Turpin (2008) on stoic exempla. On the discourse of Roman exemplarity 
see Roller (2004, esp.1-10); Kapust (2011:111-172) and Hölkeskamp (2010:106ff.). See also Sailor 
(2008:15 n.32). 
6 Lobur (2008:206-7).  






the head of the state (the one who was imbued with the highest status) became the 
prominent source and guarantor of acceptability and knowledge.8  
Such a conception of sovereignty may be read alongside Borneman’s notion of 
‘Patricentric’ leadership. According to Borneman, ‘Patricentric regimes’ aim to unify 
their subjects and create subjectivity through identification with a leader: ‘authority is 
always exercised in someone’s name and through an identification – naming and 
identification being two of the key mechanisms necessary for the enchantment that [an] 
authority generally deploys to legitimate [him]self.’ Through legitimacy, Borneman 
argues that the leader becomes ‘the general equivalent of his subjects’ and ‘the standard 
of all value’ but he himself ‘operates outside measurement’.9  
As can be seen from his Res Gestae, Augustus placed great emphasis on making 
himself the central locus of identification – as a sort of “master exemplum” against 
which later generations could shape their identity and measure their moral sense.10  
Through the Tacitean interpretation (at least) we may also argue that Augustus’ 
authority operated ‘outside measurement’ since rather than acting through the law, 
Augustus transcended the law by becoming its own embodiment. Borneman then refers 
to the end of patricentric regimes as ‘the death of the Father’ because in such regimes 
the authority figure represents himself as the single source and locus of meaning and 
truth: ‘patricentric regimes aim to arrest the crisis in symbolic identification by 
addressing the deficiency in the paternal function – speaking in the name-of-the-father, 
re-affirming the symbolic Law, reclaiming lineage…and monumentalizing national 
“landmarks”’.11  
Tacitus’ historical narratives work through a development of the patricentric 
truth at the heart of Augustus’ Principate. According to Tacitus, the establishment of 
the Principate saw the stabilisation of social order after many years of discord and civil 
violence and though corruption and servitium continued to increase within the ruling 
class, pax was nonetheless maintained; but this peace was not brought to the empire 
                                                           
8 Cf. Ando (2000:19ff.), on the role played by the emperors towards the ‘symbolic representation of 
Romanitas’.  
9 Borneman (2002:3).  
10 Notably, exemplum refers to ‘a copy’ or ‘reproduction’ as well as that which is to be copied or 
imitated, ‘the archetype’ (OLD 6, 8).  





through Augustus’ renewal of the republican constitutional order, nor by the restoration 
of the republican ‘regime of truth’. Rather, the Tacitean interpretation reveals a 
different discourse of exemplarity where truth is regulated in reflection of the imperial 
present. In other words, truth in Tacitus is determined by the emperor’s sovereignty 
because it is Augustus himself who is charged with the status of saying what counts as 
true (‘all looked to the orders of Augustus’; Ann.1.4.1).   
Tacitus’ view therefore follows from, albeit in hyperbolic form, certain 
patricentric aspects of Augustus and his Rome and the idea and image of Augustus as 
pater patriae who ‘arrested the crisis in the symbolic’ through his sovereign-paternal 
function. But in Tacitus’ Tiberian narrative, Tiberius’ ability to be ‘the Father’, to 
speak the truth and in so doing ‘re-affirm the symbolic Law’ is undermined. In the new 
reign, the problem is not that the sovereign is not ‘telling’ the truth, but that he is no 
longer deciding it.  
The aim of this chapter is to explore the severance of the relationship between 
sovereignty and truth in Tacitus’ opening narrative of the Tiberian Principate (1.6-1.15) 
in order to explore the implications of this severance for Roman society and politics. 
Through a focus on the debates in the senate house before and after the funeral of 
Augustus, I shall argue that conflict in the form of political disagreements, rumour and 
uncertainty (a conflict which defines Tacitus’ writing of Tiberian Rome) stems not 
from Tiberius’ cruelty or insincerity, nor from the sudden realisation that at AD 14 the 
reality of monarchic rule became apparent;12 rather, I shall explore an alternative 
explanation, which is that conflict stems from Tiberius’ progressive impotence, that is, 
his inability to state that which should count as true and in so doing, maintain the 
regime of truth.13  
Using this perspective, the chapter will pursue an analysis of sovereignty and 
truth beyond notions of legitimacy in a juridical sense and beyond a conception of truth 
as ‘telling the truth’ or ‘telling a lie’. Rather, and following the Tacitean narrative 
which as I shall show invites a conception of ‘legitimacy’ in a discursive sense, I argue 
                                                           
12 As implied by Eder (1993), Griffin (1995) and Oakley (2009). 
13 This chapter thus seeks to build on a view presented by Sinclair, that what was important under the 





that for the purposes of peace and order, sovereignty must work to reinforce the laws of 
a symbolic system (those laws which structure the politics of truth).14 By taking up a 
discussion of truth in a discursive sense, it emerges that Tacitus’ political thought 
allows us to expand on the theories of Agamben and Schmitt: sovereign is not only he 
who decides on the exception, but also he who decides truth. 
In the first section, I read Tacitus’ writing of Tiberius’ key traits (his silence, 
hesitation and dissimulation) as preliminary signs of Tiberius’ inability to be the 
sovereign with patricentric effect. Whether an emperor is capable of ruling is a crucial 
question at the start of a new reign but it is notable that the opening of the Tiberian 
narrative progressively works to undermine Tiberius’ sovereign ability. Part of the 
problem which Tacitus reveals is that even in the new reign Augustus maintains a 
crucial, determining presence: the reading of the will and mandate following Augustus’ 
death immediately underline the limited scope for Tiberius to assume sovereign 
control, since although Augustus is dead Tiberius’ policy has been decided by the 
absent monarch. Augustus’ control on the new regime is also written into the opening 
chapter which relates the death of Agrippa Postumus, a death embedded in the 
Augustan past. Yet, the narrative on Postumus’ death also asserts from the start a 
Tiberian inability to take control of the executive power and to control the discourses of 
power and truth (and those of the past). The murder happens seemingly without 
Tiberius willing it to happen and further, Tiberius cannot control the controversy that 
emerges nor establish the truth about it – as Tacitus states, Tiberius said nothing of the 
matter to the senate, referring instead to the word of the father (1.6.1). From this 
perspective, the opening chapter establishes a prominent and problematic theme of the 
Tiberian books – that of the emperor’s own silence. I argue that it is due to this very 
                                                           
14 Following Nietzsche, Foucault argues that the organisation of fields of knowledge is driven by a ‘will 
to truth’ which seeks to determine 1) that which is prohibited; 2) a distinction between reason and folly; 
3) truth and falsehood. These are also called the ‘rules of exclusion.’ Foucault then argues that that 
power cannot function unless it puts those truths which are established through the rules of exclusion 
into circulationand the circulation of those truths will then reinforce power: ‘‘Truth’ is linked in a 
circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it 
induce and which extend it. A ‘regime of truth’’. Foucault (1980b:133). See also Foucault (2004): 
‘Power cannot be exercised unless a certain economy of discourses of truth functions in, on the basis of, 





silence that the new sovereign relinquishes his key role, which is to state the truth and 
in so doing maintain order in the state.15 
Following on from Tiberius’ dubious stance towards the case of Agrippa 
Postumus, I trace further signs of a deficiency in Tiberius’ sovereign ability through 
Tacitus’ writing of the emperor’s hesitatio and dissimulatio. During the debate in the 
senate house following the funeral of Augustus, Tiberius is notably reluctant to fill the 
vacancy of authority left by his predecessor but in spite of this Tacitus has already 
informed us that Tiberius has used, even waited for this imperium. This has led scholars 
to conclude that Tacitus is concerned with characterising Tiberius as a hypocrite (that 
he was ‘pretending he did not want the powers when he did’).16 However, the word 
‘hypocrisy’ which from our perspective resonates with notions of ‘deceit’ and ‘lying’ is 
not necessarily analogous with dissimulation.17  Rather, I argue that dissimulatio should 
be conceived as a crucial aspect of the imperial position as well as a crucial component 
of the elite imperial self – as a method to protect oneself rather than a method to 
deceive others. Furthermore, given the centrality of dissimulation in the imperial 
regime (since, as Tacitus shows, the senators dissemble as much as the sovereign 
himself), the question is not who dissembles and who does not but rather who 
dissembles effectively (or credibly) and who does not.18 The problem in the opening 
chapters is that Tiberius, and regardless of whether in reality he was being insincere, is 
not charged with the status of telling a credible lie (deciding the truth), leading to a 
progressive disintegration in the regime of truth.  
By looking at the effects of ineffective dissimulation in the wider context of the 
political sphere rather than what dissimulation tells us about the Tiberian personality 
(which in any case has already been determined in the prologue as inherently superbus 
and cruel; 1.4.3) Tacitus enables us to pursue a wider theoretical discussion of absolute 
sovereignty in terms of what the effects of silence, hesitation and ineffective 
dissimulation are on a society’s politics of truth. This shall form the subject of the 
                                                           
15 Cf. Sallustius Crispus’ advice at Ann.1.6.3. 
16 Griffin (1995: 37). 
17 On Augustan dissimulation and deceit see Vervaet (2010:133-66) and Rich (2010:167-194). See also 
Rudich (1993:xviiff.). 





discussions in the second section of this chapter, where I argue that in Tacitus’ 
revelation of Tiberius’ progressive impotence and the conflict which thus emerges, 
Tacitus rather is drawing our attention to the problem of ‘non-sovereignty’. Such non-
sovereignty is implicit in the opening chapters during which Tacitus describes Tiberius 
not as capax imperii (capable of rule) but as ambiguus imperandi. Far from asserting a 
Tiberian tyranny, then, the narrative of Tiberius’ Principate opens through a certain 
reversion of his status, with a princeps who is non-sovereign (but still has to be the 
sovereign) in a monarchical-republican system.  
In the concluding section, I argue that the crisis at AD 14 is not that it 
represented the moment when ‘the reality of the Principate became evident’19 but 
instead, that it represented the moment when the relationship between sovereignty and 
truth collapses. In this collapse, the ambiguity at the heart of the Principate (the 
paradox of republic and monarchy) surfaces leading to a loss in the certainty of the 
present.20 Since the Tacitean narrative of Tiberius begins by undermining his 
sovereignty, it sets up a process of degeneracy within his regime from the Augustan 
inheritance into an increasingly bewildering world of uncertainty and, ultimately, 
inertia and violence. This degeneracy is seen through the initial inability to establish the 
reality of present time (imperial time) because although Tiberius is the essence of the 
age (he is the emperor and thus has the most powerful voice), he cannot establish the 
specificity of this temporal frame because he falters as the voice of power and truth in 
the state. This creates a notable and persistent disjunction between sovereign and elite. 
                                                           
19 Oakley (2009:189). 
20 On this paradox see Winterling (2009). Winterling shows that the new monarchic institutions of the 
principate (such as the consilium principis) still had to work alongside republican institutions, namely the 
senate and the mos maiorum (26-32). The point is that the principate did not destroy the old legal and 
moral structures of the republic, but came to (and had to) exist as far as possible in unity, thus creating 
various paradoxes: ‘The paradoxes of imperial times are characterised by a simultaneity of 
nonsimultaneous matters; they are thus open only to a diachronic analysis that takes into account the 
situation during republican times’ (28). Winterling then goes onto claim this paradox has found its 
continuation in the impasse of modern research in the sense that it only ever throws light on one of the 
mutually contradictory sides: the continuation of the republican constitutional order on the one hand, and 
its abolition by the absolute monarchy on the other (27). In Tacitus, it is implied that Augustus did 
abolish the republican constitutional order but in the Tiberian narrative the paradox surfaces given 
Tiberius’ increasing impotence. As a result, the Tiberian narrative resists the unilateral method of 
interpretation Winterling refers to because it is not a case of either/or; rather the point is that both the 






The problem in the accession chapters is that the governability of the elite (that is, their 
readiness to be governed even to the extent of slaves) clashes with Tiberius’ democratic 
ways (that is, his desire to share the ‘burden of ruling all things’ [regendi cuncta onus; 
1.11.1] with the senators). Tiberius’ is insistent on existing on parity with the rest, and 
regardless of whether such republican inclinations are sincere or insincere, this 
insistence creates a politics without (absolute) sovereignty (and without truth), the 
result of which is the unfolding of the excessive temporal structure of the Augustan 
episteme (civil war, republic, monarchy). This multiplicity means that the regime of 
truth cannot be established by the sovereign, for the sovereign is dead, and instead truth 
is determined by the naked interplay of power.  
 
2.1 Tacitus on the Accession of Tiberius   
 
The fact of succession, whether those who are involved in 
it are aware of it or not, involves a renewal of the 
‘contract’ between ruler and ruled.21  
 
 
From the perspective of the process of political succession, AD 14 represents an 
especially challenging moment in Roman imperial history. On the death of Augustus, 
there was no historical precedent for the transfer of power from one princeps to 
another; and since Augustus’ powers (or influence) were not wholly exercised through 
a juridical order, such powers could not easily be renewed with reference to a formal 
constitutional ‘contract’. In the Tacitean narrative we are presented with further 
difficulties. Before the narrative account of the ‘accession debate’ where after the 
funeral of Augustus the senate urge Tiberius to verbally accept the throne (1.11-1.13), 
Tacitus has already informed his readers that 1) the two consuls along with the senate, 
the army and the populace had sworn loyalty to Tiberius and 2) Tiberius was openly 
exercising the two essential features of the Principate: imperium and tribunicia potestas 
(1.7.2-5).22 So the question which arises is why debate if it would appear that Tiberius 
was already the ruler? 
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22 Cf. Syme (1958:410) on Tiberius’ exercise of imperium and tribunician power: ‘[Tacitus] shows the 





Tacitus’ chronology undoubtedly presents various contradictions and scholars 
have subsequently read the accession debate as a farce.23 But since the constitutional 
basis of the Principate was somewhat ambiguous, it is not surprising that (or we can at 
least make a preliminary assumption that) it remained important to clarify or confirm 
the nature of Tiberius’ powers in the senate house on 17th September despite the 
suggestion that he was already acting as princeps or commander four weeks prior.24 
The apparent contradiction in the narrative chronology can be seen to reflect the wider 
constitutional anomalies of the Roman political order through which Tacitus raises the 
crucial contemporary problem – that in AD 14, the senate were either to confront the 
task of distinguishing between the legislative, the militaristic, the sovereign, the 
democratic and the personal aspects of Augustus’ imperium (in a [supposedly] restored 
republican state); or they were to let this paradox continue. Any confusions of 
imperium would inevitably re-surface the moment that power is to be renewed. Given 
this, it becomes evident that Tacitus’ (and Tiberius’) concern at the beginning of the 
narratio is not so much the possession of imperium (which presumably Tiberius had 
held since AD 10) as much as it is the manner in which all aspects of that imperium are 
balanced and exercised through one individual (again, in a restored republican state).25 
The key issue in the opening narrative is therefore tied to the wider issue of Roman 
sovereignty; and the tensions and contradictions written on and around the accession of 
Tiberius can be read as manifestations of the difficulty in determining (or maintaining) 
the terms of the ‘contract’ previously held between ruler and ruled, which in AD 14 
Tiberius is to renew (or has already renewed).  
                                                                                                                                                                         
orders to the troops and dispatches to the armies, and in virtue of tribunicia potestas he convokes the 
Senate to arrange the funeral’. Notably, though Tacitus shows Tiberius to be in exercise of imperium, he 
does not explicitly state that Tiberius possessed imperium but rather that he dealt with the praetorian 
cohorts ‘ut imperator’ (1.7.5). That Tiberius was able to speak ‘like a Commander’ to the troops but not 
like the princeps to the senate establishes some distinction between the various forms of imperium which 
belonged or were to belong to the emperor, as well as the various problems involved with their renewal. 
It appears that in the military sphere the transition from republican imperator (commander of armies) to 
imperial imperator (commander of armies and princeps senatus) was less a contentious move than 
speaking as princeps in the senate house (as will be discussed further below, pp.84ff.). 
23 For example, the scene is described as ‘a ritual’ by Sinclair (1995:170); ‘a charade’ by Martin 
(1981:113); and a ‘solemn comedy’ by Syme (1958:410). 
24 Cf. Alston (1998:22ff.) and Seager (2005:46-7/217). 





In what follows, I shall analyse Tacitus’ opening narrative of the new reign in 
order to define in more detail what exactly is encompassed in Tacitus’ conception of 
the contract between ruler and ruled. Through a focus on the death of Agrippa 
Postumus, I argue that the possession of imperium and tribunicia potestas does not 
necessarily constitute the essential powers of the emperor, nor the prime features of the 
Principate, as Syme argued.26 Rather, sovereign power depends on the ability to assert 
truth, and further, to gain communal consent to whatever that truth may be. The 
problem in the opening chapters is that Tiberius’ continued silence leads to an 
immediate breakdown in the established relationship between sovereignty and truth, 
causing slippage between those statements which should count as true and those which 
should count as false. 
 
The Death of Agrippa Postumus 
In AD 9 Augustus banished his youngest grandson Agrippa Postumus to the remote 
island of Planasia. Under Augustus’ influence, the senate accordingly confiscated his 
property and declared his exile permanent and irreversible.27 After Augustus’ death, but 
before the formal accession of Tiberius, Agrippa was murdered by his guard at Planasia 
but whether the death was an order of Augustus (due to certain failings in Agrippa’s 
character) or Tiberius (Agrippa represented a potential threat to Tiberius’ own political 
future) has been the subject of considerable controversy.28 
Tacitus’ Tiberian narrative begins with this mysterious death.  Yet scholarly 
interest in the opening chapters has not focussed on the question of who killed Agrippa 
since it is generally assumed that Tiberius was responsible. This reading stems from the 
first line of the narratio: ‘The first deed/misdeed of the new reign was the murder of 
Agrippa Postumus’ (primum facinus novi principatus fuit Postumi Agrippae caedes; 
1.6.1), which many scholars have read as Tacitus’ attempt to prejudice the reader 
against the new reign from the start.29 As Goodyear states, ‘these words, like much in 
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27 Suet.Aug.65. 
28 See Detweiler (1970). 
29 Wells (1992:96). See also Sailor (2008:174): ‘at Ann.1.6.1 [Tacitus] leaps into the narrative with the 





the preceding chapters, are calculated to set the tone of the later treatment of Tiberius’ 
Principate.’30 Martin makes a similar point through a neat contrast with 13.1.1 where 
Tacitus begins his discussion of Nero’s reign with the death of Junius Silanus. As 
Martin notes, in the case of Tiberius the death is the first act of the Principate and thus 
responsibility is firmly attached to the princeps himself, whereas at 13.1.1, the 
difference in language where Tacitus writes ‘prima novo principatu mors’ (‘the first 
death in the reign of Nero’) does not suggest that the death of Silanus was through 
Nero’s instigation.31 Grünewald employs a different perspective but draws the same 
conclusion. For Grünewald, Tacitus’ reference to ‘new Principate’ as opposed to ‘new 
princeps’ is a small but telling difference; ‘Principatus is impersonal, signifying the 
whole system of government headed by Tiberius. The term allows Tacitus to accuse 
Tiberius without mentioning him by name.’32 Levick more explicitly claims: 
‘Tacitus…put[s] the blame squarely on the shoulders of Tiberius’.33  
Many scholars have thus followed Goodyear’s argument, that the opening 
words are calculated by Tacitus to accuse Tiberius of Postumus’ death and in this way, 
they can be read as indicative of the later treatment of Tiberius. However, this is 
problematic on a number of levels. Firstly, such a view presupposes that the tone of the 
later treatment of Tiberius is monolithic, which is not a characteristic of the account. 
Although one can argue that the phrase foreshadows what is to come, the 
interpretational framework for the reign is not thereby fixed. Secondly, while the 
genitive novi principatus can be read as ascribing responsibility for the crime to the 
Principate of Tiberius and therefore as an insinuation of Tiberius’ involvement, there is, 
at the same time, the possibility that the crimes to be committed are the result of, or to 
be blamed – just – to the ‘new regime’, that is, the period after the death of Augustus. 
There is at least as much, possibly more, significance in the use of the impersonal and 
abstract noun as there is in the choice of case.  
Considered in this way, the opening chapters achieve much more than 
prejudicing the reader against Tiberius. Rather, by noting the impersonal nature of 
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Tacitus’ language it can be argued that instead of prejudicing his reader against 
Tiberius, Tacitus is trying to assert a difference between the time before the start date 
of AD 14 and the time after it and instead of focusing on the person of the emperor, we 
should think of the nature of the regime and it is, of course, precisely the nature of 
regimes to which Tacitus has drawn our attention in his rapid summary of Roman 
history that introduces the Annales.  
 In particular, we must note Tacitus’ description of the nature of the Augustan 
regime in the preceding chapters which stated that Augustus absorbed the functions of 
the senate, the magistracies and the law (1.2). It is in his absorption of the law and the 
usurpation of the vital republican elements of the old constitution that we are able to 
see precisely how Tacitus’ prologue worked to construct (or identify) the personal 
nature of Augustus’ power. Yet, this is in quite clear contrast to how (impersonally) the 
new sovereign deals with state affairs, in this case the murder of Agrippa Postumus, 
about which he says nothing to the senate (…nihil de ea re apud senatum) evoking 
instead the word of the father (patris iussa; 1.6.1). As Woodman notes, ‘the episode as 
a whole is indeed significant...yet the reason is not that it portrays the first of Tiberius’ 
many murders but that it shows how crucial actions, including murder, are from the 
very start carried out by powers behind the throne and in spite of Tiberius himself.’34 In 
Woodman’s view, before AD 14 the powers around the throne were controlled through 
Augustus, but after AD 14, such powers assume a position beyond sovereign 
(Tiberius’) control.35  
Yet, we may further differentiate Tacitus from the distinctive and familiar 
image of ‘powers behind the throne’, since it is the very nature of the regime itself 
which asserts itself in the murder of Postumus and not a covert or subordinate or 
illegitimate element within the regime. Tiberius’ own role in the murder becomes an 
issue of debate, but is not that of an empowered agent. Tiberius becomes entrapped in a 
web of rumour that begins to define the regime and his actions, but it also differentiates 
Tiberius and the regime, suggesting that Tiberius is as implicated in the regime and as 
susceptible to the regime as much as any member of the elite, which again presents a 
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crucial difference between his regime and that of his predecessor. Unlike Augustus, 
Tiberius has not quite absorbed the functions of the senate, nor the law. 
 This gap between Tiberius and the regime establishes a focus on the ambiguity 
which Tacitus writes into and around the accession of Tiberius – an ambiguity which 
continues to pervade the narrative due to the sovereign’s increasing reluctance to speak 
and assert truth. When truth is not asserted in the political sphere, it creates a gap or a 
discursive void allowing other truths to enter.36 This can be seen in Tacitus’ account of 
Agrippa and more widely, given a historiographical survey of the murder: all extant 
accounts (Tacitus, Suetonius and Dio Cassius) are shrouded by uncertainty. In Dio 
(57.3.5) it is claimed that Tiberius issued an order for Postumus to be killed on 
Augustus’ death but the princeps denied any responsibility once the order had been 
carried out. But Dio subsequently reports that popular opinion blamed Augustus for the 
murder and some even blamed Agrippa’s guard in Planasia, and others Livia. In 
Suetonius (Tib.22), responsibility is again left unclear – Tiberius denied involvement 
for fear of unpopularity but the murder could have been instructed by Augustus to be 
carried out on his death or again by Livia, with or without Tiberius’ consent. In Tacitus 
there is the possibility that the murder could have been orchestrated by anyone 
(Augustus, Livia, Sallustius Crispus, Agrippa’s guard). Yet, had Tiberius decided the 
truth about Agrippa at the time as Sallustius Crispus had warned him to do so, rumour 
and uncertainty would not have taken control among his contemporaries.37 Due to 
Tiberius’ reluctance to decide the outcome, the account does not balance as Crispus had 
warned (1.6.3). The murder is left in a zone of uncertainty, further exemplified in 
Agrippa’s posthumous return to Rome in 20.38  
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speaking in the wider context of the symbolic order, as they note political power works to reinforce the 
discourses of the symbolic (2011:193ff.), which is the argument this chapter seeks to pursue. 
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accounts, Velleius omits it entirely – this suggests that whatever the truth (whether Tiberius was or was 
not involved) the murder was a threat to both Tiberius’ power and reputation and best kept secret, hence 







 A similar pattern of silence and uncertainty grips the accession debate itself 
during which Tiberius’ silence leads to further complications in the renewal of the 
relationship between sovereignty and truth. In what follows, I shall argue that Tiberius’ 
questionable stance towards his own position in the state can be read as a further sign 
of Tiberian non-sovereignty. Following this, I shall examine Tacitus’ writing of 
dissimulatio from another perspective – as a characteristic of both senate and sovereign 
which is necessary to maintain the paradox at the heart of the imperial order (Republic 
and Principate), rather than a method used by Tacitus to traduce Tiberius’ character. 
Since there remains a critical dependence between imperial politics (the sovereignty of 
the emperor) and Augustan and republican temporalities in which the history of the 
present was at least superficially embedded, in order to maintain this paradox both 
senate and sovereign must partake in a dialectical relationship of openness and 
closeness – a relationship ‘caused less by a failing of character than by the strain of 
habitually living under a kind of compulsion.’39 In the context of Tiberian Rome, we 
may now conceptualise this strain in terms of habitually trying to live under the burden 
of the republican and now Augustan pasts. 
 
Sovereign Anxiety: Re-reading Tiberian Hesitatio 
 
As a means for the preserving of the individual, the 
intellect unfolds its principle powers in dissimulation 
[Verstellung], which is the means by which weaker, less 
robust individuals preserve themselves [sich erhalten].40 
 
 
The second debate in the senate house which takes place after the funeral of Augustus 
centres around a pivotal question: ‘How long Caesar, will you allow the body-politic to 
have no head?’41 This question is doubly suggestive: on the one hand, the death of 
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Augustus has left the senate eager for a leader; and on the other, Tiberius is reluctant to 
fill the void by accepting full responsibility for the empire.  
This modality of sovereign hesitation and elite dependence is written 
throughout the interregnum period and it is also attested in other sources. According to 
Velleius, for example, while all else was well, there was one ‘struggle’ (luctatio) in the 
state, which was that while the senate and people of Rome fought with Tiberius so that 
he would succeed to the position of his father, Tiberius on the other hand strove for the 
permission to live as an equal citizen, as opposed to an emperor overall (Vell.2.124.2).  
The desire to exist on equal terms with the rest characterises too Tacitus’ 
opening portrait of Tiberius. At 1.7.3, Tacitus tells that Tiberius was ambiguous about 
ruling and that his initiatives were through the consuls, just as or as though in the old 
Republic (nam Tiberius cuncta per consules incipiebat, tamquam vetere re publica et 
ambiguus imperandi).42 Tiberius’ readiness to delegate authority is also attested in 
Crispus’ advice, which crucially warns Tiberius not to submit the case of Postumus’ 
murder to the senate for investigation, since that would weaken the throne. It is also 
noteworthy that after Augustus’ death Tacitus tells us that the only state business 
Tiberius wished to assume was the proper burial of his father (1.7.5). 
Yet, there are some notable and significant differences between the Tacitean 
account and those written earlier. Firstly, whilst Tacitus gives nearly eight chapters to 
events during the interregnum – including an account of the death of Agrippa, the 
reading of Augustus’ will, the funeral, the reading of the mandate on the 4th through to 
Tiberius’ formal accession at the end of the long debate on the 17th (1.6.1- 1.13.4), 
Velleius moves from the death of Augustus to Tiberius’ formal acceptance of the 
throne in less than a chapter (Vell.2.123.2 – 2.124.2). Yet despite his brevity, Velleius 
makes what for him was the crucial point. What is especially notable in Velleius’ 
account is that he imbues Tiberius’ person with similar patricentric and restorative 
value to Tacitus’ Augustus. Upon the death of Augustus, Velleius describes the 
situation in the city as one of crisis: he speaks of the trepidation of the senate (senatus 
trepidatio), the confusion of the people (populi confusio), the anxiety of the city (urbis 
                                                           





metus) and the narrow path between safety and destruction. However, though the 
people were left fearing a crisis once Augustus had passed, such fears of collapse 
(ruina) were cast aside due to the ‘greatness’ of Tiberius: for Velleius, such was the 
maiestas of Tiberius that there was no need for arms, neither to protect the good nor 
defend from the bad (Vell.2.124.1). 
This allows us to further differentiate Tacitus’ account. Tacitus’ does not 
ascribe Tiberius with this sort of Augustan majestic/messianic quality. Tiberius is not a 
saviour but rather, the unfortunate successor to a ‘burden’ (onus). Furthermore, whilst 
Tiberius’ hesitation does not persist as a problematic feature in Velleius’ text, since 
despite Tiberius’ reluctance Velleius is quick to state that everything soon regained 
order under the new regime, in Tacitus’ narrative of the interregnum, Tiberius’ 
hesitatio is a persistent and progressively disabling problem. It is in the very 
persistence of Tiberius’ reluctance that the reader is confronted with a difficulty of 
interpretation as well as various questions regarding Tiberius’ own interpretability. 
That which lies behind Tiberius’ hesitation remains unclear, especially since it is 
coupled with another quality, his dissimulation:  
 
Versae inde ad Tiberium preces. et ille varie disserebat 
de magnitudine imperii sua modestia. solam divi Augusti 
mentem tantae molis capacem: se in partem curarum ab 
illo vocatum experiendo didicisse quam arduum, quam 
subiectum fortunae regendi cuncta onus. proinde in 
civitate tot inlustribus viris subnixa non ad unum omnia 
deferrent: plures facilius munia rei publicae sociatis 
laboribus exsecuturos. plus in oratione tali dignitatis 
quam fidei erat; Tiberioque etiam in rebus quas non 
occuleret, seu natura sive adsuetudine, suspensa semper 
et obscura verba: tunc vero nitenti ut sensus suos penitus 
abderet, in incertum et ambiguum magis implicabantur. 
(1.11.1-3) 
 
Then prayers turned to Tiberius and he, on his part, spoke 
varyingly on the magnitude of the empire, and his own 
modesty. Only the divine Augustus had a mind fit for so 
great a task – and having being called upon by Augustus 
to share his cares, he had learned from experience how 





everything was. Consequently, given a community 
supported by so many brilliant men, not everything 
should be deferred to one man alone, several would more 
easily carry out the duties of the state by sharing the 
responsibilities.  
Such a speech was more impressive than credible; 
Tiberius’ words – even on things which he was not 
concealing – were by habit or nature always suspended, 
always obscure. But on that occasion, given that he was 
trying to suppress his inward feelings, his words were 
being entangled in more uncertainty and ambiguity. 
 
Tacitus’ comments at the end of this passage have led many scholars to conclude that 
Tiberius’ reluctance was insincere, displaying the ‘institutionalised ritual’ of a 
recusatio imperii which is used by Tacitus to disclose his own disbelief of Tiberius’ 
intention to return to the form of the old republic.43 In Syme’s view, the scene is a 
‘solemn comedy, the attitudes and language pre-ordained.’44 Gowing argues that 
Tacitus’ account ‘has much to do with his interest in characterising Tiberius as a 
paranoid charlatan, a man who pretended to respect the republic but who, in reality, 
was more a Caesar than Caesar himself.’45 Griffin similarly claims: ‘Tacitus is 
concerned to show that Tiberius was insincere in his behaviour after Augustus’ death in 
two related respects: 1) in pretending not to be princeps while already acting as one, at 
least outside the Senate, 2) by pretending that he did not want the power when he 
did.’46  
 Such readings, however, are difficult to support. Firstly, whilst Gowing may be 
right in asserting Tiberius’ paranoia, this could equally be stemming from Tiberius’s 
own awareness of the difficulties surrounding the imperial position – the difficulty of 
how the role of the sovereign position should be assumed – as a quality like hesitation 
could suggest. Secondly, there is considerable danger in analysing Tiberius’ hesitation 
through a discourse of dissimulation (that is, as false or ‘insincere’) because every word 
then becomes a lie, the Principate becomes an oppressive regime always ‘concealed’ 
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behind a democratic facade; making the princeps a hypocrite and sovereignty 
tyrannical. This sequence of thought can be found in Griffin, who claims:  
 
Tacitus, consummate literary artist that he was, presented 
what he felt about the Augustan Principate, as a system, 
in terms of the deliberate intentions of the Princeps, thus 
translating abstract ideas about the falsity and oppression 
of the form of government Augustus had created into the 
more dramatic portrayal of the hypocrisy and tyranny of 
his unfortunate successor.47  
 
The metonymic chain through which Griffin seems to orientate her argument, 
beginning with Tacitus’ presentation of the ‘deliberate intentions’ of Augustus 
followed by the ‘falsity’ of the principate through to the ‘hypocrisy and tyranny’ of 
Tiberius’ is a difficult interpretive framework to apply to Tacitus’ account. Firstly, 
deliberate intentions cannot be measured and close reading of the early narrative shows 
that Tacitus is careful not to speak about the emperors’ acts from his own point of 
view, particularly in terms of what the emperor ‘deliberately’ intended.48 Rather, 
Tacitus’ often employs more abstract phraseology, and the princeps’ acts are described 
passively from the perspective of popular opinion in terms of what was being believed 
(credebatur) or not and what was credible or not.49 Secondly, the falsity of the 
principate and the notion of ‘republican facade’ usually assigned to Augustus’ regime 
is not expressed in Tacitus’ Augustan prologue – rather, Tacitus’ view is that after the 
civil wars had ended, Augustus received all things in the name of princeps. The 
Tacitean narrative is thus rooted in a monarchic discourse, a discourse which is 
weighted and oppressive as Tiberius’ words imply: Tiberius speaks of the magnitude of 
ruling (magnitudine imperii) and the great mass (tantae molis) which only the mind of 
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grandson so that his stepson would feel more secure: …neque mortem nepoti pro securitate privigni 





Augustus was big enough to hold. Ideas about the Augustan principate, then, are 
translated into the dramatic portrayal of Augustus’ unfortunate successor as Griffin 
notes, but this portrayal is not necessarily one of ‘hypocrisy’ and ‘tyranny’ but of 
burden, impotence and moreover, ambiguity. In the passage above, Tacitus describes 
the language as incertum and ambiguum, referencing not dissimulation in which 
meaning is deliberately concealed, but an uncertainty about what is true – hence 
Tiberius’ words were being entangled (implicabantur), which implies that they were 
subject to external forces rather than controlling such forces, and by so doing deciding 
the truth. In this event, Tiberius was suppressing his feelings, but it is the obscurity of 
his words and the uncertainty of the path that was to be followed that dominate.50  
  A further point, which again problematises the interpretation of Tiberius’ 
dissimulation as a Tacitean attempt to mark his ‘insincerity’ has been raised by Tony 
Woodman. To return to the speech Tacitus reports above, Woodman raises an 
important question regarding Tacitus’ appended commentary. After Tiberius has 
claimed that he is inadequately equipped to assume the tasks of princeps, Tacitus 
claims that Tiberius’ speech was more impressive than credible: plus in oratione tali 
dignitatis quam fidei erat, and in response to this Woodman asks, whether a speech can 
be described as possessing dignitas but also lacking fides.51 The idea that there is now 
space for the existence of dignitas (nobility) despite the absence of fides (sincerity) is 
interesting in itself as one would think that the two qualities were dependent on each 
other but we are nevertheless presented with an obstacle.52 For Woodman, the difficulty 
stems from translation of fides as ‘sincerity’ and from the fact that ‘because Tiberius is 
elsewhere presented as hypocritical, it is assumed that he is always so presented.’53 In 
short, Woodman’s point is that Tacitus ‘is not saying that Tiberius himself was 
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insincere but that his speech lacked credibility.’54 Given this, the lack of fides is 
stemming from the senate’s perception of Tiberius’ speech rather than from Tiberius 
himself, and when read in this way the speech is not necessarily indicative of Tiberius’ 
hypocrisy nor is it a contrived recusatio imperii, but precisely of the uncertainty that 
surrounds the situation.55 The lack of faith raises the issue of faith to what and it would 
seem that there are peculiarly and precisely numerous truths to which Tiberius could 
have been faithful, but to which he, in his uncertain words, could only act in bad faith.  
One can see, then, that at one level Tacitus has ordered the narrative around a 
disjunction between (sovereign) speech and (elite) interpretation – between speaking 
through a discourse of dissimulation and interpreting through a discourse of 
dissimulation. In this case, Tiberius’ words do not in themselves lack credibility; rather, 
elite perception receives them as incredible.56 Furthermore, dissimulatio emerges as 
characteristic of the times, and thus a feature of those who behave with dignitas 
(implying the possibility of noble lies or lying with dignity). These are co-dependents 
rather than polarised values.57 The new sovereign is no longer charged with the status 
of saying ‘what counts as true’ but is trapped within a time and discourse of 
dissimulatio, which entails, inevitably, that the regime of truth lies in the interpretation 
of the listeners primarily and secondarily in Tacitus and his readers.  
The conflict produced from the political struggle in the state due to the void 
between elite dependence and sovereign hesitation is attested in this discursive 
struggle, which reveals a growing space and lack of understanding between sovereign 
and elite. Furthermore, the disjunction in the interpreting community is also shared by 
Tiberius himself whose position in relation to the regime (of power and of truth) is 
never fully clarified. Whilst previously, ‘all eyes had looked to Augustus’, now, ‘all 
prayers have turned to Tiberius’, but prayers are not concerned with a hope for 
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57 Hence perhaps, Tacitus later describes dissimulatio as Tiberius’ most prized ‘virtue’ (Ann.4.71.3:  





restoration; and the lack of understanding does not result from an unawareness of the 
imperial discourse.58 Rather, prayers are for Tiberius to assume sovereign control and 
meet the elite will for a head. However, through haesitatio (and again, regardless of 
whether sincere or insincere) the opening narrative inserts a rupture in the automaticity 
of sovereign renewal through which a Tiberian inability to perform the tasks of 
princeps credibly is instead asserted.59 Subsequently, Tiberius’ hesitation can be read 
as an early sign of ‘non-sovereignty’ or a sovereign anxiety of inadequacy, which 
clearly stems from the pressure to maintain Augustan Exceptionality. It is evident that 
Tiberius’ hesitation is embedded within the pressures of the republican and Augustan 
pasts: it remains uncertain whether Tiberius can embody a constitutional position 
which exists in paradoxical relationship with a republican system. Furthermore, it is 
suggested that Tiberius knows that the Principate was linked to a specifically Augustan 
sovereignty given that ‘only’ Augustus had the mind fit for such a position in the state 
(solam divi Augusti mentem tantae molis capacem; 11.1). Far from asserting or 
insinuating Tiberian tyranny, the opening narrative of the new reign marks, in stark 
distinction to the Augustan prologue, a Tiberian non-sovereignty (a lack of orders 
[iussa] to look to), the consequence of which is a gradual disintegration in the 
sovereign ability to maintain the politics of truth. 
 
Concealing and Revealing Sovereignty 
The discussions above have largely followed Tony Woodman’s radical reading of the 
accession debate, which by absolving Tacitus of accusing Tiberius of hypocrisy has 
marked a major advance in our understanding of Tacitus’ account of the accession. But 
whilst Woodman’s analysis, as he himself notes, is not designed to illuminate 
constitutional matters, my view is that Tacitus’ writing of Tiberius on his accession is 
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rooted in the wider political/constitutional difficulties of the sovereign position and, in 
particular, the confusions of imperium this position depended on.  
This can be explained through a further notable contradiction in the narrative. 
As Tacitus states at 1.7.5, Tiberius was able to speak ‘like a Commander’ to the troops 
but was not able to assert authority in the senate house, engaging instead in the long 
debate about acceding the throne. In Tacitus’ narrative, Tiberius exercised imperium 
outside of the senate (in his command of the army) but hesitated to act as though he 
was in possession of the maius imperium inside the senate house (hence the delay in the 
formalisation of his sovereign position). While from one perspective Tiberius’ 
contradictory stance towards the exercise of imperium can support the arguments on 
Tiberius’ insincerity or hypocrisy, there is, at the same time, another explanation. On 
the one hand, it shows that the discontinuities generated by the co-existence of two sets 
of power structures (republican and imperial) were more easily reconcilable in certain 
loci than others: speaking ut imperator in a military context appears to be less 
contentious (possibly because it was vitally necessary in order to avoid unrest in the 
army). However, the discontinuities are most problematic in the senate, where Tiberius 
has tribunicia potestas and senatorial seniority, but cannot immediately grip onto an 
existing form of authority to guarantee his sovereignty. On the other hand, we may 
infer that in the place of the senate house (where the discontinuities appear to be most 
apparent) the imperial position required a sense of uncertainty to surround it – not to 
conceal it, but to protect it. The very essence of sovereignty in a Roman imperial 
context is embedded within and dependent upon a dialectical pattern of concealment 
and revelation. The reason for this can be explained through the paradox at the heart of 
the Roman principate – that rule by one was exercised (and desired by the elite), but in 
a state relentlessly ordered through republican and democratic truths. Given this, whilst 
sovereign power needs to be used, the revelation of that power requires at the same 
time a certain degree of its own concealment.60 Even if Tiberius wanted to be the 
sovereign (a question which cannot be answered) the debate turns on the central 
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problem that sovereign desires can never really be revealed – or if they are to be 
revealed, they must retain a certain level of concealment. Tiberius’ contradictory stance 
towards the various forms of imperium is a manifestation of the paradox at the heart of 
the imperial order, which is that although it was no secret that people were living under 
a monarchy, there remained the pressure to make it seem as though the republic still 
existed. Tiberius’ silence and dissimulation may then be read as symptoms which both 
represent and reproduce this paradox.  
In such a context, dissimulation does not quite equate with lies but with anxiety. 
As Schiesaro has argued, ‘in Roman political discourse, dissimulation is a defect 
traditionally associated with Tiberius, thanks of course to Tacitus’ and Suetonius’ 
pathological portraits’ but ‘dissimulation, in sum, is a weapon of power and against 
power, and must be judged according to internal criteria of efficacy and expediency.’61 
Schiesaro, speaking in the context of Senecan drama, makes a powerful point. In 
Tacitus’ narrative of Tiberius, dissimulation is undoubtedly written as his ‘defect’ and 
related to the workings of imperial power and politics around him. Yet, there are 
numerous ways in which this relationship may work and in the case of Tiberius’ initial 
character sketch, dissimulation is used as his weapon against power rather than a 
weapon to secure it. 
From this perspective, what Tacitus relates through dissimulatio is a politics of 
fear and Tiberius’ own paradoxical relation to this fear: on the death of Augustus, the 
Senate are eager to replace the Augustan peace – the space of sovereignty needs to be 
filled and Tiberius is the candidate. But to protect himself from being seen as wanting 
to be in control (regardless of whether he actually wanted it or not), he has to employ a 
position of power (revealing sovereignty) and this explains why he had troops escort 
him to the forum, to the senate (1.7.5). But employing a position of supreme power is 
always involved and implicated in danger, and to protect himself from such risks a 
position of parity needs to be employed (concealing sovereignty), which explains why 
                                                           





he ‘only showed signs of hesitation when he addressed the senate’ (1.7.5) because this 
is where he felt least at ease and perhaps most exposed to misfortune.62  
Therefore, the problem is that the assumption of imperial power requires the 
concealment of that power, but the very concealment of power necessitates its 
revelation. Subsequently, rather than masking an intelligent tyranny or revealing a 
‘hypocritical’ use of imperium, dissimulation could equally be associated with a fearful 
weakness and more specifically, survival. Ultimately, there remain two possibilities 
and if we favour the alternative, which is that Tiberius’ reluctance ‘to be an emperor 
overall’ is a sign of a sovereign anxiety due to a fear for his own position, which by 
extension is used by Tacitus to capture not hypocrisy but the wider problematic and 
paradoxical elements of the early years of the principate, then this could equally be 
indicative of the tone of the later treatment of his Principate. 
 
Obscura Verba: The Centrality of Dissimulatio in the Imperial Regime  
As discussed above, Tacitus’ report of Tiberius’ speech on his accession is ordered 
around a fundamental disjunction in the interpreting community – Tiberius’ words 
remain incredible to his listeners (an explicit sign of his inability to state the truth). 
However, what is notable is that in the opening chapters of the Tiberian narrative, the 
conflict between sovereign speech and elite interpretation, as portrayed through 
Tiberius’ dissimulatio, is not focussed on the princeps alone. Rather, dissimulation is as 
fundamental a part of the senators’ discourse. This can be seen at 1.7.1, where after the 
case of Postumus has been discussed, Tacitus turns his attention to the Senate: 
 
at Romae ruere in servitium consules, patres, eques. 
quanto quis inlustrior, tanto magis falsi ac festinantes, 
vultuque composito, ne laeti excessu principis neu 
tristiores primordio, lacrimas gaudium, questus 
adulationem miscebant. (1.7.1) 
 
At Rome – rushing into servitude – consuls, senate, 
equestrians. The more illustrious, the greater the hurry 
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and falsity. And with looks set they seem neither happy at 
the death of one emperor, nor sad on the accession of 
another: so they were mixing tears and delight, mourning 
and flattery. 
 
This passage attests that dissimulatio is not so much a characteristic of Tiberius as 
much as it is a process which emerges under imperial sovereignty, and therefore central 
to the whole of the opening narrative. Whilst it is certain that Tiberius is confined 
within the category of dissembling sovereign, in the passage above, it is the senate who 
must dissemble their inner feelings and in this way, it is possible to read dissimulation 
as a characteristic of the elite imperial person rather than a specific ‘defect’ of a tyrant 
or sovereign authority. The very assertion of truth through power must be seen as 
something which forces dissimulation and dissimulation, in turn, can be read as 
something which will reinforce that power and that truth.  
Furthermore, the phrase ‘rushing into servitude’ (ruere in servitium) similar to 
sentiments expressed in the Augustan prologue (servitio promptior) must be given due 
consideration, since it undermines arguments based on the Principate as an oppressive 
form of government concealed under the guise of a democracy. If senators were 
‘rushing’ into servitude and were furthermore ‘eager’ for that servitude, of course, we 
cannot argue that they were coerced into servitude, nor blind to or deceived by the 
limited nature of their own sovereignty. Rather, we may interpret the Principate not as 
oppressive due to the tyrannical force of the sovereign individual, but due to the nature 
of the regime itself – which somehow gains consent to an acceptance of its own 
falsity.63  
 The notion of consenting to falsity, a process which must be seen as a part of 
the politics of truth, is also implicit in Tacitus’ final comments on Tiberius’ speech. As 
Tacitus states, the ‘one fear’ of the senators was not that they did not understand (the 
emperor, the emperor’s intentions, the situation), nor that they did understand – but that 
they would be seen to understand (at patres, quibus unus metus si intellegere 
viderentur; Ann.1.11.3). The point, then, is that the senate must perform a certain level 
of ignorance, regardless of whether they were or were not ignorant of the realities of 
                                                           





political power. To dissemble (‘to conceal or disguise one’s thoughts, feelings, actions, 
a situation’64) is then doubly deceptive, since on one level it is a process of 
concealment, and on another, it is a performance which seeks to make it seem as 
though one’s thoughts, feelings or a situation are disguised. The multi-layered quality 
of dissimulatio (“I conceal” as well as “I make it seem as if I am concealing”), which 
we may term “dissimulative dissimulation” thus applies to both sovereign and subject. 
But such dissimulative dissimulation of course erases any sense of actual unawareness, 
and in such a context, Tacitus pushes us to consider whether the ‘secrets of imperial 
rule’ were indeed secrets.65 
When considered from this perspective, terms like falsity, tyranny, and 
hypocrisy which are often used to describe Tacitus’ portrayal of the princeps and more 
widely Tacitus’ construction of the Principate, can reduce the political sophistication 
with which Tacitus describes, acknowledges and asserts a further paradox of imperial 
times – that, not only was rule by one being exercised in a restored state but that people 
consented to it. We may further argue that in their consent to the falsity which was their 
own system, that falsity gained the status of a ‘truth’. One could argue therefore that 
what happens and what matters in the political sphere is the performance of truth, for 
which the power technique of dissimulatio is a crucial ingredient: whether or not truth 
is really believed is secondary to consenting to performing to whatever truth should 
count as true and whatever falsehood should count as false.  
By reading Tacitus’ construction of sovereignty from this perspective, as 
something which is connected to truth and also as something which is dependent on a 
dialectic of concealment and revelation, it allows for a different reading of how 
political power is both deployed and ‘legitimised’ and we can elucidate the tradition on 
Tiberian dissimulation and hesitation far beyond conclusions of hypocrisy. 
Dissimulation, rather, can be considered the definitive feature of the ‘contract between 
ruler and ruled’ because it is the performance of truth – that is, the elite ability to blend 
tears, delight, mourning, flattery, to seem as if they are deceived and the sovereign 
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ability to conceal and reveal his own power accordingly – that regulates the realm 
within which truths and falsehoods are affirmed, thereby consolidating the ‘regime of 
truth’ through which a political system works. Tiberian dissimulatio is not therefore a 
conclusion on the imperial personality, but rather, a formative point from which we can 
understand and trace wider political and psychological issues of the imperial self, 
issues of performance but also issues of weakness which are qualities that characterise 
the senate as well as the sovereign himself.  
 It is through the extent to which the uncertain pervades the accession chapters 
that Tacitus foregrounds the importance, not of telling the truth in politics, but of 
deciding it. Equally, it is the extent to which falsity pervades the narrative that Tacitus 
foregrounds the fundamental disjunction between truth and politics, again, the point 
being that in the face of such falsity or uncertainty, truth must be decided. In such a 
context, Tacitus implies that it is a futile exercise to find the truth (facts) but to trace 
instead what makes ‘truth’ possible and, in particular, who has the status to state a 
‘credible lie’. 
 It is from this perspective that we may differentiate between Augustan and 
Tiberian Rome. Although dissimulation or acting in bad faith may have characterised 
the Augustan regime of truth, the crucial difference is that Augustus displayed his 
power and capacity to speak and determine truth, but in the Tiberian period, the 
sovereign himself lacks the power or status to do the same. To return to Schiesaro, who 
again makes the crucial point: ‘the distinction is not between those who dissimulate and 
those who do not, but between effective and ineffective dissimulation’.66  Those who 
have the power to state credible lies may then be read as ‘effective’ dissimulators, 
while those who remain incredible and regardless of whether their statements are true 
or false, are ‘ineffective’ dissimulators. Tiberius is an ineffective dissimulator and as a 
result, truth is left open to contestation. The problem in Tiberian Rome becomes not 
symbolic collapse or a ‘world of ruin’ as Velleius had momentarily hypothesised, but a 
multiplicity of symbolic systems. 
 
                                                           





2.2 Accessing Augustan Sovereignty 
  
We should avoid the direct question of what sovereignty 
is, and instead ask how it has been spoken of.67 
 
 
The core meaning of sovereignty has generally been understood as supreme authority 
within a territory, but the concept remains widely disputed. Noting the controversy 
surrounding the term (a controversy which has emerged due mainly to questions 
concerning sovereign legitimacy), Gens Bartelson pushes us to ask not what 
sovereignty is but ‘how it has been spoken of’.68 In my view, there is something 
peculiar about the way in which Tiberius (and/or Tacitus) speaks about sovereignty. 
For Tiberius, supreme power represents a burden and, as discussed above, that power 
retains an intricate, personal and mental, connection to Augustus. The nature of 
Augustan sovereignty is clearly an issue of debate in Tacitus, as can be seen from his 
account of the rumours which circulated on the day of Augustus’ funeral. But, even in 
the new reign, Tacitus pushes us to reflect back on the Augustan regime: how did 
Augustus achieve peace and what is the precise nature of the ‘burden’ to which 
Tiberius refers?  
In what follows, through a comparative analysis of Augustan and Tiberian 
sovereignty as presented in the prologue and the accession chapters, I shall examine in 
further detail how Tacitus writes about sovereignty. With reference to Flaig’s notion of 
the ‘acceptance-system’ and Foucault’s notion of biopolitics, my aim is to show that in 
Tacitus it is specifically the process of regendi cuncta (truth included) which 
guarantees peace. In this perspective, we may come to see that the question of 
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68 Controversies have also arisen in locating the original mark or sign of the sovereign authority. Further 
difficulties arise from questions such as: 1) why sovereignty came into existence (for the maintenance of 
national peace after an emergency such as civil war) and 2) how sovereignty functions thereafter 
(through brute force or the popular will). Given these questions one can see why the nature of Augustan 
sovereignty is widely disputed in modern accounts. Yet in terms of ancient perceptions, it is Tacitus who 
seems most aware of such controversies given his account of public rumours on the funeral of Augustus 
which put forth the two potential sides to the genesis, the legitimacy and the function of Augustus’ 
powers (1.8-9). On the concept of sovereignty see further Skinner’s recent genealogy of the sovereign 





legitimacy (that which always haunts the analysis of sovereignty) is not reduced by 
Tacitus to legality, nor acceptance, but centres instead on pleasure and truth. 
 
Acceptance Systems  
 
We have to classify the Principate as a specific “system of 
acceptance”…the emperor’s position was not based on 
legitimacy but rather on acceptance.69  
 
Since the publication of Mommsen’s history, it has been noted by numerous scholars 
that constitutional theorising alone cannot explain the imperial position.70 Egon Flaig 
has recently argued that the ‘legitimacy’ of the emperor’s position was not sealed 
through a coherent system of constitutional law but depended instead on the practice of 
various consensus-rituals such as imperial gift exchange. As an example, and in the 
case of the army, Flaig argues that donatives were not bribes but ‘symbols of the 
emperor-soldier relationship’ and if such a relationship deteriorated the emperor ‘could 
lose his position.’71 From this perspective, Flaig argues against Mommsen’s view that 
there has probably never been a regime as wholly devoid of legitimacy as the Augustan 
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70 Mommsen’s analysis of the role of the emperor and the governance of the empire was centred on the 
principles of constitutional law. According to Mommsen, as far as its legal constitution was concerned, 
the Principate cannot be described as a monarchy. Rather, Mommsen uses the term “Dyarchia”, a form 
of government based on the co-rule of the emperor and the senate, to describe the Principate. Following 
this, Mommsen argues that the sole rule of the emperor was mitigated and the position of princeps was 
traditionalised by linking them to an elected magisterial office by the senate, which subsequently 
legalised it. It is the senate who allow the emperor’s dispensation from the laws, thus attesting its 
sovereignty. Whilst Mommsen’s concept of dyarchia remains useful since it allows some scope for 
understanding the dual and paradoxical nature of the Principate, it has received a great deal of criticism 
because scholars have since noted that the nature of the Principate cannot be adequately analysed from a 
constitutional perspective. For re-evaluations of Mommsen see Linderski (1993:42-53), Winterling 
(2009:123-40) and also Brunt (1984:423-431) on the role of the senate in the regimes of Augustus and 
Tiberius. See also Mousourakis (2007:83-94/107-109). For Mousourakis: ‘the powers Augustus was 
invested with were conferred upon him through means compatible with republican precedents and 
therefore ‘the republic itself still functioned.’ (2007:83ff.). Winterling shows that the emperor was 
neither absolved from the laws (legibus solutis) nor able to absolve himself of them (2009:133). See also 
Wallace-Hadrill (1982) on the ambiguous civil status of the princeps. 
71 Flaig (2011:79). Such relationships or rituals of consensus can also be traced between the emperor and 
elite. As Flaig says, since the emperor exercised power already before it was ‘transferred’ by a decree of 
the senate and a law of the people, the eventual acts of transfer were consensual acts, celebrated within 






Principate. For Flaig, following Weber’s conceptualisation of legitimacy as acceptance, 
the Augustan principate was legitimate in the highest degree.72 
The relationship which Flaig describes is precisely one of performance, and 
from this perspective we may begin to understand how Roman imperial sovereignty 
worked through measures and techniques that were beyond the legal system. As Flaig 
rightly notes, the emperor’s position did not rest on legal authority but on acceptance. 
However, before conceptualising the Principate as an ‘acceptance-system’ we must 
question why and how that acceptance is achieved.  
Tacitus’ conception of the beginning of absolute sovereignty and the various 
relationships which were generated upon the foundation of the Principate can provide 
us with some answers. In the Tacitean account a similar type of sovereignty to the one 
Flaig describes above is constructed. In the prologue, Tacitus evidently surveys 
Augustan history for what in its politics eludes the juridical model of sovereignty (i.e. 
one based on statutes and constitutions).  It is evident that there is no subordination of 
the princeps to the law (rather Augustus was the law) which means that the law itself 
becomes secondary to political power (rather than that which organises and authorises 
political power). As a result something other than law must ‘legitimise’ the position of 
the sovereign, as well as seal the numerous networks of relationships performed 
throughout the social body. Again, in Tacitus’ prologue, this non-juridical factor is 
made clear: as Tacitus summarises – Augustus seduced the army with gifts, the people 
with cheap grain and everyone with the sweetness of otium.73  
This particular type of sovereignty, which we may describe as resting in a 
network of two-way relationships throughout the social body, and which garners 
legitimacy through means which are independent of a legal system, is comparable with 
Foucauldian biopolitics. Biopolitics was analysed by Foucault through tracing the shift 
from a ‘classical’ system of sovereign government as that which produced laws and 
rules to a system of governance which produced norms and systems. In the classical 
model (pre-nineteenth century) Foucault claims that the basic attribute of the sovereign 
was the right of life and death, that is, the sovereign through his supreme power has the 
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right to either put people to death or let them live.74 Given this, Foucault argues that 
‘the lives and deaths of subjects become rights only as a result of the will of the 
sovereign.’75 But, as Foucault goes onto explain, the right of life and death is exercised 
in an unbalanced way because the sovereign cannot ‘grant life’ like he can inflict death. 
Rather, the sovereign’s power over life is made manifest when he takes life away: 
subsequently, ‘the very essence of the right of life and death is actually the right to 
kill.’76  
At the turn of the nineteenth century Foucault posits a shift: ‘whilst 
sovereignty’s old right to take life or let live was not replaced, a new right emerged 
which permeated and penetrated the old: this is the right, or rather precisely the 
opposite right...it is the power to “make” live and “let” die.’77 Put in another way, the 
contrast between these two systems of power (‘classical sovereignty’ on one hand and 
‘biopolitical sovereignty’ on the other), is between the exercise of sovereignty for the 
right to kill and the exercise of sovereignty for ‘the regularization of life’.78 The 
regularization of life is achieved through a particular power technique which seeks to 
‘improve life’ (majorer la vie) by ‘establishing a sort of homeostasis through achieving 
an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers.’79 
                                                           
74 For Foucault, this right ‘derived no doubt from the ancient patria potestas that granted the father of the 
Roman family the right to “dispose” of the life of his children and his slaves; just as he had given them 
life, so he could take it away.’ (1998:135). 
75 Foucault (2004:240). 
76 Ibid. In a Roman context, this particular right may be read alongside the ius necis vitaeque civium, 
which in Tacitus is symbolised by Vitellius’ pugio, since when it was surrendered to Caecilius Simplex, 
so too, as Tacitus states, was the emperor’s ‘right of life and death over citizens’; Hist.3.68. (Cf. OLD 
s.v. ius 10, 11). 
77 Ibid (241). This right is also expressed as ‘make life or disallow it to the point of death’ (‘faire vivre ou 
de rejeter dans la mort’ [1976:181]). 
78 Ibid (249). 
79 Ibid. Foucault outlines biopower’s essential function at (2004:254) which is ‘to improve life, to 
prolong its duration, to improve its chances, to avoid accidents, and to compensate for failings’ (il s’agit 
essentiellement de majorer la vie, d’en prolonger la durée, d’en multiplier les chances, d’en détourner 
les accidents, ou bien d’en compenser les deficits’, [1997:226]. Another definition can be found at 
Foucault (1998:139) where Foucault states that the highest function of biopower is to ‘invest life through 
and through’. What is notable, especially in terms of how we may differentiate between biopower and 
disciplinary power, is that the latter is not explained in terms of positive or improving effects. Rather, 
discipline works to manage or to regulate (the verb Foucault often uses is ‘gérer’, meaning ‘to 
administer’, specifically the interests or affairs of another, or those of a society or collectivity (LGR s.v.). 
Macey thus translates the French ‘majorer’ as ‘to improve’ but in a Foucauldian context, the term should 






From this perspective, where the role of the sovereign is not simply to decide life and 
death, Foucault argued that power is transformed from a coercive machine (one which 
defines normal and deviant behaviour through the force of law) to an apparatus of 
control and self-government which operated ‘throughout and from within the fabric of 
social reality.’ Biopolitical sovereignty is a form of power which is beyond the 
juridico-legal sphere, becoming manifest at the moment when political power gains a 
‘hold over life’.80  
Though Foucault described biopolitical sovereignty as a specific condition of 
modernity, the theoretical framework above provides a neat model for Augustan 
sovereignty post-Actium, which can be explained through a biopolitical framework on 
two accounts: 1) through the focus on the circulation of republican ‘norms’ rather than 
or as well as republican laws; and 2) through the establishment of ‘homeostasis’ (i.e. 
the maintenance of equilibrium within a social group obtained after conflicts have been 
reduced) – both of which contributed to ‘the improvement and regularization of life’ 
under the Augustan age. 
Tacitus’ conception of the foundation of the principate is also biopolitical but it 
should be evident that there is a crucial difference. Though the end effect of 
homeostasis is the same; as mentioned above, the means through which this 
homeostasis was achieved are different. According to Tacitus, rather than republican 
norms, Augustus achieved equilibrium through his all-absorbing executive imperium 
and furthermore, gifts, grain and leisure. When otium is introduced into the realm of the 
socio-political as a supplement to the erosion of the mos, this is where one can trace the 
precise merging of life and politics, where power gains a ‘hold over life.’ This is 
because the state of otium, that is, a state of life which is a withdrawn form of political 
existence (or a state of inactivity), is the ideal state for the effective penetration of 
biopower, a power which targets the body as its object for the sole purpose of making it 
‘docile’ – happy and well-fed but also useful and obedient (useful because it is 
obedient).81  
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Tacitean biopolitics can thus develop our understanding of the Principate 
beyond a legal frame; but also beyond the notion of ‘acceptance’ or as an ‘acceptance 
system’ which in my view is a simplification of how power relations under the 
Principate work.82 Consent is always involved in a political system, and as discussed 
above, even consent to falsity.83 We cannot therefore, as a conclusion, conceptualise 
the Principate as a system of acceptance without questioning how (by what power) the 
‘fabric of social reality’ is organised in such a way so as to gain that acceptance and 
moreover what the implications of such accepting systems are. In the Tacitean account, 
the alteration of the fabric of social reality can be read in terms of its infusion with 
leisure and Augustus’ powers are sealed through processes of seduction and a sort of 
osmosis or absorption (rather than brute force). This allows us to hypothesise that 
Augustus’ paradoxical position in the state (republican princeps) and any confusion it 
introduced (libertas and Principate) was ‘legitimised’ because from it flowed the 
maintenance of life to a positive effect (that is, the biopolitical improvement of life 
through the Tacitean ‘sweetness of leisure’). Thus, whilst the Tacitean narrative does 
reveal the elite erosion of mores it is evident that Tacitus does not locate any sense of 
‘crisis’ in the Principate (of Augustus). Tacitus’ conception of the beginning of 
imperial time is not, on the surface level, analogous with the onset of oppression. 
Rather, regulation of life stems from the definitive, defining and exemplary position of 
the sovereign (‘all eyes looked to Augustus…’) whose health in many ways reflects 
and orders the health of the body-politic (nobody had any worries so long as Augustus 
retained his strength and his health; 1.4.1). 
Tacitus’ preliminary construction of Augustan sovereignty can help us to 
understand some of the complexities surrounding the imperial position, in particular, 
the nature of the burden which was imposed on Tiberius in AD 14. Power, in the 
Foucauldian sense, is something which emerges in the interstices of human relations. It 
                                                                                                                                                                         
produces subjected and practised bodies, ‘docile bodies’. Discipline increases the forces of the body (in 
economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience).’ 
(1995:138).  
82 Equally, theories on exceptionality cannot adequately explain why extra-legal powers are often 
consented to even after emergency ends, as is the case here. 
83 Cf. Arendt: ‘not even the most autocratic ruler or tyrant could ever rise to power, let alone keep it, 





is distinguishable from imperium and any form of authority conferred onto an 
individual by law or heritage because it is not a concrete form of authority which is 
possessed by the sovereign. Rather, power for Foucault is a productive ritual, and not a 
ritual of consensus or gift exchange, but specifically ‘a ritual of truth’ (and knowledge 
exchange) which is exercised throughout the social realm and participated in by all.84 In 
short, Foucauldian power does not refer to a type of power that affirms the binary 
between legal and illegal (a binary which would be affirmed through a constitution), 
but one which affirms the binary between true and false, the acceptable and 
unacceptable.85 However, Tacitus allows us to see a connection between these two 
forms of power. What Foucault misses is the possibility of the sovereign’s grip on 
discursive power (that is, on those rules and power structures which define truth and its 
conditions of possibility), and it is this very relation between sovereignty and truth that 
Tacitus grounds (or rather de-grounds) in the accession chapters. The problem is that 
Tiberius, due to his obscura verba and incredibility, cannot affirm the ritual of 
truth/knowledge exchange. 
Thus, Tacitus’ writing of sovereign power in terms of ambiguity and lack of 
credibility (as opposed to illegality) allows us to draw a connection between forms of 
power which must, for Foucault, be seen as distinct. In a Roman context, we cannot 
overlook the fact that the emperor was empowered with a higher authority (the threat of 
death was at his disposal and bare life is always potential in a sovereign system). Yet, 
Tacitus takes this further by implying that the emperor was (or was to be) charged, 
also, with a certain status, one which spoke truth. With an imperium that determines 
truth, sovereignty merges with discursive power because the stating of that truth 
provides a regime of truth with legitimacy, and a societal acceptance that brings with it 
power. That power will then reinforce the sovereignty of the emperor and the 
emperor’s sovereignty will reinforce the regime of truth.  
Such a framework, one which establishes social order in terms of a connection 
between sovereignty and truth (and power) rather than sovereignty and law (and 
imperium) allows us to advance an understanding of the principate beyond notions of 
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(legal) legitimacy and acceptance. It also explains the contradiction which Tacitus 
writes into the accession chapters: why did the debate take place if Tiberius was 
already exercising tribunicia potestas (one of the ‘prime features of the Principate’, as 
Syme notes86)? In my view, this contradiction allows Tacitus to make the crucial point, 
that if the debate arises despite Tiberius’ exercise of imperium and tribunician power, 
then surely this suggests that such powers indeed were not the prime features of the 
Principate. This leads me to conclude that the princeps’ sovereignty did not work 
through such legally authorised powers alone nor rituals of consensus. Rather, the 
Tacitean interpretation suggests that the power of the princeps was sealed through a 
different system of legitimacy: rather than discerning what is legal and what is not in a 
constitutional sense, law is to be decided in a discursive sense. In other words, the 
achievement of homeostasis in the Tacitean account, which characterises his perception 
of the establishment of the principate, depends upon the sovereign ability to decide 
what is true. 
 
Conclusion: Politics without Truth 
 
It was not until the peaceful and smooth transfer of power 
to Tiberius – who could not, like Augustus, convincingly 
presume upon an auctoritas that had accrued to him as 
saviour in time of need – that people’s eyes were opened 
to the existence, behind the facade of the Grey Eminence, 
of a new system of government not linked with a 
particular person.87  
 
The period of civil wars leading up to Actium can be described as an emergency 
situation, during which exceptional (legalised illegal) measures were taken to secure 
social order. This exceptional time lent Augustus’ supreme position in the state 
thereafter a messianic quality because he had brought war to an end and set everything 
in order. In this way, the law-breaking (and law-making) violence of the 30s and the 
subsequent genesis of a new system of government in 28 and 27 were ‘accepted’ on the 
                                                           
86 Syme (1958:410) 





basis that they were constructed as exceptional means which maintained rather than 
replaced or destroyed the old republican order. That exceptionality was embodied in 
the emperor and associated with the person of Augustus because, as Eder rightly notes, 
Augustus was ‘the saviour in time of need’.  
 However, it is difficult to argue for the significance of AD 14 – both as a 
moment in history and as the start date of Tacitus’ Annales – as the moment when 
people suddenly realised that they were living under a monarchy, as Eder suggests 
above. The question of when ‘people’s eyes were opened’ remains debatable; and in 
the Tacitean account, so does the question of whether they were ever ‘closed’. The 
emphasis in Tacitus’ narrative is on imperium and servitium into which the elite (with 
eyes open) rush and even desire. Given this, the Tacitean narrative opposes the 
concealed to revealed moment to which Eder refers and locates to AD 14 since it would 
appear that nothing had thus far been concealed.88  
 Many readers have overlooked a fundamental feature of the beginning of the 
Annales (and Tacitean historiography). According to Tacitus, power concentrated in the 
hands of an individual enables peace. Whilst the Annales begins by denying any notion 
of ‘res publica restituta’ in Augustus’ receipt of ‘all things’ in the name of prince, 
Tacitus does not associate this with an immediate crisis in the legal, political nor 
discursive structure of Roman imperial society. Subsequently, if peace and order are 
written through sovereignty (instead of some form of restoration or traditional 
republican auctoritas) the narrative resists any analysis which seeks to posit a 
connection between sovereignty and crisis, Principate and ‘collapse’. Rather, it is 
precisely Augustus’ sovereignty which acts as a (temporary) supplement to the loss of 
tradition and the erosion of mores and leges, and which can then maintain the paradox 
of Roman sovereignty embodied in his own person.  
It is at this point that one wonders whether, when analysing Tacitus’ writing of 
the principate as a ‘critique’ of absolute power or tyranny that we have mistakenly 
                                                           
88 Cf. Millar (1973:61ff.) on the extra-legal similarities between the triumviral period and the Principate. 
Millar argues that contemporaries saw the triumviral period for all the violence and criminality it was: 
‘The victory of Actium, the death of Antonius and the stabilization of affairs in Rome all marked steps 
towards, not away from, the establishment of a monarchy; and no good evidence suggests that anybody 





presupposed a logic from which Tacitus himself does not write. This logic, one which 
arranges sovereignty as a problem (because it endangers liberty and problematises 
democracy) and which subsequently reads supreme power as something which is or 
needs to be concealed (pace Eder, above) in order to effectively manage the secret or 
hidden subordination of subjects, is precisely not one which orders the Tacitean 
analysis.89 This is not to say that Tacitus condones absolute sovereignty (that is, that 
Tacitus is ‘for’ rather than ‘against’ the monarchy) since that is a different argument 
and in any case beside the point, but rather that Tacitus speaks about sovereignty in a 
different way, which by extension, implies a different foundation to his political 
thought.90 Tacitus is, of course, troubled by the techniques of imperial power and in 
particular the ways in which it renders libertas as seeming or imaginary rather than real 
(simulacra libertatis; 1.73.2, libertatis imagine; 1.81.4). However, that which renders 
freedom, as well as peace and virtue unreal is not the emperor and his arbitrary power 
(dominatio), but it is due to the active agents in society, who rushing into servitude, 
continue to create and empower the sovereign. It is, then, the senators themselves who 
are responsible for ‘dying freedom’ (moriens libertas; Ann.1.74). 
To return to Flaig’s notion of acceptance, then, one should note that individuals 
are not only accepting but they are ready and rushing into servitude.  Indeed, in the 
prologue it is Augustus who ‘accepts’ all things which further implies the people’s 
wilful subjugation to his authority.91 In this perspective, Tacitus alludes to the 
                                                           
89 This understanding of sovereignty as deceptive or concealing is also fundamentally Foucauldian, in 
fact, it is a supposition which enables Foucault’s theory of disciplinary power. For Foucault, the 
‘democratization of sovereignty’ was enabled because the mechanism of discipline which sovereignty is 
in nature was concealed by imposing upon it a system of rights and a juridical code: ‘once disciplinary 
constraints had to both function as mechanisms of domination and be concealed to the extent that they 
were the mode in which power was exercised, the theory of sovereignty had to find expression in the 
juridical apparatus and had to be reactivated or complemented by juridical codes’ (2004:37).  
90 Cf. Bartelson (1995:4) – The reason Bartleson pushes the reader to ask how people speak about 
sovereignty is because he believes that the writing of sovereignty is linked with the ‘unthought 
foundation of political knowledge’. 
91 We can see from this the extent of Tacitus’ influence on Hobbes’ notion of the sovereignty of the 
Leviathan state. For Hobbes, it is the unity of the multitude submitting ‘their Wills’ to one power that 
will ensure a ‘nourished’ and ‘contented’ life, as well as peace at home and safety from foreign enemies 
(1998:120-121) and despite his centralised role and power, the will of the sovereign can only be the will 
of the people because it is the people who authorise the sovereign’s authority (‘by this Authoritie, given 
him by every particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength 
conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is inabled to conforme [or ‘performe’] the wills of them all’, 





fundamentally political nature of servitude, a further tragic paradox, because it is 
servitium (a paradoxical expression of “free will”) that empowers the sovereign and 
whatever system of laws, rights, truths he puts into circulation. In such a context, 
servitium is not politically inconsequential, rather, servitium is a fundamentally and 
crucially political act because it guarantees the sovereign state and promises security in 
the present as opposed to the dangers of the past. But that servitium must be accepted 
by the sovereign (and so, the ‘acceptance system’ must also be assessed from the 
sovereign’s perspective). The problem is that Tiberius does not accept ‘all things’ in the 
name of princeps. 
With such an understanding of sovereignty, the crisis at AD 14 emerges as 
something quite different. There is a crisis upon the death of Augustus, but it is aside 
the issue of whether Tiberius can replace a republican order or continue to ‘conceal’ its 
opposite; nor is crisis linked to the proper constitution or sudden ‘revelation’ of a 
monarchy behind a republican façade on his accession. Rather, the alternative crisis in 
AD 14 stems from the death of the exceptional monarch and that Tiberius, 
paradoxically, was set to access an exceptional status.92 The question which becomes 
the focal point of the Tiberian narrative is whether Tiberius can restore Augustus’ 
Republic, and in so doing restore the network of biopolitical relationships throughout 
the social realm in order to maintain the essential relationships between sovereignty 
and peace, sovereignty and truth. 
 But when the authority figure cannot assert truth in the political sphere, it 
creates a void in the knowledge of how one should behave and when people lose track 
of how to behave there emerges violence – this is precisely what happens in the 
Tiberian narrative. Tiberius’ non-sovereignty leads to the commencement of war that 
was suspended in Augustus’ (temporary) solution. Subsequently, AD 14 is not the 
moment when the Grey Eminence behind the republican facade of a system not linked 
                                                                                                                                                                         
and 117). Again, in Tacitus this point is made by the active rushing into servitude, which authorises and 
continues to empower the emperor’s supremacy (a supremacy which is thus a reflection of the people’s 
will or agency). For a discussion of Hobbes’ use of Tacitus’ Annales in his Three Discourses (which can 
be found at Hobbes, 1995:31-70) and Leviathan see Martinich (1999:45ff.).  
92 An exception, logically speaking, cannot follow an exception because that would undermine its 
essential exceptional status. Rather, what the renewal of an exception achieves is normalisation. In the 
normalisation of the exception, the fundamental paradox is constituted which allows us to see that the 





with a particular person is suddenly revealed. Rather, if we are to understand what sort 
of shift takes place at AD 14 and why Tacitus chose to begin the narratio at this point, 
we need to note that in the Tacitean narrative, it would appear that the new system of 




SPACES OF CONFLICT: VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE INTERREGNUM 
 
 
Rather than assuming a sharp break between war and 
peace, it may be more productive to suppose that conflict 
is ever-present, that conflict is shaped at a variety of 
levels by various groups who create and manipulate it for 
various reasons, and that conflict in peacetime is in many 
ways a modification of conflict in wartime.1 
 
     
Keen’s conception of conflict as ‘ever-present’ changes perspectives for Roman 
historians. Rather than worry about the long period of peace in which there were no 
wars and few conspiracies we can see the years spanning the inter-civil war period (31 
BC-AD 69) as a period during which civil conflicts were frequent. We may suppose, as 
Keen suggests, that conflict never ended, but manifested itself ‘at a variety of levels 
and by various groups’ in a continuous cycle of emergence, suspension and re-
emergence. As such, though our sources suggest that there were times during which the 
distinction between war and peace was prominent, it may be more productive to 
suppose that such a distinction remained fragile, perhaps even illusory.2 
The opening of the Annales locates a chronology of war (emergent conflict) and 
peace (suspended conflict) in the years surrounding the establishment of the Principate. 
There was a period of discordia (before 31 BC) followed by a period of pax (28/27 BC 
– AD 14).3 But on the death of Augustus, Tacitus reminds us that a civil weakness 
began to emerge again.  
Two mutinies occurred in AD 14. Once the news of Augustus’ death was 
communicated and an official period of mourning declared, the soldiers on the Danube 
                                                           
1 Keen (2003:1). 
2 Notable here is Tacitus’ Percennius’ binary which (asserted from a military viewpoint) is not war and 
peace but bellum atrox (terrible war) and sterilis pax (barren peace); Ann.1.17. 
3 Or rather otium (1.2.1). But elsewhere it is pax e.g. Ann. 1.1.3, Ann.3.28, Hist.1.1, Ag.1.3. Part of the 
problem in asserting a binary between war and peace in Tacitus is due to the fact that after 27/28, pax 
(peace) is conflated with otium (leisure). Although many scholars read these terms synonymously, there 
is plenty of evidence which suggests that pax and otium were not synonymous. See for e.g. 
Quint.Decl.19.9; Gell.19.10.12; Plin.Pan.82.8-9; Sen.Ep.72.7 (on the dangers of leisure) and 





and Rhine rebelled against their commanders for the purpose of service reform. This 
outbreak of violence during the uncertain period of the interregnum is given due 
attention by Tacitus. After Tiberius has formally accepted the throne, Tacitus moves to 
a description of events in Pannonia (1.16-1.30) and next to a long description of events 
in Germany (1.31-1.49), where the soldiers, more violent than those in Pannonia, attack 
not only their centurions but even Germanicus himself. In Tacitus’ words, it was a 
scene different to that of all other civil wars.4  
 Following Keen’s paradigm, Tacitus’ writing of Pannonia and Germany may 
be read as spaces in which civil conflict continued to be even after Augustus had 
brought an end to such conflicts. Such a view is expressed in Ellen O’Gorman’s claim 
that the narrative of the Annales sees ‘the collapse of the boundary between Principate 
and civil war’ even though the return of civil war proper did not happen until 68.5 Yet, 
the conflict of the mutinies must also be considered from a temporal perspective 
because it is precisely during the interregnum (a period characterised by an absence of 
the sovereign’s power) that the soldiers’ violence emerges and enacts the revolutionary 
potential of the civil wars.6 Following Keen, we may read this conflict emergence as 
that which was previously suspended under the pax Augusta rather than something 
which is more generally connected to the Principate as a whole. 
 However, following Tacitus’ own interpretation that the violence of the 
mutinies was different to that of any other civil war, there are further reasons to 
distinguish the violence of the interregnum from other types of civil conflict. Firstly, 
though the new enemies of the state are Roman citizens they are not members of the 
elite battling for supreme power. Rather, this is a group of men from a lower order of 
society acting in agreement to disagree with a higher order (almost like an urban 
                                                           
4 Ann.1.49.1: Diversa omnium, quae umquam accidere, civilium armorum facies. 
5 In O’Gorman’s view ‘[the Principate] manifests the very same destructive elements of disorder within 
its regime’ which ‘entails, most importantly, the collapse of the boundary between Principate and civil 
war.’ Subsequently rather than imperium sine fine, it becomes, in the Tacitean account, ‘empire without 
definition.’ (2000:23). Keitel (1984) also discusses the connections between Principate and civil war in 
Tacitus. See also Sailor (2008:190-1) ‘In Annals civil war itself becomes a way of talking not about civil 
war but about the Principate, and the Principate thereby looks from time to time like permanent, 
institutionalised civil conflict’ (190). 
6 Tacitus’ description of the period before Augustus and his peace, as one of non mos, non ius (Ann.3.28) 





conspiracy). As a result of this, the natural hierarchy is disrupted by those who 
previously had no place to speak and be heard within the existing distribution of places 
and roles. Put differently, the violence enacted here must be distinguished from other 
acts of violentia on the basis that it is a mutiny (seditio). This is because the violentia of 
seditio (rebellion, insurrection, sedition) is a type of violence which 1) challenges 
notions of authoritative stability and constantia (harmony, constancy) and 2) is enacted 
to ‘offend against a norm.’7 In this case, the soldiers’ rebellious violence offends or 
disrupts the normal distribution of role and place within the hierarchies of the military 
order because they become insubordinate to their commanders. Sedition in this case, 
then, cancels the suppositions of inequality upon which the hierarchical structures of the 
military ranking system functioned because the soldiers act beyond their designated 
subordinate roles and enact momentarily a status of equality. This cancellation causes a 
rupture in the established social order, from which as Jacques Rancière would argue, 
there emerges a democratic moment.8 
 Rancière’s conception of democratic politics refers to a type of political 
activity, namely a conflict or ‘clash’ between two social orders, which challenges the 
naturalness of a place. The democratic moment is an ‘interruptive’ moment during 
which the structural positions supposed to be occupied within a given hierarchy are 
transgressed. In this transgression, that which was previously made invisible (a wrong) 
is made visible.9 For Rancière, this wrong amounts to the inherent inequality of certain 
economies and the modes of domination inflicted by them. But in the moment of 
democratic politics, when individuals act beyond their subordinate positions, ‘the 
ultimate equality [l’égalité dernière] on which society rests is made real’.10  
 Leaving aside the issue of ‘making real the ultimate equality of society’11 there 
is value to reading Tacitus’ writing of seditio from the perspective of Rancière’s notion 
                                                           
7 Honderich (1973:167).  
8 Rancière (1999:28ff, 101ff. and passim).  
9 Ibid (101ff.). 
10 Ibid (16).  
11 Political conflict exists precisely because it has the power to override the ethical notion of ‘ultimate 
equality’ (or the ‘presupposition of equality’). If we were to approach politics from the perspective of the 
ethical notion that everyone is equal, this would not help us to understand social relations, which 






of democracy, which does not refer to a form of government characterised by an 
equality of rights and status, but rather, to a temporary activity of ‘interruption’.12 The 
violence of the mutinies is an interruptive moment. The surplus of soldierly power 
creates a space to speak and be heard where previously there was no such place. The 
wrongs the soldiers seek to make visible, the extremity of army discipline, interrupts the 
authority of the centurions who ordinarily impose it. It is also notable that there are 
egalitarian motivations behind the soldiers’ insubordination (increased pay, better living 
conditions, better government). This means that the effects the soldiers intend are 
directed to promote some kind of progress towards equality, that the current system 
becomes a fuller realisation of democracy in its treatment of the legions.13 Yet, it must 
be stressed that the activity of interruption to which Ranciere’s conception of 
democracy refers is limited because once that activity ceases and ‘order’ is restored, the 
symbolic violence upon which the well-run regime rests is reinforced.14 In such a 
context, the soldiers do not emerge victorious nor do they achieve ultimate liberation 
from the centurion’s command; rather, and tragically, their violence creates a more 
dreadful foundation upon which to build further violence and inequality (hence, in the 
end the soldiers demands were disregarded).15  
 We may also read Tacitus’ writing of the mutinies as ‘democratic’. This is 
because Tacitus’ inclusion of the mutinies, particularly his attention to the details of the 
soldiers’ grievances which are not only represented through the disorder of furor but 
also through voices of ratio (reason), Tacitus’ own historiographical practice interrupts 
established historiographical practice, which often trivialises narratives of non-elite 
                                                           
12 Emancipation (and democracy) for Rancière ‘is a process rather than a goal’ and ‘a break in the 
present rather than an ideal put in the future.’ (2005:292). 
13 Violence is often condemned on the grounds that it is undemocratic but this violence cannot really be 
read in this way, which perhaps explains why there is no moral commentary from Tacitus in these 
episodes. Of course this is not to say that Tacitus approves of the soldiers’ violence but it should be 
noted that there is no expressed abhorrence on his part. Rather, abhorrence is expressed towards the 
counter-insurgents, the centurions and Germanicus, who made ‘mistakes’ (1.40.1 peccata) by setting 
good but illegal examples (e.g.1.38.1).  
14 On symbolic or ‘soft’ violence see below p.110, n.26 and p.137, n.90. 





violence or erases them altogether (making them invisible).16 From this perspective, 
Tacitus’ writing of seditio represents an interruptive moment wherein other voices, 
values and truths can be heard. And unlike the violence of any other civil war and 
indeed that of other civil conflicts at Rome amongst the elite, the violence of the 
mutinies can be read as moments of ‘democratic politics’. 
 The aim of this chapter is to analyse Tacitus’ writing of seditio in order to 
explore further the relationship between violence and democracy. The focus will be on 
1) the various motives for the soldiers’ mutiny and 2) the various measures taken to end 
the mutinies. My view is that Tacitus’ account of the mutinies reveals a paradox within 
the orders of the imperial episteme: Roman society was fiercely hierarchical and order 
depended on rigid structures and structural positions (assigned roles and places). But the 
narrative of the mutinies suggests that hierarchy was also a locus of everyday conflict 
due to the extent of disciplina and labor imposed onto the soldiers (modes of 
subordination). The establishing of hierarchy is then a mode of ordering structure, but it 
equally creates a space within which is compressed the potential for the dangerous and 
threatening emergence of democratic violence (acts of insubordination). But in the 
resolution of democratic violence, and the renewal of hierarchy which resolution sees, 
democratic potential is not terminated but merely suspended.  Hierarchy is therefore the 
essential space of conflict, because even though it is paradoxically designed to prevent 
democratic operation (as it did under the pax Augusta), it nonetheless embeds the 
potential for the emergence of democratic revolution (which happens after the pax 
Augusta). Put simply, the disciplining structures of hierarchy which are designed to 
prevent violence have embedded within them the prospect of democratic 
violence/resurgence.  
 In the first section, I focus on the Pannonian mutiny and in particular the 
speech given to the chieftain Percennius who incites the soldiers to revolt through a 
damming commentary of Roman military life: ‘soul and body reckoned at ten asses a 
day...we must be oppressed no longer under a standard’ (1.17.4). There are two points I 
                                                           
16 See below discussion of Velleius’ narration of the mutinies (p.111ff.). See also, in a different context, 
Trouillot’s analysis of formulas of erasure and ‘banalization’ in Haitian historiography following the 





shall consider: 1) how Tacitus integrates Percennius and his discourse into his narrative 
and 2) how the inclusion of Percennius’ discourse reflects on Tacitus’ own 
historiographical practice. 
Eric Auerbach published a commentary on Percennius in 1946 in which he 
criticised Tacitus’ narrative (as well as the rhetorical traditions of antiquity in general) 
on the grounds that they posed constraints on the representation of everyday reality. 
The reason for this, according to Auerbach, is that elite documents cannot achieve a 
balanced picture of society and culture because ancient models for writing about 
everyday life (by which he means the life of the lower classes) were ‘ahistoric’ and 
elitist: ‘If the literature of antiquity was unable to represent everyday life seriously, that 
is, in full appreciation of its problems and with an eye for its historical background; if it 
could represent it only in the low style, comically or at best idyllically, statically and 
ahistorically, the implication is that these things mark the limits not only of the realism 
of antiquity but of its historical consciousness as well.’17 For Auerbach, ‘Percennius 
speaks, but he speaks Tacitean’.18 Whilst it is certain that Percennius is (and can only 
be) represented from within Tacitus’ social imagination, Tacitus nonetheless chooses to 
include Percennius in his narrative. In this inclusion, which makes obvious the 
differences between soldier and senator, the Tacitean narrative allows us to trace the 
institution of another discourse where previously, as Rancière would argue, there was 
only ‘noise’ (bruit).19 The result is a multiplicity of voice which reflects or imagines the 
essential conflict of democratic politics, that is, the disagreement between two social 
orders and two world-views during which the minority come to represent the majority. 
By including the normatively nameless, I argue that the Tacitean narrative counters the 
homogeneous discourse of antiquity which Auerbach sought to criticise. 
                                                           
17 Auerbach (2003:39).  
18 Ibid (33).  
19 By ‘noise’ Rancière means the discourse of ‘the part that has no part’ (le part sans-part) or ‘the poor’. 
When the part that has no part makes itself visible by acting beyond its designated role, its ‘noise’ is 
transformed into discourse, becoming intelligible (1999:29-30). This idea is neatly expressed in Tacitus’ 
comment that when Germanicus approached the camp the soldiers’ ‘confused murmurs became audible’ 
(postquam vallum iniit dissoni questus audiri coepere; 1.34.2). The institution of discourse where 
previously there was only noise can also be seen at Ag.30-31 when the colonial Calgacus is voiced. For a 





In the second section, I analyse Tacitus’ writing of resolution in the German 
mutiny, questioning whether there is a correlation between Roman measures of conflict 
resolution (in particular the inculcation of military discipline) and the ever-presence of 
conflict. The additional significance of the mutiny episodes is that they provide the first 
proper introduction to Germanicus. Whilst Germanicus does act historically by 
employing traditional forms of Roman conflict resolution (stating the importance of 
disciplina militaris, trying to convince the crowd to end their mutiny through patriotic 
speech, gestures of pietas, references to the victories of the past and the importance of 
moderatio) such measures do not end the insurgency but only incite it further.  
Roman techniques of resolution during the imperial period were largely framed 
by references to the past and it was believed that following the conduct of exemplary 
Romans could prevent violence and frenzied behaviour in situations of conflict. For 
many of the authors who discuss riots, the favoured remedy is a great man using 
persuasion through his rank or personal standing, either in person or with a letter from 
the emperor to convince the crowd to stop their destructive behaviour.20 Such speeches 
(which may be read as historiographical examples of symbolic violence) are normally 
designed to instil a sense of discipline and pride in the rebels so to restore the 
importance of self-control and civil duty.21 Tacitus’ narrative is not an exception to this 
pattern – but the key difference is that the pattern fails. In the end, Germanicus has no 
choice but to forge a letter in Tiberius’ name which promises to grant the soldiers’ 
requests. When forgery fails Germanicus bribes the soldiers. When bribery fails, he 
threatens massacre. As Tacitus later tells, such measures were ill-considered, dangerous 
and outrageous (1.78.2). 
If hierarchy is rebuilt through deceit, bribery and murder then Tacitus raises the 
possibility of a certain weakness in the societal order.  From this perspective, the 
ending of insurgency is not a resolution, but rather a re-suspension of the disorder of 
revolution through the development of explicitly false rhetoric and epistemic order, the 
disorder which Augustus had suspended through similarly excessive techniques of 
                                                           
20 See for example Dio (69.1.8) who reports Hadrian’s resolution of conflict in Alexandria with a letter 
rather than the sword. See further examples in Kelly (2007:161ff., n.51). 





resolution after Actium (cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit). The ‘end’ of the mutinies is 
merely a resumption of the Augustan suspension.  
In the concluding section I discuss the significance of Tacitus’ construction of 
seditio as democratic violence in terms of what it reveals about the condition of the 
space of empire as a whole. In his commentary on Book 1 of the Annales, F.R.D. 
Goodyear stated that no sufficient explanation of Tacitus’ treatment of the mutinies 
‘can be based on the assumption that Tacitus considered the mutinies of special 
historical importance since he is so careful to disentangle them from political events at 
Rome.’22 I would, however, argue that the events in Rome and those in Pannonia and 
Germany are necessarily entangled, especially given Tacitus’ comments at 1.7.6-7, 
which explain the hesitatio of Tiberius in part due to his doubt about the situation in 
Germany, and Germanicus’ power among the legions.23 Moreover, there is an obvious 
link between the imperial position being taken in Rome while the legions similarly 
offer it to Germanicus in Germany. Most importantly, Tacitus states at 1.36 that due to 
the soldiers’ insurgency the state was in ‘a critical situation’ (in ancipiti res publica), 
which explicitly implies how significant military mutiny was/could be. 
Thus, military insurgency is a political event and certainly one of considerable 
importance in Tacitus’ narrative (witness also its dominance of the early text of the 
Annales and its role as the first event in which Germanicus features). Furthermore, 
military insurgency is a ‘democratic moment’ because the established hierarchical 
order is ruptured, leaving the state ‘in danger’. Yet, it is for this reason that Roman 
military democracy is in some tension with Rancière’s conception of democracy as ‘the 
power of those who have no specific qualification for ruling, except the fact of having 
no qualification.’24 In a Roman context it is precisely not possible to claim that the 
legions, though subject to the imperial program, were not important political actors. 
Although they may have had no ‘specific qualification for ruling’ given their place in 
the official hierarchy, it is evident that they did have the power to make the ruler and 
that this power was endemic to the imperial system. While under the Principate 
                                                           
22 As quoted in Woodman (2006:303). 
23 Ann.1.7.5: causa praecipua ex formidine, ne Germanicus, in cuius manu tot legiones, immensa 
sociorum auxilia, mirus apud populum favor, habere imperium quam exspectare mallet.  





members of the elite were faced with considerable restrictions on the parts they played, 
which of course in Tacitus’ narrative we read through his emphasis on the unrealness of 
their libertas (1.73.2, 1.81.4), the freedom or democratic powers of the legions (here 
expressed through their violence and speech) was neither unreal nor inconsequential. 
The participation of the army in the political process through seditio, licentia or libertas 
threatens the hierarchy that is established and secured through that very political 
process.  
Subsequently, the significance of the democratic moment in Tacitus is not that 
it represents the moment when ‘ultimate equality is made real’ as Rancière would argue 
(in any case that equality is never unreal, it is a basic ethical principle that cannot be 
denied). Rather in order to understand and explain why conflict emerges (or why it is 
suspended) and how the democratic moment affects the making of politics, we need to 
question what affects the manifestation of equality; and what affects it is not the sudden 
realisation with which one subordinate presupposes his equality; but that he stops 
performing his role of inequality.25  
From this perspective, the significance of the democratic moment in Tacitus is 
that it represents the moment when the soldiers cease to perform their role of 
subordination or ‘habit of submission’ as Tacitus puts it (morem obsequii; 
Ann.1.19.2).26 And in a Roman imperial military context, the historical significance of 
                                                           
25 From an ethical perspective equality is always real, but to presuppose its reality from a political and 
economic perspective is not always practical. May, following Rancière argues: ‘There is always a 
commitment to inequality: to believe that a given hierarchical police order is just or proper is to be 
committed, implicitly, to the inequality of speaking beings. It is to believe that the distribution of roles, 
which places some in the role of speaking for others, of ordering them, of exploiting them – in short, 
dominating them – is at least ethically permissible and indeed ethically proper’ (2007:28). May’s 
argument (which wrongly presupposes that all subordinates presuppose their own inequality) reveals the 
problem of conflating base ethics with politics. It is not plausible to state, in any context, that by 
committing to a police order is to believe that it is ‘ethically proper’ because this would imply that 
everyone (given that everyone is a part of the police order in varied roles) is committed to injustice and 
inequality, which is false. It is also noteworthy that movement beyond one’s established place is not 
always about liberation from inequality but can be about survival (see further Dunn’s critique of Hardt 
and Negri’s assumption that nomadism is a liberating act (2004:154ff.)). The point, then, is that from a 
practical (often economic) standpoint, people will perform their subordinate roles until they reach a limit 
point. In Tacitus, the soldiers reach their limit point during the mutinies. 
26 The soldiers’ habit of compliance is a precise manifestation of the workings of ‘symbolic violence’, 
which is violence that is ‘exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity.’ (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992:167, my emphasis). The soldiers’ failure to comply may then be read as acts which defy 
the systemic, ‘symbolic violence’ which underpins the disciplinary society as well as acts of mutiny 





the moment when the soldiery performances involved with the suppositions of 
inequality upon which society functions momentarily cease is that it is potentially a 
moment of foundation (the beginning of a new beginning). As Tacitus’ soldiers 
reminds us, the fate of Rome was in the their hands (1.31.5). In reality therefore, the 
army arguably played the most vital part, at least, securing the safety of the empire and 
at most, the capacity to make new emperors. The soldiers’ democratic moment is when 
ultimate political power is made real. 
 
3.1 Starting Mutiny: Percennius and the Power of Inclusion  
 
Grievances and demands show where soldiers saw 
themselves and where they thought they should be; 
settlements show where they really stood.27  
 
In Pannonia three legions under command of Q. Iunius Blaesus mutinied after they 
received news of Augustus’ death. These were VIII Augusta, IX Hispana, and XV 
Apollinaris.28 When Tiberius was informed of the soldiers’ rebellion, he sent his son 
Drusus with a distinguished staff and two battalions of the Guard to quell the uprising. 
Eventually, due to a lunar eclipse rather than any efficiency on Drusus’ part, the mutiny 
came to an end. 
Tacitus’ initial description of the outbreak tells that there existed ‘no new 
motives’ for the soldiers’ discordant behaviour except that the change of emperor 
created the opportunity to disturb and expose the profits afforded by civil war (nullis 
novis causis nisi quod mutatus princeps licentiam turbarum et ex civili bello spem 
praemiorum ostendebat; 1.16.2). Breebaart has extended Tacitus’ comments to argue 
that ‘the controlled chaos’ automatically broke loose because the power structure at the 
top had been disrupted: ‘only the vacuum of power, the breach in continuity, frees 
latent, but always present, destructive forces.’29  
                                                           
27 Rowe (2002:162). 
28 The last two had been in Illyricum for many years and according to Wilkes (1963:269) had probably 
fought under Tiberius in the earlier Bellum Pannonicum of 12-9 BC. VIII probably arrived from the 
Eastern Balkans during the war of AD 6-9. 





 The breaking loose of this controlled chaos during the ‘breach in continuity’ 
(that is the gap between the death of Augustus and the accession of Tiberius) may also 
be described as an emergence of suspended conflict. This idea is implicit in Tacitus’ 
language because by implying that the causes were old (nullis novis causas), he further 
suggests that the destructive forces were always there (‘ever-present’), even before the 
interregnum but only in latent (controlled/suspended) form. However, with the death of 
Augustus a space to speak freely of terrible war (bellum atrox) and barren peace 
(sterilis pax) is created.  
 In what follows, I shall analyse in further detail Tacitus’ writing of the 
Pannonian mutiny in order to explore why Tacitus’ writing of seditio in this case can be 
read as democratic. I shall do this by paying particular attention to the way in which 
Tacitus describes the soldiers’ attempts to be seen and be heard.  
 
Writing Insurgency: Tacitus and Velleius 
There are five speakers in Tacitus’ narrative of the Pannonian mutiny: the Pannonian 
chieftain Percennius (insurgent), the commander of VIIII Hispana Q. Blaesus (counter-
insurgent), private soldier Vibulenus (insurgent), Centurion J. Clemens (counter-
insurgent) and Tiberius’ adopted son Drusus (counter-insurgent). Out of the five 
speakers, the speech of the insurgents (Percennius and Vibulenus) outweighs in terms 
of length and argumentation that of the counter-insurgents (Blaesus, Clemens and 
Drusus). The conflict thus predominantly dramatises the perspective of the rebellious 
soldiers. The narrative is controlled by the rebels – first Percennius, next Vibulenus and 
then the group of insurgents as a whole. 
 After Blaesus has declared the iustitium and normal duties are suspended, 
Tacitus introduces Percennius. Formerly the leader of a theatrical claque, Percennius 
we are told had bold speech (procax lingua), an actorish enthusiasm (histrionalis 
stadium) and was practiced in stirring up crowds (1.16.3). His speech to the troops is 
reported by Tacitus as follows: 
 
Postremo promptis iam et aliis seditionis ministris velut 





paucioribus tribunis in modum servorum oboedirent. 
quando ausuros exposcere remedia, nisi novum et 
nutantem adhuc principem precibus vel armis adirent? 
satis per tot annos ignavia peccatum, quod tricena aut 
quadragena stipendia senes et plerique truncato ex 
vulneribus corpore tolerent. ne dimissis quidem finem 
esse militiae, sed apud vexillum tendentis alio vocabulo 
eosdem labores perferre. ac si quis tot casus vita 
superaverit, trahi adhuc diversas in terras ubi per nomen 
agrorum uligines paludum vel inculta montium accipiant. 
enimvero militiam ipsam gravem, infructuosam: denis in 
diem assibus animam et corpus aestimari: hinc vestem 
arma tentoria, hinc saevitiam centurionum et vacationes 
munerum redimi. at hercule verbera et vulnera, duram 
hiemem, exercitas aestates, bellum atrox: aut sterilem 
pacem sempiterna. nec aliud levamentum quam si certis 
sub legibus militia iniretur, ut singulos denarios 
mererent, sextus decumus stipendii annus finem adferret, 
ne ultra sub vexillis tenerentur, sed isdem in castris 
praemium pecunia solveretur. an praetorias cohortis, 
quae binos denarios acceperint, quae post sedecim annos 




With others ready to serve the rebellion his questions took 
on the form of a public meeting – why like slaves were 
they obedient to a few centurions and fewer tribunes? 
When would they ever be bold enough to demand relief, 
if they were not even going with arms or pleas to a new 
and still apprehensive princeps? Enough wrong had been 
done through the cowardice of so many years. Old men 
with bodies crippled by wounds were enduring thirty to 
forty years of service. Even dismissal did not see the end 
of their soldiering, but, pitched by a legion's standard they 
suffered the same hardships under another title. And any 
soldiers who may have survived so many risks would still 
be dragged off to remote and other regions only to be 
given soaked swamps or neglected mountain. Indeed, 
military service itself was oppressive and unprofitable; 
life and limb to be valued at ten asses a day; out of this, 
clothing, arms, tents, as well as the savagery of centurions 
and exemptions from duty have to be purchased. But 
indeed of floggings and wounds, of hard winters, 
wearisome summers, of terrible war, or barren peace, 





was entered on under fixed conditions: they should earn 
each the pay of a denarius a day, and the sixteenth year 
terminating their service. They should be retained no 
longer under a standard, but in the same camp a reward in 
cash must be paid to them. Did the praetorian cohorts, 
who received two denarii each per day, and who after 
sixteen years are returned to their homes, really take on 
more dangers?  
 
 
Before Tacitus gives the speech, he describes Percennius’ style of speaking with the 
adjective contionabundus compounded from the term used for an official public speech 
or meeting (contio). This is worth noting because a different kind of parallel is created 
– one which places Percennius next to Roman officials holding office, rather than one 
which places him next to barbaric or primitive others. Although contiones often broke 
into violence in republican Rome,30 the mutiny is introduced and set up within a 
political discursive frame (albeit a violent one), rather than the typical opening for a 
scene of military insurgency which would normally introduce and confine the rebels 
within a space of madness or frenzy.31   
The speech itself is well-argued and structured: Percennius begins incitingly by 
pointing to the soldiers’ servitium (servility) and lack of audacia (boldess) in order to 
question the limits of their tolerance. Next, he lists the harsh yet endured conditions of 
service: long campaigns, remote and unpleasant locations, physical labour, injuries, low 
pay, followed by retirement to unproductive land. Also included here is a general 
critique of military life which is described as unprofitable (infructuosa) and oppressive 
(gravis) under the ‘savagery of centurions’ (saevitium centurionum) who made soldiers 
with any spare cash suffer additional work so that they would purchase exemption 
(…vacationes munerum redimi). Finally, he proposes the remedy: service should be 
contracted to 16 years, with pay of a denarius a day, a cash payment made on 
termination in camp and no recall thereafter. 
 Another notable point is that the speech is indirect in form. These are 
Percennius’ views but they are not expressed by Tacitus in the form of oratio recta. 
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The effect of this is that Tacitus’ voice and Percennius’ own is hybridised. This is not 
to say necessarily that Tacitus is expressing his own views through Percennius but that 
it is difficult to distinguish between Percennius’ discourse and Tacitus’ own. This 
further means that Tacitus cannot insert a critical tone or ‘top-down’ Romano-centric 
view because the narrative is written from the perspective of Percennius, even though it 
is in indirect form. 
The point may be made clearer if we compare Velleius’ account, which is 
written from his own perspective: 
 
Quippe exercitus, qui in Germania militabat 
praesentisque Germanici imperio regebatur, simulque 
legiones, quae in Illyrico erant, rabie quadam et profunda 
confudendi omnia cupiditate novum ducem, novum 
statum, novam quaerebant rem publicam; quin etiam ausi 
sunt minari daturos se senatui, daturos principi leges; 
modum stipendii, finem militiae sibi ipsi constituere 
conati sunt. Processum etiam in arma ferrumque strictum 
est et paene in ultima gladiorum erupit impunitas, 
defuitque, qui contra rem publicam duceret, non qui 
sequerentur. (2.125.1-3) 
 
The army that was on campaign in Germany under the 
command of Germanicus, who was present there, and 
along with it the legions in Illyricum fell prey to some 
kind of madness and a profound desire to create general 
chaos. They were demanding a new commander, a new 
order of things, a new state. They even had the audacity to 
threaten to lay down the law to the senate, and to the 
emperor as well and they tried to establish their own level 
of pay and length of service. They went as far as taking 
up arms and sword and their impunity almost erupted into 
every extreme of murder. What was missing was someone 
to lead the men against the state, not those who would 
follow him.  
 
Velleius describes both mutinies in the same chapter. There is an emphasis on the 
soldiers’ madness and chaos. His outline of their motives includes a desire for a new 
leader, government and state, as well as new terms of pay and service. There is stress 





bold enough to threaten the senate and emperor. Velleius’ insurgents therefore commit 
themselves to all the acts which Percennius incites them. But the point is that Velleius’ 
description of the events is critical in tone, partly because it is expressed purely from 
his perspective. This is not because Velleius is unsympathetic to their hardships but 
because he has made no reference to them. This insurgency emerges as unreasoned or 
unjustified because the reasons for the soldiers’ seditio are excluded.  
The lack of rationale is furthered through the references to madness (rabies) and 
confusion (confusio) which suggest no thoughtful incentive behind the soldiers’ acts 
but rather violence for the sake of violence or mere frenzy (furor), again erasing any 
sense of reason.32 The insurgents in Velleius’ account are introduced as madmen and 
enemies – in Tacitus they are introduced as politically active citizens (in the contio) and 
also, as victims.   
The mutiny in Pannonia and in particular the speech of Percennius has been the 
subject of two commentaries: the first by Erich Auerbach in the second chapter of 
Mimesis: the Representation of Reality in Western Literature (1946); and the second, 
more recent, by Jacques Rancière in the third chapter of The Names of History: On the 
Poetics of Knowledge (1994). Whilst both texts have been especially influential in their 
fields, neither has been the subject of any scrutiny by scholars of Tacitus.33 Yet, the 
question that both Auerbach and Rancière raise in their readings of Percennius 
addresses a central issue and one which has been the subject of considerable debate 
within philological, literary and historical analyses of Tacitus’ narratives and ancient 
historiography generally – that of who speaks, why and how.34  
For Auerbach, Tacitus’ writing of Percennius’ speech is purely aesthetic: 
‘Tacitus is a master of his craft, and his speeches are no sheer display; they are really 
imbued with the character and the situation of the persons supposed to have delivered 
them; but they too are primarily rhetoric. Percennius does not speak his own language; 
                                                           
32 Kelly (1997) has suggested that the frequent description of the mob or the crowd in Latin literature as 
mad, irrational and fickle may have originated from riot scenes and descriptions of crowds in rhetorical 
works. On furor as madness see further below n.68. 
33 Auerbach’s Mimesis is referred to by Mellor but only in passing (1993:65). 





he speaks Tacitean.’35 What interests Auerbach is the way in which the narrative of the 
mutiny, of Percennius, reflects on the nature of Tacitus’ historical discourse and how 
the construction of that discourse limits the mimetic representation of reality (and by 
extension, modern understandings of the ancient past). Auerbach’s critique of Tacitus’ 
Percennius is not only based on the grounds that it is purely aesthetic, but moreover, 
that it is purely elitist: ‘as different as Petronius and Tacitus may be in a great many 
respects, they have the same viewpoint – they look down from above.’36  
Auerbach makes a valid point. Tacitus, being an elite Roman male and schooled 
in the rhetorical tradition of antiquity, can only represent Percennius ‘falsely’ (from 
within the confines of his own elite Roman male worldview). However, the problem 
with Auerbach’s method (tracing antique realism) is that it is not fruitful for the modern 
historian to analyse and assess the mimetic value of a text in terms of what it can tell us 
about the life of the lower class, lower class realia and indeed, realia in general. This is 
simply because written representations of the ‘everyday’, where they have survived, are 
naturally created from an elite consciousness and thus inevitably embedded in a certain 
degree of falsity (that is, in re-presented form).37 The analytical framework of mimetic 
realism is therefore somewhat limiting and Auerbach reveals only the obvious problem 
of Tacitean historiography (Tacitus is not Percennius and subsequently cannot present 
Percennius realistically) and historiography/ethnography in general (can the 
plebeian/other speak?).38 
Jacques Rancière offers a different reading by discussing Tacitus’ narrative 
beyond mimetic realism. Rancière notes the limit which concerns Auerbach, that 
                                                           
35 Auerbach (2003:39). 
36 Auerbach continues: ‘...the vulgarity of language is not designed to arouse laughter in a large crowd 
but is rather a piquant condiment for the palate of a social and literary elite accustomed to viewing things 
from above with epicurean composure.’ (46-7). 
37 Given this, Auerbach’s argument only makes the obvious point, that aspects of the analyst’s culture 
will influence the analysis of their subject of analysis. In any case, this is not a specific fault of ancient 
historiography, but a problem embedded within all historiography, contemporary social science and 
cultural anthropology.  
38 Mimetic Realism is also reductive because it slightly confines our criteria for understanding the past to 
the notion of realia (material) which again can be limiting and for the reader of Tacitus, irrelevant. 
However, it is notable that the assessment of realia is intertwined with an assessment of historiography 
since given the distance between event and narrative, historiography (narrative) is inevitably used to 





‘Percennius doesn’t speak.’39 Rancière even takes this further by stressing that 
Percennius, as the poor, has only ‘an essential relation to nontruth’ (un rapport 
essentiel à la non-vérité).40 Nonetheless, Rancière’s emphasis is on the fact that 
Percennius is given a place to speak: ‘Tacitus lends him his tongue.’41 By including 
Percennius, Rancière argues that the Tacitean narrative attests the inclusive power of 
language which ‘is always susceptible of allowing entry into its community of those 
excluded when its circle is drawn.’42  
In the following discussions, by way of expansion on the differences between 
Tacitus’ and Velleius’ tone, I will discuss further why Tacitus’ narrative, specifically 
his writing of Percennius, should be noted for its inclusivity (Rancière) rather than its 
exclusivity (Auerbach) and the implications of this inclusivity on the nature of Tacitus’ 
historical narrative. Whilst the narrative of the mutinies does attest the violence and 
immoderation of the soldiers, my view is that these acts are not presented through a 
discourse which reflects Tacitus’ own ideological position (or the modern 
understanding of what that ideological position was).43 The ‘unrealist’ rhetorical tropes 
traditionally used to present Rome’s enemies (as barbaric, excessive, ‘madmen’) are 
juxtaposed in Tacitus with other voices, ones which with reason and discontent are 
fighting for a place to speak and be heard. The result of this is not mimesis but 
polyphony, a ‘multi-voicedness’, which counters the monologic Roman discourse 
which Auerbach seeks to criticise.44  
                                                           
39 Rancière (1994:27), [1992:40]. 
40 Ibid (28). 
41 Ibid (27). (Ce n’est pas Percennius qui parle mais Tacite qui lui prête sa langue; [1992:58]). 
42 Rancière (1994:29). For the original passage see below p.125, n. 54. 
43 Cf. Syme: ‘Tacitus appears to nourish in hypertrophy all the prejudices of an imperial race’ (1958:30). 
See also Percival (1980). 
44 In Critical Theory, the term ‘polyphony’ refers to literary writing which manages to ‘liberate the voice 
of its characters from under the domination of the authorial or narratorical voice’ (DCT, p.370). It is a 
term largely associated with Mikhail Bakhtin who used it to describe prose literature and novelistic 
discourse (in particular that of Dostoevsky) which presents a ‘multi-leveledness…the passing of a theme 
through many and various voices’ Bakhtin (1984:279). Polyphonic form opposes ‘monologic’ form, 
which presents a singular world-view through a unified voice (for Bakhtin, lyrical and epic discourse are 
monologic because they gravitate towards themselves and they are their own referential object). In 
polyphonic writing, different voices are allowed to interact with each other. These voices can be those of 
characters in the novel but also the author’s own. But all voices are equal and they do not necessarily 
serve the ideological position of the author, rather they may conflict with it. Bakhtin never explicitly 
defines the concept of polyphony but he analyses it and makes reference to what it is through reading 






Auerbach on Percennius 
Auerbach’s Mimesis traces the development of the representation of reality in Western 
Literature from antiquity to the twentieth century to argue that literature written during 
the Christian and post-Christian period progressively revealed a more realistic form of 
representation. ‘Mimesis’ is therefore used by Auerbach as a critical term to describe a 
practice of representation which imitates something ‘realistically’.45  
 In the second chapter of Mimesis, Auerbach turns his attention to Tacitus’ 
Annales and compares Tacitus's writing of the Pannonian mutiny with the Gospel 
narrative of Jesus' arrest and Peter's denial. Auerbach praises the narrative of the 
Gospel because in his view it captures the drama and tragedy of a common person 
divided between his devotion to Christ and fear for his personal safety.46 According to 
Auerbach, such a scene could not be represented according to the models of ancient 
literature: ‘A scene like Peter’s denial...is too serious for comedy, too contemporary for 
tragedy.’47 
 Auerbach’s stance is anti-rhetorical and his view is that ancient rhetorical 
models posed constraints on the representation of reality. He draws this conclusion 
from Tacitus’ description of the Pannonian mutiny which he then compares to the 
Gospel narrative of Peter’s denial (but the latter narrative is not quoted). According to 
Auerbach, ‘the Pannonian mutiny in Tacitus [reveals] the limits of antique realism and 
thus of antique historical consciousness…It becomes manifest that Tacitus’ vivid 
recital of the soldiers’ grievances and demands is by no means based on an 
understanding of those demands…For Tacitus not only lacks understanding, he actually 
                                                                                                                                                                         
formed by the interaction of several consciousnesses’ (1984:18). The ‘activity’ of the polyphonic author 
makes itself manifest not when the authorial voice is absent, but when there emerges ‘a radical change in 
the author’s position’ (1984:67). The specificity of the polyphonic novel is that the author relinquishes 
his control to the characters. See further Bakhtin’s The Dialogic Imagination (1981) and Brivic (1985) 
who has used Bakhtin’s concept of Polyphony to analyse the Ulysses of James Joyce whose polyphonic 
stance ‘frees the work from the authority of a single author’ introducing instead ‘multiple levels of 
discourse’ (1985:57-8). See also Lodge (1990). 
45 See further Potolosky (2006) on the history of the concept of mimesis. 
46 Incidentally, and as discussed in Chapter 2, Tacitus’ Tiberius is represented through a similar sort of 
drama and tragedy – someone who is divided between his devotion to his country and fear for his 
personal safety. Germanicus faces a similar plight during the German mutinies (discussed below). 





has no interest whatever in the facts underlying the soldiers’ demands.’48 Edward Said 
similarly claims: ‘Tacitus, for example, was simply not interested in talking about or 
representing the everyday, excellent historian though he was.’49 
The remarks of Auerbach and Said reflect the generally acknowledged fact that 
the corpus of ancient historiography was written from an elite perspective. Ancient 
historiography is thus restricted in terms of being able to provide insight into the non-
elite consciousness. However, my view is that the Tacitean narrative does at times offer 
a discourse which opposes his own class-interested discourse, and the Percennian 
episode is a specific example of a moment of Tacitean historiography which resists the 
meta-narrative form. Though Percennius is inevitably speaking Tacitean, the way he 
speaks and what he says is not ‘Tacitean’ because his speech, which essentially resists 
Roman discourse (it is anti-Rome) is therefore not necessarily ‘elitist’ (nor Romano-
centric). The comments of Auerbach and Said therefore show that the presumption of 
the limits of antique realism, a presumption which in any case relies on too precise a 
distinction between non-elite and elite, (and by extension and according to them, true 
and false) can often be more reductive than the limitations inevitably contained within 
the texts themselves. In any case, before assessing the value of their critiques, it is 
useful to compare the Tacitean narrative with other accounts in order to further 
differentiate the Tacitean view. 
The reign of Tiberius has been chronicled by three other authors in some detail: 
Velleius Paterculus, Suetonius and Dio Cassius. The mutinies and the involved rebels 
are included in all three accounts, albeit to varied extents. Velleius Paterculus (2.125-
126) and Dio Cassius (57.4-5) narrate both the Pannonian and German mutinies in two 
chapters. Suetonius very briefly discusses the mutiny in Germany (25.2) but omits 
events in Pannonia. All authors mention the soldiers’ demands (fixed service and 
increased pay). In their representations of the events, none of the authors employ a 
                                                           
48 Ibid (31). Hattersley, following Auerbach, has claimed that the figures of Christ or Peter ‘simply could 
not have been portrayed in Roman literature with any degree of sympathy or understanding; no rhetorical 
category existed to contain the tragedy or triumph of common persons’ (2009:79).  
49 Said (2004:99). Said’s and Auerbach’s comments are somewhat confusing because it remains unclear 
whether their concern is what Tacitus can and cannot do (represent lower classes realistically) or what 





‘comic’ or ‘idyllic’ (‘low’) style. Nevertheless, from all four accounts, it is Tacitus’ 
which is the fullest and least monologic. 
Tacitus’ narrative on the Pannonian mutiny is long (16 chapters), obviously 
suggesting some interest in the event. Tacitus is the only author who lists grievances 
(i.e. hardships, labores…wounds, bad weather) as well as demands (improved service 
terms and pay) and thus offers an explanation of ‘the facts underlying the soldiers’ 
demands.’ In addition, Tacitus also refers to the long years of discipline which 
preceded the outbreak, showing that he does have ‘an eye for historical background’. It 
is also noteworthy that Tacitus’ account appears the least extreme or critical. In Dio, for 
example, the soldiers threatened to march on Rome (57.4.2). In Suetonius, both armies 
demanded numerous ‘special’ or ‘extra’ privileges (which makes their requests seem 
unjustified); whereas in Tacitus, after the long description of the reality of military 
service, the soldiers’ demands can only emerge as modest. Finally, Tacitus is the only 
one who uses speech. Much of the narrative is voiced through the rebels.  
It cannot be argued therefore, following Auerbach’s own criteria for what 
constitutes mimetic practice, that the Pannonian mutiny in Tacitus reveals the limits of 
antiquity’s historical consciousness because Tacitus ‘looks down from above’. While in 
much ancient historiography (and historiography in general) the voice of the everyday 
or ‘the people’s history’ is re-presented, re-written, trivialised or more often erased, 
Tacitus here does not fit well with the traditions of Roman historiography.  Tacitus not 
only expresses an interest in the mutiny but furthermore an interest in the mutiny from 
the mutineers’ perspective.  
 Of course, this does not make his narrative more or less ‘real’ because the 
question of what is real can never be fully answered through a narrative account of 
history. The question to ask, if we do want to see what Tacitus is telling us about the 
past, is to do with what he invents and how and why he invents it. In his writing of the 
Pannonian mutiny, the subject of his invention is the discourse of the other, which 
ruptures the traditional and totalistic perspectives of ancient historiography. The point, 
then, is that rather than assuming homology in order to deny antique realism, it is more 





For Auerbach, Tacitus’ narrative remains a one-sided, elite representation of 
society and, as a result, it is limited in terms of any realistic insight it can offer the 
historian studying the life of the everyday, in this case the soldiers. However, Tacitus’ 
narrative does present a number of different value systems alongside his own elite 
view. Compressed within his narration of events, we can trace the voice of the senator 
and the centurion in the valorisation of disciplina and obsequium. Yet, the voice of the 
soldier is also apparent, which represents the same qualities as violent and oppressive. 
Polyphony can also be applied to Tacitus’ writing of the cause of sedition which, as 
will be discussed below, is represented as mad behaviour produced from greed from 
one perspective, and rational action produced from grievance from another. Tacitus, 
then, offers a polyphonic narrative and in doing so the voice of the soldiers, although it 
is represented from Tacitus’ point of view, is not necessarily dominated by the 
monolithic ideological position of a Roman elite, as Auerbach claims. Through the 
multiplicity of voice there is the possibility of finding other perspectives and meanings 
– not realia but other truths.  
 
Becoming Visible: the Politics of Tacitean Seditio  
 
 
Politics is primarily conflict over the existence of a 
common stage and over the existence and status of those 
present on it...Politics exists because those who have no 
right to be counted as speaking beings make themselves 
of some account.50  
 
 
The mutinies in AD 14 can certainly be read in terms of a conflict over the existence 
and status of those present on a common stage. As Rowe puts it, ‘grievances and 
demands show where soldiers saw themselves and where they thought they should be; 
settlements show where they really stood’.51 The discrepancy between someone’s idea 
of his own status and the status that he really has is partly why mutiny occurs. We may 
extend this to argue, as Rancière does, that in the act of mutiny during which ‘those 
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who have no right to be counted as speaking beings’ try ‘to make themselves of some 
account’ there is a moment of democracy. 
In order to analyse Tacitus’ writing of seditio from a Rancièrian perspective, as 
democratic, it is first necessary to explain a key distinction in Rancière’s work – 
between ‘the police’ and ‘politics’ so to explain exactly what is meant by his definition 
of democracy. Rancière uses the term ‘the police’ to describe the orders which support 
the organisation of roles and place within a given hierarchy. Furthermore, the police 
order ‘defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being and ways of saying, and 
sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task; it is an order 
of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is 
not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as noise.’52  
‘Politics’ on the other hand, is a term used by Rancière to describe a type of 
activity which is antagonistic to policing: ‘political activity is whatever shifts a body 
from the place assigned to it…political activity is always a mode of expression that 
undoes the perceptible divisions of the police order by implementing a basically 
heterogeneous assumption – that of a part of those who have no part.’53 Democracy is 
thus not characterized as a political regime, a normative value or way of life but as a 
moment, specifically an interruptive moment which through antagonistic activity 
enables new subjects (those which were previously presupposed to be subordinate 
given the natural hierarchies organised by the police order) to come into existence. 
 As I have discussed above, Tacitus’ writing of Percennius certainly enacts an 
attempt to be heard. Furthermore, his speech is particularly focussed on revealing 
grievance or something incorrect or wrong within the established social order. This is 
continued through his account. After Percennius’ speech has ended, he describes the 
soldiers’ excitement in creating a tribunal: ‘a turf was piled up, and a platform erected 
so to make the place as visible as possible’ (simul congerunt caespites, exstruunt 
tribunal, quo magis conspicua sedes foret; 1.18.2). The conflict which Tacitus narrates 
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is therefore clearly focussed on the soldiers’ own attempts at being seen, even though 
they ordinarily had no place being seen. This is further continued with Vibulenus’ 
speech at 1.22-23.5 – the second named rebel leader who continues to voice the 
drawbacks of military life. As he explains: “…we are not dying because of any crime, 
but only because we were working for the army’s good” (interfectos nullum ob scelus 
sed quia utilitati legionum consulebamus), again making heard something which had 
no place being heard. 
From this perspective, we may understand why Tacitus’ writing of sedition 
emerges as democratic. The soldiers are fighting to be counted as equal ‘speaking 
beings’ and in so doing, they disturb the given ‘police order’. The extent of this 
disturbance is clearly expressed by the counter-insurgents (the people of the ‘police 
order’), who desperately try to remind the rebels of the normal inequalities of the social 
order. Julius Clemens, for example, appeals to the rebels to cease their disruptive 
behaviour because the sad truth of the imperial order was that ultimately, Percennius 
and Vibulenus were not going to replace Neros and Drususes as lords of the Roman 
world (28.5). Meanwhile Blaesus urges the soldiers to kill him rather than pose any 
threat to the emperor himself (1.18).  
By writing about insurgency in this way, Tacitus’ own historiographic practice 
emerges as democratic. By this I mean that it is not only the soldiers’ acts inside the 
narrative which can be termed democratic but more significantly, that Tacitus’ own 
historiographical practice, by including their discourse and thus embedding an 
alternative (non-Romano-centric) narrative within his own, can be described as such 
too. If sedition is to make obvious the power and ability to voice complaints of certain 
persons not normally allowed to speak, the seditio in the historical past (the ‘real’ 
mutiny) is replicated in the account of it in Tacitus. This replication is notable 
particularly since ancient historians could either avoid it (as Dio, Velleius and 
Suetonius did) or as Auerbach claims, only represent sedition through a comical or 
grotesque rhetorical model. The Pannonian mutiny therefore represents a two-fold 
politics of equality – inside the narrative (the insurgents’ words and acts) and outside 
(by actually giving these words to the insurgents, who would otherwise have remained 





Tacitus’ writing of sedition, as something which seeks to make wrong visible, is 
expressed in Rancière’s own commentary on the Pannonian mutiny:  
 
Although Percennius may well be the radical other, the 
one excluded from legitimate speech, his discourse is 
included…What nonetheless remains is the gathering 
power of language and of the play that it authorises, the 
power of a discourse that is always susceptible of 
allowing entry into its community of those excluded when 
its circle is drawn.54  
 
In Rancière’s essay on the Pannonian mutiny, he offers a counter-argument to the one 
in Mimesis. According to Rancière, Tacitus’ narrative asserts the ‘gathering power of 
language’ because it includes the normatively excluded. In Rancière’s reading, what is 
notable about Tacitus’ writing of the Pannonian mutiny – in ‘Tacitus’s discourse’ – is 
‘not its effect of exclusion, underscored by Auerbach, but, on the contrary, its power of 
inclusion: the place it gives, through its own agency, to what it declares to have no 
place. Percennius is not, for Tacitus, among those whose speech counts, to whom his 
fellows speak. And nevertheless he makes Percennius speak in the same mode as the 
others.’55  
Rancière makes an important point. Whilst it may have been expected rhetorical 
practice to include speeches, speeches which were rhetorical or fictional but 
nonetheless included for the purpose to excite readers or display rhetorical skill, the 
irony is that by making Percennius into a ‘speaking being’ – making him perceptible 
and audible, on the same stage of Romans – this in turn offers a more ‘democratic’ 
narrative, one which embeds other voices alongside normal or natural Roman ones.56 
                                                           
54 Rancière (1994:28-9). (Percennius a beau être l’autre radical, l’exclu de la parole légitime, son 
discours se trouve inclus [1992:62]. Reste pourtant le pouvoir rassemblant de la langue et des jeux 
qu’elle autorise, le pouvoir d’un discours toujours susceptible de faire entrer dans sa communauté ceux 
qui le trace de son cercle exclut [63-4]). 
55 Rancière (1994:28).  
56 See further Ernst on the value of other discourses: ‘Anthropologists and historians can gain valuable 
insight through an awareness of non-persons and their roles in daily life. Far from being unimportant, 
these ‘normal deviants’ act as catalysts for social interaction. By performing atypical actions, often in an 
individually predictable and consistent manner, these individuals contest the notion of homogenised 





However, there is at the same time a slight danger in Rancière’s argument, in 
that he makes language sound a little too inclusive, as something which is ‘always 
susceptible’ of allowing entry into its community when its circle is drawn. What 
something ‘always’ or inevitably is cannot help us to understand why things are the 
way they are in a specific situation.57 Language, rather, is extremely exclusive: if you 
do not speak a language you are excluded from society by not being able to understand 
and interpret through the essential way in which that society expresses its identity. In 
an ancient context, language not only enabled one to speak and interpret but also 
enabled one to assert a powerful identity.58 Although Percennius, a mutinous soldier, is 
given a subjective voice that goes against authorial discourse (he voices resistance to 
the illegal and unjust acts of centurions) he ‘always’ remains within the confines of the 
objectifying authorial discourse (because he can only be represented from Tacitus’ 
point of view or he ‘speaks Tacitean’ as Auerbach puts it). The point is then, that 
language is not always susceptible of allowing entry as Rancière asserts, but that 
Tacitus here shares his language or rather organises his historiographic practice in a 
less exclusive way than it always remains. 
Still, this is not the specificity of Tacitus’ writing of sedition. In the other 
accounts, when the violent acts of insurgency are included, reason and rationale are 
replaced with madness and frenzy. So it is not only that Tacitus’ language includes and 
gives agency, but that it includes, gives agency and reason.59 From this perspective, it 
is possible to further explore why Tacitus’ constructions of violence may be read as 
democratic. In contemporary theories of civil conflict, there are two general categories 
used to explain the causes of insurgency: greed and grievance.60 Proponents of the 
greed theory argue that the cause of civil war is opportunity. Civil wars, from this 
                                                           
57 This is equally the problem with Rancière’s analysis of politics from the perspective of base ethics 
(‘the presupposition of equality’). See above p. 110, n.25. 
58 See further Spentzou on Ovid’s fear of forgetting Latin in exile, and by extension his humanity 
(2005:329).  
59 See Woodman (2006) for the opposite view. Woodman argues that the furor in Livy’s description of 
the Spanish mutiny against Scipio Africanus in 206 BC (28.24.5-29.12) constitutes the principal intertext 
for Tacitus’ writing of the Pannonian mutiny (2006:312ff.). This may be the case but notably furor is 
balanced with ratio. This is in stark contrast to Velleius’ monologic account of the mutinies, which as 
discussed above, makes no reference to the cause and discusses the soldiers’ acts only through the 
rhetoric of furor, rabies, confusio. 





perspective, occur because rebel groups have something real to gain by winning and 
have reasonable expectations of winning.61 Proponents of the grievance theory argue 
that deprivation fuels violence, rather than opportunity: ‘what drives rebellion is the 
desire to reform or remake the extant socio-political order because of its apparent lack 
of fairness.’62 
World Bank researchers Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler have extensively 
analysed the causes of contemporary civil conflict through the greed versus grievance 
model.63 Their research has shown that the cause of contemporary civil conflict is 
‘greed’ rather than ‘grievance’. They even claim that ‘there is no point in asking rebels 
why they are rebelling since they will inevitably draw attention to their grievances even 
when their motivation is greed.’64 In response to their argument, D. Keen has argued: 
‘This ‘greed’ discourse can also be seen as de-legitimising grievance – as politically-
conservative but also a variation of the colonial tradition of dismissing every rebellion 
as the work of criminals.’65 Keen’s argument is explored in the work of M. Trouillot, 
who discusses the trivialisation of the slave rebellions during the Haitian revolution of 
1791-1804 in subsequent historiography. Trouillot terms the dismissal of the slave 
revolts in Haitian historiography as a ‘formula of banalization’ – a formula which seeks 
to drain moments of resistance and rebellion of their political significance by 
constructing slaves as criminals or by claiming that they were ‘“prompted” or 
“provoked” to rebel by some higher being other than the slaves themselves’.66 A 
similar pattern in the analysis of insurgency cause can be seen in the ancient writing of 
rebellion.67 There are many examples of ancient authors explaining soldiery mutiny on 
account of greed (avaritia), anger (ira, ferocia), criminality (scelus) and madness 
                                                           
61 Breuning and Ishiyama (2010:112). 
62 Ibid.  
63 Collier and Hoeffler (2004). (It should be stressed here that I am only drawing a comparison with 
Collier and Hoeffler in order to trace how people write about rebellion, it is not an attempt to explain 
why rebellion arises).  
64 As quoted in Keen (2002:1). 
65 Keen (2002:1). See further Collier (2000) on rebellion as a ‘quasi-criminal activity’. 
66 Trouillot (1995: 103). See further Trouillot (1995: 83, 96-7, 102-104).  
67 On greed as a motivating factor in military mutiny see for example Liv.22.9, 22.42.7, 29.8; 





(furor). The consequence of this is that a narrative similar to Collier’s thesis on greed, a 
narrative which de-legitimises grievance, emerges.  
Ancient narratives often negate the cause of democratic violence by writing the 
rebel through the use of rhetorical tropes associated with furor (madness and 
senselessness – pace Velleius).68 This “furor discourse” then creates a similar tradition 
of dismissal because by rendering possible acts of democracy as senseless and ‘mad’, it 
banalises the revolutionary moment, making it difficult for the modern reader to 
interpret ancient insurgency as stemming from a deeper discomfort or political 
movement from within the lower classes. However, while I am not claiming that 
Tacitean historiography is a total exception to formulaic banalisation, there is a 
difference in his writing of rebellion. As discussed above, in Tacitus’ narrative there is 
more of a nuanced picture – there is furor but it is juxtaposed with ratio. Tacitus makes 
a clear reference to the greed or opportunity theory (ex civili bello spem praemiorum; 
16.1) but he equally explores the grievance theory (1.16.3-1.17.6). 
There is therefore a different kind of historicity which is expressed through the 
speech and the question is not whether or not it is fictional but why Tacitus invented it 
and what he is trying to make visible through this invention. As I have discussed, what 
Tacitus makes visible are the wrongs suffered by the soldiers under the imperial 
program, and such wrongs, which oppose the ideology of the pax Romana, to which 
Tacitus himself was of course a subscriber, create a polyphonic narrative in which the 
authorial senatorial voice is presented alongside the voice of the soldier, a voice which 
is furthermore not banalised but rationalised. So there are ways to compensate for the 
mimetic limit of Tacitean historiography. While it is written from an elite perspective, 
and therefore according to Auerbach and Said ‘false’ (and to Rancière ‘non-true’), 
Tacitus counteracts this by producing a reasoned and two-sided narrative which is not 
monologic nor necessarily conservative. The violence of the mutineers is not dismissed 
through furor discourse, but it is explained with ample consideration of their 
grievances, grievances which elsewhere are often trivialised or erased altogether, in 
both ancient and modern interpretations. 
                                                           






3.2 Ending Mutiny: Germanicus and the Problem of Roman Conflict Resolution 
 
 
In the early empire, disciplina militaris attempted to 
routinize the army as a source of imperial power, 
mitigating conflict between emperors, aristocracy, and the 
soldiers and discouraging usurpations by promoting 
probureaucratic rationalization and values or behaviours 
that produced the habitus appropriate to the soldiers and 
officers…In the Roman army, instead of a formal code, 
exemplary narratives, anecdotes, and treatises promoted 
specific habitus. In the Roman army, full rationalization 
was impeded by tradition and by the charismatic authority 
projected by the commanders. Imperium militae and its 
descendant in the Empire gave commanders unfetted 
authority over soldiers.69 
 
In Roman Military Service: Ideologies of Discipline in the Late Republic and Early 
Principate, Sara Elise Phang argues that disciplina militaris was a form of authority 
exercised by military commanders, the aristocracy and the emperor to inculcate Roman 
values in the military. Disciplina militaris was used as a form of administration which 
rested on educating the military through the knowledge of past precedents.70 Such 
ideological knowledge, Phang argues, was learnt through social contacts and by 
following the examples set by centurions and the emperor himself.71 For example, 
centurions sought to promote labor and moderatio amongst their troops, as opposed to 
luxuria and otium. By promoting such qualities within the military sphere, Phang 
argues that the essential qualities of virtus and fides which were to define the 
disciplined military male were kept in regulation, and in so doing, the risks of 
insurgency and usurpation were minimised.  
 Disciplina militaris, as can be seen from Phang’s conclusion quoted above, 
was not therefore put into practice through a formal authoritative code or legal 
structure, but instead rested on knowing and performing ancestral custom, the 
knowledge of which was drawn from the didactic historiography of the Roman literary 
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knowledge) see Miner (2007:265-274). 





tradition (‘exemplary narratives, anecdotes, treatises’).72 By following such examples, 
Phang argues that a specific habitus was promoted, and in circular fashion, this habitus 
then continued to regulate disciplina militaris.73 
 Phang’s analysis centres on Bourdieu’s sociology, which is a useful analytic 
framework to use because it enables us to explore the inculcation of discipline which 
maintained hierarchy in the space of the camp as something which worked through 
structural as well as legal formations.74 Similar to the mos maiorum, Phang’s analysis 
of the role of disciplina militaris in a military context is something which was to guide 
and promote correct behaviour through knowledge of social practices and beliefs, 
which as handed down through posterity became socialised into the present (‘history 
turned into nature’), creating the appropriate habitus.75 However, while Bourdieu’s 
sociology and the concept of habitus can help to understand social groups and their 
relations in terms of non-juridical modes of regulation (historic discourse and 
structures) which condition them to know appropriate behaviour and responses 
(through what Bourdieu terms ‘le sens pratique’76), there is always a limit to how far 
these structures will work. It is precisely this limit which underpins Ranciere’s notion 
of democratic politics, which is the moment during which habitus is defied.77 
 In Tacitus’ narrative, the defiance of the norms which habitus puts into 
circulation can be traced during the mutinies: the constitutional hierarchy of the 
military ranking system is subverted (soldier becomes centurion) and the ideological 
hierarchies engrained within the Roman habitus (Roman becomes non-Roman – 
                                                           
72 Phang (2008:4ff.). On didactic historiography see Woodman (1988).  
73 The habitus refers to ‘the locus of those actions which are performed unthinkably’ (DCT, p.218). The 
term is associated with the works of Pierre Bourdieu, whose definition of habitus can be found in 
Bourdieu (1977:78). 
74 On power as extra-legal (or pre-legal) see Bourdieu (1977:16-17); on power as extra-lingual see also 
Bourdieu (1977:21): ‘the constitutive power which is granted to ordinary language lies not in the 
language itself but in the group which authorises it and invests it with authority’. We anticipate in the 
context of the German mutiny that Germanicus’ language will be invested with this type of authority. 
75 Bourdieu [1972:179]: ‘[L’habitus est] histoire faite nature, c’est-à-dire niée en tant que telle parce 
que realise dans une seconde nature’.  
76 ‘Le sens pratique est ce qui permet d’agir comme il faut...sans poser ni exécuter un “il faut”, une 
règle de conduite’, Bourdieu [1997:166]. 
77 Cf. Ranciere (2005:293): ‘[Emancipation] means breaking with the law of the police, where everybody 
is in his own place…Social emancipation was first made of individual breaks with the kind of ‘identity’ 






violent, immoderate, undutiful) are ruptured.78 Furthermore, the power of habitus as 
history turned into nature or ‘the immanent law, lex insitia, laid down in each agent by 
his earliest upbringing’79 presupposes and depends upon one identical history for all 
members of society, but in Tacitus’ polyphonic narrative, the history of the senator is 
not the same as the history of the solider. The problem therefore is that the aspect of 
habitus which inculcates the senator’s discipline (morem maiorum) is for the soldier 
conflated with something which has only dominated him through teaching a habit of 
submission (morem obsequii).80   
 In what follows, I shall expand upon the discussions in the previous section, 
in order to explore further Tacitus’ writing of democratic violence (now on the Rhine 
frontier) and in particular his writing of resolution through a focus on Germanicus’ 
attempts to reinstate order. For Phang, disciplina militaris was integral to Roman 
conflict resolution but Germanicus’ attempts to promote discipline and ‘the habitus 
appropriate to the soldiers and officers’ repeatedly fail. Tacitus offers us a different 
understanding: the problem in Tacitus is not the lack of traditional disciplina but rather 
its imposition. This is made clear in the introductory chapter which claims that excess 
and leisure were the soldiers’ desire because hard work and discipline had become 
displeasing (luxum et otium cupere, disciplinam et laborem aspernari; 1.16.2). From 
this perspective, Tacitus’ writing of the cause and resolution of seditio reveals a 
peculiar paradox: disciplina and labor embed the potential for democratic violence 
within the imperial episteme by causing prolonged grievance through subordination 
(through hierarchy); yet, disciplina and labor are the ideological tools, which according 
to Phang (and our sources) were used to prevent violence and promote peace. The 
measures which cause conflict are the same as those used to quell it. The resolution of 
conflict, an act which depends on the inculcation of symbolic violence (‘calls for order, 
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79 Bourdieu (1977:81). 
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threats, seduction’81) may therefore be interpreted as a process which embeds further 
conflict into the system, while on the surface level it may appear to achieve stability. 
 
Ordered Chaos on the Rhine Frontier 
The mutinies in Germany follow a similar pattern of events to those in Pannonia.82 The 
interregnum creates an opportunity to riot for the purpose of service reform. However, 
there are some significant differences: firstly, the soldiers in Germany are notably more 
violent and enraged than those in Pannonia. And the sedition, which begins in the 
territory of the Ubii, extends to surrounding areas drawing in natives, ambassadors sent 
from Rome, soldiers situated elsewhere in the territory of the Chauci, as well as the 
four legions under the command of A. Caecina Severus who had initially started it. 
Another difference is that in Germany, additional motives behind the soldiers’ 
insurgency are outlined: they wanted a timely discharge, better pay and less pitiable 
conditions but also ‘vengeance on centurions’ (centurionum ulciscerentur). (The 
cruelty of centurions is expressed by both Pannonian and German legions as a cause of 
their uproar [saeuitiam centurionum; 17.4, saeuitiam…centurionum; 31.4], but only in 
Germany they state explicitly a desire to seek vengeance). The most significant 
difference between the two mutinies is that in Germany the soldiers’ hope was that 
Germanicus, unable to tolerate Tiberius as emperor, would surrender himself to the 
legions (1.31.1-5). The situation is not only one of insurgency but also one which 
threatens usurpation. 
The soldiers’ desire for vengeance anticipates the extremity of their anger and 
violence which Tacitus builds upon throughout the account. But it also adds another 
level of democracy, which again prevents us from interpreting Tacitus’ writing of 
violentia and seditio through a framework of madness and senselessness alone. To seek 
vengeance implies the soldiers’ supposition of and fight for an equal status (which is 
obviously an essential feature of a democratic movement) and violence acted against 
centurions is not only violence against the physical body but also against the structures 
of the camp hierarchy (and the disciplining mechanisms of the habitus). Furthermore, if 
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such violence was directed towards promoting Germanicus as the new leader, someone 
onto whom the ‘hopes of freedom’ were passed (1.33.2), this is another motive which 
subverts the soldiers’ violent acts into acts designed to serve the ends of democracy.83 
With such political motives established, and following the encouragement of a native 
crowd, the first, fifth, twentieth and twenty-first legions sank into rage (in rabiem 
prolapsus):  
 
non unus haec, ut Pannonicas inter legiones Percennius, 
nec apud trepidas militum auris, alios validiores exercitus 
respicientium, sed multa seditionis ora vocesque: sua in 
manu sitam rem Romanam, suis victoriis augeri rem 
publicam, in suum cognomentum adscisci imperatores. 
Nec legatus obviam ibat: quippe plurium vaecordia 
constantiam exemerat. repente lymphati destrictis gladiis 
in centuriones invadunt: ea vetustissima militaribus odiis 
materies et saeviendi principium. prostratos verberibus 
mulcant, sexageni singulos, ut numerum centurionum 
adaequarent: tum convulsos laniatosque et partim 
exanimos ante vallum aut in amnem Rhenum proiciunt. 
(1.31.5- 1.32.2) 
 
Here it was not just the matter of one, like Percennius as 
in the army of Pannonia, nor were words addressed to the 
ears of nervous soldiers looking to other stronger armies. 
But here were many seditious faces and voices: “in their 
hands were Roman affairs, their victories increased the 
state, their names were taken by commanders. Nor did the 
legate offer any counter measures. In fact, the madness of 
the many removed his firmness. Suddenly, frantic and 
with swords drawn, they attacked the centurions, it was 
this group that had fuelled the soldiers’ hatreds the 
longest and thus the starting point of their savagery. They 
were overthrown, beat up and lashed sixty strokes each, 
one for each centurion in the legion. Then, shattered and 
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butchered and some lifeless, they were thrown beyond the 
walls or into the Rhine.  
 
 
This passage clearly shows the extremity of the soldiers’ violence. The centurions, 
those who were specifically responsible for training and discipline, are now beaten and 
‘discharged’84 – cast outside of the fortifications of the camp, suggesting both the 
physical and metaphorical disintegration of established hierarchical structure. This is 
further seen in Caecina’s reluctance to get involved and assert his natural authority. As 
they attack their centurions and gain control, the soldiers demonstrate their own words, 
which claim that Rome’s fate was in their hands (1.31.5).  
 Given my argument in the previous section, it is must be noted that furor is the 
prominent feature in this passage. While in Pannonia it was balanced with ratio, 
Tacitus makes several references to rage and madness during the German mutiny.85 
Tony Woodman has argued that Tacitus’ description of the mutiny is seen in sustained 
metaphorical terms of mental illness: ‘the very legions upon whom the imperial 
security depended…are shown to be vulnerable to collective madness.’86 In the above 
passage, however, it is evident that Tacitus is also revealing the ‘vulnerability’ of the 
centurions, who may not show a ‘collective madness’ but do reveal a new collective 
weakness. Furthermore, Tacitus’ language suggests that it is not only the soldiers who 
are ‘mentally’ affected but also the commander Caecina, whose constantia is lost due 
to the extent of the vaecordia plurium. In any case, though at first glance the rage with 
which they are gripped does appear to be like a ‘madness’, such madness, though 
chaotic, is ordered: 
 
                                                           
84 Proicere can mean ‘to throw or fling forth’ but also ‘to cast out of a place as undesireable, to abandon, 
to banish’ (OLD s.v. proicio). 
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furentibus; 49.3 piaculum  furoris ) but the contexts in which these terms are used prevent the conclusion 
that the soldiers’ frenzied acts are senseless and irrational.  





non tribunus ultra, non castrorum praefectus ius obtinuit: 
vigilias, stationes, et si qua alia praesens usus indixerat, 
ipsi partiebantur. id militaris animos altius 
coniectantibus praecipuum indicium magni atque 
inplacabilis motus, quod neque disiecti nec paucorum 
instinctu, set pariter ardescerent, pariter silerent, tanta 
aequalitate et constantia ut regi crederes. (1.32.3) 
 
Neither tribune, nor camp prefect upheld authority any 
longer: watches, pickets and whatever else their present 
needs declared, were distributed by the men themselves. 
To anyone wanting a deeper understanding of the 
soldiers’ minds, a principal symptom of the extent and 
implacability of their disturbance was that they were 
neither scattered nor under the influence of only a few, 
but they erupted together and fell noiseless together, with 
such levelness and agreement, that you would have 
believed them to be under command.  
 
 
The passage above is telling. Firstly, military hierarchy is now completely destroyed. 
Tribunes and camp prefects hold no more authority. But the defining feature of this 
passage is that there is a sense of organisation amongst the chaos, which runs against 
the furor discourse seen in the previous passage. The soldiers, as Tacitus describes, 
were not ‘scattered’ (disiecti); they take whatever they need and distribute it 
accordingly amongst themselves so to plan their attack. It is also notable that any 
‘mental illness’ or madness is counteracted with Tacitus’ references to the soldiers’ 
aequalitas (levelness, equality) and constantia (agreement, constancy). Tacitus then 
explains the implacability of their disturbance (inplacabilis motus)87 due to this 
togetherness and/or ordered violence. So again Tacitus is not constructing a typical 
form of Roman furor and Woodman’s idea of a plaguing ‘mental illness’, though valid, 
is counteracted with the references to the soldier’s composure. While in Pannonia furor 
was juxtaposed with ratio, now it is juxtaposed with ordo (order).  
 It is possible to extend Tacitus’ construction of ordered chaos in the passage 
above to explore a possible paradox of hierarchy, which is that it can lead to its own 
replication in lower orders of society. The mechanisms and tools used to dominate the 
                                                           





soldiers are now being used to dominate the centurions. As Tacitus states, it seemed 
like they were under command (regi) but this command is created from their own order 
and agreement. The soldiers are therefore momentarily their own masters, and they not 
only cause a rupture in the established hierarchy of the military order but they go 
further, creating their own system of place and role out of their democratic violence in 




periculosa severitas, flagitiosa largitio: seu nihil militi 
sive omnia concedentur in ancipiti res publica. 
(Ann.1.36.2) 
 
Strictness was dangerous, liberality disgraceful: whether 
all or nothing was conceded to the soldiers, the state was 
equally in danger. 
 
The Tacitean narrative complicates the general understanding of what constitutes 
resolution. A resolution is understood as something which solves a problem. The period 
which follows a resolution is described as a period of peace. And a period of peace is 
normally understood as a period characterised by an absence of violence.89  
 This understanding of resolution, as well as the period of non-conflict which 
follows it (the period of peace), cannot be so easily applied to the Tacitean narrative. 
This is because resolution is already a problematic in the Tacitean account of the 
establishment of the Principate. To return briefly to the Augustan prologue, Tacitus 
writes that Augustus’ technique of resolution after the civil wars was cash gifts and 
grain (1.2). Furthermore, the term which Tacitus uses to describe the period after the 
settlement of 27/28 BC is not only pax but otium (leisure). Resolution is not 
straightforward in Tacitus and the emergence of mutiny implies that Augustus’ 
resolutions after Actium were neither permanent nor wholly resolute.  
The paradox that techniques of resolution integrate further violence into the 
system (on a symbolic as well as physical level) can be traced in Tacitus’ writing of 
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Germanicus.90 Tacitus’ Germanicus may be read as a product of ‘specific habitus’, 
which to return to Phang, produced values and behaviours necessary for ordered 
military life. Germanicus certainly exemplifies and abides by such values, yet, what is 
most notable during the mutiny episodes is that Germanicus’ symbolic gestures and 
words – his attempts to discourage usurpation through the evocation of tradition and 
exemplarity – fail to secure the compliance of his troops. In what follows, I shall 
explore Tacitus’ writing of resolution through a focus on Germanicus’ attempts to 
reinstate order. The question I want to consider is whether methods of Roman conflict 
resolution can be read as a cause of conflict, as well as the cure of conflict.  
The narrative on the German mutiny provides the first proper introduction to 
Germanicus. Before Germanicus is made aware of the mutinies (he was in Gaul 
conducting a census when they first broke out), Tacitus provides the below 
introduction: 
 
neptem eius Agrippinam in matrimonio pluresque ex ea 
liberos habebat, ipse Druso fratre Tiberii genitus, 
Augustae nepos, set anxius occultis in se patrui aviaeque 
odiis quorum causae acriores quia iniquae.  
quippe Drusi magna apud populum Romanum 
memoria, credebaturque, si rerum potitus foret, 
libertatem redditurus; unde in Germanicum favor et spes 
eadem. nam iuveni civile ingenium, mira comitas et 
diversa ab Tiberii sermone vultu, adrogantibus et 
obscuris accedebant muliebres offensiones novercalibus 
Liviae in Agrippinam stimulis, atque ipsa Agrippina 
paulo commotior, nisi quod castitate et mariti amore 
quamvis indomitum animum in bonum vertebat. (1.33) 
 
[Germanicus] was married to the granddaughter of 
Augustus, Agrippina, and had several children by her and 
since he was the son of Nero Drusus, brother of Tiberius, 
he was the grandson of Augusta. But Germanicus 
suffered from the fact that his grandmother and Tiberius 
                                                           
90 On symbolic or ‘soft’ violence as that which refers to subtle forms of rule exercised in the name of 
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hated him, the reasons for which were bitter but therefore 
all the more unjust. 
  In fact, the memory of Nero Drusus among the 
Roman people was strong and it was believed, that if he 
had been in control of things, he would have returned to 
the people their freedom. Hence goodwill and the same 
hope passed to Germanicus. Indeed the young man had an 
ingrained civility and wonderful kindness, in contrast to 
the assuming and ambiguous looks and words of Tiberius. 
There were also problems among the women: Livia had a 
step mother’s bitterness toward Agrippina and Agrippina, 
though determined, was also rather excitable. But she put 
this spirit to good effect through loyalty to her husband. 
 
The above passage leads on from Tacitus’ comments earlier at 1.7.7 which explain that 
the reason behind Tiberius’ lack of hesitation when acting as commander outside of the 
senate was fear of Germanicus’ popularity among the legions and the people of Rome 
(in cuius manu tot legiones, immensa sociorum auxilia, mirus apud populum favour). 
As can be seen from the passage above, Tacitus continues to portray Germanicus in an 
exemplary light. Germanicus has an engrained civility (civile ingenium) and wonderful 
kindness (mira comitas). Since his father was Nero Drusus, whose memory was 
honoured among the Roman people (because had he been emperor freedom would have 
been restored), similar respects and hopes for freedom were passed onto his son.  
 Tacitus’ introduction fits in with the tradition on Germanicus which largely 
describes him as a kind of ‘republican hero’, a figure of prisca virtus, esteemed by the 
senate and people of Rome.91 Yet, despite this introductory character sketch, Tacitus’ 
overall portrayal of Germanicus’ moral character is rather complex. Germanicus is 
written historically, as someone who is conditioned to know the ideas and ideals of the 
past, but whether this type of knowledge will prevail in the situation of conflict 
becomes progressively uncertain. 
Germanicus’ arrival at the camp is met with chaos. Tacitus relates soldiers 
bearing their aged limbs and thrusting Germanicus’ fingers into their mouths to feel 
their toothless gums. Germanicus, for want of order, commands the troops to divide 
into maniples but they replied that they would hear better as they were (1.34.2-3). 
                                                           





Germanicus then makes the appropriate speech, beginning with veneration of 
Augustus, then a recollection of the victories of Tiberius and references to the 
consensus in Italy and the loyalty of the Gallic provinces (1.34.4).  However, the 
speech is met with silence. Germanicus continues by asking the soldiers what happened 
to their moderation and the dignity of their old discipline (ubi modestia militaris…ubi 
veteris disciplinae decus; 1.35.1) but the soldiers only continue their demands for 
relief. In the following chapter, we are told that they offered support to their 
commander should he require supreme power (si vellet imperium, promptos 
ostentavere; 1.35.3), a proposition to which Germanicus responds by drawing his own 
sword to his chest, claiming that death would be more honourable than disloyalty. 
Tacitus’ writing of Germanicus, at this point, coincides with his earlier portrait. 
Germanicus maintains a civil, ‘socialised’ approach: he calls for disciplina militaris, he 
shows his pietas to Rome and Tiberius and he remains moderate, refraining from 
resorting to any violent measures. His speech, as reported by Tacitus, also represents 
the traditional voice – he evokes the qualities which prevent disorder in the camp 
(fides, modestia and disciplina) and which define the standards appropriate to the 
virtuous and disciplined Roman soldier. From this perspective, we may interpret 
Germanicus as someone who is written with a certain ‘symbolic capital’, which 
according to Bourdieu is possessed by the individual who ‘abides by the rules’ and 
‘falls into line with good form’.92 Germanicus is shown to honour the values of the 
Roman past and the discourses which bind and authorise the systems of knowledge 
which organise right and wrong behaviour. However, the inculcation of these values 
fails to win the group over to his side and the soldiers only continue their rebellion. 
Eventually a decision is made to forge a letter in Tiberius’ name, promising 
demobilisation after 20 years, immediate discharge to sixteen-year veterans and double 
payment of requested legacies (1.36.3).  Once the soldiers are informed, the discharges 
are quickly arranged but since cash payments were to be postponed until the troops 
reached their winter camps, the fifth and twenty-first legions refused to leave their 
summer quarters. In the end, the sum was paid using the travelling funds of 
                                                           





Germanicus and his staff. As Tacitus tells, it was a shocking march back to the Ubian 
capital with Eagle, standards, and the cash paid out by their commander (1.37.2).93  
 Tacitus’ portrait of Germanicus becomes less structured as the conflicts 
continue. Despite the previous reference to the exemplary fides of the Gauls, 
Germanicus himself decides to deceive the soldiers using Tiberius’ name. Further and 
extreme resolutions devoid of modestia can also be seen in the punishment 
(supplicium) inflicted against two soldiers on the order of camp prefect M. Ennius 
(38.1).94 Tacitus’ appended commentary here is notable; in his own voice he describes 
Ennius’ resolution as an illegal but good example or ‘more a good example than legal 
concession’: (bono magis exemplo quam concesso iure). This is one of the few times 
during the narrative on the mutinies that Tacitus interrupts the story of events with his 
own opinion in moralizing tone, yet illegal punishments as setting a good example 
suggest an irony and reference explicitly the exceptional period of civil wars which 
preceded the establishment of the Principate, characterised similarly by ‘non mos, non 
ius’ (3.28).95  
The narrative continues to draw attention to the corrosion of Germanicus’ 
symbolic capital in the context of conflict. At 1.39, Tacitus describes soldiers dragging 
Germanicus from his bed at night, compelling him to surrender the banner kept in his 
quarters under the threat of death. This passage represents the climactic moment of the 
soldiers’ violence as well as Germanicus’ own subjection to their control and as Tacitus 
later states, Germanicus, in contrast to the pure virtue (praeclara pudicitia) of his wife 
appeared as a man standing in a conquered city – rather than a triumphant commander 
in his own camp (1.41.1). 
Meanwhile, the sedition among the fifth and twenty-first legions continues. 
Germanicus’ new resolution is to declare war on them if they reject his authority (igitur 
Caesar arma classem socios demittere Rheno parat, si imperium detrectetur, bello 
                                                           
93 Germanicus also resolved the potential of resistance from the four legions in the Upper army by 
offering money and dismissal (without them even demanding it [pecunia et missio quamvis non 
flagitantibus oblata est; 1.37.3]). Tacitus later comments that such measures were ill-considered (1.78.2).  
94 Woodman (2004a:21) translates supplicio as ‘reprisal’ which in this context (of warfare) implies that 
Ennius inflicted injuries onto the soldiers greater than those received. Supplicium can also be understood 
as capital punishment, torment, execution (OLD 3, 4). 
95 The limitations of law and morality, as well as the incompatibility between the two, will be discussed 





certaturus; 1.45). Eventually, he reconsiders and instead sends a letter to Caecina 
proposing a massacre unless he finds the main enemies and force reprisals. If no 
reprisals were conducted, Germanicus would continue his initial plan to resort to 
massacre (1.48). After a planned attack, the centurions broke into the tents and killed 
the unknowing occupants. According to Tacitus, on arrival at the camp soon after and 
seeing the result of what he himself had threatened, Germanics described the event not 
as a cure but as a disaster (non medicinam...sed cladem; 1.49.3). 
 It is difficult to conclude on the nature of Tacitus’ writing of Germanicus from 
the start of the mutinies to their eventual end.96 The introduction which Tacitus gives, 
that Germanicus had an engrained civility (civile ingenium) and wonderful kindness 
(mira comitas) is problematised during the course of the violence. On the one hand, 
Germanicus strives to maintain the disciplined ‘Roman’ approach. He remains dutiful 
to Rome at all costs – and furthermore at the sacrifice of the safety of his wife and son 
(certainly symbolic of Aenean piety). When the soldiers offer their support to him 
should he require imperium, he responds by drawing his own sword to his chest, 
claiming ‘death to be more honourable than disloyalty’ (1.35.3). Germanicus may be 
interpreted as an individual who embodies the system, as someone who strives to 
uphold and act according to the norms which habitus puts into motion. However, in the 
end, in order to quell the violence Germanicus has to act against his socialised or 
structured self. Rather than showing and exemplifying disciplina, Germanicus’ 
measures of conflict resolution reveal: 1) a lack of fides because he lies to his men by 
forging a letter in Tiberius’ name; 2) a lack of moderatio because he resorts to 
excessive financial bribery (flagitiosa largitio) and 3) a lack of clementia and civilitas 
because in the end, and following the soldiers’ example, he resorts to the threat of 
death. In any case, the actual resolutions of the mutinies are independent of 
Germanicus’ intervention: while some of the rebels (by choice) end their violence 
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moral/republican by claiming that the ambivalence of the Tacitean Germanicus functions as commentary 





because of pity for Agrippina; others (by force) end upon being ambushed by Caecina 
and his staff.  
The irresolvable tension between Germanicus and the soldiers which the mutiny 
episodes reveal reflect a wider incompatibility between the commitment to disciplina 
and the maintenance of order. Although the soldiers’ agency does not destroy the 
system (nor instigate change – democratic politics is only momentary and in the case of 
the mutinies, it is ultimately futile since the soldiers’ demands were disregarded) 
Tacitus does allow us to see the potential flaws in the system because the source of 
seditio resides in the ideology of discipline which defines it. Furthermore, Germanicus 
– similar to other figures or ‘character types’ that are imbued with a certain level of 
‘symbolic capital’, such as Lucius Piso and Quintus Haterius97 – cannot promote order. 
Compliance and order, in the end, are founded through biopolitical measures (cash, 
profit).  
The Tacitean narrative does not therefore wholly support the idea that discipline 
was something which prevented insurgency – rather, discipline became distasteful. Nor 
does Tacitus contribute to traditional didactic historiography, which represents 
disciplinary exemplarity (and other symbolic representations of Romanitas) on behalf 
of army commanders as something which resolved conflicts. This pushes us to think 
again about how the system is held together and how hierarchy is reinforced. It is not 
necessarily the case that loyalty to the father, to Rome and to tradition, is what 
maintains the stable state. Rather, it appears that resolution comes from other sources – 
economic benefits (cash, gifts, grain) and the promise of discharge (reduced service, 
otium). There is therefore a notable problem with the notion that the inculcation of the 
ideology of disciplina militaris prevented insurgency and promoted resolution.  
 
The Paradox of Disciplina Militaris  
To return to Phang, disciplina militaris attempted to discourage usurpations by 
‘promoting probureaucratic rationalization and values or behaviours that produced the 
habitus appropriate to the soldiers and officers.’98 Furthermore in the Roman army ‘full 
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rationalization was impeded by tradition and by the charismatic authority projected by 
the commanders.’99 Phang further argues that otium was regarded as a ‘source’ of 
insubordination: ‘if soldiers had too much otium, the military hierarchy risked 
dissolution.’100  
There are many examples in ancient literature of otium and luxuria as qualities 
which caused violence.101 For example, in the Histories, Tacitus writes that in the army 
of Vitellius’ complete disorder and drunkenness of a type suited to bacchanalian 
crowds prevailed, rather than the discipline appropriate to camp life. The consequence 
in that case was that a mutiny broke out which saw the massacre of two cohorts. 
Tacitus’ view is that the soldiers’ strength was corrupted by luxury, which was in 
contrast to the ancient discipline of the ancestors, in whose day valour rather than 
money was the foundation of the Roman state (Hist.2.69).  
Tacitus is therefore clearly aware of the dangers of luxuria and otium, which 
can of course also be seen in the Annales in his description of the elite who were 
seduced by it. However, in Germany and Pannonia, there is a slightly different pattern 
of cause and consequence. Whereas Phang argues that luxuria can cause the collapse of 
disciplined habitus, leading to loss of self-control; in Tacitus it seems that the cause of 
the military violence is not due to an excess of otium but rather an excess of discipline. 
This is explicit at 1.19.2 (…disciplinam et laborem aspernari) and later reiterated at 
1.36.2 when in his own voice he states that severity can be dangerous. At 1.31.4 the 
implied cause of the German mutiny is otium because the legions had been held in the 
territory of the Ubii for a period of only light duties (nam isdem aestivis in finibus 
Ubiorum habebantur per otium aut levia munia). But at 1.35.1 Tacitus further suggests 
that it was not otium which caused the mutiny but whatever else (labores) was invented 
to prevent it: (…et si qua alia ex necessitate aut adversus otium castrorum 
quaeruntur). Overall, and throughout both accounts, the long lists of the soldiers’ 
grievances which were assigned for disciplinary purposes but are now used as the 
reasoning behind their violence (that is, their lack of disicplina and fides) suggest that 
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the cause of mutiny was labor, which is most notably the product of disciplina rather 
than otium.  
 On the one hand, then, the symbolic violence (the rules, norms, orders) which 
is imposed on the soldiers and which is fundamental to the disciplined, stable state is 
necessary and legitimate; but on the other, Tacitus invites us to consider the violence of 
discipline, which is that it incites sedition through its own imposition. Ultimately, 
discipline remains integral to the dynamics that allow peace and profit but this is not 
without creating moments of rupture. 
 Discipline as something which inspires violence evidently reveals the paradox 
of discipline ideology and by extension, the role this played in maintaining military 
hierarchy and promoting specific habitus.102 Yet Tacitus offers us an explanation as to 
why this paradox may have existed within the military habitus. The concept of habitus 
is fundamental to understanding social relations. Nevertheless many scholars have 
dismissed Bourdieu’s theory on the grounds that it is too deterministic.103 However, in 
his Outline of a Theory of Practice Bourdieu does suggest the potential power of 
human agency to override social structures: ‘practices are always liable to incur 
negative sanctions when the environment with which they are actually confronted is too 
                                                           
102 This means that the practices and institutions which foster disciplined behaviour can at times foster 
conflict. This is not only seen in the soldiers’ acts but also Germanicus’ own, because his method of 
conflict resolution is not promotion of ‘specific habitus’ but rather deceit, threat of war and murder. 
Phang’s analysis of discipline in a military context as an ideology is useful, but she does not develop 
discipline and the structures of habitus to their full paradox, which is that they are repressive and may 
lead to a desire for liberation, seen during the mutinies through violence. Bourdieu himself discusses this 
but through ‘symbolic violence’ which is not physical but rather ‘the gentle invisible form of violence, 
which is never recognised as such and is not so much undergone as chosen, the violence of credit, 
confidence, obligation, personal loyalty, hospitality, gifts, gratitude, piety – in short all the virtues 
honoured by the code of honour’ – which then maintain hierarchy (1977:192). Symbolic violence in 
Bourdieu is therefore not really distinguishable from the structures of the habitus. My argument 
following Tacitus’ narrative is that this ‘symbolic violence’ leads to physical democratic violence. And 
democratic violence is not only about liberation but also about survival. 
103 Jenkins (1992:118) summarises the ‘too deterministic’ critique of Bourdieu: ‘the central thread which 
unites the empirical and theoretical critiques is the argument that Bourdieu’s theory of cultural 
reproduction and social reproduction is deterministic. It fails to allow for social change at the level of the 
system and does not allow for meaningful agency or process at the individual level’. I think that to deny 
the deterministic elements of habitus would be as problematic as denying the existence of agency 






distant from that to which they are objectively fitted.’104  This incurrence of negative 
sanctions can explain why the ideology of disciplina militaris was paradoxical (and as 
a consequence potentially foundational). As Phang argues, hierarchy was reinforced 
through, on one hand accepting notions of virtus and on the other, rejecting notions of 
servitium. To work hard and be dutiful was virtuous but to be servile (like slaves) was 
‘disgusting’.105 Soldiers were supposed to act like proud Roman males, dissociated 
from subordination. Socialization depended on the rejection of certain behaviours and 
characteristics – ‘ideological disgust reproduces social hierarchies and values…Roman 
elite authors depict civil warfare and insubordination as abject’.106 However, in 
Tacitus’ narrative on the mutinies, honor and virtus are in conflict with the servile and 
subordinate conditions of the soldiers’ existence (‘their wounds, the marks of their 
beatings, the price of exemptions, bad pay, the severity of their assigned tasks, 
especially the ramparting, the ditches, having to carry pasture, timber and firewood and 
any other task which was designed to control idleness in the camp’; Ann.1.35). 
Subsequently, there is a further problem involved with disciplina ideology. When a 
society has within it an image of what it is partly because of a precise idea of what it is 
not, any slippage between the positive and negative ideal will cause a problem, 
increasing the potential of social conflict. The negative dialectic as problematic can 
especially be seen in the narrative on the mutinies because the soldiers are presented as 
the thing they are not supposed to be (servile) and the extent of their servility conflicts 
again with how they are supposed to appear (virtuous). The environment in which they 
live – one of dirt, excessive labor and servility – confronts them with a ‘negative 
sanction’ which is perhaps too distant from that to which they are supposedly 
objectively fitted.107 
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106 Ibid (35). 
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the nature of his character clear from the beginning (civile ingenium, mira comitas). The point is that 
such a character cannot maintain itself in the context of violence because the engrained sense of civility 





So the paradox of discipline in the Tacitean narrative, in terms of its own 
enforcement (it is dangerously extreme) and the means through which it produced 
hierarchy and promoted specific habitus (by separating the soldier from abject things 
like servility) is therefore that it is self-defeating. The soldiers in Tacitus are described 
as living within the conditions which produce the abject: they are slaves to their 
commanders and have to endure harsh laborious tasks which merge with the abject 
subordination of slaves. Subsequently, discipline in excess means they themselves 
become abject because their hardships threaten their disciplined and habitus-structured 
identity as virtuous and honourable Roman males. 
If there is this type of self-defeating paradox located in disciplina militaris, one 
which produces a dialectical conflict, then there is also one located in military 
hierarchy, leaving democratic violence susceptible to emerge and habitus open to 
rupture.  
 
Conclusion: Habitus and Rupture, Senators and Soldiers 
 
 
The habitus as ‘the active presence of the whole past’ 
encompasses past dislocation just as much as past 
stability…Before we throw out the concept of habitus in 
favour of an analytic frame that privileges fragmentation 
alone, let us consider how, far from being lost through 
experiences of disruption, dislocation, destruction, and 
even apocalypse, the habitus feeds on these and takes 
them into itself. Instead of being inimical to reproduction, 
then, rupture becomes part of what is reproduced.108 
 
 
The emergence of civil conflict during the interregnum can be read as an example of 
action which ruptures the habitus. This is because the insurgent soldiers transgress the 
hierarchical structures habitus promotes and the structuring structures it produces. But 
from Shaw’s perspective above, it could equally be argued that the emergence of 
mutiny is something which is ‘reproduced’ from the disruptive and ‘apocalyptic’ 
                                                                                                                                                                         
environment of sedition because the environment of sedition is possibly ‘too distant’ from that to which 
Germanicus, is ‘objectively fitted’.  





elements that are already engrained in the habitus. If habitus, as ‘the active presence of 
the whole past’, is historic and furthermore historically generative, it could potentially 
generate violence (the ‘bad’ memories of the past or ‘past dislocation’) as well as order 
(the ‘good’ memories of the past or ‘past stability’).  
A useful way to trace how rupture becomes part of what is reproduced through 
the habitus is to pay attention to the repetition of certain traumatic or ‘apocalyptic’ 
events in certain contexts. Civil wars happened more than once in early imperial Rome. 
Furthermore, civil wars founded the establishment of the Principate. Given this, civil 
war in Rome was not only endemic to the history of the early imperial and late 
republican system but it was also foundational.  
In Tacitus’ narrative on the mutinies, the soldiers recall the civil war past in the 
violent acts they commit against their fellow Romans. But they also recall how 
politically significant their violence is and has been in the past: sed multa seditionis ora 
vocesque: sua in manu sitam rem Romanam, suis victoriis augeri rem publicam, in 
suum cognomentum adscisci imperatores (1.31.5). We may extend the self-reflexive 
possessive adjectives used here (sua, suis, suum) and the context in which they are used 
to suggest that the soldiers are referring not only to themselves and their individual 
memories and experiences, but possibly even to earlier groups of soldiers who had 
fought and won Rome’s wars, and who inspired commanders’ names and who 
demonstrated that Rome’s fate was in their hands – groups of soldiers with whom these 
soldiers in the present feel connected.109 Furthermore, while the soldiers can 
legitimately refer to a past in which they made significant contributions to the making 
of politics, the senator cannot to the same extent reference a past in which his action 
increased or determined the glory of Rome, at least not in the Tacitean account. The 
point is that Tacitus’ narrative sees a momentary role reversal between the army and 
the elite in terms of which order of society is ‘the part that has no part’.  
 However, despite the increasing significance of the part played by the military 
and the decreasing significance of the part played by the elite, the problem which 
Tacitus raises during the mutinies is that the soldiers are not treated as significant 
                                                           





political actors. From this perspective, Tacitus’ narrative continues to work to outline 
multiple pasts and the tensions created from their presence in the present. On one hand 
there is a tension between the soldiers’ victorious past (in which they played a 
significant part) and the soldiers’ aggrieved present (in which they are treated as if they 
play no significant part). On the other, there is a tension between the elite republican 
past (one of dignitas and honor) and the elite imperial present (one of otium and 
simulacra libertatis).110 Furthermore, while the elite ‘rush’ into servitude and are ‘eager 
for servitude’ this is in clear contrast to the soldiers’ servitude, which is not chosen but 
has been endured. The soldiers’ pasts and present are not the same as the senators’ past 
and present. 
 This allows us to understand the habitus from another perspective. Military 
habitus cannot really be understood without due consideration of what actually happens 
in the camp (the everyday laborious activities of the soldiers) as well as the more 
abstract and idealizing structures of the habitus which influenced disciplined behaviour 
in the camp (the mos maiorum and disciplina militaris). Nor can military habitus be 
understood monolithically, in terms of what history and memory is handed down from 
the past and socialized into the soldiers’ present. It is very possible that non-idyllic 
memories became part of the habitus, such as the everyday memory of the soldiers’ 
own oppression and servility (‘experiences of dislocation’) which is explained in 
Tacitus with reference to their grievances, as when they ‘bared their bodies as one man 
to reveal the scars of their beatings’ (nudant universi corpora, cicatrices ex vulneribus, 
verberum notas exprobrant; 1.35.1). But it is also possible that revolutionary memories 
became part of the military habitus (sua in manu sitam rem Romanum) to counteract 
the soldiers’ ‘habit of submission’ (morem obsequii). From this perspective, if habitus 
as ‘the active presence of the whole past’ is historic and furthermore historically 
generative, it could potentially generate both subordination and insubordination.  
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 In conclusion, while it cannot be denied that habitus helped to determine and 
promote hierarchy and discipline, it could equally be productive of ‘disruption, 
dislocation’ and resistance. It could equally be productive of democratic violence. As I 
have discussed, democratic violence is precisely what is produced during the 
interregnum, a time which Tacitus uses to reveal the most critical difference between 
soldier and senator. Under the Principate the elite moved away from negotia publica 
and instead lived in otium. And due to his frequent references to their servility, Tacitus 
makes it clear that the senators did not stop performing their roles of subordination but 
rather continued to allow the suppositions of inequality to shape social hierarchy. But 
the soldier’s democratic activity reveals the opposite: the soldiers during the mutinies 
stop accepting their role of subordination. The mutinies represent moments of extreme 
forms of political activity which are in sharp contrast to the unproductivity of the elite 
in Rome. The elite have disengaged from political life but the soldiers, in contrast, now 
deeply engage in the making of politics through their democratic violence. And in the 
democratic violence of the interregnum, the revolutionary soldiers engrain a new 









TACITUS AND THE THEME OF CORRUPTION 
 
 
Let us not blame people and their attitudes: the problem is 
not corruption or greed, the problem is the system that 
pushes you to be corrupt.1  
 
Corruption describes a process of decay through which an individual or institution 
changes from its original condition into something ‘unsound, impure, debased, 
infected, tainted, adulterated, depraved [or] perverted.’2 Corruption refers to defiance of 
the law and it can also refer to deviance from an established notion of what is moral 
(‘good’) or ethical (‘right’).3 In Roman historiography, corruption is associated with a 
decline in traditional morality. Corruption is a condition which results from acts and 
activities that debase or distort the exemplary ways of the maiores.4  
The theme of corruption is central to Tacitus’ Annales. Multiple narratives of 
deviant behaviour together reveal the extent to which corruption was embedded within 
the wider network of political and power relations that made up Tiberian society. This 
can be analysed in the many forms of corruption which Tacitus explores, forms which 
are neither completely discrete nor completely disconnected. For example, there is a 
narrative of political corruption, seen in the growing culture of delation. In the 
delations, where the practice of law becomes the profession of the informant, there is 
rhetorical corruption and juridical corruption (corrupta iudicia).5  The secrecy of court 
politics leads to relational corruption in the betrayal of friendship (a corruption of 
amicitia, a corruption of fides) and a wider conflict between self-interest, duty to the 
community and duty to the princeps (a corruption of pietas). The confusions of duty (to 
whom or to what to remain dutiful) inflect a process of individual corruption through 
increasing servitium (to the princeps, to the regime and even to one’s own position in 
                                                           
1 Zizek (2012), [online].  
2 Philp (1997:445). 
3 On definitions of corruption see Philp (1997), Heidenheimer and Johnston (2002) and Pardo (2004:1-
11).  
4 See for example Sall.Cat.5.8-13.5, 36.4-39.5. On deviance from the mos maiorum as not right see 
Suet.Rhet.1 and Cic.Or.3, 24, 93-5.  





the state). These narrations culminate in a corruption of discourse through which what 
is right and wrong is lost, as Tacitus himself reminds us.6  
From this perspective, one can see that the Tacitean narrative follows earlier 
historiography which discloses corruption as a contagion (contagio) or plague 
(pestilentia) that infects the imperial state.7 Yet a paradox of Tiberian Rome which 
serves ultimately to underpin the process of corruption is that the various forms of 
corruption (political, individual, rhetorical, juridical, civic, discursive) serve the 
purpose of individual virtus and state concordia, and provide the regime with its force. 
Ordinarily, a corrupt act is the antithesis of a virtuous act (as a free act is the antithesis 
of an enslaved act) but corruption in Tacitus is equally and paradoxically constitutive 
of virtue.  
In Tacitus’ analysis of Tiberian Rome deviant action such as illegality, 
immorality and deception is shown to play an on-going role in maintaining the 
architecture of government (the secrets of state) and the Roman ‘arts of existence’ (the 
processes of earning wealth and status).8 In this view, corrupt activity not only surfaces 
in order to satisfy questionable desires such as greed (avaritia) and luxuriousness 
(luxus) but Tacitus shows that corruption is also a route to satisfy moral drives such as 
honor and decus (moral propriety).9 Since corruption (bad or wrong behaviour) and 
morality (good and right behaviour) coincide as different means to achieve the same 
ends (virtus, albeit only in appearance), it is more accurate to understand corruption in 
Tacitus not as antithetical to morality (as a condition of non mos, non ius), but rather, 
as something consistent with the aims of morality. Subsequently, the theme of 
corruption in Tacitus as something which penetrates and exhausts the state signifies 
much more than a ‘bad’ or ‘wrong’ value or activity, such as luxury (luxuria) or bribery 
(largitio). Rather, corruption as legal, moral and ethical deviance is recognised as a 
condition of life which is integral to the workings of politics and even the workings of 
                                                           
6 Ann.4.33.2.  
7 See for example Sall.Cat.10 on the pestilentia which ‘invaded’ the res publica. See also Livy.Praef.9 
and Cic.Leg.3.30-2 on corrupt men corrupting others.  
8 On the ‘arts of existence’ see Foucault (1988b:259ff.) and (1990:10-13). Cf. Foucault’s ‘technology of 
the self’ which is ‘the way a human being turns him or herself into a subject’ (1983:208).  





morality. Any political identification with the regime, which is the path to virtus and 
fama, requires an acceptance of corruption.  
In this chapter I will analyse Tacitus’ writing of corruption in order to explore 
further the relationship between corruption and politics and, more widely, corruption 
and morality. In order to analyse corruption as something which played a continuing 
role in the early years of the Tiberian Principate, my focus will be on particular 
episodes during the years between AD 15 and AD 22 (Ann.1.72-3.76), which as I shall 
show work to reveal various continuities between morality and corruption, that is, 
corruption as virtuous and virtue as innately corrupt. 
In the first section, I focus on Tacitus’ writing of law, paying particular 
attention to Tacitus’ interpretation of the lex Papia Poppaea and proposed sumptuary 
legislation. My aim is to examine Tacitus’ writing of law as something which causes 
corruption rather than that which prevents it. According to R. Bauman, ‘law reform was 
rooted in one of the deepest well-springs of the Roman ethos’ and throughout their 
turbulent history, the Romans ‘turned to their law as the one sure shield against 
dissolution and decay, and when they criticised a regime it was for its lawlessness more 
than for anything else: res publica sine iure is a recurrent refrain.’10  
Bauman neatly sets up the essential aim and importance of law in Roman 
society: that the institution of the law was aimed at ‘shielding against dissolution and 
decay’ is undeniable and that law reform was ‘rooted in one of the deepest well-springs 
of the Roman ethos’ is again difficult to refute. Yet, Tacitus offers a different 
understanding of law; his critique of the imperial regime is not, in sum, aimed at its 
lawlessness. Rather, what Tacitus is critiquing is the plurality of the law (plurimae 
leges; 3.27) and more specifically the disjunction between laws (leges) and rights (iura) 
– that is, the inability of civil law to serve one of its essential purposes, which is to 
protect citizen rights.11 I shall explore the disjunction between law and right through 
                                                           
10 Bauman (1989:16). 
11 I note that ius also refers to law as in lex (Cf. OCD s.v. ius civile) but in contrast to lex, ius 
encompasses a wider meaning (such as the more ‘theoretical’ sense implied by ius gentium, c.f. OCD 
s.v.). I employ the term ius in its more extensive sense, which covers natural law (‘in a wider sense, that 
which is good and just’, OLD 7) as well as one’s ‘right’ (‘what one is entitled to esp. by law, one’s due; 
the right to do or have something’, OLD 10, 11). On Tacitus’ use of ius in the sense of one’s 





Tacitus’ writing of delation, focussing in particular on the case of Libo Drusus in AD 
16 (2.27-2.32). Delation is a legal process, designed to enforce the laws and in so 
doing, ‘shield against dissolution and decay’. However, in Tacitus, what delation 
produces in its own legal-protective (surveillant) process is a disciplinary system of 
terror, in which privacy is violable, fear is automatic and by which property, and more 
tragically for Tacitus honour, is displaced to those less honourable. In this view, ‘res 
publica sine iura’ is what concerns Tacitus, but this is due not to a lack of law nor 
inadequate law reform. Rather, it is due to a contamination within the very system of 
law itself (the delatores), a contamination which under the Principate endangers 
fundamental civil rights (to freedom, to property, to privacy, to speech, to a fair trial) 
and to being Roman (to maintaining one’s own honor).12  
 Tacitus’ narrative problematises the normal understanding of law as that which 
prevents corruption.13 His writing of delatio shows that corrupt forces can often stem 
from the law itself, which rather than ordering morality becomes the very mechanism 
through which dissolution and decay are perpetuated.14 A similar paradox (that is, 
mechanisms of order as mechanisms which cause disorder) can be traced in Tacitus 
writing of Roman moderatio. Roman morality was grounded in the virtue of 
moderation. An adherence to moderation prevented transgression of the boundary 
between virtue and vice, thus allowing the individual (to know how) to assert an 
honourable and virtuous identity. However, in Tacitus’ Rome, the practice of 
moderatio, as the practice of observing/knowing limits, is in conflict with imperial time 
– a time which was not one for censorship but rather one for excess (2.33). This can be 
seen in particular in Tacitus’ writing of certain vices, especially luxuria, which on the 
one hand is something which softens the mind, but on the other something which 
enables dignity and fame, albeit through decadence.  
Tacitean historiography is set within the context of imperial excess (luxuria, 
luxus, avaritia), yet in contrast to the views of Sallust and Livy who align excess with 
                                                           
12 On delatio as contaminating and intrusive see for example Ann.2.27.1, 3.66.4, 4.66.1; 4.68.1ff. See 
also Hist.1.2.3. On civil rights in Roman thought see Wood on Cicero (1988). On human rights Bauman 
(2002).  
13 Cic.Rep.3.33 and Leg.1.18-19. 





the destruction of the health (salus) of the state Tacitus offers a different view. 
According to Tacitus (or Tacitus’ Tiberius), although sumptuary legislation will curb 
luxuria, in doing so it will ruin the state’s best (splendidissimi) people, cause large 
scale crime (crimen) and bring financial loss (damnum) to the state. Subsequently, 
although excess remains a vice and moderation a virtue, the problem is that moderation 
can no longer enable virtue, nor concordia. Instead, luxuria allows both individual 
dignitas and consolidates wealth and power in the imperial state (thus asserting order). 
In Tacitus, luxuria is not written as a cause of systemic decline. Rather it emerges as a 
‘useful vice’, ensuring stability and peace both on the level of the individual and the 
level of the state. 
The moral potential of excess, which Tacitus writes through luxuria, is similar 
to the moral potential of excess explored through delation.  In Tacitus, rumour, power 
and wealth (signs of ‘nimia licentia’ or ‘nimia cupiditas’ which Cicero warns against15) 
are written as essential means of gaining and asserting a virtuous identity, thereby 
outweighing the moderating values encoded in Roman culture (values which are 
asserted through the law and the mos maiorum). From this view, that vice or excess 
allow something positive (albeit an immoral positive), one can begin to trace precisely 
how Tacitean thought reveals a different understanding of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in which 
‘good’ is a relative rather than absolute concept. And if morality is relative, then so 
must be immorality (and ‘corruption’).16  
In the second section, I focus on Tacitus’ writing of mercy (clementia), paying 
particular attention to the proceedings in the law courts during the criminal 
investigations of Clutorius Priscus (3.50-1), Junius Silanus (3.66-8) and Lucius Ennius 
(3.70). In theory, the act of mercy was for Romans something which represented 
kindness and ‘civilised’ behaviour.17 For Seneca, clementia was the most human of all 
virtues.18 However, the practice of clementia, though ‘humane’ (at least according to 
some of our sources19), is revealed by Tacitus as a source of conflict. This conflict, 
                                                           
15 Rep.1.68. See Cic.Off.1.19.64 on the problem of ‘nimia cupiditas’ (excessive desire).  
16 See further Pardo (2004:1-15) on the non-absolute nature of corruption.  
17 See for example Cic.Inv.2.164. 
18 Clem.1.2.3 (cf. 1.25.1 on the crudelitas of wild beasts). 





notable especially during the trials of treason, is to do with three related questions: 1) 
how to establish a balance between displaying clementia while also preserving 
severitas; 2) who has the right to exercise clementia (who can speak in the name of 
Rome or where does sovereignty reside) and 3) on whose behalf should clementia be 
exercised or to whom does the majesty of the state belong (the senate, Tiberius or 
Augustus).  
A further problem revealed through clementia relates to exceptionality. It is 
notable that Tacitus, through Tiberius, allows us to read clementia in its essential 
meaning, not only as a humane or moderate virtue but also as a peculiarly exceptional 
virtue (as above the law). The decision on mercy rests on deviance because by being 
supra leges it is a virtue which can only appear through an act which distorts the law 
(since to forgive a crime is to make a legal exception). Yet, clementia not only corrupts 
the notion of iustitia for the sake of avoiding punishment, but clementia furthermore 
cannot exist without the creation of bare life.20 For Cicero, it was the role of justice not 
to violate humanity (iustitiae partes sunt non violare homines; Cic.Off.1.99). However, 
it is notable that although the subject of mercy was often rescued from death, he was 
nevertheless declared an outlaw (interdictus or homo sacer), stripped of his citizen 
rights and banished from Rome.21 Given this, the choice of ‘bare life’ made by the 
condemned and which then constituted the morality of the sovereign is a thoroughly 
corrupt procedure, since it involves the reduction of the citizen to the subject and as 
such undermines the identification of the Roman as citizen. Furthermore the ever-
present potential for the citizen to be subject to clementia meant that the state of bare 
life was always present, threatening citizen values and reducing the individual, in the 
last instance, to a subject (a ‘rootless, stateless, rightless’ individual22). 
Tacitus’ narrative on Tiberian clementia allows us to locate a deeper form of 
corruption, paradoxically embedded within the act of virtue itself. As a symbol of 
Roman humanitas, clementia was integral to the moral identity of the princeps and the 
Roman state. Clementia along with aequalitas and iustitia were fundamental tenets of 
                                                           
20 On bare life see above p.23-4. 
21 On homo sacer see Festus 424L (above p.24, n.47). 





Roman humanitas.23 Yet, clementia is corrupt because it depends on a deviance from 
the law and it is virtuous because it appeals to Roman ideals of civilitas and humanitas. 
The double-sided nature of clementia is the quintessential manifestation of the 
relationship between corruption and morality, illuminating how the sovereign 
reinforced his power (by making exceptions in the law) while simultaneously 
legitimating his sovereignty through discourses of humanity (lenitas, civilitas, 
humanitas). Clementia in Tacitus may therefore be read as an act of ‘virtuous deviance’ 
(as a harmful virtue).  
Such connections between virtue and vice, morality and corruption 
problematise the conventional understanding of what for Tacitus is precisely the cause 
of corruption in Roman society. It appears that corruption is caused by law and 
morality rather than something which reflects a lack of individuals’ adherence to the 
law and morality. Moderatio by restricting luxuria prevented individual dignitas and 
increased distress and crime, while clementia for the purpose of the display of 
sovereign humanitas confused iustitia as well as violated humanity in the creation of 
bare life. If it is through morality and the law (a society’s ordering structures) that 
injustice and inequality is perpetuated, then, Tacitus shows, corruption does not only 
stem from ‘lawlessness’ nor is corruption something which is made manifest through 
untraditional desires such as greed. Rather, corrupt forces are embedded within Roman 
epistemology because it is by the ordering structures of Roman society (by the law and 
by the mos maiorum, that is, those structures which contribute to the constitution of 
knowledge), that dissolution and decay are caused: corruption is fundamentally 
systematic (omnipresent or regular) and systemic (built into or deep-seated in Roman 
culture). In such a context, we may understand Tacitus’ statement at Ann.3.27 in 
reverse form, not that the more corrupt the state the more numerous the laws 
(corruptissima re publica plurimae leges) but rather that the more numerous the laws, 
the more corrupt the state. 
Yet, as I shall argue, this can be extended further to consider not law and 
morality as corrupt but the source of epistemology (the thing that guides law and 
                                                           





morality) as corrupt. In Tacitus, corruption is to do with the Roman ‘ethos’ itself, in 
particular, the wider notion of Roman humanitas, that which bound the system together 
through the rhetoric of civility, humanity and power, yet also that which required the 
law to be suspended or transgressed in order for that display to be achieved.24 The 
problem therefore is not ‘the system that pushes the individual to be corrupt’ (pace 
Zizek, above) but rather, in a Roman context, the problem is that the system pushes the 
individual to be virtuous, at whatever cost, and in which context virtue is deviant and 
thus rendered abstract from its traditional, ethical or absolute meaning. Morality in 
Tacitus presages Arendt, in the sense that it emerges as something which is ‘more than 
the sum total of mores, of customs and standards of behavior solidified through 
tradition’.25 
In this view, we may read from a different perspective the digression at  
Ann.4.33, during which Tacitus tells that under the Principate few had the knowledge 
(prudentia) to discern the honourable from the worse (honesta ab 
detorioribus…discernunt) and the useful from the harmful (utilia ab noxiis discernunt; 
Ann.4.33.2). This claim immediately suggests a certain epistemological problem (a 
collapse of the binary between right and wrong, good and bad). However, although 
Tacitus attributes bad behaviour to a problem of knowledge, his analysis of court 
politics prior to this digression suggests that the problem did not lie in prudentia nor 
was it due to a lack of doctrinaire morality (boni mores or prisca virtus). Rather, the 
knowledge of good and right exists but such knowledge is in conflict with imperial 
time.26  
                                                           
24 Humanitas in Tacitus is also enslaving (Ag.21). On definitions of humanitas see Woolf (1998:54-73). 
See also Plin. NH. 3.39, Gell.NA.13.17.1. (See also OLD s.v.: ‘human nature or character; the quality 
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25 Arendt (1998:245). Discussed further below. 
26 Part of the difficultly involved with reading ‘good’ in Tacitus is that there is a conflict between the 
didactic element of his historiography (to teach posterity through the provision of good examples, as well 
as bad) and the subject of his historiography (politics of the imperial court). This conflict makes it so that 
the lesson Tacitus himself tries to teach through his historiography is subsumed by his own narration of 
the politics of the period, through which he tries to teach it. The digression at 4.33 is an obvious 
expression of this conflict, the conflict between what the Roman should be (generally speaking) and 





Imperial time in Tacitus is such that the commitment to honestas no longer 
serves any effectual role in imperial politics nor in the making of an honourable or 
powerful identity. Rather, Tacitus’ analysis of the imperial regime is one in which 
temporal pressures are exerted, pressures to be wrong, to be evil, to be deceitful (to be 
corrupt), and not for the sake of greed, but for the sake of the good of the state (that is, 
to support its systems of power). Tacitus implies that such was the nature of the time 
that honourable acts (moderatio) led to harm and that dishonourable acts (luxus) could 
be useful. In such a context, individuals are not necessarily confused nor are they at a 
loss due a lack of traditional or customary notions of morality/prudentia. Rather, it is 
possible to be humane and to rise in status, but this tragically requires wilful corruption 
and servitude.27  
The Tacitean narrative thus presents a rounded analysis and understanding of 
corruption. Corruption signifies a moral deficiency in the individual, an inability to 
adhere to an ethical code, a rejection of traditional moderating discourses and the 
failure to abide by the law. The existence of this form of corruption can be found in 
much ancient historiography. Yet, where the Tacitean narrative differs is that it allows 
insight into what corruption affords, which provides the reader with an insight into not 
only what corruption is but why corruption persists. Tacitus shifts focus from 
corruption itself to the question of what precisely a society’s maintaining ‘ethos’ is, 
raising the possibility that corruption is as central to that ethos as is morality. The 
significance of this is that the Tacitean narrative retains a focus on individual will, 
which means that we cannot attribute bad deeds in Tacitus to ‘banality’, that is, evil 
excused on account of individuals ‘not knowing what they are doing’.28 Rather, by 
drawing the link between corruption and virtue, evil and good, it appears that people 
are accountable for their bad deeds, and they knowingly take part in evil because it can 
offer an access to virtue.  
Subsequently, since virtue, fame and glory maintained the Roman ethos then so 
must corruption, since it is through virtuous corruption in the form of delatio and 
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28 On the banality of evil (evil resulting from ‘thoughtlessness’ and an ‘inability to think’) see Arendt 
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luxuria and deviant virtues such as clementia, that one can gain glory and fame.29 
Tacitus therefore shows that virtus remained powerful under the Principate since 
individuals went to greater (corrupt) lengths to achieve it. Of course this does not mean 
that Tacitus condones corruption, this is clearly not the case, nor the point. Rather, 
Tacitus writes morality as a form of politics or dynamics, as something which ‘changes 
like the seasons’, emphasising mutability and thus the limits of society’s traditional 
discourses.30 In such a context, where there is a fine line between virtue and vice, 
Tacitus shows that the commitment to corruption remains a commitment to humanitas. 
But the commitment to humanitas depends on an exercise in corruption. 
 
 
4.1 Moderatio and the Problem of the Law 
 
Power does not corrupt. Fear corrupts…perhaps the fear 
of a loss of power.31 
 
In AD 16, the senator Lucius Piso made an emphatic speech to the senate on the current 
state of law and order. As Tacitus explains, the corruption of the law courts (corrupta 
iudicia) as well as the cruelty (saevitia) of orators, so affected Piso that he declared he 
was leaving the senate house, would proceed to exit the city and live instead in some 
rural, distant place.32 Piso’s dramatic exit was quickly deterred by the emperor; but 
then Piso drew attention to the corruption of the courts by prosecuting Urgulania, 
whose friendship with Livia had previously raised her above the law (…supra leges 
amicitia Augustae extulerat). In breach of Piso’s summons Urgulania proceeded to the 
emperor’s house but Piso continued in his attempts to condemn her, and even despite 
Livia’s complaints of being violated and diminished (...Augusta se violari et imminui 
quereretur). Piso’s rebellion eventually came to a close once Livia paid the 
defendants’s debt. According to Tacitus, the consequence of this was that Piso himself 
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30 Ann. 3.55.5, (quoted above, p.20, n.37). 
31 Safire (1968:567), quoting John Steinbeck. 





was not dishonoured and the emperor rose in fame (…neque Piso inglorious et Caesar 
maiore fama fuit; 2.34).  
 Tacitus concludes the chapter with a comment on Urgulania’s potentia, which 
was so great to the state (Urgulaniae potentia adeo nimia civitati…) that when her 
testimony was required by the senate on another occasion she refused to give her 
evidence in the courts on account of it being unworthy. The questioning thus took place 
at her own house – a privilege not even extended to the Vestales.   
Piso’s seditious speech carries various implications for the nature of politics and 
the process of justice at this time. The cruelty of oratory and the role of amicitia in the 
perversion of law vividly underline the corrupt state of the juridical order. Yet it is 
notable that Piso’s speech is evoked by a discussion on the sumptuary legislation 
(2.33), which is concluded with Tiberius’ statement that this time was not one for 
censorship (…non id tempus censurae; 2.33.4). Prior to this debate Tacitus presents a 
series of chapters in which delation, another form of uncensored activity (paradoxically 
designed to censure) is revealed as a form of maintaining social order, but achieved 
only through a perversion of truth and rights.  
The dissatisfaction expressed by Piso may therefore be read as symptomatic not 
only of the corruption in the courts but more widely, the nature of imperial time, a time 
in which executive powers were no longer rooted in the law nor in traditional notions 
of morality, but rather in the hands of powerful imperial friends (Urgulania) and 
imperial spies (the delatores). Piso’s attempts to restore some sort of moral or righteous 
knowledge immediately clash with imperial prerogatives (and, notably, the settlement 
of Urgulania’s case represented a compromise since it was Livia, not Urgulania, who 
paid the damages). Yet, in any case, and as Tacitus tells us at the end of the story, the 
emperor’s popularity was increased by these events and Piso was not dishonoured.  
There is in this an immediate revelation of the time of the Principate as one 
which retained and depended on a peculiar relation between corruption and virtue. In 
order to allow an access to virtue, corruption, either in the form of corrupta iudicia, or 
in the form of vices such as luxuria and avaritia must not be suspended.33 Rather, it is 
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through an acceptance of corruption in its various forms that virtue is enabled. Piso’s 
rebellion, in tune with an absolutist sense of right and wrong is nevertheless out of tune 
with the imperial logic.34 In what follows, I will analyse Tacitus’ writing of corruption 
in order to explore Piso’s claims in further detail. I shall begin by tracing the theme of 
corrupta iudicia (as both ‘corruption in the law courts’ and ‘corrupt judgements’) 
through Tacitus’ writing of delatores in the chapters which lead to Piso’s eventual 
outburst (2.27-2.33). I shall then move onto a wider discussion of the role of luxuria in 
the stability of the state through a focus on Tacitus’ writing of sumptuary legislation 
(3.52-55). There are two points I aim to make. Firstly, through an analysis of delatio I 
argue that the law, the system which was to regulate moderate behaviour and protect 
rights, sources rather than prevents corruption and secondly, through luxuria I argue 
that corruption and corrupt behaviour are sources of power, fundamental to the 
formation of moral identity and the power of the imperial state in the time of growing 
empire. 
 
The Art of Criminal Implication  
After the key events at the beginning of the Annales – the death of Augustus, the 
accession of Tiberius and the mutinies on the frontiers – Tacitus’ narrative is largely 
focussed on political affairs at Rome, in particular, the criminal trials of treason and 
various other acts of illegality. Interwoven with Tacitus’ narrative on criminality is the 
intrusive work of delatores – those who witnessed, accused or prosecuted illegal 
activity.35  
 Tacitus’ representation of delatores is derogatory.36 Delation was a form of 
life, made famous by the needy (egens) and restless (inquies) proposals of certain 
shameless men.37 A key example of the process of delatio comes at 2.27-31, which is 
the case of Libo Drusus, an event which in Tacitus’ opinion marked the emergence of 
something that corroded the res publica for many years (2.27.1).  
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In AD 16, Libo Drusus of the family of the Scribonii was charged for 
attempting a revolution (moliri res novas). The charges were brought upon him by his 
close friend (amicus intimus) Firmius Catus, who had encouraged Libo to consult ‘the 
foresight of the Chaldaeans and magicians’ rites’ (ad Chaldaeorum promissa, 
magorum sacra). Such practices, as well as Libo’s general extravagance (luxus) were 
encouraged by Catus so that he could entangle Libo all the more into the proofs of 
crime (quo pluribus indiciis inligaret). Once Catus had enough evidence, he indicated 
Libo’s crimes to Flaccus Vescularius, a close friend of Tiberius, in the hope that 
Flaccus would then report Libo’s bad deeds to Tiberius. Following this, Catus asked for 
a meeting with the emperor, but Tiberius declined in case the same evidence might be 
brought to his attention by Flaccus. Meanwhile, Tiberius continued as normal, 
occasionally inviting Libo to dinner and even furnishing him with a praetorship, 
showing no strange expression or agitation in his words (non vultu alienatus, non 
verbis commotior).  
Then a certain Junius, the necromancer whom Libo had previously consulted, 
reported further evidence against Libo to Fulcinius Trio, a man who was known among 
informers for his desire for mala fama (2.28.4). Trio immediately approached the 
consuls and demanded that Libo should be tried. The senators were then summoned to 
consult on a great and terrible matter (2.28.4). Libo meanwhile sought help from his 
more illustrious relatives in the hope that they might save him from danger, but all 
refused – under different pretences but from the same fear (...cum diversa 
praetenderent, eadem formidine; 2.29). 
When the senate met there was an argument as to who had the right to state the 
charges (the ius perorandi) against Libo. As well as Catus and Trio, Agrippa and Caius 
Vibius were also part of the prosecution. Eventually it was decided that Vibius would 
lead. Tacitus’ commentary suggests that the scene in the courts was pathetic. According 
to Tacitus, Vibius produced or invented (protulit) largely absurd accusations (…libellos 
vaecordes adeo), for example that Libo had made enquiries so as to see whether he 
would ever have enough money to cover the Appian way all the way to Brundisium. 
There were other similar questions, which Tacitus describes as foolish (stolida), empty 





The prosecution was unsuccessful until Vibius produced a document which was 
written in what was supposedly Libo’s handwriting. The document listed the names of 
senators and Caesars next to which were terrible or secret marks (atrocis vel occultas 
notas). Libo denied that the handwriting was his and so it was decided that one of his 
slaves should be examined under torture to identify it. However, there existed an old 
statute which prohibited questioning a slave in the case of his master’s life. 
Consequently, Tiberius intervened by devising a ‘new law’ (novi iuris repertor; 2.30.3) 
whereby he ordered Libo’s slaves to be sold to the State Agent (actor publicus) so that 
they could be questioned without infringing on the old decree.38 Following this, Libo 
asked for a recess and with this granted he went home and later committed suicide. 
Despite Libo’s suicide, the prosecution continued the next day and Tiberius made a 
statement on oath that even though he knew Libo was guilty he would have spared his 
life (2.31.3).  
On the following day the senators put forth various proposals for punishment 
(2.32): 1) Libo’s property was divided among the delatores; 2) praetorships out of the 
ordinary (extra ordinem) were conferred on those delatores who were of senatorial 
rank; 3) Cotta Messalinus proposed that Libo’s bust was not to be carried in the funeral 
processions of any of his descendants; 4) Cneius Lentulus proposed that no member of 
the Scribonii should assume the cognomen Drusus; 5) days of public thanksgiving 
(supplicatio) were appointed on the suggestion of Pomponius Flaccus; 6) offerings 
were given to Jupiter, Mars and Concord; 7) Asinius Gallus, Papius Matilus and Lucius 
Apronius decreed the 13th of September, the day on which Libo committed suicide, to 
be observed as a festival; 8) decrees were passed to expel astrologers and magicians 
from Italy – two were killed, one was hurled from the Tarpeian rock and one executed 
according to ancient custom on the order of the consuls. 
Tacitus’ narrative of events surrounding the trial of Libo brings into sharper 
focus the culture of fear and paranoia that was fostered under Tiberius. It also reveals 
the many ways in which the process of delatio stimulated deviant behaviour, presaging 
Piso’s reference to corruption in the courts and the corruption of judgement. For 
                                                           





example, the episode begins with the betrayal of amicitia since Libo is deceived by his 
close friend Catus. Following this deceit, and with ‘evidence’ of Libo’s conspiracy 
confirmed, the crime is brought to the attention of the princeps. Yet, given that no one 
but Trio can approach Tiberius or the consuls directly, the process of delatio must 
continue through suggestion and rumour.39 Through rumour, that is, an excess 
circulation of potentially inaccurate information, one can read delatio as something 
which both depended on and created falsity, damaging the possibility of truth as well as 
the value of trust. When Libo later turns to his relatives for help, they deny him any 
relief which reveals a betrayal of pietas (loyalty) due to fear (formido). Also notable, is 
that the crucial evidence in Libo’s case (the list of imperial names against which were 
dark and mysterious marks) is provided by a necromancer (Junius), which as well as 
pushing the process of criminal implication into the realm of the absurd, also reveals a 
weakness in established hierarchical structures, that a great man (Libo’s aunt Scribonia 
was the second wife of Augustus; 2.27.3) could be brought down by the hand of the 
disreputable. At the same time, it is hierarchy itself (established roles and places) which 
must be read as the source of this deviance, given that what drives the delator is the 
prospect of a heightened status, or in the case of Trio mala fama.40 Most corrupt 
perhaps, is the way in which ‘truth’ is eventually sought – as in many other cases, 
Libo’s slaves were interrogated under torture (per tormenta). The information extracted 
in such conditions is not necessarily going to be reflective of any truth, but more likely 
a product of fear. Furthermore, that torture is used to extract information suggests that 
the court was not in search of truth, but desperate to find what was to count as true.  
From this perspective, it appears that delatio was driven by political impulses 
rather than juridical codes and the problem is not only corruption in the courts but 
moreover, that justice and truth are seemingly no longer imperial prerogatives, neither 
inside nor outside the courts. The irony of delatio is that politics rather than law are at 
its centre, but that the emperor and, indeed, all others behave as if this is an issue 
                                                           
39 Cf. Liv.28.24.1 on ‘the innate human passion for deliberately feeding rumours’. Where Livy analyses 
rumour from the perspective of human nature in Tacitus rumour serves a political purpose. 
40 In the context of disciplina militaris (as discussed in the previous chapter) hierarchy retains the 
potential for democratic violence. In this context, a different form of conflict as a result of the violence 
suspended within established hierarchical structures emerges, not physical conflict but an abuse of law, 





primarily of law. Rather than supporting the rule of law, the process of delatio is 
somehow artificial, a process which antagonises the delivery of justice and truth. This 
is further supported by the fact that though charged with something ‘magna et atrox’, 
Libo himself does not mount a defence (he entered the courts sine patrono), suggesting 
that the legal process itself is flawed and to all intents irrelevant.  
 We may suppose, then, that there is a wider ‘game of power’ being played here 
so that the episode can meet its necessary conclusion, but this conclusion is not about 
punishing Libo’s crime through due enforcement of the law (maintaining the judiciary 
order) nor about the regulation or enforcement of doctrinaire morality (Tacitus makes 
no reference to delation as something which achieved a moral purpose) but about 
elevating the reputations of the accusers while at the same time re-empowering the 
surveillant technologies necessary for those reputations to be acquired (maintaining a 
disciplinary order).41 The notion that delation reflects an ensemble of procedures which 
are designed to lead to a result which is extraneous to punishing the criminal or the 
crime, is supported by the nature and number of punishments and public remembrances 
which Tacitus lists after Libo’s suicide. 
 Libo’s death did not provide an adequate closure and whether Libo’s suicide 
was an admission of guilt seems irrelevant. Rather, Tacitus’ concern is with the 
auctoritates and adulationes which followed, all of which make it clear that Libo’s 
crime was manipulated for wider socio-political purposes. For example, the expulsion 
of astrologers and magicians from Italy and Rome, a ban in line with traditional policy, 
was designed to maintain the purity of the centre and the state and assert traditional 
religious discipline.42 The effort to assert the appearance of a purified city centre is 
reinforced through the performance of public acts of thanks (as though following a 
victory) and especially in the offerings to Concord, which suggest that pax had been 
restored (as though following a civil war). Yet, and as Tacitus himself implies, these 
acts were excessive as well as signs of (nonsensical) sycophancy (that Libo was 
                                                           
41 On power games see Foucault (1987:5-15) ‘…when I say ‘game’ I mean an ensemble of rules for the 
production of truth … It is an ensemble of procedures which lead to a certain result, which can be 
considered in function of its principles and its rules of procedure as valid or not, as winner or loser’ (15).  





consigned to the damnatio memoriae is somewhat in conflict with the fact that the day 
of his death was also declared a public holiday).  
The severitas which followed Libo’s death says something about how crime 
and punishment in Roman society were connected with the wider architecture of 
government. It appears that Libo’s case was less about his conspiracy and more about 
how that conspiracy could be used to reinforce (old) disciplinary structures and present 
subsequently the semblance of order.43 It is a semblance of order because the death of 
Libo Drusus and the offerings to Concord made subsequently do not end corruption in 
the state. Rather, the acts which take place after Libo’s death only empower corruption 
by rewarding delatores. That which incites the delator to ‘entangle (friends) in the 
proofs of crime’ is the opportunity for an increased status: notably, Libo’s property was 
distributed amongst his accusers and those accusers who were of senatorial rank were 
given praetorships ‘out of the ordinary’ (2.33). 
From this perspective and returning to Zizek, we can begin to trace what it is 
about the ‘system’ that ‘pushes’ the individual (in this case the delator) to be corrupt.  
Delation, problematic though it was, was incentivised by a reward system of money 
and political ascendancy. The opportunity for reward is what underpins the process of 
delatio, explaining what gives delation its force and what encourages the artificiality of 
the legal process (pace Foucault, ‘we have to produce the truth in order to be able to 
produce wealth’44). Subsequently, the paradox of delation is that it is due to such 
‘protective’ means that corrupt forces (rumour, deceit, violation) are maintained within 
the regime. At the same time, it is due to such means that the delator can gain virtus 
and that concordia can be constructed by the sovereign, albeit at the cost of others’ 
                                                           
43 Both Foucault (1995) and Benjamin (1996) analyse the penal system from a similar perspective, in the 
attempt to show that the practice/purpose of punishment is not to punish the infringement of the law (the 
crime) but rather to ‘reaffirm the law’ (Benjamin, 1996:242). For Foucault punishment is ‘a political 
tactic’ and the task is to regard punishment as a complex social phenomenon (1995:23-24). In this 
perspective, and similar to the wider political effects of servitium (that servitude empowers the 
sovereign), Tacitus again points to the wider political nature of senatorial adulatio. The excessive 
adulatio which followed Libo’s death may be read as a ‘political tactic’ in the sense that it is not just a 
sign of sychophancy but a process which consolidates the wider power structures governing discipline 
and punishment, and by extension, affirms the power of the state.  





lives. Corruption therefore is spread through and due to the very measures put in place 
to prevent it.  
 In this view, one can see that there is something about ‘the time’ that demanded 
that corruption continue, which is the point made in the subsequent chapter (2.33). 
Here, during a discussion of the country’s current luxury which took place the day after 
Libo’s suicide, a debate arises between Quintus Haterius, Octavius Fronto and Asinius 
Gallus. Haterius and Fronto argue that food should not be served on vessels of gold, 
that silk garments should not be worn and that restrictions should be placed on 
furnishings and housing. However, in opposition to Haterius and Fronto, Asinius 
Gallus made a lengthy speech in support of luxury. For Gallus, with the growth of the 
empire private wealth naturally increases and luxuria reflects neither excess nor 
moderation but simply relates to the fortune of the possessor. The corruption of the 
empire is thus exposed. Furthermore, a participation in that corruption is linked to relief 
(delenimentum), whereby the honourable can be allayed in the face of anxieties and 
dangers (2.33.3).  
The clash between Haterius and Fronto on one side, and Asinius Gallus on the 
other, can be extended to explore the clash between traditional/moralist notions of 
prudentia and imperialist/Tiberian notions. Such a clash is explored in Tacitus’ 
narration of Piso and Urgulania. Piso argued against corrupta iudicia similar to 
Haterius and Fronto’s argument against decadence. Yet, just as Piso’s knowledge was 
rendered out of time, possibly even harmful to the imperial state, so too are the moral 
and moralising views of Haterius and Fronto. Luxuria is recognised by Gallus as a cure, 
and accordingly moderation, misrecognised by Haterius and Fronto as right, emerges as 
something harmful (noxius). Following Gallus’ speech, similar confessions of vices 
under the guise of honourable names follow from the senators (facilem adsensum Gallo 
sub nominibus honestis confessio vitiorum et similitudo audientium dedit; 2.33.4). 
Tiberius too agreed, claiming that if there was a decline in mores, someone to make 
things right would not be lacking (adiecerat et Tiberius non id tempus censurae nec, si 
quid in moribus labaret, defuturum corrigendi auctorem; 2.33). 
This same form of reasoning, to not want to correct or make something right 





trial. To return briefly to Tacitus’ narration of the episode, after Libo is turned down by 
his illustrious friends and relatives (excepting his brother), he appeals to Tiberius but 
the emperor refuses to do more than read the charges and names of the accusers. 
Tiberius’ inactivity is not in itself a sign of corruption; but sovereign passivity can be 
read as something which allows corruption to continue. For Mellor, ‘Tacitus speaks to 
us today about the corruption of power and the ways in which both rulers and ruled are 
complicit in that mutual corruption.’45 Mellor further states that the culture of paranoia, 
fear and distrust was created by Tiberius, and then further exaggerated by Tacitus.46  
This view can be supported by a brief statement made by Tacitus in an earlier chapter 
where it is implied that the destructive force (gravissimum exitium) [of delation] crept 
in (inrepserit) through the art of Tiberius (Tiberii arte).47  Yet, the role played by 
Tiberius here, as is often the case, is minimal. When Tiberius is mentioned, he is 
described by Tacitus as a sort of calming influence among the noise. He remains, 
typically, unmoved (immoto) and overall reluctant to get involved.48 As in the case of 
Agrippa Postumus, as well as many other cases in the early books, one wonders 
whether part of the problem is that Tiberius is not despotic or fearsome enough: he 
does not take charge and exercise power, leaving others to act corruptly. Tacitus 
himself points out that even though Tiberius had the power to stop Libo’s bad deeds he 
refrained from doing so (2.28.3) and notably, as mentioned above, Tiberius takes an 
oath to declare that he would have interceded for Libo’s life had he not killed himself. 
Tiberius has the power to act, but he is impotent. Nevertheless, Tiberius plays a critical 
role in the process of criminal implication, only by not playing a role at all. 
One wonders whether there is a strategy behind Tiberius’ impotence and 
whether it is this very (deliberate) impotence which is what Tacitus implies in his 
reference to the ars of Tiberius. The lack of action shows that the imperial logic of 
delation cannot, in the end, be resisted, not even by the emperor. Tiberius’ choice not to 
be moved reflects a decision to withhold sovereign interference in due process, 
                                                           
45 Mellor (1993:166).  
46 Mellor (2011:106), see also Hammer (2008:167ff.). 
47 1.73.1. Others have read the ‘gravissimum exitium’ as something which resulted from the revival of 
the lex maiestatis, which is possible. In any case delatio and the lex maiestatis are connected, as will be 
discussed in the next section.   





allowing a corrupt process to continue. His (lack of) power is however eventually 
displayed when he states (on oath) that he would have saved Libo’s life. Power is 
displayed in its denial, but it is ineffectual (given that Libo had already killed himself) 
and entangled in the act that it sought and failed to deny. Such forms of deliberate 
impotence and deliberated non-impotence are possibly what Tacitus means when he 
refers to the ‘art’ of Tiberius.  
Tacitus’ narration of the case of Libo Drusus is explicitly aetiological in 
purpose, in that he narrates this case not only to recount an evil historical event from 
the past but in order to understand the history of evil as he sees it from his own time, 
but which in his view began around the time of Libo’s trial. To return to Tacitus’ 
comments at the beginning of this episode, Tacitus states that he will explain Libo’s 
case because it was from that time that things which for so many years have corroded 
the state originated (eius negotii initium, ordinem, finem curatius disseram, quia tum 
primum reperta sunt quae per tot annos rem publicam exedere; 2.27.1). The same 
sentiment is expressed at the end of the episode when Tacitus explains that he has 
related the adulationes and auctoritates of these men so that an old evil in the state 
would be revealed (quorum auctoritates adulationesque rettuli ut sciretur vetus id in re 
publica malum; 2.32.3). Since Tacitus dates the inception of delatio to AD16, it 
appears that delatio is connected to the Tiberian Principate, but it is later revealed that 
its origin (which is what Tacitus is concerned with) is not in the time of Tiberius but 
lies rather in the time of Augustus, in the foundation of the Principate. This point is 
made explicit in Book 3 during Tacitus’ description of the lex Papia Poppaea, in 
reference to which Tacitus makes his most condemnatory analysis of Roman law: 
 
sexto demum consulatu Caesar Augustus, potentiae 
securus, quae triumviratu iusserat abolevit deditque iura 
quis pace et principe uteremur. acriora ex eo vincla, 
inditi custodes et lege Papia Poppaea praemiis inducti ut, 
si a privilegiis parentum cessaretur, velut parens omnium 
populus vacantia teneret. sed altius penetrabant 
urbemque et Italiam et quod usquam civium corripuerant, 







Eventually, in his sixth consulship Caesar Augustus, with 
power composed, annulled the decrees of his triumvirate, 
and gave us laws which we might enjoy with peace and 
the Principate. Then our chains became more tight, and 
custodes [guardians] were imposed, stimulated by prizes 
under the Papia Poppaea law, so that if men avoided the 
privileges of fatherhood, the State, as if universal parent, 
might obtain their empty properties. But this espionage 
became deeply penetrative, and the city and Italy and 
citizens everywhere were seized. The status of many men 
was ruined, and a terror extended over all. 
 
 
The lex Papia Poppaea of AD 9 (but notably dated by Tacitus to 28 BC), passed under 
Augustus and which Tiberius later revised, imposed various penalties on the childless 
and guaranteed rewards for informers who discovered those without children.49 The 
purpose of the legislation has been debated. Wallace-Hadrill, for example, has 
proposed that the law was designed to ‘stabilise the transmission of property and 
consequently of status, from generation to generation.’50 Edmonson has argued that the 
law was part of Augustus’ moral legislation, which gave Augustus the opportunity to 
attempt to ‘reconstruct social and moral practices according to the traditional set of 
principles that he personally espoused as princeps.’51 In Tacitus, the issue of why the 
law was put in place is less pressing than the penalties imposed on those found guilty 
and the way in which the guilty were found. For Tacitus, the deeply penetrative work 
of these ‘guardians’ (custodes) was a problem because every house was being 
overturned by the ‘interpretations’ of delatores (cum omnis domus delatorum 
interpretationibus subverteretur; 3.25.2). From this perspective, the evil which Tacitus 
is describing in 16 is the panoptic atmosphere instigated under Augustus, that is, the 
sense of permanent visibility designed to automatically ensure the operations of power 
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50 Wallace-Hadrill (2009:253).  
51 Edmonson (2009:200). See further Rutledge (2001:54ff.) on the lex Papia Poppaea, lex Julia de 





and control.52 Hence even Augustan Rome was a city of terror, as Tacitus now 
reveals.53  
 The intimate association of delatores with the Principate establishes a clear 
temporal relationship between monarchy and delation. Delation emerges as an integral 
element in specifically monarchic control, which corroded and contaminated the res 
publica. In this context, we can rethink Steven Rutledge, in whose analyses of 
delatores we are reminded to be ‘cautious and vigilant’ with our sources.54  Rutledge 
emphasises the validity of delatio, which as he rightly acknowledges was ‘a perfectly 
legitimate act of law enforcement’ and in so doing suggests that Tacitus’ negative 
accounts of delation are one-sided and limited.55 Yet, Tacitus’ point is not that 
delatores or custodes were a group of bad men who corroded the state through illegal 
acts (note the role played by Asinius Gallus who is at worst a morally ambiguous 
character in the opening books of the Annales). Rather, the problem is that delation, in 
spite of its corrosive effects, was wholly legitimate and supportive of the imperial 
system.56  
Generally, corrupt activity is taken as undermining the juridical order because it 
threatens the effectiveness of government. Such activity is often understood as private 
gain at the cost of public interest. Tacitus himself makes this precise point, that under 
Tiberius the public good was disregarded for private interest (privato usui bonum 
publicum postponitur; 6.16.1).57 Yet, from a different perspective, corrupt activity can 
also refer to the violation of rights, such as that of privacy, which the law should 
protect. In a republican context, the protection of privacy and in particular the 
protection of private property is specifically noted as the purpose of the law.58 Yet, with 
                                                           
52 Cf. Foucault (1995:187ff.) on the invisible nature of disciplinary power which imposes on its subjects 
‘a principle of compulsory visibility’. 
53 Whereas previously it was described as an age of otium (1.2).  
54 Rutledge (2001:8). The delator was ‘a rhetorical construct as much as a historical phenomenon’ (5). 
55 Rutledge (2010:114). See also (2001:7ff). Cf. Plin.Ep.2.16.3, 6.31.5, 10.96-7 on delatio as a normal 
legal activity.  
56 Also notable is that delation is not ‘secret’ in the sense of ‘secret police’ (which in the modern sense 
means above the law), nor is delation invisible.  
57 A point made in reference to accusatores. 
58 See especially Cic.Caec.70.73-5 and Cic.Top.2.9: ‘the civil law [ius civile] is a system of equality 
[aequitas] established between members of the same state for the purpose of securing to each his 





the passing of the lex Papia Poppaea, the citizen’s right to property is in conflict with 
the delator’s right to accuse and in such a context, it is to the needy delator (and 
ultimately to the state) that rights, and more sadly for Tacitus honor, become 
susceptible. Corruption in Tacitus is not only to do with the simple issue that the rule of 
law is being overturned for private gain; but also with legitimate intrusive activity 
which renders fragile the rights of Roman citizens (now susceptible to the custodes), 
and which endangers the political community and its identity. Delatio is used by 
Tacitus to reveal the wider perversion of the institution of the law, hence his view that 
whereas the country had previously suffered from its crimes, now it suffered from its 
laws (3.25.2).59  
It emerges then that delation is double-sided:  on the one hand, it exists as a 
fortified means of moral regulation, fortified because it is inscribed into the law and 
encouraged by the prospect of increased wealth and political ascendancy. On the other 
hand, delatio though designed to maintain the censored state (defending from 
immorality and flagitia) creates through its own legalised (intrusive) process a corrupt 
foundation in the state, because it is a process which in order to maintain order 
potentially reduces the rights and privileges of Roman citizens through its very 
operation. Delation is a domination of others by fear, rendering fragile their privacy 
and their private possessions. Yet the threat delation poses to the individual is 
overpowered by the fact that such threats or ‘interpretations’ of crime allow the less 
honourable to rise in reputation. Thus, from one perspective delation ensures order and 
moral health, from another it negates the very system of sovereignty from which it is 
authorised because it works on a reduction of those civil rights which are fundamental 
                                                                                                                                                                         
man the free and undisturbed custody of his own particular property’. (Id enim est proprium, ut supra 
dixi, civitatis atque urbis, ut sit libera et non sollicita suae rei cuiusque custodia).  
59 Cf. Benjamin (1996:242ff.) on police violence: ‘the “law” of the police really marks the point at which 
the state, whether from impotence or because of the immanent connections within any legal system, can 
no longer guarantee through the legal system the empirical ends that it desires at any price to attain.’ For 
Benjamin, the price is peace but similar to the Tacitean view peace is ambiguous and intricately 
connected with power, exception and violence: ‘the task of “peace” after all the wars of the mythic age, 
is the primal phenomenon of all law-making violence. Here we see most clearly that power, more than 





to sovereign existence (property, privacy, freedom, equality) while also displacing 
those moral ‘rights’ which are fundamental to Roman elite identity (honor, status).60  
The double-sided nature of delation can be read as a replication of Tacitus’ 
understanding of the foundation of the Principate, which establishes the same paradox 
and ambiguity of meaning as does his analysis of delation. As mentioned above, the 
case of Libo is used by Tacitus to establish a clear temporal relationship between 
Principate and delation. However, it should be noted that the connection Tacitus draws 
between delatio and the Principate is historically inaccurate. As Powell has recently 
noted, ‘in condemning the delatores who brought prosecutions for treason and other 
offences under the early emperors, Tacitus thought he had identified a new evil in the 
state, but forgot (maybe) that prosecutors had always tended to have a bad name, from 
the sycophants of Classical Athens to the accusers whom Cicero clashed in court.’61 I 
am inclined to think that Tacitus did not forget that the practice of Roman informing 
had a history beyond 28 BC (nor did he forget that the lex Papia Poppaea was passed 
not under the sixth consulship of Augustus, but under his last). The point is that in 
Tacitus’ thought, delation deliberately emerges as an integral element in specifically 
imperial/monarchic control. What should be further noted here is that the other feature, 
which for Tacitus is specifically connected with the foundation of the Principate, is 
pax. The Principate for Tacitus is therefore founded on a precise relationship between 
corruption (delatio) and stability (pax/otium), at once intrusive, at once restorative. The 
same relationship is re-founded in the aftermath of Libo’s death, which asserts order 
but at the same time marks the beginning of something which thenceforth continued to 
corrode the state. The significance of this is that Tacitus’ understanding of the 
Principate is to do with the inception of a specific form of power, a power which is not 
manifestly violent, but rather a power which is either concealed through biopolitical 
                                                           
60 Cf. Arendt (1998:58-72) who reads property more from the perspective of the human need for privacy 
rather than citizen right to property: ‘A life spent entirely in public, in the presence of others, becomes, 
as we would say, shallow…The only efficient way to guarantee the darkness of what needs to be hidden 
against the light of publicity is private property, a privately owned place to hide in.’ (71). 





mechanisms such as otium or legalised through intrusive disciplinary mechanisms such 
as delatio.62   
In the following section, I will examine further the circular relation between 
corruption and virtue (corruption as leading to virtue, and virtue as systematising 
corruption) with reference to the conflation of the honourable and the dishonourable 
and how from that conflation certain vices (luxuria) were made into something 
virtuous. The difference between the corruption represented by delation and the 
corruption implied by luxuria is that while the force of delation sees the subjection of 
the honourable to the needy and to the state, the force of luxuria represents the self-
subjection of the individual to the regime, but again this is for the sake of virtue. In this 
view, corrupt forces are not only exerted from below (delatores) but also and 
inescapably stem from time.   
 
 
Writing Decline: Sallust and Tacitus   
 
…omniaque orta occidunt et aucta senescent. 
(Sal.Iug.2.3) 
 
…and all things rise and fall, progress and decline. 
       
 
From a political and juridical perspective, Roman moderatio was to regulate power and 
justice so to prevent corruption in the courts.63 From a moral and social perspective, 
                                                           
62 Delation is an ancient form of Foucauldian disciplinary power: delatio is predicated on a loss of faith 
in society’s moral code, which sees subsequently the intrusion of private space and the erosion of citizen 
rights. With regard to the lex Papia Poppaea, which for Tacitus marks the beginning of delatio, there 
emerges more specifically a peculiar form of biopower, that is, a power exercised ‘at the level of the 
population’, concerned with the regulation of the population in terms of its longevity (‘to prolong its 
duration’, Foucault 2004:254) and the subsequent becoming of the population as a political object, 
belonging as Tacitus implies to the state as if universal parent (velut parens omnium populus…). Here 
then, Foucault’s ‘majorer la vie’ (see above p.93, n.79) should take on its base meaning, which is not ‘to 
improve life’ but ‘to increase life’ and more specifically ‘to give an excessive importance to life’ 
(‘donner une importance excessive à’; LGR s.v. majorer) rather than reduce life or take life away. 
However, a notable difference is that whereas Foucault maintains that biopower is a form of power 
which is separate to sovereign power, and powerful because it is invisible in operation, in Tacitus 
delation is rooted in sovereignty – it is legal, it is visible and it is connected to the moral ethos of the 
state. It is thus more effective as a means of discipline but at the same time more powerful as a force in 





moderatio was to regulate behaviour. Moderatio, then, is both a virtue in itself but also 
that which regulates the practice of virtue. It is a prominent feature in Roman 
historiography that after the destruction of Carthage in 146 the revered values of 
parsimonia and frugalitas came into conflict with the expansion of the empire, which 
caused instead an excess of bribery (largitio), greed (avaritia) and luxury (luxuria).64 
And since Romans viewed the practice of traditional restraint as something which was 
more widely connected with the well-being or ‘health’ (salus) of the res publica, 
corruption as the violation of the mos maiorum (the ethical system of the past which 
was to moderate the health of the present) was likened to a national contagion and 
moreover, a sign of imminent collapse.65  
 In Tacitus we are presented with a different theory of decline. Although an 
excess of vice is traditionally used to explore and explain decline, since an excess of 
greed and wealth naturally represents a distance from the moderate and ‘healthy’ ways 
of the ancestors, Tacitus’ notion of individual and national well-being is not wholly 
written from within this type of republican or traditionalist perspective (loss of mores 
equals decline). Rather, given the profits afforded by wealth (status, political 
advancement) there is in Tacitus an awareness, albeit an anxious one, of the political 
and social uses of certain vices, in particular luxuria.  
 In what follows, I will analyse Tacitus’ writing of decline in order to question 
what precisely in Tacitean thought constitutes its cause: a loss of moderatio or a loss of 
wealth and power, which luxuria affords? I shall start by analysing views of moderatio 
and luxuria as expressed in earlier historiography, in particular Sallust, and I shall then 
analyse the ways in which Tacitus’ narrative differs from those of his predecessors. 
According to C. Berry, ‘for the Romans, and beyond, luxury was a political question 
because it signified the presence of the potentially disruptive power of human desire, a 
                                                                                                                                                                         
63 Moderatio played a crucial role in republican politics. As Cicero’s Marcus explains, the whole 
management of a country is kept in check by the moderatio of its magistrates (…discriptione omnis rei 
publicae moderatio continetur; Leg.3.5).See also Leg.3.12 and Leg.3.40.  
64 On luxuria see for example Sall.Cat.12.2, 52.7, 52.22.  See further Cicero (Rep.5.1-2) on the 
degenerate state of his present day Rome.  
65 See for example Liv.Praef.3-4, 9 and Sall.Cat.10 (discussed below). See also Kapust (2011:50ff). See 





power which must be policed.’66 Berry continues to say that ‘once luxury emerged then 
civic virtue (in the republican tradition) or a proper ordering of ranks (in the aristocratic 
tradition) would be undermined.67 Tacitus’ narrative is not an exception from the view 
that luxury, along with its associated vice avaritia, must be policed through ancient 
forms of disciplina in order to maintain civic notions of virtue (that is, selflessness and 
commitment to public good as opposed to private desire) and prevent disruption.68 
However, at the same time, Tacitus changes focus by raising the question of what ‘bad’ 
desires can achieve for political and personal good and the possibility, even, that the 
disorderly powers of human desires could contribute to and allow for a far more 
powerful way of ordering and empowering the imperial system and elite identity. 
 In the preface to his Bellum Catilinae, Sallust confesses that upon entering 
public life as a youth, he was countered by many obstacles since in the place of shame, 
self-restraint and virtue – arrogance, bribery and greed prospered (nam pro pudore, pro 
abstinentia, pro virtute audacia, largitio, avaritia vigebant; 3.3). He continues to 
explain that as he was young and weak at that time, he too became corrupted by 
ambition (3.4). The problem of lacking pudor, abstinentia and virtus continues 
throughout the work. In his tenth chapter, Sallust gives further explanation as to what in 
his view caused and resulted from corruption at Rome: the country had grown great 
through labor and iustitia but when Carthage had been ruined, fortuna began to grow 
cruel, bringing confusion to affairs at Rome. From this point onwards, the desire for 
money and power grew strong which in Sallust’s view was the root of all evil. He 
continues: 
 
namque avaritia fidem, probitatem ceterasque artis bonas 
subvortit; pro his superbiam, crudelitatem, deos 
neglegere, omnia venalia habere edocuit. Ambitio multos 
mortalis falsos fieri subegit, aliud clausum in pectore, 
aliud in lingua promptum habere, amicitias 
inimicitiasque non ex re, sed ex commodo aestumare 
magisque voltum quam ingenium bonum habere. Haec 
                                                           
66 Berry (1994:63). 
67 Ibid (86). 
68 See for example Galba’s view of Nero’s luxuria at Hist.1.16.2 and Hist.2.69 on the luxus of the 
soldiers as something which was ‘contra veterem disciplinam et instituta maiorum’. See also Ag.15.4 on 





primo paulatim crescere, interdum vindicari; post, ubi 
contagio quasi pestilentia invasit, civitas inmutata, 
imperium ex iustissumo atque optumo crudele 
intolerandumque factum. (10.4-6) 
 
 
For greed subverted honour, trust, and all other virtuous 
qualities; and instructed in their place pride, cruelty, to 
neglect the gods, to set all for sale. Ambition drove many 
men to become false; to hold one thought inside, another 
ready on the tongue; to assess friendships and enmities 
not on their merits but by opportunity, and to have the 
appearance rather than the spirit of good. At first these 
vices grew slowly, sometimes they were punished; 
finally, when the disease had invaded like a plague, the 
state was changed and its government, once the most 
righteous and good, became cruel and intolerable. 
 
In the thirteenth chapter, Sallust adds that luxuriousness and gluttony were the sorts of 
vices that enticed young men to crime (13.4) since their minds were habituated to evil 
practices they were given up to lust (lubido) and every other method of profit and 
extravagance (omnibus modis quaestui atque sumptui deditus erat; 13.5). Similar 
sentiments can be found in the Bellum Iugurthinum. Again, Sallust here states that 
before the destruction of Carthage, the senate and people of Rome ruled peacefully and 
with modestia; there was no discord among the citizens for gloria nor dominatio since 
fear of the enemy preserved the morals of the state (41.2). However, after the removal 
of the enemy, wantonness (lascivia) and pride (superbia) naturally arose (Iug.41.3). In 
summary, for Sallust, the years of the early republican period (before 146) were of 
‘concordia maxuma, minuma avaritia’ (Cat.9.1). After the enemy had been removed, a 
period of avaritia, crudelitas, ambitio, falsatio, lubido, superbia and lascivia began. 
 A comparison with later historians reveals further similarities. As Velleius 
summarises, the first of the Scipios opened the way for Roman power, while the second 
generation opened the way for luxuria (2.1.1). Luxuria in Livy, along with avaritia and 
libido are also represented as vices which represented the gradual decay of the original 
parsimonia of the Roman character (Praef.11), which not only reflected a decline in 





tragic portrait, the body-politic can endure neither its infection nor its remedy: ‘…donec 
ad haec tempora quibus nec uitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus perventum est. 
Hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli 
documenta in inlustri posita monumento intueri’. The body-politic is thus doomed; 
unless one undertakes close study of the healthy and fruitful (salubre ac frugiferum) 
deeds of the ancestors.  
 Carthage does not feature in Tacitus’ theory of decline.69 However, the view 
that decline is caused by a lack of moderation (in the form of greed), can be seen at 
2.37-8 which is Tacitus’ account of the case of Marcus Hortalus. Marcus Hortalus was 
a poor but noble youth. His grandfather was the orator Quintus Hortensius Hortalus 
(114 BC-50 BC) and so that one of Rome’s most illustrious families might not become 
extinct Augustus had given Hortalus a gift of a million sesterces so he could marry and 
have children. Hortalus later did marry and had four sons. However his money soon ran 
out and so in late 16 he entered the senate house and made a speech to the emperor in 
the hope that he might offer some help: “…save from poverty the great-grandsons of 
Quintus Hortensius, the foster-sons of the divine Augustus.”70  
 Following Hortalus’ speech, and though Tacitus reports that the senators had 
received it favourably, Tiberius responds with the following: 
 
“si quantum pauperum est venire huc et liberis suis 
petere pecunias coeperint, singuli numquam 
exsatiabuntur, res publica deficiet. nec sane ideo a 
maioribus concessum est egredi aliquando relationem et 
quod in commune conducat loco sententiae proferre, ut 
privata negotia et res familiaris nostras hic augeamus, 
cum invidia senatus et principum, sive indulserint 
largitionem sive abnuerint. non enim preces sunt istud, 
sed efflagitatio, intempestiva quidem et inprovisa, cum 
aliis de rebus convenerint patres, consurgere et numero 
atque aetate liberum suorum urgere modestiam senatus, 
eandem vim in me transmittere ac velut perfringere 
aerarium, quod si ambitione exhauserimus, per scelera 
supplendum erit. dedit tibi, Hortale, divus Augustus 
                                                           
69 Carthage is mentioned twice in the Annales (4.33, 4.56) but the references do not relate to moral 
decline. On Tacitus’ theory of decline see Ann.3.26. 





pecuniam, sed non conpellatus nec en lege ut semper 
daretur. languescet alioqui industria, intendetur socordia, 
si nullus ex se metus aut spes, et securi omnes aliena 
subsidia expectabunt, sibi ignavi, nobis graves.”  
(2.38.1-3) 
 
"If all poor men begin to come here and beg money for 
their children, individuals will never be satisfied and the 
State will fail. Nor were our ancestors allowed on 
occasion to deviate from a motion, in our turn for 
speaking, to propose something for the common good in 
order that we might in this house increase our private 
business and our property, bringing infamy on the senate 
and on emperors, whether they were to grant or deny such 
lavishness. In fact, that is not a request but a demand, as 
untimely as it is unforeseen, when the fathers have met on 
other matters, to rise pleading the number and age of 
one’s children, place pressure on the modestia of the 
Senate, then transfer the same constraint to myself and, as 
it were, break open the treasury which if we exhaust by 
favouritism will have to be replenished by villainy. 
Divine Augustus gave you money, Hortalus, but without 
solicitation, and not on the condition that it should always 
be given. Besides, industry will become weak and 
carelessness encouraged if a man has nothing to fear, 
nothing to hope from himself, and everyone will expect 
support from others, becoming useless to themselves and 
a burden to us." 
 
As with many other problems which confront Tiberius after 14, the burden of Hortalus 
transferred to Tiberius in 16 is rooted in the Augustan past. That Hortalus was 
previously given a gift of a million sesterces and is now demanding further help from 
Tiberius implies a certain lack of Augustan moderation and foresight (as do other 
Tacitean comments such as Augustus’ manner of seducing the people and the army 
with gifts and grain). The self-defeating nature of Augustan moderatio which then 
came to represent a problem under Tiberius is also written into Tacitus’ account of the 
passing of the lex Papia Poppaea, which though designed to moderate the population 
and promote traditional values nevertheless encouraged ruin and corruption in the form 
of delation. Tacitus continues to show how solutions taken in the Augustan past which 





problems in the Tiberian present, to which there are no longer any ‘right’ solutions. As 
Tiberius states, invidia (infamy, ill will) would be brought to the emperor were he to 
grant or refuse lavishness (…cum invidia senatus et principum, sive indulserint 
largitionem sive abnuerint). This is possibly why Tiberius expresses irritation, given 
that either way odium was potential. 
 Nevertheless, Tiberius’ speech above does draw attention to the wider 
purpose of moderatio, which, in tune with earlier historiography, is the role it plays in 
the regulation of the salus of the state. The vice being moderated here is greed, as well 
as one’s dependence on the state. Tiberius describes Hortalus’ begging (petere) as an 
‘importunity’ (efflagitatio), as untimely and unforeseen (…intempestiva quidem et 
inprovisa) and as something which was wearing (gravis) and which placed constraints 
upon him (...vim in me transmittere).71 But as Tiberius explains greed and dependency 
need to be moderated: if all poor men were to ask the emperor and senate for money, 
individuals would never be satisfied and the state would ‘fail’ (singuli numquam 
exsatiabuntur, res publica deficiet). Then, if the treasury were to be exhausted by 
favouritism, it would need to be replenished by villainy (si ambitione exhauserimus, 
per scelera supplendum erit). This sequence of events which Tiberius hypothesises 
were moderatio not to be employed shows the centrality of moderation in the well-
being of the state. Yet, on closer inspection it appears that it is not an adherence to 
moderatio that prevents the failure of the state but fear (languescet alioqui industria, 
intendetur socordia, si nullus ex se metus…). The passage above makes explicit the 
nature of the relationship betwen moderatio and metus, that is, how fear regulates 
moderation and by extension, defends the state from socordia (recklessness) and 
ignavia (idleness).   
 If moderation for the sake of moderation ceased to work, then there were 
other ways of inducing restraint. Fear is a key example, as Kapust has argued ‘by 
evoking the prospect of future evils or diminished goods’ the rhetorical and 
historiographical evocation of metus persuaded groups to act in certain ways and 
thereby maintained individual morality and served to foster social cohesion and 
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harmony (concordia).72 The rule of fear as a mechanism of control (as opposed to the 
rule of law or ingrained sense of right and wrong) is precisely what Tiberius is referring 
to here, since if men have nothing to fear purpose (industria) and hope (spes) will 
become weak while excessive license or negligence (socordia) will be encouraged. 
Indeed, fear is what regulated Tiberius’ moderatio, given that the reason he did not 
accept honorific titles was to prevent rendering in lubrico his political position (1.72).73 
 This idea of fear-induced restraint is a prominent feature in Sallustian 
thought, which aligns the civitas inmutata of his day with the destruction of Carthage, 
after which morality declined. The meaning is, as Sallust explains, ‘fear of the enemy 
holds in check the good morals of the state’ (metus hostilis in bonis artibus civitatem 
retinebat; Iug.41.2). The point then, as Tiberius similarly implies, is that the loss of 
metus could lead to a loss of moderation. Fear therefore has to exist in order to inspire 
moderation. If fear regulates moderatio, then it is the level of fear which must work in 
ratio with vice in order to prevent decline, rather than the level of society’s 
commitment to the broader ideas associated with traditional morals and customs.  
 This immediately shifts focus from the question of mores to the question of 
metus and more specifically what precisely is the subject or source of metus. While the 
subject of fear in earlier historiography is focussed on the dangers posed by a foreign 
enemy, which then regulated the practice of moderatio at Rome, fear in Tacitus does 
not stem from such external threats. Rather, fear in Tacitus as we have seen already is 
to do with being reduced in status and naturally, what helps to consolidate status both 
on the level of the individual and on the level of the state is wealth. In Tacitus, as we 
shall see below, fear is to do with the loss of luxuria (a fear of poverty, a fear of 
seeming only human) and the potential of indecus (disgrace, shame) this could create. 
In such a context, what emerges is a problem of choice (rather than a problem of 
prudentia) because luxuria, though a detriment to the moral or ‘natural’ self provides a 
route to a powerful identity and a powerful state (through wealth). The utilitas of 
moderation is undermined by the growing uses of luxuria. 
                                                           
72 See Kapust (2008:353-373). On fear and concordia see Sall.Iug.10.6. On the use of fear of the enemy 
(metus hostium) and fear of the Gods (deorum metus) see Liv.1.1.19 and especially Plutarch’s account of 
the debate between Cato and Publius Scipio Nasica on the threat of Carthage (Cat.Mai.2.26-7). 






Fear of Imperfection: The Role of Luxuria in the Stability of the Empire 
 




In the year 22, a year free from commotions abroad, Tacitus reports that problems were 
arising in the capital due to the anticipation of strict measures against the current 
luxury, which extended without limit to everything that money could consume (…qui 
immensum proruperat ad cuncta quis pecunia prodigitur; 3.52.1). While some 
expenditure was kept secret through concealment of the real prices, Tacitus reports that 
the expensive preparations for gluttony (venter) became the subject of gossip and cause 
of anxiety (cura), given that an emperor of such old-fashioned frugality may be too 
strict with his reforms (3.52.2-3). The senate were consulted but deferred the matter to 
the emperor who was away in Campania at the time.  
After some consideration of the potential dangers involved with repressing 
tastes, such as the financial loss (damnum) it would bring to the state, how disgraceful 
(indecorus) it would be to meddle with something beyond his control and that limiting 
extravagance would demand the dishonour and infamy of men of distinction 
(ignominiam et infamiam virorum inlustrium posceret; 3.52.4) Tiberius gave the 
following response: 
 
“mihi autem neque honestum silere neque proloqui 
expeditum, quia non aedilis aut praetoris aut consulis 
partis sustineo. maius aliquid et excelsius a principe 
postulatur; et cum recte factorum sibi quisque gratiam 
trahant, unius invidia ab omnibus peccatur. quid enim 
primum prohibere et priscum ad morem recidere 
adgrediar? villarumne infinita spatia? familiarum 
numerum et nationes? argenti et auri pondus? aeris 
tabularumque miracula? promiscas viris et feminis vestis 
atque illa feminarum propria, quis lapidum causa 
                                                           





pecuniae nostrae ad externas aut hostilis gentis 
transferuntur?” (3.53.2-3) 
 
 “For me however, though remaining silent is not 
honourable, to speak out is not easy, because I am neither 
aedile, nor praetor, nor consul. Something grand, more 
impressive is expected from the emperor; and though 
people praise themselves for their good actions, the blame 
for collective misconduct falls on one man. And where 
should I begin my prohibitions and attempted reversions 
to ancient standards? With the vast mansions, or the 
hordes of slaves of different nationalities? The weight of 
silver and gold, the wonderful pictures, the bronzework, 
the men’s clothes indistinguishable from women’s? Or 
the feminine speciality – the export of our currency to 
foreign or enemy countries for precious stones?”  
 
 
Tiberius’ letter immediately problematises the conventional (political and 
historiographical) conception of luxuria as vitium. Certainly, and as Berry has noted, 
‘luxury is both a standard ingredient in the rhetoric of Roman corruption and a 
contemporary perception, an awareness, of an increase in opulence and government 
instability.’75 (The very existence of Roman sumptuary legislation attests this view). 
However, in the letter above Tiberius is not mourning the loss of traditional restraint, 
nor is he condemning luxuria, nor is he defending luxuria.76 Rather, he is drawing 
attention to the fact that luxuria has already been accepted and the contradiction he 
would represent and conflict he would create if he was to call for restraint on his own 
and everybody else’s opulence.  
 From this perspective, it appears that Tiberius’ letter follows his earlier 
comments in the senate house which led to Piso’s outbreak, that moral reform was not 
or would not be lacking if there was a decline in mores. Similarly, as Tiberius now 
explains, it would be ‘disgraceful’ to meddle with something beyond his control 
(extravagance was something he could not restrain, ‘non obtineret’; 3.52). The reason 
extravagance is beyond even the emperor’s control is because it is connected with 
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imperial time (non id tempus censurae). Notable on this point is the attention Tiberius 
draws to the role of the foreign enemy: the hostis does not serve to regulate moderatio 
amongst the Romans by instilling the fear of invasion but in growing empire, the 
enemy depends on Rome for money and Rome depends on the enemy for precious 
stones (lapides). Accordingly, and as Tiberius notes, to limit extravagance would bring 
damnum to the state, which could of course lead to ‘res publica deficiet’.77  
 Tiberius’ speech is rooted in the imperial logic, a logic which is extraneous or 
incompatible with notions of traditional restraint, notions such as those expressed 
earlier by Haterius and Fronto only to be quickly rebuked by Asinius Gallus, Tiberius 
and the rest of the senators (2.33). Subsequently, Tiberius reveals the new problem, 
which is that in empire social order no longer depends on moderation, but on luxury: 
 
Nec ignoro in conviviis et circulis incusari ista et modum 
posci: set si quis legem sanciat, poenas indicat, idem illi 
civitatem verti, splendidissimo cuique exitium parari, 
neminem criminis expertem clamitabunt. atqui ne 
corporis quidem morbos veteres et diu auctos nisi per 
dura et aspera coerceas: corruptus simul et corruptor, 
aeger et flagrans animus haud levioribus remediis 
restinguendus est quam libidinibus ardescit. (3.54.1) 
 
I am not unaware that people condemn all this at banquets 
and social gatherings and demand for some restraint. But 
if a law were to be passed and a penalty imposed, those 
very people will cry out that the state is being destroyed, 
that society’s best people are facing ruin, and that no one 
is safe from incrimination. Yet even as bodily infections 
of length and growth can be checked only by harsh and 
painful treatment, so the fever of a diseased mind, itself 
corrupt and a corrupting influence, can be cured only by 
remedies as strong as the passions which inflame it.  
 
According to E. Shills, tradition is ‘the guarantor of order and civilisation.’78 This view 
of tradition as normative, as something which is connected with ‘order’ and 
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‘civilisation’ is grounded in Roman conceptions of observing moderation. As Velleius 
claims for example, to cross the bounds of moderatio would lead to the breakdown of 
otium.79 And as Cicero had claimed earlier, moderation protected not only the dignitas 
of the orator, but also the safety of the mass of private citizens and the entire republic.80 
To return to Livy, moderation (parsimonia) is aligned with the ‘healthy’ deeds of the 
ancestors and thus it forms a guide for stability. The same applies to Sallust, who 
connects the lack of moderation (modestia) with crime or wicked deeds (facinora).81  
But the view revealed in the letter above tells something entirely different. According 
to Tiberius, though extravagance is criticised at social gatherings, if it was reprimanded 
by a law, those critics themselves would claim it to be a national disaster, and the result 
would be the conversion of everyone into a criminal. The traditional view of law and 
moderation as something which helps to establish social homeostasis (an equilibrium 
that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers) is therefore not only 
contested but furthermore described as that which would cause the breakdown of 
society. In Tacitus, luxuria and extravagance are given almost a juridical dimension 
because they offer social peace (since if laws were to be passed to restrict luxuria ‘no 
one would be safe from crimen’) while moderatio is given a deviant dimension because 
to moderate wealth would cause damnum and could furthermore destroy the vital 
relations of exchange between Rome and her ‘enemies’. The conception of moderation 
as that which protects the body-politic from danger (Cicero, Velleius, Sallust, Livy) as 
well as the base understanding of law as that which ‘shields against dissolution and 
decay’ (Bauman) is thus subverted by Tacitus through Tiberius: extravagance has 
become the national necessity (the cure), and moderatio the cause of national crisis (the 
disease).  
 The Tacitean narrative problematises the normative view of tradition, a view 
which somewhat eludes the crucial notion that tradition will prevail only if it serves the 
safety and interests of the people. Tacitus’ narrative also conflicts with the conception 
of moderatio as something which needed to be observed in order to maintain peace. In 








Sallust’s model of decline, the civitas inmutata resulted from luxuria and avaritia 
(Cat.10), whereas in Tacitus, if a law was to be passed to moderate extravagance, those 
who called for modus would declare that the state is being overthrown (…civitatem 
verti; 3.54). This shows a notable progression from the views of Sallust’s Caesar, that 
no one has ever obeyed at the same time lust and utility: ‘neque quisquam omnium 
lubidini simul et usui paruit’ (Sall.Cat.51.2). Of course, the assertion of a divide 
between an act which is privately pleasurable and privately or publicly useful is not 
only Sallustian/Ciceronian but forms the basic understanding of the distinction between 
a corrupt act and a moral act. In Tacitus, however, the passion for excess is dangerously 
(or conveniently) close to the best interests of the individual and the state.  
 Tacitus’ narrative thus presents a peculiar conception of virtue and vice, 
whereby vice is turning into virtue and producing order (and elsewhere virtue is turning 
into vice and producing corruption). Of course, we cannot extend this as far as saying 
that moderation was ‘fatal’ (pace Wilde) but the Tacitean/Tiberian interpretation does 
sensitise us to the reality of imperial time – of which a dominant characteristic is a 
struggle to establish a balance between glorifying the traditions of the past whilst at the 
same time ‘legitimizing’ the untraditional needs of the present.82  
 From this perspective, we can trace in further detail the subversion of the 
honourable and the dishonourable which Tacitus refers to later at 4.33, but the 
subversion is not caused by a lack of traditional prudentia but by the inadequacy of 
such knowledge in politics. Sallust saw that ambitio as vitium was closely associated 
with virtus.83 The meaning is that ambition could lead to higher public office, thereby 
bringing personal distinction and wealth.84 Tacitus applies the same thinking not to 
ambitio but to luxuria; as Tiberius states, to restrict extravagance would demand the 
ignominia and infamia of men of distinction. The sumptuary legislation would thus 
cause dishonour and infamy (3.52.4).  
                                                           
82 Cf. Kansteiner who on the other hand argues that ‘our crises of memory are concomitant 
with crises of identity…memory is valorized where identity is problematized’ (2002:184). 
Tacitus allows us to see the problem from a reverse perspective, that, identity is 
problematised because memory is valorised.   
83 Sallust refers to ambitio as a vice (vitium) but also almost a virtue (sed primo magis ambitio quam 
avaritia animos hominum exercebat, quod tamen vitium propius virtutem erat; Sall.Cat.11.1). 
84 But for Sallust this form of distinction was fleeting and fragile (Sall.Cat.1.4; nam divitiarum et formae 





 Given this, Tacitus offers an analysis of luxuria which not only gives some 
consideration of the critical role it played in the stability of empire and the maintenance 
of valuable imperial exchanges but he also shows the value of luxuria on an individual 
level, which is that it made a significant contribution to one’s social status. Tacitus 
ascribes a different name or signification to luxuria, a name which constructs luxuria 
not as a virtue but similar to Sallust’s ambitio, as something which is nonetheless 
closely connected with virtue (through the honour and fame it ensures).85 By 
connecting luxuria with honor, Tacitus reminds us that though immoral or corrupt, 
luxuria served a purpose. If it is luxury that ensures fama, as Tiberius explains, and if it 
is luxury that supports the state’s ‘best people’, then what Tiberius is saying is that it is 
through luxuria that a powerful identity is enabled and that the powerful can stay 
powerful.  
 The type of luxuria which Tacitus is describing is therefore functional rather 
than primarily moral since it is connected with hierarchy. This was the perspective 
from which Asinius Gallus justified delenimenta earlier at 2.33.3; as Gallus explained 
to Haterius and Fronto, in whatever was acquired for use in the cases of households or 
silver, nothing was either excessive or modest, but simply related to the level of the 
possessor’s fortune (neque in familia et argento quaeque ad usum parentur nimium 
aliquid aut modicum nisi ex fortuna possidentis). As Gallus goes onto explain, 
distinctions had been made in the census of senators and knights not because they were 
‘naturally different’ (non quia diversi natura) but so that their superiority in place, rank 
and reputation (sed ut locis ordinibus dignationibus antistent) might also be maintained 
through those things which allow for mental repose and physical health (ita iis quae ad 
requiem animi aut salubritatem corporum parentur…). Unless, Gallus continues, those 
in the highest position were to undergo more anxieties and greater dangers and to do so 
without assuagements (nisi forte clarissimo cuique pluris curas, maiora pericula 
subeunda, delenimentis curarum et periculorum carendum esse). 
                                                           
85 This is not a contentious view given that banquets, a prominent focus of the sumptuary legislation, 
provided a means of asserting and gaining social prestige. See further Veyne (1990) on euergetism 





 Gallus’ description of delenimentum as something which is to work alongside 
the clarissimi, as something by which one can be superior to (antistare) or maintain his 
superiority over someone else, attests the ‘class character’ of  luxuria and by extension 
the detriment to established hierarchy that would be posed by sumptuary laws. The 
‘class character’ of sumptuary legislation is how Berry describes 14th century English 
laws on consumption.86 What gave these laws their class character and thus their 
‘political dimension’, and for Berry separated them from their Roman antecedents, is 
the fact that English laws were designed in such a way so that consumption could 
reflect and maintain class differences. The 1363 Act, for example, was composed of 
seven clauses and each prescribed a particular quality of clothing for each class 
(according to status/occupation).87 In this way, English sumptuary laws made 
provisions so to legally ensure the status of some classes over those of others through 
appearance. The most striking aspect of Roman sumptuary laws, for Berry, is that they 
do not make explicit references to class, yet such classist provisions are precisely what 
Gallus is arguing for during the debate on consumption, which in his view should not 
be moderated in the case of those in the highest social positions.88  
 Thus, we can understand the nature of the imperial logic. Tiberius claimed 
that this was not a time for holding a censorship (non id tempus censurae). We could 
read this generally as meaning that the time was not suited for such censorial actions, 
but we could read this as a technicality, suggesting that it was not a moment at which 
the Romans would normally appoint a censor, and thus that Tiberius was using a 
republican precedent for avoiding acting, in a way which would have restored 
republican values. Gallus provides an explanation: the problem/danger at this time was 
                                                           
86 Berry (1994:78ff.). 
87 For example, Clause I deals with grooms and servants; Clause II with tradesmen and artificers; Clause 
III with gentlemen ‘under the estate of knighthood’ who possess land under the value of 200 pounds; 
Clause IV with those whose land is valued above 200 (Berry 1994:79-90). 
88 It is often assumed that the sumptuary laws aimed to maintain class differences but there is no record 
of a sumptuary law which explicitly differentiates between classes, whereas there is evidence of gender 
differentiation (eg. Lex Oppia). This is obviously not to say that dress was not used to differentiate class 
in Rome, obviously it was. But Berry suggests that Roman sumptuary laws did not make allowances for 
certain higher classes because the hierarchy was so strong that it did not need to be reinforced through 
consumption: ‘Fashion depends on the presence of a class beneath the ruling order with the financial 
power to vie with that above it, and with, accordingly, the wherewithal to emulate its dress and thus defy 
its sumptuary laws’ (81). Berry’s point is that Roman society was hierarchical to the extent that no one 





not about the reduction of the civis romanus (though it is a problem for Tacitus) but 
about the reduction, more specifically, of the civis clarissimus.89   
 By showing the connections (between luxuria and wealth/hierarchy), Tacitus 
shifts focus from conceptions of luxuria as a ‘moral vice’ to conceptions of luxuria as a 
source of ‘political virtue’, which means that even though an acceptance of luxury 
represented something morally wrong, it nonetheless contributed to one’s political 
identity (status). And, in circular fashion, if it is the distribution of power that 
determines the dignitas and decus of the individual, that is, who can afford to appear as 
‘honest’ and stay as superior, then morality in Tacitus is not altogether to do with an 
absolute notion of ‘good’ and ‘right’. Equally, it is not to do with the type of morality 
which is normally encapsulated by the term ‘boni mores’.90 Rather, what Tiberius is 
talking about is the honores afforded by corruption. Similar to the delator’s 
‘extraordinary praetorship’ gained through deceit, luxuria is constructed by Tacitus as a 
feature of a specifically imperial political morality. 
 Given this, morality in Tacitus is a politics through which the state’s best 
people are able to appear as virtuous.  Morality as political (virtue as power and power 
as virtue) means then that mores such as parsimonia and moderatio (moral virtues) are 
rendered separate to mores such as dignitas and decus (political virtues) because the 
former two prevent the latter two. The obvious argument against this is that if honour is 
gained through luxuria and delation/deceit, then it is not a sign of ‘real’ moral virtue. 
However, this is possibly the question Tacitus is trying to raise: is there a distinction 
between being virtuous and seeming virtuous? Moreover, what precisely constitutes a 
virtuous act? Alternatively and presaging the digression at 4.33, Tacitus’ point maybe 
one of utilitas, specifically political utilitas: what is more ‘useful’ from a political 
perspective for the imperial subject – moral virtues such as moderatio, parsimonia and 
frugalitas or political virtues such as fama, decus and honor, gained now through 
                                                           
89 Cf. Ann.2.48, where Tiberius explains that nobiltas should be supported by wealth (nobilitatem 
utriusque pecunia iuvandam). This is supported, as will be discussed in the next section, by Tiberius’ 
moderation of delation in cases where the honour of citizens is at stake (but there are exceptions to this 
rule). Cf. 4.20, the case of Caius Silius, which Tacitus reports was the first instance of Tiberius’ severe 
handling of the wealth of others (4.20.1; ea prima Tiberio erga pecuniam alienam diligentia fuit). 
90 Which would be the type of morality associated with the ferocissimi referred to at Ann.1.2 and the 





luxuria and corrupta iudicia? Either way, Tacitus does show that in this time morality 
was coming to be relatively defined, presaging his forthcoming reference to the cyclical 
nature of all things, mores included (3.55.5).  
 
4.2 Clementia and the Majesty of the State  
 
The only rudimentary sign of an awareness that 
forgiveness may be the necessary corrective for the 
inevitable damages resulting from action may be seen in 
the Roman principle to spare the vanquished (parcere 
subiectis)—a wisdom entirely unknown to the Greeks—
or in the right to commute the death sentence, probably 
also of Roman origin, which is the prerogative of nearly 
all Western heads of state.91 
 
In The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt outlines forgiveness as a specifically political 
virtue. Forgiveness, for Arendt, is one of the two cures to the ‘irreversible’ and 
‘unpredictable’ nature of human action, which in her political thought always retains 
the potential to go wrong.92 In Arendt’s theory of politics, action must be freed from 
the forces of universal or external notions of good so that human action and thought 
can reach its full potential.93 Moral agency and conscience must be plural and free, so 
to reflect the essential human condition, which is plurality and freedom.94 However, 
Arendt notes the obvious danger in this form of liberated action in politics, which is 
that without a universal or external moral guide (such as ‘coercive’ religious truths), in 
which context humans would not know what they are doing, action can become corrupt 
                                                           
91 Arendt (1998:239). 
92 Ibid (236-242). 
93 On Arendt’s critique of external notions of good, notions which come from Christian morality, the 
Socratic morality of conscience and generally self-evident truths see Arendt (1963:84), (1998:73-78), 
(2003:45ff, 79, 123). For Arendt external standards of good (‘clichés, stock phrases, standardized codes 
of expression and conduct’) are things which ‘have the socially recognised function of protecting us 
against reality’ (1978:4) and in so doing they limit thoughtful moral judgement. It should however be 
noted that Arendt’s view that politics should remain autonomous from moral evaluation is less radical 
than often assumed. For example, in Arendt moderation remains the fundamental (political) virtue: ‘the 
old virtue of moderation, of keeping within bounds, is indeed one of the political virtues par excellence’ 
(1998:191). Moderation, in the way Arendt describes, is precisely ‘external’ in the sense that the 
knowledge of ‘bounds’ is something that depends on pre-existing notions of right and wrong. 





or frail.95 The cure for such frailty (‘the frailty of human affairs’) lies firstly in the 
human capacity to forgive (so the wrongdoer can be freed from their bad deed and 
begin again) and secondly in the faculty of making promises, such as inviolable 
agreements and contracts (which can stabilise the uncertainty of the future).96 Both 
faculties, forgiving and promising, are the only ‘moral precepts’ compatible with 
human action since they do not stem from external criteria of ‘good’ but arise instead 
out of the will to live together.97 Both faculties, for Arendt, can be traced back to two 
Roman principles: 1) ‘parcere subiectis’ (to spare the subjected/subdued) and 2) ‘pacta 
sunt servanda’ (agreements are to be maintained).98  
Tacitus’ narrative of Tiberian politics reveals a significant relationship to 
Arendtian politics. In the previous section, I argued that luxuria though ‘harmful’ from 
the perspective of traditional morality (‘boni mores’ or ‘prisca virtus’), nonetheless 
became useful under the growing empire. Luxuria can be read as a ‘useful vice’, 
something which remains distinct from mores but conducive, nonetheless, to morality. 
Insofar as Tacitus describes a political landscape in which action is liberated from 
universal notions of good, and from which morality subsequently emerges as ‘more 
than the sum total of mores, of customs and standards of behavior solidified through 
tradition’, Tacitus’ analysis of Tiberian Rome may be read in conjunction with 
Arendt’s ideal of liberated political action and thought.99  However, whereas Arendt 
believed that the faculties of forgiving and promising can ‘correct’ the inevitable 
damages resulting from such liberated action in politics, in Tacitus, such faculties only 
continue corruption in the state rather than prevent or correct it. 
                                                           
95 Arendt (1998: 188-192, 236-240).  
96 ‘The possible redemption from the predicament of irreversibility—of being unable to undo what one 
has done though one did not, and could not, have known what he was doing—is the faculty of forgiving. 
The remedy for unpredictability, for the chaotic uncertainty of the future, is contained in the faculty to 
make and keep promises’ (1998:237). On forgiveness and promise see Arendt (1998:236ff.). On the 
importance of natality (beginning anew) see (1998:247). 
97 Arendt (1998:246). The will to live together is what guides Arendt’s moral thought because it is only 
through living and acting with others (plurality) that one’s moral judgement can be valid: ‘our decisions 
about right and wrong will depend upon our choice of company’ (2003:145-146). On judgement, 
plurality and politics in Arendt see the useful discussion in Garsten (2010:328ff) and Badiou (2005:10-
25).  
98 Cf. Aen.6.753 on Rome’s mission as parcere subiectis et debellare superbos and Cic.Off.3.92: ‘pacta 
et promissa semperne servanda sint.’ See also Dig.2.14 on the law of pacta. 





In Tacitus, there is a dark side to the principles of forgiving and promising since 
it is both forgiveness (in the form of mercy – clementia) and promise (in the form of 
secular and sacred agreements – lex, ius, fas) which are ‘haphazard and frail’, in which 
context, we may read forgiveness and promise not as ‘moral precepts’ which act to 
‘correct’ corruption and safeguard freedom but as imperial prerogatives which maintain 
corruption as well as further individual servitude.100 Just as luxuria is subverted into a 
‘useful vice’, in this section I will show that clementia (as well as the ordinarily 
righteous commitment to lex) are subverted by Tacitus into ‘harmful virtues’. 
Tacitus’ presentation of the virtutes of Tiberius (in particular his moderatio, 
civilitas and clementia) is often read by scholars from the perspective of irony, 
employed by Tacitus in order to make jibes at Tiberius’ character.101 In order to analyse 
the narrative on Tiberius’ virtues from a different perspective, I shall examine Tiberius’ 
virtue not in terms of Tacitean irony but rather as something which reflects the nature 
of politics at this time, which was such that any virtuous act was susceptible to 
becoming its opposite (a corrupt act). In this perspective, Tacitus is not using irony to 
traduce Tiberius’ character but is writing Tiberius as a product of the irony (or frailty) 
of imperial politics and the limitations of virtue itself.  
I will analyse the limitations of virtue through Tacitus’ writing of mercy, which 
features prominently in the early Tiberian narrative, especially once the law of treason 
is revived.102 Clementia is a political virtue, representing a ‘humane’ and ‘civil’ act by 
which the sovereign’s leniency spares the victim and allows him to be freed from his 
bad deed. Yet at the same time, clementia is inherently problematic because in the 
                                                           
100 I note that forgiving (ignoscere) is not the same as mercy (clementia), since mercy does not forgive a 
bad act in its totality but offers a less severe punishment than that deemed due. However, under Tiberius, 
forgiveness and clementia are conflated since Tiberius is not only lenient in his handling of criminal 
behaviour (by offering less severe punishments than those prescribed by the law) but he is often wholly 
forgiving (he dismisses criminal cases altogether, not punishing at all). Konstan (2010) has argued that 
forgiveness ‘did not exist in classical antiquity…it played no role whatever in the ethical thinking of 
those [Greek and Roman] societies’ (2010:ix). I find this difficult to believe because the fact that 
clementia was an imperial virtue suggests that the basic idea of forgiving (the reconciliation of the 
relationship between the wrongdoer and the wronged) did exist as an ethical notion. If the Romans did 
not have some sort of ethical preconception that reconciliation was good, it becomes difficult to explain 
the emergence/existence of clementia as a political virtue. 
101 See for example Syme (1958:414) and Martin (1981:225). 
102 Tiberius revived the lex maiestatis in 15 but secured acquittal for all those charged with treason 





forgiveness of a crime there is a failure of justice: ‘a bad law over-ruled by a merciful 
pardoner might result in the fair treatment of an accused, but could not represent 
Justice’.103 Clementia is also contentious as a virtue because it opposes other 
quintessential tenets of the Roman ethos, in particular severitas which was also seen as 
that which enforced the distinction between right and wrong, through punishment.104  
Moreover, in the forgiveness of a crime, legal pacts and agreements (which Arendt saw 
as the genius of the Roman legal system) are either broken or ignored.105 Clementia is 
always an arbitrary act of power, supra leges or ‘exceptional’. In this view clementia is 
not only an act of power but it is an act specifically of sovereign power. Clementia is 
the virtue of the king or prince (specifically) and as such, it is a relational act as Arendt 
perceives and praises but one which only takes place between superior and inferior, 
through which the King’s reputation is enhanced rather than that of the subjected or 
condemned. Clementia, then, is the quintessential manifestation of the sovereign’s 
corrupt virtuousness, which makes obvious the various relations of inequality upon 
which society rests.  
Since Arendt does not make the connection between forgiveness and 
sovereignty, a connection implicit in the imperial virtue of clementia, the potential role 
played by forgiveness in the reinforcement of sovereign power (and the citizens’ 
subjection to that power) is left unexplored.106 Yet in Tacitus’ analysis of crime and 
punishment, the display of clementia as the reinforcement of a specifically sovereign 
position (the prerogative of the head of the state) is of crucial concern, mainly because 
the locus of sovereignty is not defined. Further to this, the principle of parcere in 
                                                           
103 Shotter (1991:3311). Whether clementia results in ‘fair’ treatment is also questionable, though Shotter 
appears not to think so. On the paradoxical relation between forgiveness and justice see Murphy 
(1988:167ff.). 
104 The concept which for Romans foremostly represented ‘the necessary corrective for the inevitable 
damages resulting from action’ is not clementia but severitas. For Seneca, it is punishment (even in the 
extreme form of punishment by death) that corrects and reforms (Ira.1.6.3-4).  
105 For Arendt on lex see below n.128. 
106 Here we may return to Giorgio Agamben’s analysis of sovereignty and bare life: ‘The sovereign is the 
one with respect to whom all men are potentially homines sacri, and homo sacer is the one with respect 
to whom all men act as sovereigns’ (1998:53). Agamben does not draw a connection between 
forgiveness and sovereignty, but the way in which Agamben understands sovereignty, as something 
which is empowered through exclusions and bans, as something which makes ‘bare life’ (the sacer 
homo), is comparable with the Roman practice of clementia because when the condemned was saved 






Tacitus is not as liberating as Arendt perceives, nor as ‘humane’ as Seneca perceives, 
because if the punishment was execution (as was prescribed for a treasonable offence), 
then clementia did not necessarily release the wrongdoer from his bad deed, allowing 
him to begin again; rather, clementia bound the wrongdoer to his bad deed, for eternity, 
either through the damnatio memoriae, exile, the loss of citizen rights, or the 
confiscation of property.107 It emerges then, that corrupta iudicia does not only refer to 
the cruelty of orators as Piso claims, nor to the ‘interpretationes’ of delatores as 
Tacitus implies, but corrupt judgement also refers to the virtuous act of clementia. 
In what follows, I will analyse Tacitus’ writing of Tiberius’ revival of the lex 
maiestatis in order to show the shortcomings of maintaining particular pacta. I shall 
then outline the difficulties involved with defining the crimen maiestatis in order to 
explore Tacitus’ writing of the ambiguity of particular crimes, and I shall then move 
onto a wider discussion of the role played by the imperial virtue of clementia in the 
perpetuation of corruption. Using Arendt’s theory of forgiveness, as well as the value 
of promise she attaches to the Roman past, my aim is to trace Tacitus’ writing of 
clementia and lex as dangerous reservoirs which withhold the potential for violence and 
deviance, rather than stabilising correctives for the inevitable damages resulting from 
action.  
 
Reviving the Lex Maiestatis 
 
Tiberius’ broadening of the lex maiestatis to include 
intimations deemed hostile to the emperor proves to be 




                                                           
107 In this view, one can see that in a Roman context forgiveness is precisely not something which, as 
Arendt would argue, makes possible a reconciliatory politics by allowing the possibility of a new 
beginning.  





With the revival of the lex maiestatis the Tiberian narrative sees a surge of criminal 
accusations.109 Many scholars have read the treason trials alongside Tiberius’ 
increasing saevitia and dominatio.110 Earlier Roman writers, too, remembered and 
recorded the period under Tiberius as a negative example in Roman history.111  
Tiberius’ revival of the treason law is a definitive influence on Tacitus’ analysis 
of the Tiberian Principate since the revival confirmed another form of imperial 
censorship (on words as well as acts) and stimulated the process of delation.112 
However, although the revival does represent a particularly ‘despotic’ use of law (by 
which I mean a use of law designed specifically for a system of rule by one) it is 
notable that when Tacitus describes the revival, he does not condemn Tiberius’ 
character. Rather, Tacitus reads the dominatio implied in the revival as something 
which problematised the appearance of Tiberius’ civilitas, the appearance of which was 
asserted in the rejection of the title pater patriae:  
 
nomen patris patriae Tiberius, a populo saepius 
ingestum, repudiavit; neque in acta sua iurari quamquam 
censente senatu permisit, cuncta mortalium incerta, 




The name ‘Father of the Fatherland’ which the people had 
so often pressed upon him, Tiberius rejected; nor did he 
allow obedience to be sworn to his enactments, although 
the Senate recommended it, for he maintained that all 
human affairs were uncertain, and that the more he 
obtained, the more dangerous was his position.  
 
 
                                                           
109 The lex maiestatis was directed at those qui contra imperatorem vel rem publicam aliquid moliti sunt 
(J.Inst.4.18.3). See also Dig.48.4 and Ann.1.72.3. On the lex maiestatis see further Bauman (1974:1-10) 
and Goodyear (1981:141-150). On punishment for treason see Bauman (1967, 2002) and Mousourakis 
(2007). In Tacitus punishments vary, including execution (sometimes without trial), expulsion from 
Rome (including loss of citizen rights), confiscation of property and denial of burial.  
110 Tiberius’ saevitia, ’tyranny’ and ‘deviousness’ have been attested in the revival/extension of this law. 
See for example O’Gorman (2000:85ff.), Kapust (2011:166ff) and Mellor (2011:86).  
111 Sen.Ben.3.26.1, Suet.Tib.19, 58. Dio.57.19. 





Tiberius’ rejection of the title pater patriae is an obvious example of imperial 
moderation. It should however be noted that Tiberian refusals of power have been the 
focus of some debate given that many scholars have been reluctant to read the 
moderatio implied in such refusals at face value.113 Goodyear suggests that the reader 
has already been conditioned to take Tacitus’ comments on Tiberius’ moderation ‘not 
at their face value, but as evidence of arrogance and hypocrisy’.114 There is some 
reason to read Tiberius’ moderation as ‘arrogant’ since the connection between 
moderatio and adrogantia is drawn by Tacitus at 1.8.5 during his account of Augustus’ 
funeral: when the senate proposed to carry the body of Augustus to the pyre 
themselves, Tacitus states that Tiberius declined ‘with condescending moderation’ 
(adroganti moderatione). Levick has suggested that ‘adroganti moderatione’ was ‘a 
jibe at Tiberius’ cardinal virtue.’115 A similar view is expressed by Martin who states 
that the adjective adrogans renders the imperial virtue ‘offensive’ while reminding the 
reader of Tacitus’ earlier statement that Tiberius possessed the inherent superbia of the 
Claudian family (vetus atque insita Claudiae familiae superbia; 1.4.3).116 
From a modern perspective, adrogans is certainly an ‘offensive’ term and may 
represent a Tacitean ‘jibe’. In an ancient context, superbia implies an innate familial 
tyranny, problematising any later references to Tiberius’ virtue. Yet, in the context of 
imperial virtue (the virtutes of the emperor) and given the meaning of adrogans as 
‘presumptuous’, ‘arrogating’ or ‘over-bearing’, there is a question of whether it was 
even possible for an emperor’s virtue not to be received as adrogans since it was an 
exercise of the supreme authority. We may read Tiberius’ moderatio not as 
aggrandising so as to assert Tiberius’ falsity, but rather a reflection of imperial power. 
 With regards to the refusal of the title pater patriae, whether or not the 
moderation implied in Tiberius’ recusatio is ‘real’ or ‘false’ is not what concerns 
Tacitus. As can be seen from the passage above, according to Tacitus, Tiberius rejected 
the title on the puzzling grounds that the more he obtained, the more slippery (in 
                                                           
113 On the contrived recusatio imperii as a form of ‘imperial etiquette’ or ‘mock-ritual’ see Vervaet 
(2010:166).  
114 Goodyear (1972:149). See further 149-151. Syme (416) states ‘“Moderatio” occurs four times in a 
Tiberian context, and only once it is authentically impugned’. 
115 Levick (2003:207n.29).  





lubrico) his position. It is possibly for the same reason that Tiberius did not allow 
obedience to be sworn to his enactments and also why he later refused permission for 
his own person to be associated with the divi imperatores.117  
 Tiberius presents his moderatio as sustaining of his political position, to 
prevent it from facing harm.  The refusal is not an act produced from an innate sense of 
virtue (real moderatio) and it would be problematic to read from this perspective given 
that we have already been informed that Tiberius inherited Claudian superbia. Rather, 
the refusal is bound up in the protection of the regime’s power, namely self-protection. 
Tiberius seems to be saying that the more power you have, the more powerless you 
become, explaining a further paradox of imperial power.118 Tiberius appears to be 
denying himself honours as insurance against some future event (presumably a fall 
from power). The recusatio of honours granted to Augustus would seem to be a refusal 
of Tiberius to be trapped within a paradigm of imperial power set by his predecessor: 
he was not Augustus and his position was not the same. In this sense, the recusatio was 
a repetition of the events of the accession debate, but just as that debate had not 
persuaded his audience, so this second recusatio was also misconceived:  
 
non tamen ideo faciebat fidem civilis animi; nam legem 
maiestatis reduxerat, cui nomen apud veteres idem, sed 
alia in iudicium veniebant, si quis proditione exercitum 
aut plebem seditionibus, denique male gesta re publica 
maiestatem populi Romani minuisset. (1.72.2) 
 
Nevertheless he did not thereby create a belief in his civil 
spirit, for he had reintroduced the law of treason. This had 
the same name among the ancients, but other matters 
came under its jurisdiction, such as the impairment of an 
army by betrayal or of the plebs by sedition, or, in short, 
any bad act by which the majesty of the people of Rome 
was impaired.  
 
The moderation implied in Tiberius’ recusatio becomes problematic because it is 
paired with a revival of the law of treason. On this occasion the falsity of the refusal 
                                                           
117 Ann.2.87, Tiberius punished those who referred to his work as divine and himself as dominus. 





lies not in the intent, but in Tiberius’ ability to persuade. As can be seen from the 
passage above, the virtuous meanings associated with Tiberius’ refusal of the title pater 
patriae (mainly that Tiberius was a princeps who did not let his status exceed that of a 
citizen when offered the opportunity) were deemed incredible as was his civilis animus 
because such virtuous meanings conflicted with his subsequent decision to revive the 
law of treason.119  
 The consequence of the revival is the emperor’s inability to construct (facere) 
credibility (fides). Similarly, Tacitus dismissed Tiberius’ speech to the senate during 
his accession as more impressive than credible (plus in oratione tali dignitatis quam 
fidei erat; 1.11.2). The issue is not to do with Tiberius’ innate falsity (nor Tacitean 
irony) but his lack of credibility. Put differently, Tiberius’ deficiency [for Tacitus] is 
not that he is a hypocrite or arrogant but that he lacks the capacity to speak the truth 
and have that truth be received as credible, which results in him inevitably appearing as 
hypocritical or arrogant.  
 Tacitus’ writing of the revival has been misread as Tiberius ‘extending’ the 
law.120 Yet according to Tacitus, though Tiberius had revived (reduxerat) the law, it 
was not Tiberius who ‘broadened’ it:    
 
facta arguebantur, dicta inpune erant. primus Augustus 
cognitionem de famosis libellis specie legis eius tractavit, 
commotus Cassii Severi libidine, qua viros feminasque 
inlustris procacibus scriptis diffamaverat; mox Tiberius, 
consultante Pompeio Macro praetore an iudicia 
maiestatis redderentur, exercendas leges esse respondit. 
hunc quoque asperavere carmina incertis auctoribus 
vulgata in saevitiam superbiamque eius et discordem cum 
matre animum. (1.72.3-4) 
 
Actions were prosecuted, words went unpunished. It was 
Augustus who first, under the heading of this law, applied 
legal investigation to defamatory writings, being 
provoked by the passion with which Cassius Severus had 
                                                           
119 Cf. Bauman: ‘to Tacitus and Suetonius it was almost a routine matter for an emperor to mark his 
accession by an abolition and nothing proved Tiberius’ bad faith more clearly than his apparent failure to 
conform.’ (1974:222).  






defamed men and women of distinction in his shameless 
writings. Soon Tiberius, when consulted by the praetor 
Pompeius Macer as to whether prosecutions for treason 
should be restored, replied that the laws must be enforced. 
He too had been exasperated by the publication of 
anonymous poems about his cruelty, his superbia and his 
discordant relations with his mother. 
 
The extension in the law’s jurisdiction to include words is, in Tacitus, Augustan 
(primus Augustus...). As with the lex Papia Poppaea, the misuse of the law is re-dated 
to the Augustan principate.121 Tacitus implies that Augustus used the law to defend the 
social hierarchy with which his regime was identified.  When Tiberius was asked by 
Pompeius Macer whether the treason trials were to be restored, Tiberius responded that 
the laws should be enforced (exercendas leges esse), meaning that defamation was to 
continue to count as punishable under the lex maiestatis. Once again, no-one would 
approve of defamation, but the virtuous law and the decision to maintain law (which in 
itself would normally be seen as a virtuous or ethical decision) undermined belief in 
Tiberius as a civilis animus, since the operation of the law was instrumental in asserting 
imperial power. The point is not that ‘simply put, Tiberius’ spirit was not that of a 
citizen (civilis animi)’ nor that ‘Tacitus portrays Tiberius as a largely vicious 
individual’,122 but what constrained the performance of civility in particular situations.  
Tacitus employs a balancing and contrasting structure in his analysis of 
Tiberius’ actions, making obvious, again, the clash between the ideal of civic virtue (in 
this case civilitas) and the requirement for established imperial prerogatives to take 
their course (in this case censoring famosi libelli). Tiberius refused an honour which 
would associate him with imperial superbia while reviving a law which was superbus 
in itself, a law which unleashed the corrosive force of delatores and brought ruin 
                                                           
121 Tacitus is contradicted by a passage in Cicero (Rep.4.10) where it is stated that slander was an offence 
under the Twelve Tables, punishable by death. Verbal injuries were also punishable under the lex 
Cornelia de iniuriis (81 BC). Suetonius and Dio refer to an S.C. of AD6 after which the investigation of 
any pseudonymous libelli was legalised as were the necessary investigations and rewards for delatores in 
any such investigations which were judged successful. Suet.Aug.55, Dio. 55.27.1-3. See further Bauman 
(1974:27-28). 
122 Kapust (2011:166-7).  Nor is Tacitus adducing Tiberius’ handling of the lex maiestatis ‘as proof of 





(pernicies) upon many illustrious citizens.123 Yet the resumption of the law of treason, 
which already under Augustus had been broadened to censor dicta, was something 
which Tiberius could not undo: as Tiberius explains a few chapters later, it would not 
be right (fas) to interfere with any responsum of the divine Augustus (divus 
Augustus…responderat, neque fas Tiberio infringere dicta eius; 1.77).124 On a later 
occasion, Tacitus has Tiberius explicitly attribute the rule of law to Augustus’ facta and 
dicta.
125 Tiberius even punished by exile and had erased from the senatorial register 
Apidius Merula for not having sworn obedience to the legislation of the divine 
Augustus (an offence which was viewed by Tiberius as treasonable; 4.42.3). Tiberian 
moderatio (refusing to elevate himself above Augustus or even to compare himself to 
Augustus) required that he did not alter the system Augustus bequeathed to him (since, 
pacta sunt servanda; Cic.Off.3.92), but in this preservation the instruments of imperial 
terror, created but perhaps suspended by Augustus, were allowed free play. Tiberius’ 
view was that the laws must take their course (exercendas leges esse) and in the 
process, he ‘opened the floodgates’.126 
In this context we may reconsider Arendt’s concept of Roman lex as something 
which in her view contributed to the ‘political genius of Rome’.127 Arendt praises the 
Roman legal system because its legitimacy did not rest on the knowledge of natural 
laws, nor on an immortal, divine legislator.128 Rather, Roman legislation for Arendt 
was a system of mutual agreements between individuals. Lex meant ‘lasting tie’ and 
‘contract’ between private citizens and in this way, Arendt saw lex as something 
fundamentally and crucially man-made, contractual and thus political: ‘[lex] is 
something that links human beings together, and it comes into being not by diktat or by 
                                                           
123 The latter consequence is used by Tiberius himself as a reason for why the law should not be invoked 
and applied in every situation (1.73). 
124 Prior to this at 1.76 Tacitus implies that Tiberius had a fear of being contrasted with Augustus (…et 
metu conparationis, quia Augustus comiter interfuisset).  
125 Ann.4.37.3; ‘qui omnia facta dictaque eius vice legis observem’. 
126 Cuff (1964:137).  
127 Arendt (1998:195). 
128 For Arendt on Roman law see (1963:187-188), (1998:63 n.62, 243) and (2007:183-4). ‘The law is 
then here something creating new relationships between men and which does not bind them in the sense 
of a natural law for which the natural conscience of all human beings naturally distinguishes right from 
wrong, nor in the sense of commandments imposed to all from without, but in the sense of an agreement 





an act of force but rather through mutual agreement’.129 From this viewpoint, Arendt 
contrasts Roman lex with the Greek concept of law (nomos), which, in Arendt’s view is 
‘pre-political’.  Arendt saw law in Greece as something which pre-exists the political 
community rather than something which is made within it.130 For Arendt, the Greeks 
‘interpret the law not as a link and a relationship, but rather as an enclosing border that 
no one should overstep.’131 As a result, nomos could not accommodate the essential 
human condition (in Arendt’s view freedom and plurality) to the extent that was 
achieved by Roman lex. 
Arendt’s conception of lex as something which is made within politics rather 
than from outside of politics is corrupted under Tiberius since Tacitus shows us that it 
becomes fixed through an ‘immortal, divine legislator’ (Augustus). We may read 
Pompeius Macer’s question to the princeps as one which was designed to test this very 
notion. The lex maiestatis had not exactly been out of use, so the question of its 
‘revival’ is peculiar, implying that Tiberius’ audience was trying to figure out 
something more, possibly, what is the status now of Augustan laws? Tiberius’ actions 
and Tiberian politics are shaped by laws treated as sacred or inviolable – which 
culminates ultimately in the absent presence of a legislator (divus Augustus as the law). 
Tiberius is thus bound by a system in which civil acts in the present are susceptible to 
reversal or misinterpretation due to corrupting laws that cannot be corrected.132 
 
Defining the crimen maiestatis or the ‘crimen inevitabile’ 
Once the law of treason is revived more problems follow, namely, what counts as 
treason? Immediately after Tacitus describes the revival, he goes on to report two 
                                                           
129 Arendt (2007:184). What is political for Arendt is the interaction of men (not man), hence Roman lex 
is a ‘political concept of law’.   
130 ‘It is true, though, that in Greece it was held that the lawgiver came from outside the community, that 
he could be a stranger and called from abroad; but this means no more than that laying down the law was 
pre-political, prior to the existence of the polis, the city-state, just as building the walls around the city 
was prior to the coming into existence of the city itself.’ (1963:186). 
131 Arendt (2007:183). 
132 The coercive force of Augustus may also be read in terms of an ‘emotional’ constraint. Emotions, for 
Arendt, must be removed from politics because similar to her views on self-evident truths, emotions 
restrict political action. Yet, just as self-evident truths can never be removed from politics, Tacitus also 
implies through the nature of the relationship between Augustus and Tiberius, that emotion too can never 





charges of maiestas: a certain Falanius was accused of selling a statue of Augustus 
along with the sale of his house and a certain Rubrius was accused of violation by 
perjury of the divinity of Augustus (1.73.2-3). When the charges, which are described 
by Tacitus as some form of experimentation (praetemptata crimina) were brought to 
the emperor’s attention, Tiberius, in a letter to the consuls vetoed all charges stating 
that the deification of Augustus had not been decreed so that the honour of citizens 
could be destroyed on account of it (ubi Tiberio notuere, scripsit consulibus non ideo 
decretum patri suo caelum, ut in perniciem civium is honor verteretur; 1.73.3). In 
Tiberius’ view it was not contra religiones for the emperor’s image, nor those of any 
deities to be added to the sale of gardens and houses. With regards to the crime of 
perjury, Tiberius stated that this should be judged as though Rubrius had deceived 
Jupiter (ius iurandum perinde aestimandum quam si Iovem fefellisset; 1.73.3) – and 
injuries to the Gods were the Gods’ concern (deorum iniuriae dis curae). 
Since Tacitus reports Tiberius’ acquittal of the cases of Falanius and Rubrius 
immediately after he tells us of Tiberius’ revival of the lex maiestatis, it becomes 
difficult to read Tacitus’ writing of Tiberius’ revival in terms of Tiberius’ own 
‘despotic purposes’.133 Rather, Tacitus continues to employ a balancing and contrasting 
structure in his analysis of Tiberius: Tiberius rejected the title pater patriae (attesting 
civilitas and moderatio). But then Tiberius revived the lex maiestatis (which implies 
saevitia, dominatio and for Tacitus some form of political ars).134 Tiberius then refuses 
to use the law he has just revived to punish crimes deemed by accusers as punishable 
under its jurisdiction (now re-attesting moderatio).  It appears then that Tacitus is not 
leading us to believe that ‘Tiberius was some power-starved monster for whom 
maiestas trials satisfied a lust for seeing people suffer.’135 Tiberius revives the treason 
law, given pressures to do so, yet Tiberius immediately balances this contentious act 
with attempts to limit its effects. The reason for this seemingly contradictory use of the 
law can be surmised from Tiberius’ rescript to the consuls. The maintenance of honor 
                                                           
133 Ramage (1989:657).  
134 1.73.1; Haud pigebit referre in Falanio et Rubrio, modicis equitibus Romanis, praetemptata crimina, 
ut quibus initiis, quanta Tiberii arte gravissimum exitium inrepserit, dein repressum sit, postremo arserit 
cunctaque corripuerit, noscatur (discussed below). 





remains the guiding principle to Tiberius’ policy. Excessive forms of censorship 
(delatio and the lex maiestatis) are permitted, so long as they do not damage the 
identity of the honourable. But if censuring interferes with the identity of the honorable 
(such as sumptuary legislation and extreme accusing) then it must be vetoed. Yet as 
Tacitus goes onto show, the problem is that the more extreme or ‘experimental’ the 
accusation of treason, the more ‘inevitable’ the crime. 
In the next chapter (1.74) Tacitus reports another charge of treason. The charge 
was against M. Granius Marcellus (praetor of Bithynia) who was accused of treason by 
his quaestor Caepio Crispinus.136 Marcellus was accused of defamation, desecration 
and extortion. It was alleged that he had made insulting remarks about Tiberius, 
focussing on the princeps’ worst habits. This was, as Tacitus describes, an ‘inevitabile 
crimen’ (an inescapable charge or inevitable crime) because the remarks were true and 
so were believed to have been said (nam quia vera erant, etiam dicta credebantur). The 
charge of desecration was brought forward by Romanus Hispo who alleged that 
Marcellus had replaced the bust on a statue of Augustus with that of Tiberius.137 In 
contradiction to his normal silence, Tacitus reports that Tiberius flared up to such an 
extent that he declared he would express his opinion on the case openly on oath so that 
the others would be placed under the same constraint (…quo ceteris eadem necessitas 
fieret). Cn. Piso then asked the emperor when he intended to vote – if Tiberius voted 
first, Piso would know how to vote, but if Tiberius voted last, then Piso risked voting 
the wrong way (“quo loco censebis, Caesar? si primus, habebo quod sequar: si post 
omnis, vereor ne inprudens dissentiam”; 1.74.5). Tiberius, shaken (permotus) by Piso’s 
question consequently absolved the charges of defamation and desecration; he decided 
the charge of extortion should be assigned to the board of recoverers (reciperatores). 
Tacitus’ writing of the case of Granius Marcellus is obscure. This is because it 
is difficult to know what precisely angered the emperor and why he eventually stopped 
the trial.138 But what is telling is the nature of Piso’s question, which makes evident the 
                                                           
136 On Tacitus’ writing of Caepio see Rutledge (2010:113-114). 
137 Hispo also accused Marcellus of positioning his own statue higher than those of the Caesars (1.74.3). 
138 In Katzoff’s view, Marcellus’ substitution of the head of the new emperor for the old was a ‘perfectly 
reasonable’ act, ‘in fact, the action would be less an affront to the memory of Augustus than flattery of 





futile nature of collective decision making. Tiberius was not under any pressure to have 
the case decided democratically. Nevertheless, he made the decision to decide on 
Marcellus’ punishment by oath (collective judgement139). But Piso’s question makes it 
clear that the nature of ‘collective judgement’ under the Principate is such that it will 
only mirror the judgement of the princeps. Tiberius’ attempt to be civilis and moderans 
is subsumed by his own over-bearing presence as princeps. 
There is in this another example of the imperial logic at work because despite 
Tiberius’ show of moderation, the result is the reinforcement of rule by one. The 
problem therefore is not that the Principate restricts freedom outright; rather and as 
Tacitus perhaps ironically goes on to note, this was a time in which there remained 
some traces (albeit dying) of freedom (1.74.5) but what is more ironic is that such 
freedom could not be used freely. The point is repeated in the very next chapter, where 
Tacitus states that Tiberius sat in on many trials; as a result of the emperor’s presence, 
many decisions which opposed bribery and the hopes of the powerful were made. 
However, as Tacitus goes onto state, though this promoted truth it ruined freedom (sed 
dum veritati consulitur, libertas corrumpebatur). Libertas in this context is the right to 
be corrupt and the presence of the emperor restrained corruption, but in so doing ended 
libertas.140 Tiberius’ attempt to moderate the senatorial court attends to the power of 
the imperial regime, which in this case is fed, paradoxically, by the emperor’s 
moderating gaze. Tacitus is not therefore criticising Tiberian moderatio but he is using 
moderation to draw attention to the frailty of political affairs in which good acts can 
become their opposite, making obvious the limitation of imperial virtutes, in this case 
principis moderatio. 
In AD17, as the lex maiestatis was maturing (adolescebat) Tacitus reports 
another charge of treason (2.50). Appuleia Varilla (the granddaughter of Augustus’ 
sister Octavia) had ridiculed Augustus, Tiberius and Livia in some insulting remarks 
(quia probrosis sermonibus divum Augustum ac Tiberium et matrem eius inlusisset). 
                                                                                                                                                                         
(1971:683). Furthermore, ‘if they acquitted, they would seem too casual about maiestas; if they 
condemned, they would be condemning flattery of Tiberius. It was one thing for Tiberius to refuse 
flattery; it was quite another for the senate to refuse it for him’ (683). See also Shotter (1966:207-208). 
139 Woodman (2004a:39, n.98). 





She was also accused of adultery. The grounds for the informer’s accusation of treason 
were accordingly that Appuleia had defamed a God, an emperor, an emperor’s mother 
and that she had committed adultery in connection with the imperial house (Caesarique 
conexa adulterio teneretur).  
In this case, again Tiberius is shown to moderate the application of the lex 
maiestatis: adultery was punishable under the lex Julia de adulteriis and Tiberius 
accordingly ruled that the charge of adultery was to be punished under that law rather 
than the proposed lex maiestatis. As for the charges of defamation, Tacitus reports that 
Tiberius did not want Appuleia’s remark against him to be the subject of legal inquiry; 
however regarding any derogatory comments against divus Augustus Tiberius decided 
that Appuleia should be condemned if she had spoken irreligiously of Augustus 
(maiestatis crimen distingui Caesar postulavit damnarique, si qua de Augusto 
inreligiose dixisset: in se iacta nolle ad cognitionem vocari). Regarding the allegation 
that Appuleia had also spoken unfavourably of Livia, when Tiberius was asked what 
was to be done about this, the emperor remained silent. Then on the next day, Tacitus 
reports that Tiberius, in his mother’s name, begged the senators not to condemn as 
criminal any words spoken against his mother.141   
Tiberius’ decision to punish the charge of defamation against Augustus varies 
from the earlier episodes but Tacitus reports that Tiberius eventually decided that 
Appuleia was to be acquitted of all charges of treason (liberavitque Appuleiam lege 
maiestatis) and punished only for committing adultery.  
The above cases allow an exploration of corrupta iudicia from a different 
perspective. The crimen maiestatis is not in itself that which is used by Tacitus to 
represent increasing corruption (the growth of illegality) in the state. Rather, what 
Tacitus is drawing attention to as corrupt is the growth of that which was interpretable 
as corrupt (as treasonable). A crime in legal terms refers to an act which is in breach of 
the law, but the Tacitean narrative shows that certain acts, which were not necessarily 
in breach of the law, nonetheless became crimes in political terms, with the help of the 
ambiguous scope of the lex maiestatis. As Tacitus notes, the lex maiestatis grew 
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between the years 15 and 17 and the four cases above make evident this growth since a 
selection of crimes, in addition to verbal injuries, were being brought forward as 
punishable under the law of treason (desecration, perjury, adultery, extortion). It also 
appears that certain acts which were not illegal under any law, such as the sale of 
imperial statues, became prosecutable. The growth of ‘crime’ and corruption under 
Tiberius stems not from questionable human action (at least not imperial action) but 
from a questionable law (the lex maiestatis), which was exploited for private rewards. 
What made this exploitation possible was the change in the nature of the 
regime, which had at its core the identity of the princeps. Under the republic, the 
maiestas populi Romani was not identified with an individual nor his family and so it 
was not possible for certain crimes, such as adultery or desecration, to extend to an act 
which diminished the greatness of the state. However, with the beginning of the 
Principate, acts against the emperor or the imperial domus became, by extension, acts 
against the state.142 This provided the needy and restless accusers with the opportunity 
to abuse the fading distinction between maiestas populi Romani and maiestas principis 
through ‘experimental’ accusations so that the meaning of treason in the new age was 
defined in terms of maintaining the greatness of the emperor rather than that of the 
state.143 
Tacitus’ narration of corrupta iudicia retains a focus on delatores and their 
‘interpretationes’. The narrative is not focussed on crime but rather the interpretation 
of crime, in which case treason is in ‘the eye of the beholder’ and seemingly, so is the 
law.144 Yet what is utterly corrupt about ‘relative treason’ is that it is a derivative of the 
imperial ethos, specifically, the ethos to protect the regime’s (the emperor’s) greatness, 
in which case relative treason, though something which damages the credibility of the 
legal system, protects by being supportive of the imperial ethos. 
                                                           
142 Cf. Foucault on the relationship between law and sovereignty: ‘Besides its immediate victim, the 
crime attacks the sovereign: it attacks him personally, since the law represents the will of the sovereign; 
it attacks him physically, since the force of the law is the force of the prince’ (1995:47).  
143 One notes, for example, that when Cordus attempted to defend himself to the senate in 25 after being 
charged for writing a history in which he praised Brutus and Cassius, his basis for innocence of any 
treasonable offence was simply that he had not offended Tiberius nor Augustus, whom the lex maiestatis 
encompassed (“verba mea, patres conscripti, arguuntur: adeo factorum innocens sum. sed neque haec in 
principem aut principis parentem, quos lex maiestatis amplectitur”; 4.34.2). 





The notion that treason is defined in this way (by interpretation rather than by 
law) is implied also in Seneca’s analysis of maiestas trials under Tiberius (Ben.3.26.1). 
For Seneca, under Tiberius the frenzy of treason charges saw a greater destruction of 
citizens than that caused by any other civil war (sub Tib. Caesare fuit accusandi 
frequens et paene publica rabies, quae omni ciuili bello grauius togatam ciuitatem 
confecit). The talk of drunkards, the innocent words of jesters were apprehended 
(excipiebatur ebriorum sermo, simplicitas iocantium). Nothing was safe and every 
occasion welcomed violence (nihil erat tutum; omnis saeuiendi placebat occasio). 
Seneca then goes onto to say that there was no need to wait for the fate of the accused 
for there was but one outcome (nec iam reorum expectabantur euentus, cum esset 
unus). The implication is that the accused would inevitably be found guilty and either 
exiled or executed. This is notably similar to the Tacitean account, in which the 
inevitability of certain acts (particularly defamation) being interpreted as criminal 
similarly features.145 However, there is a crucial difference between the Senecan and 
Tacitean accounts which is that if we were to name ‘one outcome’ of the treason trials 
under Tiberius in Tacitus’ narrative, it would be clementia.146  
In the previous section, I argued that Tiberius’ inaction during the events 
leading up to Libo’s trial represented a lack of sovereign interference in due process 
which allowed corruption to continue. The above cases show another side, which is that 
Tiberius did interfere when he deemed it to be necessary. I return to the case of 
Marcellus: Marcellus was accused of something which could be interpreted as a serious 
offence. As Bauman notes, ‘to mutilate a statue was tantamount to pronouncing some 
                                                           
145 Another source of exploitation was Tiberius’ perceived bad character. In the case of Marcellus, his 
words are problematic not only because they defamed the emperor but because they were true (nam quia 
vera erant) which then meant that they were believed (…etiam dicta credebantur), and his crime as a 
result became inevitabile. Were Tiberius not saevus, then defamation against his character would not be 
believable and the crime not inevitable but such was the perception of Tiberius’ character that 
defamation of his character would be believable, rendering the offender’s crime inescapable. There is 
therefore no judgement involved in a crime of defamation against Tiberius. Judgement is not only 
corrupt but seemingly lacking altogether. The problem therefore also stems from perceptions of Tiberius’ 
saevitia, which not only problematised his own imperial image but also corrupted the legal process since 
it gave accusers something else to exploit in the hope of reward.  
146 Tiberius acquitted all cases of treason up to and including 20AD. Even after 20AD Tiberius acquitted 
or dismissed several cases (6 in total) and showed clementia in the form of mitigated sentences on two 





sort of unofficial damnatio memoriae.’147 Yet following the policy asserted after 
Rubrius’ violation of the majesty of Augustus by perjury, that ‘injuries to the Gods 
were the Gods’ concern’ (1.73.4) Tiberius decided not to prosecute. His defamation of 
the emperor was also forgiven, despite the fact that his remarks were believed (because 
they were true). Appuleia’s defamation of Augustus was similarly eventually dismissed 
as were Rubrius’ and Falanius’ violable acts against Augustus.  
Consequently, the revival of the treason law provided Tiberius with the 
opportunity to appear clement and moderate.148 This contradiction provides insight on 
the wider process of government and in particular Tacitus’ reference to the mysterious 
‘ars Tiberii’ which suggests some form of premeditated design. At first, clementia can 
be seen as a much needed corrective to systemic corruption. However, while it may be 
possible to read Velleius’ account in this way,149 Tacitus’ Tiberius is different. Tacitus 
makes frequent references to Tiberius’ dissimulatio, the cryptic ars Tiberii and ‘secreta 
patris’.150 Clementia is a Tiberian ars; clementia is a conditional virtue in the sense that 
it depends on crime in order to come into existence and the revival of the law of treason 
provided an excess of crime. While of course it is not implied by Tacitus that Tiberius 
revived the lex maiestatis for the sole purpose of clementia, it is implied that it was 
revived for a particular reason (...quanta arte Tiberii). The imperial system requires the 
law to be oppressive to allow the virtuous (and corrupt) suspension of law. The revival 
did ‘open the floodgates’ but given the arts of Tiberius as Tacitus would hold (or the 
                                                           
147 Bauman (1974:76), similar to what Augustus did to his own triumviral statues in 28 (RG 24). 
148 See the appendices in Walker (1952:263ff.) for details. Walker’s statistics show that in the first hexad 
of the Annales Tacitus details around 75 individuals who were charged with treason (in many cases there 
were other charges too). Out of these 75 individuals, 18 were executed, 19 were punished otherwise than 
by death (mainly by exile), a further 2 were possibly executed but it is unclear. 4 individuals had their 
sentences cancelled or mitigated (in two of these cases the change was due to Tiberius’ intervention).19 
people were acquitted altogether (of these, 5 were due to Tiberius’ intervention). 12 cases were 
dismissed without trial (7 of these were on Tiberius’ orders). In cases where Tiberius is not shown by 
Tacitus to lessen the sentence or dismiss the case this is not necessarily due to Tiberius’ decision to 
punish/condemn but may be due to Tiberius’ absence, the accused’s suicide or hasty decisions made by 
the senate. A consistent picture of Tiberius’ role in the trials of treason does not emerge from the 
Tacitean account.  
149 Cf. Vell.2.129.2: ‘Cum quanta gravitate ut senator et iudex, non ut princeps, causam Drusi Libonis 
audivit!’.  
150 1.73.1, 3.37. See also 4.19, where Tacitus states (in his own voice rather than as a report of popular 
opinion) that it was characteristic of Tiberius to conceal his most recent discoveries of wickedness in 





singularis moderatio Tiberii as Velleius would have us believe151) it opened the gates 
to clementia. Yet, the virtuous suspension of the law in the act of clementia does not 
resolve corruption but produces another form of corrupt justice. Clementia is in breach 
of the law for the purpose of the appearance of virtue and, as we shall see below, it 
further perpetuates, ‘under the name of something honourable’, corrupta iudicia. 
 
 
Clementia in Theory and Practice 
 
“Surely you did not kill your father, did you?” 
 
One of the penalties for parricide was the culleus – to be sown up in a sack (sometimes 
together with beasts) and thrown out to sea.152 If the defendant pleaded not guilty, he 
was to be interdicted from water and fire and that way he could go into voluntary exile 
rather than be put to death.153 Suetonius reports an incident when a man on trial for 
parricide was saved by Augustus’ mercy. Though he was evidently guilty of the crime, 
Augustus, in order to avoid enforcing the death penalty, asked the defendant again, 
"certe patrem tuum non occidisti?" (Aug.33.1). Able to plead ‘not guilty’, the defendant 
was declared an interdictus (an outlaw or sacer homo) instead of being executed.154 
Suetonius references this case to give an example of Augustus’ administration of 
justice, which was both ‘diligent and lenient’.155  
 Clemency was an important Augustan virtue. It was one of the four virtues 
inscribed onto the clupeus virtutum (shield of virtues), along with virtus, iustitia and 
pietas, awarded to Augustus in 27 (RG 34). Our sources show that clementia was also a 
prominent virtue of Tiberius.156 Tacitus gives several examples of Tiberius’ mercy. For 
example, and in addition to the four cases discussed above, the offences of Lucius 
                                                           
151 Vell.2.122. 
152 See Kyle (1998:230, n19).  
153 On the penalty aquae et ignis interdictio see Kelly (2007:25ff.) and Bauman (1996:20ff).  
154 Kelly notes that the penalty of interdiction from water and fire derived from the religious penalty of 
sacratio, hence someone punished by interdiction (exile) was designated a sacer homo, who according to 
Festus could be killed with impunity but could not be sacrificed.  
155 See also Aug.34.2; Sen.Clem.1.9-11 on Augustan clementia. 





Ennius (3.70), Vibius Serenus (4.28), Publius Sullius, Gaius Cominius and Catus 
Firmius (4.31) and Cotta Messalinus (6.5) were either dismissed or culminated in exile 
(rather than execution) due to the intervention of the emperor. The penalties for the 
charge of civil war placed on Marcus Piso proposed by the senate were exonerated by 
Tiberius (3.16). Upon Agrippina’s death in 33, the senate voted thanks for Tiberius’ 
earlier act of clemency towards her, which as Tiberius reminded them was displayed in 
his decision to exile rather than execute or throw her down the Gemonian steps 
(6.25.3).157   
Much later and addressing the emperor Nero, Seneca defined clementia as an 
act of ‘moderation that remits something of a deserved and due punishment…stopping 
short of what could deservedly be imposed’ (Clem.2.3.1-2).158 For Seneca, ‘of all the 
virtues none benefits a human being more than clementia since none is more humane’ 
(1.3.2). Yet, according to Seneca, the act of mercy must also reflect a personal 
sacrifice: ‘a man of great mind is not one who is generous with what belongs to others, 
but who gives at the cost of depriving himself.’ Seneca goes onto say that the word 
merciful is applicable to the one ‘who understands that the mark of a great mind is to 
endure wrongs done to him even where his power is supreme’ because ‘nothing is more 
glorious than a wronged prince unrequited’ (1.20.3).  
Seneca also lists numerous benefits of practicing clementia. Showing clementia 
makes an example of the accused, prevents crime (1.23.1), enhances a ruler’s safety 
and also his honour (1.11.1-4). More generally, Seneca claims that clementia is a kind 
of philosophy which will make any household it reaches happy and calm and a mind 
free from anger (1.5.4). Clementia, though, was not to be confused with pity 
(misericordia) nor pardon (venia): ‘pardon is the remission of punishment that is due’ 
(2.7.1).159 Pity is ‘the fault of a petty mind succumbing to the sight of evil that affects 
others’ (2.2.5). Clementia is also separate from forgiving (ignoscere) which is ‘failing 
to punish what in your judgement should be punished’ (2.7.3).  
                                                           
157 For further examples of Tiberius’ clementia see the figures in Walker (1952:263ff.).  
158 Translations of Seneca’s De Clementia are those of Cooper and Procopé (1995).  





Seneca’s notion of clementia is complex. As well as embodying its base 
meaning (mercy or moderate punishment), given the time in which it was written and 
to whom it was addressed, it naturally encapsulates the wider discourse of sovereignty. 
As Seneca states, clementia represents a freedom of decision (liberum arbitrium), 
judging not by constitutional formulae (it is sub formula) but by what is fair and good 
(ex aequo et bono, 2.7.3).160  
Notable here is the difference between Arendt’s theory of forgiveness and the 
Roman theory of clementia. Whereas Arendt’s theory lacks a consideration of the 
status of those between whom the act of forgiveness takes place, for Romans this was a 
key concern. For example, Arendt does not distinguish between forgiving a legal crime 
(in which case whoever forgives must have the power to make exceptions from the 
law) and forgiving non-illegal bad acts (in which case the one who forgives would not 
necessarily have to be of executive/sovereign status).161 Arendt sees forgiveness as 
taking place between equals yet ‘the right to commute the death sentence’ could never 
be a right enacted between those of similar status. Exercising forgiveness/clementia in 
this sense is a virtue but more specifically a right, and in a Roman context (and indeed 
any political context) it is the right only of the sovereign, as Seneca makes obvious (‘Of 
all men, however, mercy becomes no one more than a king or prince; 1.3.3).  
The prince’s clementia, then, represents or should represent 1) an act of 
remission in punishment; 2) an act of self-sacrifice; 3) a free decision (liberum 
arbitrium) and 4) a judgement of aequitas. As a result, clementia emerges as a virtue 
which represents humanitas and through that, it will earn gloria. Nevertheless, 
clementia should not always be shown since ‘to forgive all is as cruel as to forgive none 
(nam tam omnibus ignoscere crudelitas quam nulli; 1.2.2).162 Finally, clementia for 
                                                           
160 Cf. Schmitt on the sovereign exception: ‘What characterises an exception is principally unlimited 
authority…The decision frees itself from all normative ties and becomes in the true sense absolute’ 
(1985:10). Clementia, though representative of this kind of freedom of decision, was not free from 
normative ties (to be discussed further below).  
161 The reason Arendt does not draw such distinctions is because she writes forgiveness as something 
which is fundamental to the political will (as something which pre-existed Christian notions of morality, 
as an ontological condition of action and the political realm). As such, the capacity to forgive is for 
Arendt something which all humans possess. This is probably true, but it is problematic since it is 
difficult to effectively analyse political virtue and action in abstraction from the law and sovereignty. 
162 Cf. Derrida who argues that forgiveness must be worth something in the sense that forgiveness can 





Seneca should not be conceived as the opposite of severitas, since no virtue can be the 
opposite of virtue (nulla virtus virtuti contraria est; 2.3). 
Turning to Tacitus, although he does not offer us a theory of clementia, Tacitus 
does present us with political situations in which we can test the theoretical ideas of 
earlier and later writers. Tiberius is shown to be merciful on several occasions, but this 
is not without creating various tensions. While clementia is certainly a quality of the 
king, and the defining feature of Tiberius’ punishment policy in the first five years of 
his reign, the problem is that it cannot exist as a King’s virtue without creating conflict. 
Clementia, as an arbitrary act of power which works in contravention of the law, is the 
right of the sovereign. For Seneca, writing under Nero, this was not a problematic 
aspect of the virtue given that Nero’s role was clearly defined. Prior to the Principate, 
clementia, specifically clementia Caesaris was problematic because Caesar did not 
have the right to make exceptions from the law. Plutarch’s Cato, for example, claims 
that he does not want to be saved by Caesar’s clementia, for that act would be against 
the law, which Caesar had no right to breach.163 Tacitus’ analysis of Tiberian clementia 
lies somewhere between these two extremes: Clementia Tiberii is not a bad virtue (like 
clementia Caesaris) but it is not presented as a King’s virtue (as is Senecan clementia). 
This is for two reasons. Firstly, the idea of self-sacrifice which is attached to Seneca’s 
clementia depends on a defined sense of what belongs to whom. For example, if the 
majesty of the res publica is embodied by the king then in his forgiveness of an offence 
against the state, he makes a personal sacrifice; he becomes a ‘glorious wronged prince 
unrequited’ (Clem.1.20.3). The problem in Tacitus’ writing of Tiberian politics, as 
discussed above, is that the question of to whom a crime causes offence is not so 
defined. Subsequently, the danger of ‘being generous with what belongs to others’ is 
real. Secondly, although clementia for Seneca is the virtue of a king or prince, this 
again creates various problems. In Tacitus’ Tiberian Rome, clemency is not something 
which can offer just the right amount of remission, which is so clearly a concern for 
Seneca. This is because the emperor’s ‘freedom of decision’ (liberum arbitrium) may 
conflict with what the senate consider to be ‘due’ and ‘just’, categories which are 
                                                           





somewhat subjective anyway. In a sense, Tacitus’ construction of clementia is that of a 
King’s virtue, but part of the problem is that the freedom of decision at this time still 
belongs to the regime. Put differently, given the paradoxical nature of Tiberian politics 
(republic and Principate, oligarchy and autocracy) the right to clementia is not defined 
and this creates a conflict of power between leading men in the state. The question thus 
becomes, who can speak for the state?  
Such tensions can be traced in Book 3. In AD 22, Lucius Ennius was accused of 
treason for melting down a silver statue of the emperor for domestic use. Tacitus 
reports that Tiberius vetoed the prosecution but Ateius Capito openly objected, 
claiming that such a serious crime should not go unpunished and that the emperor’s 
own indifference towards acts against himself should not go so far as to condone 
offences against the state (3.70). Tiberius, Tacitus states, understood these remarks 
(intellexit haec Tiberius), as there was more to them than what was being said (ut erant 
magis quam ut dicebantur), but nevertheless persisted with his veto (perstititque 
intercedere). According to Tacitus, the result of Capito’s show of freedom (quasi per 
libertatem),which presents yet another clash between traditional ideals (in this case 
severitas) and imperial prerogatives (in this case clementia), was that he had now 
disgraced an eminent public career as well as good conduct in private matters.  
The short story of Ennius is telling. As mentioned before, a corrupt act is often 
understood as something which seeks ‘private gain at public offense’.164  Tiberius’ 
performance of the virtue of clementia is naturally a private gain since whether 
intended as such or not, it reflects a ‘humane’ act. Yet as Capito notes, it is equally one 
which offends the senate and their sovereignty by vetoing their original decision to 
prosecute and furthermore by forgiving a crime which, according to Capito, offends the 
res publica. Though the line between a crime against the emperor and a crime against 
the state is fluid (since the emperor was supposed to be the father of the state), in this 
case, Tacitus shows another side. For Tiberius to exemplify his clementia by forgiving 
Ennius’ act is beneficial for his own identity, but it is in conflict with the identity of the 
                                                           





senate who retain the right to be offended, by extension, in cases of offences directed at 
the princeps. 
Secondly, it is notable that despite the ‘forces of despotism’ a conflict of 
opinion is still possible between senate and emperor, which implies that the ‘despot’ 
was not necessarily the absolute ruler. In Capito’s opinion, the senate should not have 
to be snatched away from their ‘power of deciding’ (non enim debere eripi patribus 
vim statuendi; 3.71.2). Furthermore, in a conflict of opinion as to what is due and just, 
the act of clementia slips into an act of pardon (venia) which is a Senecan vice and 
which is how Tiberius’ clementia on this occasion is portrayed. This is suggested by 
Capito when in his show of libertas he warns the emperor ‘not to be too generous’ 
(pace Seneca) in cases of offences to the res publica (…rei publicae iniurias ne 
largiretur). Seneca’s distinction between venia and clementia, the King’s clementia and 
clementia publica, as well as the distinction between what belongs to Tiberius and what 
belongs to the senate (and what would therefore precisely constitute a ‘self-sacrifice’) 
are distinctions which in Tacitus cannot be so easily determined. In Tacitus, the theory 
of clementia cannot be reconciled with the practice of clementia. Furthermore, and in 
contravention of Seneca’s dictum ‘nulla virtus virtuti contraria est’, it is evident that 
Tiberius’ virtuous clementia is in opposition to the senate’s virtuous severitas. 
From this perspective, Tacitus’ narrative of punishment reveals some of the 
subtle problems and paradoxes embedded within the virtue of clementia. It is a 
potential locus of political and juridical conflict. Furthermore, by tracing Tacitus’ 
narrative on the practices of clementia, it is revealed that the nature of government was 
still in tension and paradoxical. It is often taken for granted that the Principate at this 
time was a despotic system, with a definitive line between the sovereignty of the senate 
and that of the emperor. Yet the line is not so defined here. We may extend this conflict 
between who has the right to appear as either clement or severe, to explore the question 
of who has the right to appear as prudens: the question is not only to do with who has 
the prudentia to distinguish between good and bad, right and wrong; rather, the issue 





so doing decide good and right and thereby assert knowledge (and reinforce power).165 
Such questions remain difficult to answer, as does the question of whether it is prudens 
or ‘right’ to be clement or not. 
Similar conflicts can be traced in Tacitus’ writing of the case of Clutorius 
Priscus (3.49-51). Clutorius Priscus was charged for writing a poem which anticipated 
Drusus’ death following the praise and payment he received from Tiberius after 
composing successful verses on the death of Germanicus. Since Clutorius had read the 
poem in the house of Publius Petronius there were many witnesses who gave evidence 
against Clutorius when the case went to trial. Clutorius was subsequently deemed 
guilty. Haterius Agrippa the consul designate proposed the imposition of the death 
penalty but Marcus Lepidus opposed and argued for a less severe punishment (again, 
interdiction from water and fire, effectively voluntary exile). Lepidus’ speech to the 
other senators on behalf of Clutorius is recorded by Tacitus as follows: 
 
“si, patres conscripti, unum id spectamus, quam nefaria 
voce Clutorius Priscus mentem suam et auris hominum 
polluerit, neque carcer neque laqueus, ne serviles quidem 
cruciatus in eum suffecerint. sin flagitia et facinora sine 
modo sunt, suppliciis ac remediis principis moderatio 
maiorumque et vestra exempla temperat et vana a 
scelestis, dicta a maleficiis differunt, est locus sententiae 
per quam neque huic delictum impune sit et nos 
clementiae simul ac severitatis non paeniteat. saepe 
audivi principem nostrum conquerentem si quis sumpta 
morte misericordiam eius praevenisset. vita Clutorii in 
integro est, qui neque servatus in periculum rei publicae 
neque interfectus in exemplum ibit. studia illi ut plena 
vaecordiae, ita inania et fluxa sunt; nec quicquam grave 
ac serium ex eo metuas qui suorum ipse flagitiorum 
                                                           
165 Cf. Foucault, ‘the exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge, and, conversely knowledge 
constantly induces effects of power’ (1980a:52). Of course, Foucault focusses this circular relationship 
between power and knowledge to truth, as something which produces truths (see above p.67, n.14). 
Notably, truth is not connected with (classical) sovereignty in Foucault (that is, truth is not something 
which is constructed by those in power), but this is not the case in Tacitus (nor is it the case throughout 
Foucault, since he does refer to certain people who are charged with the ability to decide truth 
(1980:131). It is difficult to know what exists first (power, knowledge or truth) but in Tacitus it appears 
that power exists first. In Tacitus the point is that truth has been drained from the system (hence defined 
binaries have lost their definitions) and so there emerges a struggle to make it again by those in power. 





proditor non virorum animis sed muliercularum adrepit. 
cedat tamen urbe et bonis amissis aqua et igni arceatur: 
quod perinde censeo ac si lege maiestatis tenerentur.” 
(Ann.3.50) 
 
"If, Senators, we look at the single fact of the nefarious 
utterance with which Clutorius has polluted his own mind 
and other listeners, neither prison nor noose nor tortures 
chosen for slaves would be enough. But though shameful 
crimes and evil deeds have no limit, penalties and cures 
are tempered by the moderation of the emperor and by the 
precedents of your ancestors, and yourselves. Folly 
differs from wickedness; evil words from evil deeds, and 
thus there is space for a sentence by which this fault may 
not go unpunished, while we shall have no cause to regret 
either our clementia or severitas. I have often heard our 
emperor complain when any one has anticipated his 
misericordia by a choice of death. Clutorius's life is still 
untouched; if spared, he will be no danger to the State; his 
death will make no example to others. His works are as 
inane and fluid as they are replete with folly. Nothing 
grave or troubling is to be taken from the man who is the 
betrayer of his own shameful works on the minds, not of 
men, but of common women. Let him leave Rome, lose 
his property, and be interdicted from fire and water. That 
is my proposal, just as though he were judged under the 
law of treason." 
 
Similar to conflicts between the emperor and senate, Lepidus’ speech reveals a tension 
between the views of leading men in the state given the contested notion of what 
constitutes a deserved punishment and what precisely would constitute something 
which stops short of that, thus representing clementia. Haterius deemed it right to 
impose the death penalty, but in Lepidus’ view, having paid some attention to the 
nature of Clutorius’ crime, which is seen by him as empty and meaningless (studia illi 
ut plena vaecordiae, ita inania et fluxa sunt), this would be far too severe.  Although 
Clutorius’ poem polluted his own mind and those of his listeners it was not in Lepidus’ 
opinion a serious crime. The implication is that severitas (in this case death) should be 
reserved for meaningful crimes (scelera) and misdeeds (maleficia), whereas clementia 
(in this case exile) is for meaningless (vanus) crimes and words (dicta). Subsequently, 





serviles quidem cruciatus in eum suffecerint) except for declaring Clutorius an outlaw 
and banishing him from Rome. In the end however, despite Lepidus’ argument for 
punishment by exile, Clutorius was executed.166  
Again, the point is that judging a bad act in terms of its meaning and nature in 
legal terms is no longer the method by which punishment is decided (or enforced). 
Clutorius’ studia…inania et fluxa became criminal, even punishable by death, because 
of dubious political connotations. We may read this as a reverse display of Senecan 
venia which is ‘the remission of punishment that is due’. What Tacitus draws attention 
to here is the opposite of venia, which is the enforcement of punishment that is not due. 
This is not severitas but possibly ira, which is implied in an earlier passage as 
something which Tacitus saw as the opposite of clementia.167 
Tiberius was away from Rome at the time of Clutorius’ trial but on hearing the 
outcome he established a policy whereby all executions were to be delayed for ten days 
following the senate’s verdict (so if need be the emperor could veto). The suggestion is 
that Tiberius favoured Lepidus’ more thoughtful approach over Haterius’ hasty 
execution, which made capital punishment for verbal treason (even if inane in nature) a 
legal precedent.  
Yet regardless of Haterius’ undue representation to execute, the decision retains 
a connection with virtue, and not in the form of severitas but in the form of pietas. At 
the end of the chapter Tacitus states that Tiberius praised Lepidus but he also 
commended the senate for their pietas to the emperor in so zealously avenging any 
iniuriae to the princeps. Every corrupt act (in this case unwarranted execution) has a 
virtuous derivative (in this case pietas). In such a context, and to return to Tacitus’ 
digression at 4.33, one can only wonder what precisely is the right or ‘prudent’ thing to 
do. In this case, it would be right to be merciful and have Clutorius exiled rather than 
                                                           
166 Notable here is that Lepidus proposes the invocation of the lex maiestatis because he deemed this to 
be the lesser of two evils (3.51.4, above). So, in the case above it is Lepidus who ‘exploits’ the lex 
maiestatis for his own (though not despotic/cruel) purposes given that he proposes Clutorius be punished 
under this law because exile would be less severe than execution.  
167 3.22: here during the trial of Aemilia Lepida Tacitus writes that no one could perceive the emperor’s 
mind, since so greatly did he mix the signs of ira and clementia (…adeo vertit ac miscuit irae et 
clementiae signa). Cf. Hist.1.18 on the ‘nimia severitas’ of Galba which is portrayed in a negative light, 






executed (Lepidus’ choice) yet it would also be right to execute Clutorius, since that 
would represent loyalty to the emperor (the choice favoured by the rest of the senators 
and Haterius). In this view, it is not that people cannot discern right from wrong but 
rather, that the right thing to do in itself is no longer self-evident but relatively defined, 
and even then it remains contentious.  
Alternatively, we may read Tacitus’ reference to few being able to ‘wisely 
discern’ right from wrong and use from harm (pauci prudentia…discernunt) in terms of 
misrecognition, that, most people were not wise enough to see that traditional 
conceptions of right (such as those favoured by Lepidus, as well as Haterius, Fronto, 
Capito and L. Piso) were no longer right under the time of the Principate, a time in 
which luxury, informing and now execution offered an access to virtue. 
Whether the theory of good (what morality should be in politics) can be 
reconciled with the practice of good (what morality is in politics) is something which 
Tacitus continues to question. In this perspective the problem in Tacitus is not to do 
with the frailty of political action but the frailty of political morality. 
 
The Dangers of Forgiveness  
 
fama clementiam sequeretur. (Ann.4.31.2) 
 
In the previous section, I discussed the ways in which Tacitus’ narrative draws 
attention to certain factors which reveal the practice of clementia as a source of 
conflict. This conflict is to do with a question of imperium (who has the right to 
exercise clementia?) and a question of prudentia (what is the right thing to do – to 
show venia, clementia, severitas or ira?).  In this final section, I will examine Tacitus’ 
writing of the virtue of clementia as one which was inherently corrupt in order to argue 
that clementia in Tacitus is not as corrective, nor as humane as it emerges in the 
theories of Arendt and Seneca. The paradox of clementia is that it is a virtue which can 
only exist in contravention of the law. The state, then, displays its power in the 
suspension of the very law that makes the state. From this perspective, one can see that 





clementia as sub formula is in contravention of the basic Roman principle pacta sunt 
servanda (Cic.Off.3.92) and Tiberius’ ‘leges exercendas esse’ (Ann.1.72.4). Contrary to 
Seneca’s focus on clementia as moderate, clementia rather is boundless.  
The problem of boundlessness is something which Tiberius himself draws 
attention to in his speech to the senate during the case of Junius Silanus (3.66-8). Junius 
Silanus was accused of extortion by the people of Asia where he had been governor. 
Following this charge the former consul Aemilius Scaurus, the praetor Junius Otho and 
the aedile Bruttedius Niger charged Junius Silanus with offences against the majesty of 
Augustus and Tiberius. Such crimes were supported by two senior members of Silanus’ 
staff in Asia, Gellius Publicola and Marcus Paconius. In Tacitus’ view, Junius Silanus 
was guilty but given the nature of the accusations, even an innocent man would have 
been in danger (3.67.1-2). Further charges were placed upon him and his slaves were 
sold to the State Agent for examination by torture. Following this, Silanus abandoned 
his defence (3.67.4).  
Tacitus’ narration of the case so far shows why certain charges were 
inescapable even before the defence was given. Initially, Silanus was charged with 
extortion and sacrilege (3.66.1) but charges of maiestas were later added, which 
Tacitus describes as ‘binding’ and something which caused ‘an obligation for silence’ 
(vinclum et necessitas silendi; 3.67.4). The point being that once maiestas is invoked, it 
is not likely that the accused will be believed to be innocent nor is it likely that anyone, 
even a friend, will speak in the victim’s defence (et ne quis necessariorum iuvaret 
periclitantem maiestatis crimina subdebantur; 3.67.3). A similar sentiment was 
expressed in Tacitus’ discussion of the case of Libo Drusus – when Libo turned to his 
relatives for help, refusals were made under different pretexts but from the same fear 
(…cum diversa praetenderent, eadem formidine; 2.29). Further to this, and again 
similar to the case of Libo Drusus, it is also notable that Silanus abandoned his defence 
after his slaves were sold to the state agent (igitur petito paucorum dierum interiectu 
defensionem sui deseruit). If slaves are going to be questioned under torture, with the 





to say, regardless of what is true or false.168 With maiestas invoked, more likely is that 
Silanus’ slaves would have supported the informers’ accusations even if they thought 
their master was innocent. Any defence is thus rendered wholly pointless. Clearly, this 
is another sign of corrupta iudicia designed to support the majesty of the state rather 
than regulate justice, the latter being irrelevant or at least irreconcilable with imperial 
prerogatives. 
In the next chapters Tacitus describes the process of deciding Silanus’ 
punishment. In order to justify the proceedings against Silanus by precedent (sub 
exemplo) Tiberius ordered the citation of Augustus’ libelli at the trial of L. Valerius 
Mesalla Voleus.169 After the libelli were read, Tiberius asked L. Piso for advice, who 
proposed that Silanus should be outlawed and relegated to the island of Gyaros 
(3.68.2). Advice from other members of the senate followed, some excessively 
adulatory, but all for the cause of clementia. Tiberius, in opposition, then made the 
following speech, as reported by Tacitus: 
 
non quidem sibi ignare quae de Silano vulgabantur, sed 
non ex rumore statuendum. multos in provinciis contra 
quam spes aut metus de illis fuerit egisse: excitari 
quosdam ad meliora magnitudine rerum, hebescere alios. 
neque posse principem sua scientia cuncta complecti 
neque expedire ut ambitione aliena trahatur. ideo leges in 
facta constitui quia futura in incerto sint. sic a maioribus 
institutum ut, si antissent delicta, poenae sequerentur. ne 
verterent sapienter reperta et semper placita: satis 
onerum principibus, satis etiam potentiae. minui iura 
quotiens gliscat potestas, nec utendum imperio ubi 
legibus agi possit. (3.69.2-3) 
 
 
Caesar said that it was not of course unknown to him 
what was being said about Silanus, but nothing is to be 
established by rumour. Many men had acted in the 
                                                           
168 So in the slave’s case, and returning to Foucault, it is not only ‘we have to produce the truth in order 
to be able to produce wealth’ (Foucault, 2004:25) but ‘we have to produce the truth in order to be able to 
produce our freedom’).  
169 The proconsul of Asia in AD 11/12 who was prosecuted for having executed 300 provincials in one 






provinces contrary to what was hoped or feared of them. 
Some were excited to better deeds by the greatness of the 
circumstances; others became dull by it. It is not possible 
for an emperor’s knowledge to encircle everything, nor is 
it proper that he should be swayed by the ambition of 
others. In fact, it is for that reason that laws are to be 
established, what will be in the future is uncertain. It was 
the rule of our ancestors that, whenever there was first an 
offence, some penalty should follow. Let us not 
revolutionise a wisely created and ever pleasing system. 
Emperors have enough burdens, and also enough power. 
Rights are lessened as power increases; we should not fall 
back on imperium when we can act by the law.  
 
 
Tiberius’ speech reveals an Arendtian tone. Pacta, for Arendt acted to stabilise the 
uncertainty of the future, and this is precisely why in the speech above Tiberius is 
arguing for a return to constitutional practice (ideo leges in facta constitui quia futura 
in incerto sint).170 Against the senators, then, Tiberius argues for a return to the law. He 
also condemns the practice of delation (‘nothing should be established by rumour’) and 
an excess of imperium (‘rights are lessened as potestas increases’). For Tiberius, in 
accordance with the maiores, punishment must follow crime (sic a maioribus 
institutum ut, si antissent delicta, poenae sequerentur) and imperium should not 
overtake the laws. Similar to his earlier claim ‘exercendas leges esse’ Tiberius is not 
speaking as the law but he is speaking in defence of the rule of law – actual Roman 
Law. For Tiberius neither rumore, nor imperium, nor potestas, should determine justice 
(though Augustan libelli evidently should).  
Nevertheless, clementia remains determinate. In the end, Silanus was punished 
but he was not ‘punished in full’. Despite the allegations of extortion and sacrilege, as 
well as crimes against the majesty of Augustus, Tiberius and the state, Tiberius asked 
the senate to consider exiling Silanus to the less dreary and lonely island of Cythus. 
The senate agreed to do so.  
Tacitus’ writing of Tiberius’ character is contradictory. According to R. Mellor, 
‘Tacitus shows Tiberius as deeply devious in hiding his real desires and allowing 
                                                           





informers and prosecutors to enforce harsh laws while distancing himself from them. 
This has become a tactic of tyrants through the ages – today we call it “deniability”.171 
It is, however, difficult to support Mellor’s claims from the narrative. Tacitus certainly 
shows Tiberius as someone who was complicit in the process of corruption. As was 
seen in the case of Libo Drusus, Tiberius let corruption continue. However, Tiberius 
did not necessarily allow informers and prosecutors to enforce harsh laws while 
distancing himself from them. There are many examples of Tiberius moderating the 
‘harsh’ use of law. In other cases, the informers’ attempts to enforce harsh laws are 
cancelled out altogether due to Tiberius’ dismissals of cases. In the speech above, 
Tiberius is clearly condemning delation since neither imperium nor rumore should 
guide the truth.  Furthermore, the revival or enforcement of certain ‘harsh laws’ is not 
necessarily reflective of Tiberius’ tyranny but may be read instead as a reflection of 
coercive imperial prerogatives, which placed pressures even on the emperor himself to 
commit to corrupt acts. As was discussed with regard to the revival of the lex 
maiestatis, there are other reasons behind the law’s revival, which do not necessarily 
imply tyranny nor “deniability” but reveal aspects of the regime which made it so that 
certain ‘tyrannical’ or better ‘political’ decisions and actions had to be taken. The 
instruments of tyranny were left by Augustus and what Tacitus shows is that they could 
seldom be controlled by Tiberius.  
  Moreover, and if we are to take Tiberius as a tyrant as Mellor asserts, one 
wonders whether the tactic of ‘deniability’ would be necessary. Deniability does not 
link with tyranny nor monarchy because it is in the emperor’s power to decide who 
should be accountable. Deniability, in other words, would be a useful tactic for the 
flattering senator, the needy delator or the condemned, but it would be useless to the 
emperor of Rome. A tyrant or despot had the power to make new laws (novi iuris 
repertor; 2.30.3) or make exceptions in existing laws; he would not need ‘deniability’ 
as a political tool. Hence, during the trial of Calpurnius Piso (3.10ff.), who was charged 
with the murder of Germanicus, a murder which Tiberius was believed to have played 
some part, Tiberius did not need to ‘deny’ any involvement. Rather, he safely 
                                                           





transferred the whole case to the senate for investigation. Alternatively, he arranged it 
so that Piso was murdered so any damaging truth about the emperor would not be 
revealed. Ultimate power becomes the emperor, but the problem is that Tiberius was an 
emperor who did not want this to be the case, since ultimate power was viewed by him 
as something which could endanger his political position. Tyranny, in terms of over-
bearing force, is not therefore necessarily located in the emperor but it may instead be 
read as something which is located in the time, a time in which the law, morality and 
the (Augustan) past were coercive rather than corrective sources of knowledge. 
Tacitus’ contradictory writing of Tiberius’ character may then be read in 
conjunction with Tacitus’ writing of morality. At Ann.3.55, Tacitus supposes that there 
is in all things a cyclical element, and just as the times change, so too do mores. 
However, one consistency in the early narrative is Tiberius’ clementia. Yet, clementia 
itself is a problematic virtue, since as Tiberius reminds us in his speech above, the law 
not imperium should rule. Clementia is an exceptional virtue and as a result it 
problematises the legal and ethical meaning of pacta. However, although the virtue of 
clementia as sub formula represents a legal exception, of course, this is not to do with 
the legalisation of violence which is how the exception is often understood.172 Rather, 
clementia is to do with the purpose of moral self-fashioning and the power that is 
achieved through sovereign humanitas.  
This allows us to understand the ‘exception’ from a different perspective, 
outside the realm of violence and injustice and inside the realm of mercy and discursive 
structures. In the works of Giorgio Agamben, exceptionality has been analysed from 
the perspective of violence, law and sovereignty.173 In Agamben’s view the state of 
exception is a ‘no man’s land’ in which the distinction between legality and illegality is 
legally suspended. This suspension is declared by the sovereign: ‘the one who marks 
the point of indistinction between violence and right by proclaiming the state of 
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173 ‘As long as the two elements [auctoritas and potestas] remain correlated yet conceptually, temporally 
and subjectively distinct . . . their dialectic . . . can nevertheless function in some way. But when they 
tend to coincide in a single person, when the state of exception, in which they are bound and blurred 






exception and suspending the validity of the law.’174 Agamben’s definition of the state 
of exception follows that of Carl Schmitt: ‘what characterises an exception is 
principally unlimited authority…The [sovereign’s] decision frees itself from all 
normative ties and becomes in the true sense absolute.’175  
Tacitus’ writing of the years which preceded and followed the foundation of the 
Principate can be described as a state of exception in accordance with the definitions of 
Schmitt and Agamben. In Augustus’ absorption of the functions of the law, the courts 
and the magistrates, his power is rendered absolute.   
The concept of mercy in a Roman context, clementia as supra leges or sub 
formula, is marked by an exceptional quality. Although Agamben himself does not 
focus on mercy as an exceptional decision, the continuity between the legal and the 
illegal that is encapsulated by the act of mercy has attracted some scholarly attention.176  
According to S. Williams mercy operates outside of the rules by giving a lesser 
punishment than that inscribed in the law: ‘Mercy is irregular, unpredictable and 
fundamentally not rule bound.’177 According to Fiskesjö, mercy is a personal or 
quintessentially sovereign decision, for ‘to dream of a world without pardons is to 
dream of a world without sovereign power.’178 Other scholars have noted that mercy is 
itself corrupt – in the decision to forgive a crime, there is a failure of justice and 
equality.179  
For Derrida, clemency or ‘the pardon’ should ‘not be normal, normative, 
normalizing. It should remain exceptional and extraordinary.’180 But in a Roman 
context it was normal and normative, even expected of a sovereign to display 
clementia. Mercy was a part of Roman normative knowledge in the sense that it was 
closely associated with the discourses of the past and ‘civilised’ (or ‘Augustan’) 
                                                           
174 Agamben (2000:104). 
175 Schmitt (1985:10), (cf. Sen.Clem.2.7.3, above). 
176 On mercy and legal judgement see further Sarat (2012:1-18), Hampton and Murphy (1988). On mercy 
as exceptional see Williams (2012:247-290) and Derrida (1999).  
177 Williams (2012:251). 
178 Fiskesjö (2003:51). 
179 Markel (2004) cf. Nussbaum (1993).  





behaviour in the present.181 The exceptionality of clementia is not limited to the space 
of physical violence and civil war as it is in the works of Agamben and Schmitt. The 
emperor’s or the senate’s decision on mercy is not to do with allowing or opening a 
space for violence, rather it is to do with closure and virtus. Clementia for Romans was 
an act of humanitas, and therefore something ‘right’ rather than a zone of indistinction 
in which violence and right is confused.182 Yet, for this very reason – that is, the more 
subtle connotation of exceptionality which is embedded in the virtue of clementia – 
clementia is more complicated than ‘a law above the law’ and also more dangerous 
despite its less obvious connection to violence. Since it is a virtue, it is able to pervade 
juridical structures more seamlessly.  
From this perspective, Roman clementia shows the historic or systemic nature 
of Roman exceptionality (exceptionality as built into the Roman episteme because it 
was conducive to Roman ethics). As such, clementia does not create a zone of 
indistinction between violence and right but a zone of indistinction between exception 
and norm. The latter zone of indistinction (between exception and norm) is also a 
concern for Agamben but it is perhaps more usefully traced in the pervasive sub-
structures of morality and discourse rather than the realm of manifest violence. 
Although violence does represent a manifestation of law’s threshold, morality because 
it ordinarily works alongside the law is more capable of concealing any exceptional 
(and violent) quality. The imperial virtue of clementia helps to illuminate how the 
emperor continued to reinforce his political position (through making exceptions) while 
at the same time reinforcing his moral position (through the employment of the 
discourses of humanity).183 
                                                           
181 Though, notably, not all clement acts were civilised or humane. See above p.27, n.49 on the two sides 
of clementia.  
182 In his discussion of the sovereign ban, Agamben does refer to Cicero, stating that the interdictus was 
the product of the sovereign ban, and again following Cicero (Cic.Caec.34.100) exile is rightly noted by 
Agamben as inbetween punishment and refuge (Agamben, 1998:65-6). But Agamben does not consider 
the outlaw in terms of how he is declared as such because he was saved from death. The implication of 
this on the ban is significant because the ban is a choice made by the condemned and inevitably so 
because the alternative was execution. 
183 Notably, the impetus on clementia is a fundamental manifestation of the workings of biopower, a type 
of power which, as explained above cannot reduce life because it seeks to administer it and multiply it. 
To return to Foucault, when he posits the shift from sovereign power to biopower, he asks (rhetorically): 





From this perspective we may read the darkness of Tacitus from a different 
perspective. Certainly Tacitus describes a violent society, growing dominatio, crime 
and wicked deeds but there is always a virtuous derivative, which does not legitimate 
violence or corruption but can explain why people were committing evil acts and more 
widely how the system was designed in such a way so as to reward evil acts, thus 
systematising the connection between corruption and morality. The virtuous conclusion 
of corruption may be read in particular in Tacitus’ analysis of clementia which though 
exceptional would nevertheless be followed by fame (fama clementiam sequeretur).  
However, a final point is that although clementia was a sign of humanity, it is 
notable that in a Roman context there is a close association between mercy and the 
production of bare life.184 This is because in cases of capital punishment the person 
who was condemned to death but given the option of voluntary exile was declared an 
outlaw. Prior to Caesar the capital penalty (poena capitis) simply meant death. Caesar 
replaced immediate execution with the interdiction from water and fire (aquae et ignis 
interdicto, many examples of this penalty are in Tacitus).185 This placed a ban on the 
condemned from shelter and sustenance in Rome, stripped him of his citizen rights, and 
made him liable to be killed by anyone with impunity.186  
Bauman has argued that exile was a civic outgrowth of Roman humanitas – 
since the Romans were reluctant to condemn citizens to death and so allowed the 
option of exile.187 In his monograph on the history of exile in the republican period, R. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
ensure, sustain, and multiply life, to put this life in order? For such a power, execution was at the same 
time a limit, a scandal and a contradiction’ (1998:138). Clearly, an awareness of this contradiction did 
not emerge in modernity as Foucault believes; rather, our sources show both an awareness of the 
contradiction (hence the debate and conflict between severitas and clementia) and in the end, a 
reconciliation of the conflict through biopolitical (merciful) imperatives. However, the impetus on mercy 
(saving/making life) is not separate to the classical model of sovereignty since it is by saving life or 
‘disallowing life to the point of death’ (showing mercy) that the power of the sovereign is affirmed. The 
point is that it is not a case of one form of power turning into another, as Foucault argues, but that 
different forms of power co-exist, and furthermore that the biopolitical imperative to ‘make life’ cannot 
be disentagled from the sovereign’s power or right over life and death, nor, on the other hand, from the 
discourses of humanity.   
184 Agamben traces the production of bare life in particular in the space of the camp which for Agamben 
is the space in which ‘the most absolute conditio inhumana that has ever existed on Earth was realized.’ 
(1998:95).  
185 Kelly (2006:95-8). 
186 At Ep.4.11.3, Pliny states that the interdicted person also lost the right to wear the toga. 
187 Bauman (1996). Sallust condemns the Romans for taking over the death penalty from the Greek 





Kelly has also revealed that most capital convictions ended in exile rather than death 
but for Kelly this was the result of Roman concordia rather than humanitas.188  
 In Tacitus, given that fama clementiam sequerentur, exile can be read as an 
outgrowth of the psychological and civic notion of fame (‘the one thing to be untiringly 
worked for’).189 Nevertheless, whether connected to the idea of concordia, the wider 
ideology of humanitas or the sovereign’s desire for a favourable memory, homo sacer 
was a by-product of clementia (of virtue). Subsequently, clementia is a ‘harmful 
virtue’. It is the quintessential manifestation of corrupta iudicia because not only does 
it distort the rule of law but it potentially reduces the identification of the Roman as 
citizen. However, similar to the corrupt force of delation, there are virtuous reasons for 
this distortion (fama, concordia, humanitas). Clementia then is the exemplary 
manifestation of virtuous corruption. 
As such, to reduce Roman imperial conflict to the emperor’s despotism even 
urgens dominatio will prevent an understanding into the extent of conflict which was 
either suspended or hidden beneath Roman normalising structures and/or imperial 
virtutes. Of course we cannot use clementia to locate a Roman inhumanitas or ‘conditio 
inhumana’ as that would be anachronistic and in any case beside the point, but it is 
notable and paradoxical that the obscure figure of Roman law used by Agamben to 
trace the production of bare life, something which in contemporary political discourse 
represents gross physical cruelty, is a manifestation of what for Romans was a humane 
act of mercy, something which was initially defined as the very opposite of cruelty 
(‘Quid ergo opponitur clementiae? Crudelitas’; Sen.Clem.2.4.1). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
the accused the alternative of exile (Cat.51.22-40). Exile therefore was not a statutory punishment. See 
also Cic.Caec.100, where it is stated that exile is not a punishment but a ‘refuge’ from punishment 
(exsilium enim non supplicium est, sed perfugium portusque supplici). 
188 ‘Exile was not a formal legal penalty contained in statutes, although it was the practical outcome of 
most capital convictions. Indeed, due to the custom of allowing voluntary exilium, there are relatively few 
recorded instances of death sentences actually being carried out against Roman citizens during the 
republican period’ (2006:1). Kelly has argued that exile was an outgrowth of concordia rather than 
clementia: ‘Roman exile was an outgrowth of the civic ideal of concordia in that it served to promote the 
stability of the state. To this end, exilium performed a very specific function: it acted as a “safety valve” 
to prevent public disputes among elite citizens from turning into armed civil conflict’ (2006:13).  






Conclusion: Virtuous Corruption and Deviant Virtue 
 
 Don’t blame morality where much more systemic forces 
are at power.190  
 
Tacitus’ analysis of corruption is complex. In the Germania, Tacitus writes that the 
Germans were able to pursue pudicitia because they were not corrupted by the 
allurement of the games, nor the irritations of dinner parties. In Germany, no one 
laughs at vice ‘nor calls it the spirit of the age to corrupt and be corrupted’ (…nec 
corrumpere et corrumpi saeculum vocatur; 19.1). Good morals are stronger in 
Germany than good laws are elsewhere (19.2). From such comments on the nature of 
morality among the Germans, we could make a few assumptions as to what, in Tacitus’ 
view, were the causes of corruption among the Romans – games, dinner parties and 
ineffective laws.  
The notion that Roman culture in the form of baths and elegant feasts (balinea 
et convivia elegantiae) stimulated corruption is also implied in the Agricola. Though 
the Britons referred to such things as civilisation (humanitas), for Tacitus, such 
pleasures (voluptates) were in reality a part of their enslavement (Idque apud imperitos 
humanitas vocabatur, cum pars servitutis esset).191 
 In the Annales, corruption is certainly connected to and sourced from 
ineffective law. Corruption may also be read in terms of the ‘irritationes conviviorum’ 
(the stimulants of banquets). However, at the same time, the difference in the Annales 
is that Tacitus allows an insight into why such vices and problematic laws persisted in 
Rome and furthermore, why they became a crucial part of imperial politics and 
identity. Corruption in Rome is closely connected with concordia and virtus. Deviant 
laws (such as the lex maiestatis) play an on-going role in maintaining order in the state 
and questionable activities (such as delatio and luxuria) are fundamental to the 
individual’s process of earning wealth and status. The point (and the problem) therefore 
is that the dynamics of corruption is intimately linked with a dynamics of morality. 
Corruption does not stand alone, but serves a purpose, specifically a virtuous purpose. 
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In this perspective, the reason corruption infects the imperial body, and persists like a 
pestilentia, is because an engagement in corruption enables something good – either the 
appearance of virtue or physical survival. 
As I have discussed in this chapter, Tacitus’ writing of Tiberian politics shows 
that corrupt acts have virtuous outcomes: through luxuria the senator is afforded status 
and dignitas; through deceit the delator is afforded a possible alliance with the emperor 
and an alternative access to power. Tacitus therefore allows an insight into the benefits 
of corruption, which implies that corruption does not amount to a failure of 
‘rationality’, nor is corruption a reflection of uncivilised human behaviour.192 Rather, 
corruption, when a tool for social and political advancement, is precisely a rationale 
and precisely reasoned. Corruption in Tacitus’ Rome is a conscious (a cultural, 
civilised and Symbolic) activity because it is through corrupt activity that individuals 
can assert an honourable position in society. In this perspective, it is the fear of a loss 
of power (rather than power itself) that stimulates corruption because corruption is that 
which enabled power and virtue. 
Yet, corruption in Tacitus is further complex. From a reverse perspective, 
Tacitus’ narrative also reveals that virtuous acts had corrupt outcomes, that certain 
virtutes retained certain limitations. The moderatio of the emperor attends to the 
despotic powers of the regime (as when he maintains a commitment to tyrannous laws 
or when he sits in on the courts, monitoring iustitia while also preventing libertas). The 
clementia of the sovereign similarly ends in corrupt justice since not only does mercy 
bend the law but it also results in exile, which sees the wrongdoer’s loss of citizen 
rights.  
Since Tacitus allows an insight into the benefits of vice and the limitations of 
virtue, it is often difficult to know where corruption ends and morality begins; virtue in 
Tacitus always retains an element of vice and vice an element of virtue. In this 
perspective, that corruption is something which is maintained within a dialectical 
relation with morality, we may understand corruption in Tacitus not in terms of lacking 
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mores or traditional prudentia; but as something which reflects and results from the 
frailty of morality itself, and even the frailty of knowledge. 
Tacitus’ writing of the frailty of morality and knowledge, a frailty which is 
implied in his digression at 4.33, makes it difficult (for those in his text, as well as for 
those reading his text) to know what precisely is or was the ‘right’ thing to do under the 
Principate. Of course, for Tacitus, a pre-existing or self-evident knowledge of good and 
right exists, since if not, he would not be able to offer (as he intends) a didactic writing 
of the past, since teaching right and wrong through good and bad exempla depends of 
course on a preconception of what is right. That said, it appears to me that Tacitus’ 
conception of right is not necessarily in tune with traditionalist views. As a historian, it 
seems that Tacitus is someone who challenges the relevance and strength of the mos 
maiorum (as well as the law) rather than someone who is trying to teach why an 
adherence to society’s ordering structures should be maintained (in order to prevent 
corruption).  
The prevention of social corruption depends on a specific organisation of law 
and morality, whereby what is defined as legal and moral (as ‘right’ or ‘good’) has to 
denote something which is in the best interests of the community.  However, as 
discussed above, Tacitus writes a society in which law and morality are not organised 
in this way. The problem of the law is that it is designed to defend foremostly the 
imperial hierarchy rather than citizen rights, justice and truth. The consequence is a 
system of law which brings ruin to the citizens, a system which makes legitimate and 
furthermore rewards corrupt activities such as delation and even unlawful execution. 
The problem of the mos maiorum is that it cannot in Tacitus accommodate the imperial 
will.193 As Tacitus states, the ways of the past were not always better (3.55) and in 
many episodes, Tacitus shows that the commitment to the mos maiorum (as seen in 
Piso’s attempt to restore iustitia to the courts, Capito’s ‘show of libertas’ against 
Tiberius’ venia or Haterius and Fronto’s appeal to parsimonia through limiting 
decadence) simply cannot be reconciled with the time of the Principate, a time in which 
                                                           





other virtues or other paths to honour (iniustitia, servitium, luxuria) were beginning to 
appear. 
This allows us to trace, from a wider perspective, the conflict between morality 
and politics, how politics antagonises morality and how morality antagonises politics. 
The value of Tacitus as a political analyst is that he shows precisely how and why 
politics is not conducive to absolutist notions of morality or ‘good’. Tacitus starts from 
the basis that self-evident truths and emotions exist in politics, and inevitably so (as 
does inequality) but regardless of such knowledge, in politics the notion of ‘right’ or 
the ‘right’ thing to do can only be relatively determined. Whereas Arendt starts from 
the assumption that self-evident truths (‘thou shalt not lie’) and certain bad emotions 
(such as compassion) should not enter politics, because they prevent free thought,194 
Tacitus grounds this theory by accepting the entry of truths and emotions into politics 
and then showing the ways in which they hinder political actions and endeavours. Yet 
the difference is that Tacitus does not critique truths and tradition on the basis that they 
restrict freedom and thought but rather on the basis that they restrict honour. 
In Tacitus, doing the ‘right’ thing is not necessarily analogous with doing the 
‘honourable’ thing (as traditionally conceived). In certain situations, it may be easier or 
more beneficial (or safer) to do the wrong thing or make a corrupt decision (such as 
when the slave lies and condemns his master for the prospect of freedom or to end 
torture) rather than remaining committed to honestas and the truth. In other situations, 
there may not even be a straightforward ‘moral’ or ‘right’ option (as in the case of 
showing clementia through exile or pietas through execution). It is prudens to be 
moderate but for the delator it is prudens to be egens (needy) and for the senator, it is 
prudens to be servilis and luxuriosus.  
In this perspective, Tacitus is not describing individuals who are not wise 
because they choose against the ways of the past. Rather, Tacitus is describing a society 
which can no longer be empowered through traditional notions of good. We may 
explain this through the pressures stemming from the imperial hierarchy. The imperial 
will, as far as Tacitus describes, is grounded in the maintenance of an elite hierarchy. 
                                                           





And corruption persists because the hierarchical regime is grounded in a humane and 
civil ethos, by which individuals were not seduced by the pressures of vice (simply for 
the sake of vice) but seduced by the pressures of virtue (to appear as virtuous, to rise in 
status), at whatever cost. The cost of appearing as virtuous (as humane, as clement, as 
powerful) is, tragically, an acceptance of corruption and servitude. In such a context, it 
was possibly quite difficult for any political actor to gain fides in a civilis animus. 
Furthermore, when duty to the state and duty to mos cannot be so easily reconciled with 
the maintenance of honour and status, Tacitus also shows why corruption was 
perpetuated, and to a certain extent, even necessary.  
It is not surprising that the Tacitean narrative is written from this perspective, 
one in which morality is analysed according to context, because Tacitus would have a 
precise insight into the fragility of one’s moral codes in an imperial political context, 
that is, how one’s internal, self-evident or traditional sense of right and wrong could 
become corrupt in politics. We may want to consider the nature of Tacitus’ own 
political career under Domitian, that Tacitus associates himself in a crucial role in the 
corrupt process of criminal implication (nostrae duxere Helvidium in carcerem 
manus…nos innocenti sanguine Senecio perfudit; Ag.45.4) and that Tacitus too enjoyed 
the virtuous outcomes of many corrupt acts under a despotic regime, and often at the 
cost of others’ livelihoods (Ag.3). We may therefore read Tacitus’ analysis of 
corruption and morality as a reflection of his own experience of being trapped between 
the pressures of precedent (the ways of the past, cultural notions of good or self-evident 
truths) and the pressures of preference (wealth, status, power, fama) and as recognition 
of his own guilt for accepting corruption for the purpose of maintaining an honourable 
identity.  
This can also explain why Tacitus’ narrative retains a focus on individual will 
(the will for servitude, for corruption). Tacitus leads us to believe that he values 
libertas above servitium. Yet, there is much in his narrative which suggests the 
opposite. Notably, Tacitus does not valorise revolution as does Arendt. Freedom is not 
the guiding moral principle in Tacitean politics and nor, evidently, is servility. Rather, 
morality or ‘doing the right thing’ in Tacitus appears to lie somewhere between libertas 





Agricola, his key exemplum, is praised not for his libertas but for his obsequium 
(Ag.42). Tragically, complying with the regime means to accept the link between 
morality and corruption, to remain trapped within the pressures of precedent and the 
pressures of preference. More tragically, given that Tacitus analyses Tiberian politics 
from this perspective, we may suppose that the trap remained in Tacitus’ own time of 
writing; in Arendt’s words, ‘nobody knows the nature of traps better than the one who 
sits in a trap his whole life long.’195 
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CONCLUSION: ON THE POSSIBILITY OF POLITICS MINUS PARADOX 
 
Politics is war, the continuation of war by other means.1 
 
This thesis set out to analyse Tacitus’ writing of conflict in the first three books of the 
Annales. In particular, it sought to trace the continuation of conflict in the institutions 
of peace in order to expose the non-violent dimensions of conflict in early imperial 
Rome.  By reading conflict as something which stems from the deeper, systemic and 
epistemological, structures of Roman society, as well as the non-sovereignty of the 
princeps, this study has advanced an understanding of Tacitus beyond the discourses of 
tyranny, republicanism and reason of state. Instead it has elucidated the paradoxical 
nature of Tacitus’ narrative, with the hope of raising a more pluralistic conception of 
Tacitus’ political thought.  
Tacitus shows us that it is only through grasping the various, often 
contradictory shades of politics that it can be fully understood; paradox is not an 
anomalous aspect of Tacitus’ writing of history and the political, rather it is part of the 
wider design of Roman society, which, as Tacitus shows, generated power and peace 
through its own internal contradictions. That imperial politics depended on paradox to 
support the workings of its own maze-like power structures may be read as both its 
own tragedy but also the source of its potential. Politics is thus ‘the continuation of war 
by other means’, as Foucault hypothesised, but at the same time, Tacitus shows that the 
continuation of this ‘silent war’ is a process which remains intertwined with a moral 
and civil purpose, in which context conflict and peace cannot be disentangled, indeed 
the notion that conflict generates peace (and power) implies that the dialectics of their 
relationship must be maintained. 
In order to conclude the study, this final section shall provide 1) an overview of 
the initial research aims and objectives, with an explanation of how the focus on 
conflict (specifically peacetime conflict) enabled the aims to be met 2) a summary and 
synthesis of the conclusions reached in each of the four chapters, highlighting the 
implications of the conclusions drawn on the political and historical thought of Tacitus 
                                                           





and 3) a summary of the ways in which the theoretical methodology employed 
broadens our understanding of Tacitus’ writing of conflict. 
 
Overview of Research Aims and Objectives 
This study had two main aims, each of which was focussed on Tacitus’ analysis of 
peacetime conflict. Firstly, it sought to reassess Tacitus’ construction of monarchical 
sovereignty in order to develop an understanding of the emperor’s power as exceptional 
and biopolitical in form, rather than merely tyrannical (this analysis was carried out in 
Chapters 1 and 2). The second aim was to analyse Tacitus’ writing of Roman 
institutional structures (such as the law, the imperial hierarchy and mores) as structures 
of disciplinary and oppressive power and by extension, sources of social conflict (this 
argument was pursued in Chapters 3 and 4).  
 The main reason I chose to focus on peacetime conflict was in order to frame 
my thesis around a crucial paradox maintained throughout Tacitean historiography, 
which is that although the monarchy problematised the traditional political structures of 
the res publica, as well as certain political and moral values (for example, libertas), it 
nevertheless founded peace (at least on the surface level). This interpretation resists an 
understanding of monarchical sovereignty in Tacitus as ‘tyrannical’, especially 
according to classical models which conceptualise tyranny as antithetical to peace, as 
well as an unjust form of seized power which reduces citizens to servitude. Rather, 
Tacitus offers a different view, since his emphasis on the relationship between pax and 
princeps, as well as his remarks in the prologue that Augustus ‘accepted’ power (rather 
than seized it), following which the elite became ‘eager for servitude’, is in direct 
contravention of the typical and generally assumed characteristics of tyrannical rule. 
From this perspective, Tacitus provides the opportunity to conceptualise conflict as the 
product not of absolute sovereignty (since the monarchy established pax) but of non-
sovereignty. This implies a reversal of the normal liberal perception of the source of 
conflict in society; however we read the dynamics of the establishment of the 
Principate, Tacitus leads us to look beyond the dominatio of the emperor as the primary 





conflict (and servitium) as something which is produced from systems of domination 
rather than the more obvious and visible person who dominates.2 
At the same time, Tacitus’ own view that only a monarchy could establish 
peace is difficult to accept without question, since not only does such a view sit 
somewhat uncomfortably with traditional (Roman republican) conceptions of political 
order (which favour either a more democratic political organisation or a mixed 
constitution), but it also contradicts Tacitus’ narration of Tiberian Rome, which is 
fuelled with conflict. As Tacitus implies, the age of empire should be an age of peace 
yet despite this claim, conflict in the form of seditio, terror, confusio and discordia 
pervades the narrative. We may then understand Tacitus’ Tiberian Rome as a time of 
‘concordia discors’, a time which created neither harmony nor discord, but a 
hybridised form of the two (a ‘discordant harmony’).3 We are encouraged to think of 
the imperial peace as retaining a connection with conflict, an idea maintained 
throughout Tacitean historiography.4  
By focussing on the dialectical relationship between conflict and peace, this 
study has enabled an exploration of the wider problematic elements of Roman society 
and politics, opening the way for a view of Roman social conflict as being latent in the 
institutions of peace (the law, morality, hierarchy, democracy, humanitas) rather than 
only manifest in moments of civic strife or produced by the unjust techniques of 
tyrannical rule.  
Furthermore, through the focus on peacetime conflict (the persistence of peace 
and conflict), this study has elucidated the pertinence of paradox in Tacitean 
                                                           
2 The thesis therefore undertook a largely Foucauldian approach to the analysis of power in Tacitus. Cf. 
Foucault (1998:92-93) and Alston and Spentzou (2011:228ff.). 
3 On rerum concordia discors see Luc.BC.1.98. Cf. Ovid.Met.1.433. See also Nietzsche (1974:2.1). 
4 The ambiguous nature of peace, as presented in the first three books of the Annales, allows us to 
identify some of the trends in Tacitean thought. For example, it may be read in conjunction with Tacitus’ 
comments on the nature of the Roman imperial peace in the Agricola. Of course domestic peace (civilis 
pax) such as that which describes a post-civil war situation is different from the Roman mission of 
bringing (or imposing) peace on the provinces (pax Romana), but both forms of resolution or betterment 
are problematic in Tacitus. While the domestic civilis pax is described as ‘sterile’ (Ann.1.17), ‘miserable’ 
(3.44) and after Augustus, as something which remained ‘bloody’ (Ann.1.10.4) – making it comparable 
with conflict and furthermore, preferable to war (Ann.3.44: miseram pacem vel bello bene mutari), the 
peace brought to the provinces through Roman culture and civilisation (humanitas) is described in terms 
of enslavement (Ag.21.2). There is thus something deeply conflictive about both domestic and foreign 
peace in Tacitus, implying that Tacitus viewed Rome as an entity which by its very nature lacked the 





historiography. Paying attention to peacetime conflict has allowed me to trace the 
various forms and means through which peace and conflict are manifest or preserved in 
society, but by being oxymoronic, and thus encapsulating the wider idea or theme of 
concordia discors, a focus on peacetime conflict also brings to the fore the significance 
of paradox in Tacitus’ understanding of the past. Concordia discors refers not only to 
war and peace, harmony and discord (as is implied in Lucan’s use of the phrase), but it 
may also be read in terms of a general co-presence of opposites and their generative 
potential (as implied in Greek philosophical and cosmological contexts).5 As discussed 
in the opening chapter, the generative potential of paradox can be located to the 
foundation of the Principate (a moment which is of course of central importance in the 
Annales). The Principate of Augustus was wholly paradoxical, seeing the compression 
of a republican social and moral order within an imperial polity. Yet, the paradox of 
‘Augustus’ Republic’ nonetheless resolved conflict and generated pax (albeit an 
ambiguous and conflictive form of pax, at least according to the Tacitean 
interpretation). There is therefore something about Rome which is resilient to and even 
dependent on paradox. In this vein, it has been a primary aim of this study to accept the 
paradoxical elements of Tacitus’ narrative, not only to stay true to the Tacitean 
interpretation of the past but also to allow for an exploration of the idea that the 
imperial political situation was inherently paradoxical, and possibly because paradox 
was critical to imperial politics.  
 
Chapters 1 and 2: Sovereignty, Pleasure and Truth  
In order to achieve the initial research aim, which was to think beyond Tacitus as a 
critic of tyranny, I began with a comparative analysis of the sovereignty of Augustus 
and Tiberius with a view to reassessing Tacitus’ writing of monarchical power. This 
analysis raised various implications as to the precise nature of monarchical sovereignty 
in Tacitus, in particular, the conditions of the relationship between pax and princeps. I 
demonstrated that peace in Tacitus depends on an exceptional relationship between 
sovereignty and law, as well as a biopolitical relationship between sovereignty and 
                                                           





pleasure. I further argued that conflict is produced from the severance of the 
relationship between sovereignty and truth.   
 The exceptional nature of Augustus was discussed with reference to Tacitus’ 
comment that Augustus absorbed the functions of the senate, the magistracies and the 
law (Ann.1.2). The notion that the Principate was grounded in exceptionality even after 
the emergency of civil war had ended implicates the monarchical system (in particular 
the princeps himself) in a fundamentally paradoxical (yet precise) relation to the law. 
As I argued, the monarch is the law, in which context we may read Tacitus’ 
understanding of the foundation of the Principate as the moment which saw the 
normalisation of the state of exception. In this perspective, the Tacitean analysis of the 
Augustan Principate is written through a modification of the theory of exception, given 
that the suspension of the law is normally associated with periods of emergency; as 
Cicero notes, ‘during war laws are silent’ (silent enim leges inter arma; Mil.4.11). Yet, 
the principate of Augustus was not a period of emergency; rather it was one of post-
emergency (post-civil war) yet nevertheless, the sovereign retained an exceptional 
status. The silence of the law is thus taken up by the sovereign body: the law is 
‘spoken’ by Augustus. In such a state, the citizenry, ordinarily protected by the rule of 
law, become subjects of and to a more random operation of law and power. As a result, 
Tacitus immediately pushes us to analyse the principles of law (justice, legitimacy) 
from a different perspective, one which measures their existence not against a 
constitution but against what the sovereign states (speaks). Peace, then, was achieved 
but in Tacitus’ analysis, this depended on maintaining a set of circumstances which 
were characteristic of the situation of emergency, and moreover decisively intertwined 
with Augustus’ own person, immediately pointing to the ambiguous and conditional 
nature of the pax Augusta. 
The biopolitical nature of Augustan sovereignty was demonstrated with 
reference to Tacitus’ comment that Augustus seduced all with the sweetness of leisure, 
the army with gifts and the people with grain (Ann.1.2). This immediately 
problematises the ‘classical’ model of sovereignty, and that of tyranny, models which 
read absolute sovereignty in strictly negative terms. Rather, Tacitus alludes to a certain 





force, nor through a disregard of public well-being, but through maximising, on a large-
scale, social welfare (through gifts, grain and leisure).  It is undoubtedly the ‘positive’ 
(though no less dangerous) elements of Augustan rule which Tacitus credits for the 
resolution of conflict and the maintenance of pax. The significance of the Tacitean 
interpretation on this point is that it asserts the existence in the early Roman imperial 
period of what Foucault perceived to be a decisively ‘modern’ form of power. Tacitus 
shows us that Roman sovereignty was not a form of power which sought solely to 
reduce life, a notion which grounds Foucault’s genealogy of power. Rather, making life 
and ‘fostering life’ (faire vivre) was fundamental to Augustus’ policies after Actium, as 
evidenced by the use of gifts, grain and leisure (as well as the passing of the Lex Papia 
Poppea and the pertinence of clementia above the sovereign right to execute), all of 
which make evident the biopolitical nature of political societies far before the turn of 
the nineteenth century.  
In chapter 2, working from the presentation of Augustus in the prologue, I 
focussed on Tacitus’ writing of Tiberian sovereignty. Given the ideas presented in the 
prologue, namely that the monarchy (specifically Augustus’ all-absorbing imperium) 
established peace, my aim here was to question whether Tiberius continued the 
exceptional status/power of Augustus and in so doing maintained order in the state. 
Such a hypothesis, one which supposes that conflict emerges from the lack of sovereign 
power, has not previously been applied to Tacitus’ analysis of Tiberius, yet there is 
something markedly faltering rather than fluent about Tacitus’ Tiberius. As I argued 
with reference to the death of Agrippa Postumus, the episode with which the main 
narrative begins, Tacitus asserts right from the start a certain Tiberian lack, in this case 
his inability to be the executive power and decide the outcome of events. This lack of 
power continues throughout the accession chapters, as can be seen through Tiberius’ 
hesitatio and dissimulatio, traits which again appear to dilute the essential nature of 
sovereign exceptionality.  
The characteristics of hesitation and dissimulation have more often been used to 
assert Tiberian ‘hypocrisy’ and, by extension, Tiberian insincerity. On one hand, the 
obscurity of Tiberius’ words and looks along with the ambiguous nature of Tiberius’ 





and shifting focus to what the effect of these traits may be in the political sphere (rather 
than what Tacitus intends to imply through these traits on the nature of Tiberius’ 
personality), I argued that such traits were a manifestation of Tiberius’ inability to be 
the law (to be Augustus). Furthermore, and instead of reading hesitation and 
dissimulation as evidence of Tiberius’ insincerity, I explored an alternative possibility 
which was that Tiberius’ hesitation and dissimulation represented an inability to decide 
the truth. In this perspective, Tacitus allows us to draw a distinctive insight on the 
nature of monarchical politics, one which continues to position the sovereign being at 
the intersection of discursive forms of power and the more traditional or centralised 
forms. In the accession chapters, Tacitus not only draws attention to the crudelitas and 
adrogantia of Tiberius (thereby implying a level of tyranny to Tiberius’ person/rule), 
but he also, through Tiberius’ obscura verba, implies that after the death of Augustus 
truths could no longer be defined by the sovereign authority. 
The argument presented in Chapter 2 allows for a different way to conceive of 
the conflict or incompatibility between truth and politics. Hannah Arendt, for example, 
looks at the disjunction between truth and politics from the perspective of lies and 
deceit, questioning why telling the truth has never been counted as a political virtue.6 
However, Tacitus offers us a different point of departure, which is that in order to find 
the problem in the political realm of activity and debate (its void or deficiency), we 
must not necessarily search for the liar, but for the impotent. Truth, then, becomes 
something which must be decided (and this is irrespective of whether that decided truth 
is real or false). The question then becomes not who tells the truth and who lies; but 
who has the authority to assert that which should be counted as true and that which 
should be counted as false. Tragically and paradoxically, during the accession debates, 
the weak, powerless and incredible is the emperor himself. In this sense, the 
principatus in which sovereignty is encapsulated (and in which truth can be asserted) 
exists in separation from the princeps who remains unable to assert truth. 
                                                           
6 Arendt (2006): ‘Lies have always been regarded as necessary and justifiable tools not only of the 
politician’s or the demagogue’s but also of the statesman’s trade. Why is that so? And what does it mean 
for the nature and the dignity of the political realm, on one side, and for the nature and the dignity of 
truth and truthfulness, on the other? Is it of the very essence of truth to be impotent and of the very 





Chapters 1 and 2: Wider Implications  
By the end of the first two chapters, the study thus achieved the first aim which was to 
demonstrate why the concept of ‘tyranny’ cannot adequately explain the nature of 
sovereignty in Tacitus. While the intention was not to define a precise theory of 
imperial sovereignty based on the first fifteen chapters of the Annales, it did seek to 
loosen the somewhat crude presumptions which the term tyranny implies, presumptions 
which are not in fact implied by Tacitus. In my view, the problem with the concept of 
tyranny is that it simplifies the Tacitean analysis of imperial power and politics and 
also the nature of human relations since it fails to aptly consider the notion of consent 
and why people consent, assuming instead that individuals are either forced to accept 
which implies that people lack the capacity to oppose (that they lack choice) or 
alternatively that they are indifferent or ignorant to the cunning and deceptive means 
through which tyranny works (which implies that individuals are blind or ignorant).7 
Yet, it is precisely the awareness of supreme power which Tacitus highlights, and 
further, it is supreme power that the senate are ready for and rush into. Perhaps in the 
past a democratic government, favouring civic engagement and freedom were the real 
ideals, but confronted instead with the experience of war and the license and dangers of 
the republic and the contrasting prospect of pleasure and security, the inhabitants of 
early imperial Rome, it appears, willingly sacrificed the means and end of democracy, 
making evident a stark difference in the way libertas came to be (dis)valued under the 
early empire. 
It is by looking beyond tyrannical conceptions of power that we may understand 
a different form of subjugation which followed from the foundation of the principate, 
especially given due consideration of Agamben’s notion of the sovereign ban. The 
structure of the ban is traced by Agamben through the figure of homo sacer, who as 
discussed in the final chapter, is abandoned by the sovereign and reduced to a status of 
                                                           
7 See for example Boesche (1996) on Tacitean tyranny as something which is ‘contrary to the general 
good’ and ‘violently imposed on a resentful population’ (445). As the study has argued, the relationship 
between pax and princeps makes it difficult to argue that sovereignty in Tacitus is ‘contrary to the 
general good’. Alternatively, if peace was established through Augustus’ use of gifts and grain, as well 
as the seduction of all by the sweetness of leisure (methods which are in tension with what, in a Roman 
context, would generally be perceived as ‘good’) then Tacitus makes the fundamental point that a 






bare life. Yet, for Agamben, the point is that the exile in his abandoned state remains 
included in the politico-juridical order: that which has been banned or abandoned ‘is 
delivered over to its own separateness and, at the same time, consigned to the mercy of 
the one who abandons it – at once excluded and included, removed and at the same 
time captured…the ban is the force of simultaneous attraction and repulsion that ties 
together the two poles of the sovereign exception: bare life and power, homo sacer and 
the sovereign.’8 Agamben then develops this further to argue that ‘the relation of ban 
has constituted the essential structure of sovereign power from the beginning.’9  
In my view, Agamben’s argument remains somewhat incomplete; his 
(controversial) conclusion is, given the ontological condition of sovereignty as one of 
abandonment, that ‘in our age all citizens can be said, in a specific but extremely real 
sense, to appear virtually as homines sacri.’10 Subsequently, for Agamben ‘we must 
learn to recognize [the] structure of the ban in the political relations and public spaces 
in which we still live.’11 Although Agamben speaks in terms of potential, that is, all 
have the potential to be abandoned rather than all are abandoned, his argument remains 
difficult because it does not adequately account for those other spaces which cannot be 
described as exceptional, nor those other individuals who have not been directly 
reduced to bare life, either in the form of exile or detainment. How is it, then, that their 
relation to the sovereign is one of an inclusive exclusion (esclusione inclusiva), which 
it must be, if, as Agamben claims relations of abandonment and the connected 
production of bare life is the original activity of sovereign power?  
In my view, Tacitus provides a clue: in Tacitus, this other space or relation of 
abandonment can be recognised in otium. Throughout this study, I have discussed 
otium as a manifestation of biopolitics in the sense that it is a productive and positive 
use of sovereign power in order to advance an understanding of Roman sovereignty 
beyond the discourses of tyranny (reduction, death, injustice, illegality). However, 
otium has two sides: on the one hand leisure is a place of sweetness, of enjoyment and 
                                                           
8 Agamben (1998:110-111), [1995:122-123]. 
9 Ibid (111). 
10 Ibid. 






abundance, but on the other, leisure manifests a different type of bare life; through 
leisure one is not excluded from the domain of civil rights (as one is in exsilium) but 
one can be said to be excluded from the realm of the political. Otium is not only a 
manifestation of biopower in the sense that it is positive rather than negative (that it 
‘disallows life to the point of death’12) but it is also biopolitical because it is precisely a 
mechanism of abandonment, which, by pushing the elite out of the arena of politics, 
seducing them with inactivity, they are excluded but also, in their docile state, more 
subject to the workings of sovereign power. 
In this perspective, Tacitus grounds the view of Agamben, that the inclusion of 
bare life in the political realm is the ‘original nucleus of sovereign power’ (il nucleo 
originario del potere sovrano).13 Yet, it is only by extending the relation of 
abandonment or the structure of the inclusive exclusion to otium (a time out of politics 
and business [negotium] and the retreat to an aesthetic, ‘textual time’14) that we can 
trace the ontological structure of politics as abandonment (to include as well as 
exclude, to include through exclusion) which Agamben is concerned with showing. 
While I would not extend this to argue that all in Tacitus are in a ‘real sense virtually 
homines sacri’ the structure of the ban which ensured ‘security and the present’ (tuta et 
praesentia) is that which Tacitus uses to describe the relationship between ‘all’ and the 
sovereign (cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit).  
It is here that we are lead back to Foucault and despite Agamben’s intention to 
‘correct’ Foucauldian biopolitics, his notion of all as homines sacri can only find 
recompense through Foucauldian biopoltics. For Foucault, the point is that in order for 
power to be applied at the level of life itself, in order to give power its access even to 
the body, biological life must come into power’s sphere of intervention and 
knowledge’s field of control.15 In other words, what Foucault wants to show is the way 
in which (and the moment when) ‘power would no longer be dealing simply with legal 
subjects over whom the ultimate dominion was death’, but power dealing with ‘living 
beings, and the mastery it would be able to exercise over them [when] applied at the 
                                                           
12 Foucault (1998:138). 
13 Agamben (1998:6).  
14 On leisure and writing (in a Republican context) see Stroup (2010:37ff.). 





level of life itself’.16 Hence ‘improving’ and ‘increasing’ life is for Foucault purposed 
to penetrate and dominate life to a greater extent.  
Tacitus’ emphasis on the connection between principate and otium is 
comparable to the way in which modern forms of power for Foucault contributed to the 
‘relaxation’ (le desserrement) of man or the making of man into a ‘docile body’ – at 
once obedient and useful (useful because he is obedient). It has been recently argued 
that only a jaundiced critic like Tacitus would denounce the domestic tranquillity 
resulting from Augustus’ principate in part to reflect the ‘apolitical torpor’ of the ruling 
classes.17 Yet, there is more in this since what Tacitus allows us to see is that this state 
of apolitical existence is paradoxically crucially political, for it is in their being ‘lulled’ 
(banned or exclusively included) that they may be seen to further empower the 
sovereign. Biopolitics, though positive and productive continues to feed sovereignty: 
otium ‘optimizes forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making 
[subjects] more difficult to govern.’18  
We can see, then, that in Tacitus the foundation of the principate is 
characterised by the synthesis of biopower and sovereign power, which for Foucault 
was an impossibility (since the two forms of power are distinct) and which for 
Agamben emerged in the exceptional institutions of the Third Reich. This synthesis, as 
well as the structure of abandonment/relaxation which foregrounds a significant 
relationship between Tacitus, Agamben and Foucault, attests the complex disciplinary 
and paradoxical nature of power in early imperial Rome and it may be read as the 
critical source of Tacitus’ Augustus’ success post-Actium. It is however, this very ethic 
of abandonment/relaxation which Tiberius misrecognises as crucial to the biopolitical 
regime, wanting to share the munia rei publicae among the many illustrious men in the 
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Chapters 3 and 4: The Ever-Presence of Conflict 
In Chapters 3 and 4 my focus was on Tacitus’ analysis of the methods of Roman 
governance. In particular I sought to elucidate Tacitus’ writing of the institutions of 
peace (the imperial hierarchy, law, mores) as reservoirs of conflict. The arguments 
developed in these chapters continued to trace a disciplinary conception of power, since 
instead of reading power as the sovereign’s ‘power over others’ (power as imperium), I 
sought to elucidate the ways in which Tacitus exposes power as something which is 
embedded in the state apparatus (power as leges and mores).  
In the third chapter, through a focus on the mutinies in Pannonia and Germany, 
I focussed on the problems inherent in military hierarchy. Hierarchy is a fundamental 
institution of order. In a Roman military context, the significance of hierarchy is not 
only that it defines the soldiers’ duties, rights and positions in relation to one another 
(maintaining order in the camp) but that it is also designed to ensure the wider purpose 
of protecting the frontiers (maintaining peace in the empire). However, as I argued in 
this chapter, what Tacitus allows us to see are the dangers inherent in this very crucial 
institution of order. Hierarchy is a means of fostering revolution in the form of 
democratic violence. Disciplina is not something which culminates in estranged labor 
or docility but rather, in Tacitus, it is something which incites an awareness of 
injustice, pushing the soldiers to recognise the wrongs they face (low pay, terrible 
living conditions, physical abuse). The consequence of such awareness is sedition, 
making obvious a certain paradox of discipline and hierarchy. 
This chapter also showed that Tacitus’ disclosure of such a paradox places some 
distance between his practice of historiography and that of his contemporaries. As I 
argued with reference to the descriptions of the mutinies in Velleius, Suetonius and 
Dio, as well as the commentaries on the Pannonian mutiny by Erich Auerbach and 
Jacques Rancière, it is not often that Roman historians write Roman military 
insurgency in such a way so as to suppose the drawbacks of disciplina militaris, which, 
comprising of qualities such as moderatio and severitas, was in many ways comparable 
to the wider doctrine of the mos maiorum. More often than not, soldiery sedition (and 
popular sedition) is banalised by elite historians, expressed through the language of 





rebellion. Though Tacitus does employ terminology associated with madness, at the 
same time, he gives reason to the soldiers’ revolts which is that they are aggrieved (not 
simply greedy). As a result, and contrary to the way in which other historians (both 
ancient and modern) narrate mutiny, Tacitus presents a picture where sympathy lies as 
much on the side of the insurgents as it does on the side of the counter insurgents 
(indeed Tacitus evokes more sympathy for the rebellious soldiers than he does for 
Germanicus). As a result of this, I argued that Tacitus’ own historiographic practice 
emerges as ‘democratic’ – one which gives space for other voices (voices which 
ordinarily have no space) to be heard, in which context Tacitus represents an exception 
to Auerbach’s contention that ancient historiography was mimetically deficient 
(‘unable to represent everyday life seriously, that is, in full appreciation of its problems 
and with an eye for its historical background’).19 Rather, we are pointed to the 
polyphonic nature of Tacitus’ historical thought, in this case because his method of 
writing the past resists (what one would expect to be) his own elite viewpoint.20  
By reading the mutinies from the perspective of democratic violence (a type of 
violence which seeks to disrupt established roles and places) I also demonstrated why 
democracy does not necessarily refer to, as Rancière claims, ‘the power of those who 
have no specific qualification for ruling, except the fact of having no qualification.’21 
Notably, Rancière’s statement is based on a peculiar understanding of democracy; yet 
more problematic is that Rancière’s view of democracy as the power of those who 
essentially have no power is wholly misleading in the context of Roman military 
insurgency (a context which forms part of his argument on the poetics of knowledge).22 
As I argued, the democratic power of the soldiers is arguably the power of those who 
retain the highest capacity for ruling. The soldiers are persons of real political 
importance since their offer of the throne to Germanicus was something which they had 
the strength to deliver. This reveals a further paradox of political control. The fate of 
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20 Cf. Tacitus’ narration of the Britons and Germans, which also resists a Romano-centric viewpoint. 
Ag.30-32, Germ.23-4. 
21 Rancière (2004:305). 





Rome was in the soldiers’ hands but regardless they were treated as though they had no 
qualification for determining that fate.  
In Chapter 4, I focussed on Tacitus’ writing of corruption. Instead of reading 
corruption as a product of the failure of morality and the law, as a condition which in 
much ancient historiography is used to represent and signal decline, I proposed, on the 
other hand, that corruption persists because it is intricately connected with the aims of 
morality (to be or appear as virtuous) as well as the aim of law (to protect citizen rights 
and justice). This argument was pursued through Tacitus’ writing of luxuria, which 
though a questionable activity from the standpoint of traditional mores, nevertheless 
enabled an access to virtus and fama (through wealth). The problem of law was 
focussed on a discussion of the lex maiestatis, which though designed to prevent 
treason and ensure order in the state, nevertheless embedded corrupt forces into the 
regime through its dependence on the legalised process of delatio, a process which 
rendered citizen rights fragile. 
The paradox of corruption, then, is that it served a specifically virtuous purpose, 
as well as the wider purpose of state concordia. From this perspective, I argued that 
corruption in Tacitus should be read as a specifically moral and social phenomenon (in 
terms of its aims and what it affords). By extension, rather than reading moral decline 
as the result of ‘the rise of tyranny’23 or the collapse of moral knowledge, Tacitus 
shows corruption as something which was produced from the very pertinence of moral 
knowledge. Corruption is not due to the inherently corrupt nature of individuals but it 
may be read as a product of the nature of the regime, a regime which continued to 
impose the pressure to appear as noble, clement and humane – even if it depended on 
an exercise in deception, illegality and excess.  
Since Tacitus allows an insight into the virtuous advantages of vice, I extended 
this to argue that it adds a new dimension to the digression in Book 4 when he explains 
that few could wisely discern between use and harm, the honourable and the worse 
(4.33.2). It is tempting to read this statement in terms of a growing moral deficiency, 
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that is, an individual inability to act according to normative standards. Alternatively, 
Tacitus may be referring to an epistemological deficiency, that is, an inability to know 
how to differentiate between right and wrong. Yet, given that his analysis of corruption 
cannot necessarily be seen as diametrically opposed to morality (since both corrupt 
behaviour and moral behaviour can enable an access to virtus), this then loosens the 
traditional distinctions between that which is utilis and that which is noxius, allowing 
us to explore the digression from a different perspective. It is not that individuals are 
unable to distinguish moral behaviour from corrupt behaviour but that the two, 
ordinarily distinct categories, are in themselves indistinguishable in terms of what they 
afford. On one hand this inserts a level of moral relativism into Tacitean thought, 
something which is reiterated when he refers to mores as fluid rather than stable 
phenomena. On the other hand and given that moral relativism does not fit with the 
whole of Tacitus’ thought (since an ethical position can of course be traced in his 
formulations of certain concepts24) we are pointed to another conflict, which is not that 
people cannot tell the difference between right and wrong; rather they can, but the 
problem is that in politics, doing that which is ‘right’, ‘honourable’ or ‘good’ according 
to traditional moral codes, is not necessarily ‘useful’ according to imperial 
prerogatives.  
 
Chapters 3 and 4: Wider Implications 
The third and fourth chapters together met the secondary research aim because they 
demonstrated the ways in which Tacitus writes Roman institutional structures, 
particularly those which are ordinarily designed to ensure peace and promote order, as 
vehicles of social tension. In the case of military hierarchy, the paradox of this 
                                                           
24 The ethical position of Tacitus is difficult to define. For example, in terms of the values he prescribes, 
Tacitus can be read as liberal (because he values libertas and because he sees monarchy as antithetical to 
freedom). Also notable is that in his critique of morality at Ann.3.26, he implies that aequalitas was a 
condition of the veteres, which means that Tacitus held equality as a normative principle (again 
positioning him in a liberal tradition). At Hist.1.3, it is evident that pietas is valued highly as a moral 
virtue. However, at the same time, Tacitus can be viewed as relativist because he writes morality in 
terms of use or usefulness. His thought may also be described as ‘postmodern’ since he refers to the fluid 
nature of mores (3.55) which implies that he saw moral standards as norms and truths rather than normal, 







particular institution is that it incites sedition. Despite the fundamental role the military 
played in the maintenance of peace (the military was itself a fundamental if not the 
fundamental institution of peace), the soldiers were nevertheless treated as insignificant 
political actors and thus their role in the perseveration of peace (the maintenance of the 
regime) was relegated to that of a secret of empire. Yet, the military hierarchy was a 
paradox critical to imperial politics since as well as embedding conflict into the regime 
(through the ever-present, ever-latent ability of the soldiers to make and unmake the 
regime) it nevertheless ensured the proper distribution of role and place. The immoral 
violence to which the citizen soldiers were subjected was an act of power enforcing of 
the hierarchy on which the regime depended is balanced against the (potential or 
historical) act of violence in which the soldiers called into being the regime and which 
maintained its centrality to the regime. Thus, the reversal of order (the democratic and 
revolutionary moment) remains paradoxically central to the establishing of order. 
Similarly, the paradox of morality and law (disciplinary as well as institutional 
structures) is that they infuse corrupt forces into the regime, while also being the very 
means through which corruption is to be prevented. Yet again, this paradox was critical 
to imperial politics, given that it was often the case that it was only through a 
transcendence of the law and the mos maiorum that the individual could assert a 
virtuous (powerful) identity.  
The final chapters also shed light on the concept and significance of utilitas in 
Tacitean political thought. In order to make sense of Tacitus’ writing of forms of social 
conflict such as mutiny and corruption, it may be said that Tacitus gives primacy to the 
concept of utilitas rather than the concept of nobilitas. For example, while it would 
have been noble for the soldiers to abide by the rules of disciplina militaris, instead 
they revolted since this would potentially enable more useful things (money). 
Similarly, although it would have been noble for Germanicus to suspend the mutiny 
through fine speech and reference to the importance of military discipline, instead he 
threatens massacre and falsifies a letter in Tiberius’ name because it was the more 
useful (easier) option at the time. In the same way, it would have been more noble for 
senators to practice moderatio rather than luxuria, but the problem is that moderation 





to Tacitus’ writing of Augustus’ particular political tools (leisure, gifts and grain) 
which were again possibly a more useful (quicker) way to pacify his subjects in the 
aftermath of civil war. We may then take from Tacitus a different form of reasoning, 
which is that the reason individuals do not do what is noble is not because they lack an 
awareness of what is noble, but because in the political sphere, a noble act is not 
necessarily utilis, indeed it can be noxius.  
 The concept of use thus allows us to look at political activity from a different 
perspective, one which is ‘nonmoral’ in principle (that is, not constrained by moral 
truths). The significance of such a perspective is that it alludes to the notion that 
politics, like war, is not a moral enterprise in practice (though it may claim to be by 
nature). Such a notion is implicit in Tacitus’ narrative since it is often difficult to 
reconcile the behaviour of those in his narrative (and his own views of this behaviour) 
with conventional notions of good, right behaviour. This is partly because Tacitus is 
writing a history in descriptive rather than normative terms (men as they are rather than 
as they should be). Yet it is due to this method that we are able to trace a wider problem 
and paradox of politics. The problem of politics in Tacitus is not only about the more 
obvious disjunction between freedom and Principate but we may want to read it from 
the more fundamental disjunction between morality and politics. That morality and 
politics (like truth and politics) are somewhat irreconcilable in Tacitus explains why his 
descriptions of political activity are often difficult to measure against normative values, 
that is, those values which we assume to be good and right (freedom, democracy, 
justice). Rather, utilitas introduces a third concept into the dynamics between freedom 
and servitude, justice and injustice, democracy and monarchical rule. While the good 
values may have a moral or political significance, Tacitus shows why they are not 
always ‘useful’. Abiding by fundamentally good values (or moral truths) cannot always 
serve the other processes and purposes so significant to political life, namely safety and 
survival. 
 Although such an argument problematises the conventional, orderly and easy, 
understanding of Roman political thought as a body of literature which represents an 
undying attachment to Republicanism and its associated ideals, as well as a type of 





politics/morality and politics, a focus on use nevertheless enables a more accurate 
reading of Tacitus’ narrative, which is a narrative about human needs (the need to 
survive) as much as it is a narrative about political needs (to need to be free).25 
 It emerges, then, that there is much more in Tacitus than an exploration of 
evil deeds committed in the name of reason of state.26 In many ways, ‘reason of state’ 
as a description of a solely political motivation for action, often based on the interests 
of the state/sovereign and regardless of any possible contraventions of the rights of the 
citizenry, is characteristic of all political organisations. It is therefore a point of entry 
into political analysis rather than a conclusion on the nature of politics/the state. In 
other words, the secrets of the state are what Tacitus relates but obviously the nature of 
these secrets needs to be questioned, rather than assuming simply that the functioning 
of these secrets at the cost of individual rights and moral codes is a manifestation of 
evil and tyranny. The final chapter showed that what is specific about the reason of 
state in Tacitus is that rights and laws were transgressed but this transgression 
remained, paradoxically, intertwined with some form of moral reasoning, either to 
enable individual virtus or pax. Tacitus is not just about the ‘evil conditions of 
autocracy’,27 but about the reconciliation of good and evil, and the sacrifices such 
reconciliation entailed.  
In this perspective, we may take something more positive from Tacitus, which 
is that although the acceptance of sovereign power (and by extension an acceptance of 
the workings of arcana imperii) may have entailed the end of democracy (which 
immediately connotes a level of evil, from a liberal perspective, but also a disjunction 
with the traditions of citizen-government from a Roman perspective); in the acceptance 
of that power, and the loss of a certain individual freedom this acceptance entailed, a 
relationship was established through which a wider purpose was enabled. In Tacitean 
historiography this wider purpose was the making of peace. That peace is a condition 
for the continuity of Rome and the continuation of Roman values. The peace is 
                                                           
25 Though, evidently it is not necessary that human needs (the needs to survive or enjoy life) are abstract 
to political existence/imperatives. 
26 At the beginning of his Della Ragion de Stato, Botero states: ‘State is a stable rule over a people and 
Reason of State is the knowledge of the means by which such a dominion may be founded, preserved 
and extended’. 





essential to the establishing of a biopolitical regime of power in which all gain: it is a 
productive, useful peace. The sacrifice of freedom (albeit a sacrifice difficult to live 
with) was ultimately worthwhile. 
Yet, as with much else in Tacitus, peace remains double-sided. Although a 
period of peace is determined by an absence of war, Tacitus shows that it is through the 
politics and procedures of making peace that the ‘disequilibrium of forces manifested 
in war’ are reproduced.28 Tacitus’ writing of the institutions of peace thus exposes the 
way in which politics is the continuation of war by other means. As Tacitus reveals the 
contradictory nature of these structures, that is, the way in which social memory, 
hierarchy, law, morality and humanitas came to embed conflict and tension throughout 
the social sphere, we are left with a precisely Foucauldian image of imperial society, 
which reveals, indeed, a ‘net-like’ organization of power structures.  And these 
structures, as Tacitus shows, are not only sources of conflict but, further, sources of 
servitium. Accordingly, they are imbued with pressure points pushing individuals to 
resist – either through oblivion, sedition, corruption or suicide. It is here that we can see 
why Foucault urges us not to think of power in the classical form; sources of 
subjugation stem not, solely, from the sovereign and his domineering gaze but they are 
embedded in and produced from the fabric of social reality. Certainly, the power of the 
princeps establishes a complicated maze through which the individual must carefully 
navigate, but as I have argued throughout this thesis, this maze is further reinforced and 
the navigation of it further problematised due to, paradoxically, the institutions of 
peace.  
It is through this complex, maze-like picture of political life which Tacitus 
draws that we may also trace the discursive conditions (the conditions of possibility) 
which engendered Tacitus to imbue obsequium with a moral value. This further allows 
us to read in Tacitus the essential genealogical project, which is not to question the 
morality or truth of a certain notion but to find the historical conditions which made 
that moral notion or truth come to be defined or believed as such. Arguably, obsequium 
is a problematic ‘virtue’ and especially in the Tacitean account given that it is of course 
                                                           





closer in meaning to servitium than libertas; it is also, in a political context, reminiscent 
of adulatio which he so clearly represents as abject. Yet, at the same time he exposes 
the conditions which made compliance acceptable, and for him, the most noble of 
traits. It is in living in the maze which Tacitus details to such penetrative an effect that 
we can see why obsequium, above libertas, came to be recognised by Tacitus as a 
virtue, and why Agricola is his moral exemplum.  
 
Conclusion 
My main aim in this thesis was to expose the complexity of Tacitean thought and I 
have done so through a detailed reading of Tacitus alongside many modern political 
theorists. I have, I hope, exposed areas in which Tacitus provides us with a more 
nuanced and sophisticated and perhaps more credible view of the working of politics 
than some of those theorists. In particular, Tacitean views of the relationship between 
sovereignty and power, between the ability to speak truth and a regime, between 
freedom and moral order, and individual and social value comment critically on themes 
central to Arendt, Foucault, Agamben and others. The ‘doctrines’ of Tacitus emerge 
not in philosophical engagement, but in narrative and are imbued with the practicality 
of use and usefulness. Tacitus offers us a hard doctrine, both because it avoids easy 
answers (history is not a matter of good and bad emperors; good and bad people; good 
and bad acts) and refuses easy ideological positions. Tacitus does not allow his reader 
the comfort of political alienation or restful nostalgia. The text, like the language so 
often, is never comforting or comfortable: men cannot easily tell good from bad. But he 
exposes us to the everyday paradox of political complexity. It is, of course, a pattern of 
paradox with which we are familiar from our liberal democratic states and thus the 
problems of the Tacitean text have resonances. Freedom and peace cannot quite work 
without certain sacrifices and politics, thus, cannot escape (though it may temporarily 
reconcile) the conflicts and violence which haunt and inspire it. Ultimately, whether or 
not we agree with the Tacitean analysis (perhaps especially the valorising of acceptance 
and peace above revolution or even political struggle), we must recognise the value of 
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